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Swmniarv
This thesis is intended to deal with the conflict problems of recognition of foreign 
divorces and related issues in the English, Scots and Iraqi conflict of laws. The structure 
of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 outlines the general questions which have a 
connection with the present thesis subject. Chapters 2 and 3 will examine the Jurisdictional 
and choice of law aspects in divorce cases. Chapters 4 and 5 will deal with the questions 
of recognition and non-recognition of foreign divorces. Chapteis 6 and 7 will consider the 
effect of recognition of foreign divorces on capacity to marry and financial relief. A review 
of findings, and recommendations for change, are contained in the conclusion.
The main puiposes of this thesis are: (1)- A study of divorce conflicts rules in different 
legal systems, serving to identify the problems and defects (particularly 'limping 
marriages') which justify the making of change. (2)- To provide a work of reference for 
the Iraqi lawyer, since it is believed this thesis is the first work of this kind dealing with 
divorce conflict of laws in Iraq.
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Introduction
I- Scope of the Thesis
It is generally agreed that marriage and divorce are at the core of personal status. Since 
these matters come very largely within the orbit of personal law, which is not the same in 
all legal systems, it follows that marriage and divorce questions will be treated differently 
according to which policy the legal system concerned has adopted. The countries whose 
laws are examined in this thesis are very illustrative of this, and it is shown that the aim of 
international uniformity in determination of personal status is still rather distant.
Although earlier attempts were made to create an international body of rules to govern 
conflict problems in matters of divorce, it is unfortunate these have failed. Apart from the 
1970 Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, whose 
application is now confined to certain states and its scope limited only to the question of 
recognition, every state has now the power to determine by itself all of its divorce policy.
Accordingly, conflict problems are bound to arise. The countries which are subject to 
this study have responded by introducing rules dealing with divorce matters. The English 
and Scots rules may initially be traced to the decision of Le Mesurier v. Le MesuirerS^'^ 
which was for many years the basic judicial approach in matrimonial causes. The doctrine 
enacted in that case made the law simple by applying one legal system, but at a significant 
cost in terms of international concerns and hardship for many people. They were deprived 
of remedies on the ground that they did not satisfy Lord Watson's principle that "the 
domicile for the time being of the married pair afford the only true test of jurisdiction to 
dissolve their m a r r i a g e " . T h e  narrow rules and hardship were also characteristic of 
the Iraqi law/. Until 1951 residence of either party was the only basis of jurisdiction and the 
choice of law rule was subject to an unclear test.
I - (1895) A.C.517.
2- Ibid, at 540.
The desire to provide a just system and to promote international concerns produced 
pressure to expand both the bases of Jurisdiction and the grounds of recognition. This 
development is not without a price, it creates new problems of increased litigation with the 
possibility of forum-shopping, the dispute of deciding whether to stay proceedings, 
limping marriages, the ability to provide financial relief and the dispute over capacity of 
divorced persons to remarry. Although the existing rules have made significant changes 
and have removed the major problems facing the parties in the past, they are still in certain
cases unsatisfactory. They leave much to be desired in promoting certainty of status and
providing a system of justice.
Although England and Scotland have each their own legal system, it is worth noting 
that in recent times both countries have set up a joint team which aims to reform the rules of 
private international law including those relating to divorce in order to diminish their 
differences almost to the vanishing point. The outcome of this work is that most aspects of 
divorce conflict rules have now been placed in statutory provisions by virtue of which the 
courts' administration in both countries is d e t e r m i n e d . I t  would be therefore 
unrealistic to discuss both legal systems separately but any differences between them will 
be mentioned. The study will also cover the common law rules since they are still of great 
value or authority to fill the gaps in the present statutory provisions. The Iraqi law, on the 
other hand, is not directly concerned to any great extent with this subject of conflict rules 
concerning consistorial cases and there is no legal study or judicial opinion in which a 
senoiis effort has been made to give an objective picture of it. However, in this work we 
try to refer to the general rules of Iraqi conflict of laws and domestic laws to assert the 
solution of the problems arising within the sphere of divorce.
 Jhe  object of chapter One is to give a brief outline of the general questions which have
3- A notable cxccplion . where the sam e end is pursued by slightly d illcren l means in the two
jnrrsdicuims ,s conuiined in the Mulrimoniul and Family Proceedings Act 1984, part III tor England and
pan  IV for Scotland.
a connection with the present thesis subject. The questions addressed in this chapter will 
be the nature of marriage, and methods and causes of divorce, it is also the purpose of this 
chaptei to examine the main reasons and appropriateness for using domicile and nationality 
as connecting factors to determine the personal law of the parties. ‘
Jurisdiction, as being logically the first matter for consideration in any divorce action, 
wdl be examined in chapter Two with reference to the Iraqi Civil Code 1951, and to the 
Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973. The issue of jurisdiction is a vital one 
imposing Itself here tn order to assert in what circumstances a court can assume jurisdiction 
to grant a decree of divorce and whether the existing bases of jurisdiction are capable of 
avoiding 'forum shopping'!") and of avoiding anomalies and hardship as well as 
securing so far as reasonably possible divorce recognition abroad.
The widening of the rules of jurisdiction increased litigations of divorce with the risk of 
conflicts of jurisdiction between the courts of different countries, which fact led to the 
introduction of a system of staying or sisting proceedings in the sphere of English and 
Scots law. This new problem in this area of jurisdiction needs consideration to find out 
how the courts acted to resolve such conflicts and whether there is any dispute between the
existing statutory provisions and the general power of the courts to stay or sist
proceedings.
ChapterThree will deal with the second fundamental question in cases presenting a
loreign element, namely, the question of choice of law rule applicable to a given case. This
has been treated as a purely jurisdictional question in English and Scots law. The courts
have disregarded whatever grounds of divorce might be available to the parties in their own
country and have applied their own laws in cases properly heard by them. In Iraq the two
4- 'Fonin,-shopping' I,as been defined as a "pkuniilf by-passing his natural forum and bringing his 
action in some alien In,urn which would give him relief or bcnefils which would not be available to him 
in the natural rorum'. Bovs v. C7/f/p//>/[197I| A .C .356 at 401 /VrLord Pearson.
questions of jurisdiction and choice of law are distinguished and the courts do not 
automatically apply Iraqi law. Although the principle is to apply the national law of the 
husband, this has been restricted in favour of the application of Iraqi law in several cases. 
It will be necessary to place emphasis on the arguments for and against the two choices of 
law rules in order to assess which of the existing rules would provide a system of justice 
and avoid the problems of "forum-shopping" and of securing recognition of divorce 
abroad.
The issue of whether a divorce obtained in one country will be recognised in another
country is the third main concern of conflict of laws rules which will be discussed in
chapter Four. The practical importance of this question is too obvious to need extensive
elaboration. Until 1972 the recognition of foreign divorces in English and Scots law was
generally governed by common law rules. The Recognition of Divorces and Legal
Separations Act 1971, as amended by the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973.
was enacted to give effect to the 1970 Hague Convention. The mischief which the
Convention was designed to cure was that of "limping marriage".1^ 1 The Act in this
point went much further than was required under the Convention and laid down rules for
recognition which are simpler and more generous than the Convention required. It also
retained certain common law rules. The Act was replaced with certain changes by part II of
the Family Law Act 1986 which now governs the recognition of foreign divorces. The
5- A 'lim ping m arriage' is defined as "a phrase which ha.s com e to usage to describe a  m arriage which is 
recognised in one country but not recognised in another with unhappy results that m ay flow therefrom , 
nam ely bigamous rem arriage, illegitim ate children and uncertainty or confusion o\ er status and propert) 
rights." (JiKizi V . 1^80] A .C .744  at 766 {xr W ood .l.In Indyka v. Itidyka, 1196712A11.E.R.689
at 798-9, Lord Pearce, com m enting on this problem , obser\ed  that "each ctum try may recognise ail o r 
none or take som e in term ediate position. In this it will be largely influenced b \’ public po licy ... but 
in so lar as it confines its recognition  m ore narrow 1 y than its ju risd ic tion , it is adding to the sum of 
unilateral marriages. Thus the definition of jurisdiction should be closely related to that o f recognition". 
It could be said that the current United K ingdom  recognition rules arc much w ider than its jurisdictional 
rules and this would have a positiv e effect on 'limping m arriages'. N evertheless, one m ust also say that 
'limping m arriages' will continue to be created so long as the existing rules as w hole arc not com pletely 
designed to cure this problem as w e shall sec throughout this thesis.
1986 Act has made significant changes in this field of law. but not to the point of removing
all the uncertainties created by previous laws. The Act expressly draws a distinction
between divorces obtained by proceedings and divorces obtained otherwise than by means
of proceedings and provides narrow recognition rules for the latter. This issue will be
given more attention to consider whether such an approach would satisfy the aim of the Act 
to cure "limping marriages".
The discussion also includes a number of questions which have been subject to a strong 
arguments both judicially and academically, most notably questions bearing on the meaning 
of 'proceedings', whether 'bare' takiq can be summed under 'proceedings', where an
extra-judicial divorce is obtained, and whether English and Scottish courts would recognise
transnational divorce.
In contrast, the Iraqi law contains no specific statutory provisions dealing with 
recognition of foreign divorces. Academic opinions have expressed different speculative 
views as to whether the general rules concerning enforcement of civil and commercial 
judgments should be applied to the recognition of divorces. The disciision and evaluation 
of these views is strongly required in order to find out whether the Iraqi courts can apply 
the general rifles to recognise a foreign divorce.
Chapter Five will consider the grounds for non-recognition qfjoreign divorces. Even 
if a foreign divorce satisfies the jurisdictional condition a court may refuse to recognise the 
divorce on any of the grounds listed in section 51 of the Family Law Act 1986. or under 
general rules in the case of Iraqi law. Although various discretionary grounds are available 
to English and Scottish courts, the reported law indicates that only in limited cases were 
these discretionary grounds used to refuse recognition to a divorce granted by a court of 
law. On the other hand, the courts have shown a greater willingness to allow divorces not 
obtained by a court to be attacked. This chapter will discuss these grounds to find out to 
what extent the court can use its power to refuse recognition to foreign divorces and
whether the existing grounds are necessary to justify the denial of recognition over the 
creation of'limping marriages'.
The issue of the effect of recognition of foreign divorces on capacity to marry will be 
examined in chapter Six. Since the rules governing capacity to marry arc different from 
those governing recognition of foreign divorces, conflicts are likely to arise where the laws 
concerned take different views as to whether the divorced person has capacity to marry. 
The problem particularly arises where the previous marriage was dissolved according to 
one law but not according to another or where the foreign divorce imposes prohibitions or 
restrictions on the capacity of a divorced person to marry. The purpose of this chapter is to 
mialyze and evaluate the different views and to assess the underlying reasons for the 
existing rules.
Chapter Seven will consider the issue of the effect of recognition of foreign divorces on 
financial relief. In many cases of divorce, the parties are not only concerned with the 
determination of their status, but are also concerned with the powers of the court to make 
ordeis as to financial relief. Until 1984 a party to a recognised foreign divorce was unable 
to seek financial relief in England or Scotland. The law led to unjustifably harsh results in 
certain cases and served to encourage the parties to challenge foreign divorces. The 
Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 contains separate provisions for England 
and Scotland enabling the courts in those countries to make financial relief to a party to a 
foreign divorce provided certain conditions arc met. The Iraqi courts at present have no 
such povvci. The main concern of this chapter is to discuss in which circumstances the 
couits have power to make financial relict and whether the present law has removed all the 
hardship existing before 1984. It will also examine the differences between English and 
Scots provisions and the form of order which the courts can make.
II- Legal System of Iraq
The next few pages will give a brief discussion of the Iraqi legal system to enable 
readers to obtain some understanding of Iraqi law.
A- Judiciary
The Constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary. It provides that in the 
administration of justice, a Judge is subject to no authority and that in no circumstances 
shall any one interfere with the course of justice.1^ 1 The present judicial structure of the 
country is based on the law no.26 of 1963.G i The Courts are of three tiers, at the top 
of which is th. Cou;T of Cassation. At the base of the pyramid, are the Courts of first 
instance. These Courts are composed of one Judge. In the second tier are the Courts of 
Appeal which are composed of three Judges. The jurisdiction of these courts is limited to 
appeal against the decision of the Courts of first instance where the value exceeds 1000 
dinars (£2000 approximately). At the top of the pyramid is the Court of Cassation. In 
civil matters, it has power to reverse final judgment made by the Court of first instance in 
cases where the value does not exceed 1000 dinars, the Courts of Appeal and the Courts 
of Muslim personal status.
The Court of Cassation is composed of three Chambers and the General Assembly. The 
three Chambers are the Civil and Commercial Chamber, the Chamber on matters of 
personal status and the Criminal Chamber. Each of these Chambers is composed of at least 
three Judges, while the General Assembly is composed of at least ten Judges.
Beside the Courts of first instance, there are the Courts of personal status of Muslims 
with jurisdiction in question of marriage, divorce, maintenance, custody, etc. For non- 
Muslims the Civil Courts of first instance have jurisdiction to hear such cases.
6 - A rl.60 ot the Prcnisioiial Constitution.
7- Courts O ruani/ulion C odc.N o.26 of 1963.
8B- Sources of law
Iraq's main sources of law are its constitution, legislation, custom and principles of 
Muslim law and rules of equity. In the absence of any legislative provision and custom to 
be applied the courts have to resort to the principles of Muslim law. Here the spirit of 
Muslim law viewed in its entirety has to be taken into account and not any single text. If the 
sources above do not provide a solution the courts have to apply the rules of equity.!*) 
If, however, the matter before the courts is one of personal status, the courts must apply 
the provisions of the 1959 Personal Status Code. In the absence of any legislative 
provision to be applied, judgment shall be given under the principles of Islamic law most 
suitable to the provision of the Code.!^)
C- Persons
Legal personality starts at the birth of the living child.!* 0) The age of majority at 
which capacity commences is fixed at 18 years.! * L The capacity to enter into marriage is 
also fixed at 18 years.! * A minor of 15 years may be granted permission by the court, 
subject to his (her) proving physical ability and to his (her) guardian's consent, which can 
be waived by the court if it is unreasonably withheld.! * )^
D- Property
Article 16 (2) of the Provisional Constitution describes property as a social function 
w'hich has to be exercised within the limits set by the objectives of society and the state 
programmers in conformity with the law. On the other hand. Article 7 of the 1951 Civil 
Code provides that anyone who exercises his right in an unlawful way will have to make
8 - Art. 1 o t the 1951 C i\il Code.
9 - ,'\rl.l of the 1959 Personal Status Code.
1 0- Arl,34( 1 ) o t the 1951 C o il Code.
1 1- Ibid, Art. 106.
1 2- Arl.7{ 1 ) o t the 1959 Personal S talus Code as am ended by Art. 1 o t the Act No.2 1 o t  1978.
1 3- A rt.8 o t the 1959 Personal Status Code as am ended by Art.2 o t the Act N o .21 o t  1978. R eecn lb  , the 
age tor girts has been reduced to 14,
good the resultant damage. The exercising of a right will be unlawful if its sole aim is to 
injure another: if it is designed to satisfy an interest whose importance is negligible 
compared to the injury done to another: or if it is designed to satisfy an unlawful interest. 
Every legal transaction relating to immovable property has to be concluded before the 
competent civil servant and entered in the land registry. A legal transaction disregarding 
legally prescribed formalities will held null and void.I*
Customarily, property which the parties to a valid marriage owned at the time of the 
marriage or might subsequently acquire is administered by the husband. Legally, any 
property obtained during the marriage shall be regarded as owned by the party who 
obtained it. As regards the matrimonial home, it is a duty of the husband to provide his 
wife with a home containing all the necessary means according to his financial position. If 
either spouse dies after a valid marriage the other shall inherit.! 1 5) the dissolution of 
marriage by divorce, the wife is only entitled to certain financial rights for a limited time 
and after that she has to rely on her means or her family support.!  ^ This fact is perhaps 
significant for other countries in their deliberations upon recognition of Iraqi divorce, or at 
least its incidents, and upon the subject of competing )urisdiction
E- Personal Status Law
This law covers generally the subject of marriage, divorce, parentage and degrees of
kinship, custody and fostering, maintenance, guardianship, will, inheritance and status,
including being alive, dead, missing or absent. Until 1917, the principles of Islamic law
were applied to all cases without any distinction between the personal status cases and civil
cases. The Sharia Procedures Code 1917 set up for the first time Sharia Courts to deal
only with personal status cases according to the principles of Islamic law, while the civil
cases remained subject to the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, to be decided according to
Slejellc\ the Civil Code, In 1921, when Iraq was under the British occupation, the British
1 4- Arts. I 126(2) and 1268(2) (it the 1951 Ci\ il Cede.
1 5- A rts .88  and 91 e f  the 1959 Personal Status Code.
1 6 - Infra, p. 332.
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High Commissioner, without any reasonable justification, established Civil Courts for 
personal status concerning Shiciti Muslim, applying the Shia law, while retaining the 
peisonal status cases for other Muslims subject to Sharia Courts, applying the Hanafi 
law.
This state of discrimination and confusion was abandoned by the 1959 Personal Status 
Code, now in force, which provides that its provisions apply to all I r a q i s , H  7 )  except 
those for whom special legislation was made, i.e. Christians and Jews. The provisions of 
this Code, on the whole, are of Islamic inspiration.!^ 8)
F- Private International Law
liaqis private international law is essentially a system whose main principles are 
derived from French law. The 1951 Civil Code now deals with problems of private 
international law in a chapter dedicated to the conflict of laws in space and falling under two
headings:
! D  - International conflicts in matters of jurisdiction,
( 2) - International conflicts in matters of legislative jurisdiction.
These rules do not extend to cases that are governed either by a special law or an 
international Convention in force in I r a q . H ^ )  The Code could not be said to be 
comprehensive in its conflict of laws treatment of the area.
G- Personal Status in Private International Law
Iraqi private international law in the field of personal status has been largely neglected. 
There are at least three reasons behind this negative development:
(1) - Matters ol personal status are mainly based on Islamic law. a law which has
limited the cases of conflict of laws by providing prohibitions or restrictions on non-
1 7- A rt.2( I ) ol the 1959  P ersonal Slaliis C ode.
1 8 - Religious Courts lo r the Christian and Mosaic D enom inations Code No.32 of 1947.
I 9- A rl.29  or the 1951 Civil Code.
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Muslim marriages. Moreover, although in theory, the Iraqi court is more open to choice of 
law discussion in divorce cases than is the British court, yet the Iraqi court will apply Iraqi 
law if the case in its view in any way justifies it.
( 2 ) - The background, culture and tradition of the Iraqi society indicates that the Iraqi 
family is unwilling to tie with a foreign relation.
(3) - The number of immigrant communities compared with that , for instance, in 
England or Scotland is ver)' limited
Nevertheless, there are a few rules dealing with personal status matters in the conflict of 
law s.! ! These lules are rather rudimentary, leaving many gaps and suffering from lack
of clarity. They are now the basic source of Iraqi law
2 0 -  A ns. 19-24 of the 1951 C o il Code,
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C H A PT E R  ONE 
Pre lim inary  M atters
I" The N atu re  of M arr iage  i
Before a court exercises its jurisdiction to dissolve a foreign marriage, it must be 
satisfied that there is a lawful marriage according to the law governing the marriage and that 
It is also valid and subsisting and is not contrary to public policy.(D If the court is 
satisfied that said conditions are present, it will then exercise its jurisdiction to grant a 
decree of divorce to the parties of marriage, provided that the other requirements exist. It is 
submitted that "not all the various kinds of marriages existing in different parts of the world 
are recognized as marriage".(2) Before 1972 English and Scots law, for instance, 
declined to grant matrimonial relief to the parties of a polygamous union.O) Also 
concubinage has never been recognised as a marriage for granting relief under Iraqi law. 
The question may arise of what the nature of marriage is in these laws, and whether Iraqi
marriage is recognised by English and Scots law in order to grant a decree of divorce or
O ther re lie f
A marriage in Iraqi law may be defined as "a contract between a man and a woman who 
is lawfully eligible to be his wife with the objective of life and procreation"(4) This 
definition is derived Irom the Classical Islamic law, which permits to a Muslim man four
wives at the same time without the permission of the Judge.(«) However, in Iraqi law,
1 - Sec, Infra, 261.
2 - Sec, VVolfl, P n m ie Inlernationaî/ /n r :2nd cd, Oxford Clarendon Press (1950) P.316 .
H \(h  1. Hydi (1866) L .R .l .P  &  D .130  al 138: Ohochuku v. Ohochuku [I960 ] 1W .L .R .I83 ; 
Sow a V.  S ow a  [1961] P .70 : M uham m ed  1956 S .C .3 6 6 . D i.scusscd by A nton  The
//er ,,yI956 .S .L .T  (N cw s)20I.See, Cheshire & North, C/tejA/r.
Prmm^ InUrualionalLaw, by N orth, P.M  and Faw cett, J.J., 12th cd, London, B uttcrw orths, (1992)
P .628; N orth. Pnvafe Infem aiional I jiw  in Common Law Jurisdiclion,U m <\on, (1993) pp.46-53; 
A nton, Private International Law; A Treatise From the Standpoint o f  Scots Im w , 2nd cd Edinburgh, 
W. Green & Son Ltd, (1990), p.444 .
4 -  A 11.3 ( 1) o f The 1959 Personal Status Code
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marriage to more than one wife is allowed only by permission of the judge, a permission
that cannot be granted unless the required conditions are satisfied, namely (i) that the
husband is financially capable of supporting more than one wife; (ii) that there is a
legitimateinterest(^) e.g. that he had no children from the first wife. Moreover, the
court has a discretion not to permit polygamy if it thinks that the wives will not be treated 
equitably and fairly.C^)
Despite the conditions above restricting actually polygamous marriage, it is submitted 
that a marriage is described as potentially polygamous even though the husband has not 
taken an additional wife. The nature of marriage as polygamous or monogamous is 
governed by the Islamic law for Muslims and by personal law for Non-Muslims.(*) 
Muslim marriage is always potentially polygamous according to Iraqi law regardless of the 
personal law of the parties or where the marriage was celebrated.(^) It follows from this 
view that if a Muslim domiciled in England mairies there, the marriage will be potentially 
polygamous even if the nature of such a marriage is monogamous according to the law of 
domicile and the Lex Loci Celebrationis. Whereas if a Non-Muslim domiciled in Scotland 
mairies in Iraq, the marriage will be determined by the Scots law not by Iraqi law.
Thus, the nature of a marriage celebrated in Britain in Muslim religious form between 
Iiaqi nationals domiciled in England or Scotland will be viewed differently by Iraqi law and 
by English and Scots law since the marriage will be regarded as potentially polygamous in
5- Fitzgerald, Muhammadan Im w  and Abridgem ent: According to its Various School, O xford, (1931) 
P .26; Abbas, R.Y ., D ivorce fo r  Ittjury. Baghdad, 1987, p.219 (In Arabic),
6 - Arl.3(4) o f  T he 1959 Personal S ta tu s C ode; A bbas, M .Personal Status Law, Baghdad, H igher 
Education M inistry, (1980), p.49.(In Arabic).
7 - Art 3 (5 ); A bbas, M ., o p .c il. ,  p. 4 9 ; A n d erso n , Law Reform in The M uslim  W or/r/:London 
Athlonc, (1976), p. I l l ;  U nder T he T unisien  Code, polygam y is forbidden and constitutes a crim inal 
offence; Personal Status Ctxie o f 1956, Art. 18.
8 - Sec, Kas.sab, Cotiflict o f  Law.s in Formation and D issolution o f  M arriage, Egypt, ( 1944), p.2 1 2 .(In 
Arabic).
9 -  U nlike Scots and English law , Iraqi law  does not entertain  change in the nature o f m arriage a fte r 
celebration; contrast w ith A// v. Ali [I965 j P. 564.
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Iraq but monogamous by English and Scots law, because the parties by their personal law 
of domicile do not have the capacity to enter into a potentially polygamous marriage in 
Britain, In addition English and Scots law tend to classify the nature of marriage in the first 
instance by the Lex Loci Celchnitioni.s. All marriages celebrated ifi Britain are classified 
by English and Scots law as monogamous, no matter the religious ceremony used. It is 
clear that in Iraqi law, as opposed to Scots and English law. religion is the sole and pre- 
e m in e n t  f a c to r  in c la s s i fy in g  m a r r ia g e s  as to  n a tu re .
What IS the nature of marriage between parties of different religion? Before examining 
this question, it is necessary to say that in Iraqi law (I) a marriage between a Muslim 
woman and a Non-Muslim man is mil! end void regardless of the personal iaw o f the 
parties, and (ii) a Muslim man cannot contracta valid marriage with a Non-Muslim woman 
who is not a Christian or a J e w e s s . !  10) To consider the question which has already been 
mentioned, the answer becomes easy, in the former point (i) above, no problem arises so 
long as Iraqi law declines to recognise the relationship between a Muslim woman and Non- 
Muslim man as a marriage. With regard to point (ii) above, the marriage is always 
potentially polygamous so long as the husband is Muslim. If both parties are Non- Muslim 
and they have different personal law, the nature of the marriage will be decided by the 
personal law of the husband. It seems here there is room for disagreement between the 
legal systems which are the subject of this thesis because Scots and English law do not 
recognise penal incapacities, i.e.. restriction on marriage for reason o f religion or
c a s t .H  I)
fhe case in England and Scotland is different. In the famous English case Hyde 
V.Hyde,Li 2) Lord Penzance defined marriage “as the voluntary union for life of one man 
and one woman to the exclusion of all others.”!! 3) This definition indicates that the
10- Abba,s. M.. OP.CÙ., p ,8 |;  N a s i r . . 7 y , r / . v / u „ , , c . S W i i . r . - L o n d o n ,  Graham & Trotman
(1986), p .6 3 .
I I- M ir/j™ ,ç„// „ chiinaiHs. 1937 ,S.C. 390; Chelli v C h M  1I909J P.67; See. Infra, 267.
1 2- (1866) L.R.J p & D .I30; \Varremlen.Warmiikni?3S) 2 Sh. & Macl.154.
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character of marriage is m o n o g a m o u s / !  4 )  a  person domiciled in England or Scotland 
lacks capacity to contract a polygamous marriage anywhere even if only a potentially 
polygamous o n e /! 3) Section 11(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provides that 
such a marriage is void, viz., a polygamous marriage entered into outside England if either 
party was at the time of the marriage domiciled in England. For these purposes a marriage 
may be polygamous although at its inception neither party has an additional spouse.!!
The Law Commissions,!!?) after the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hussain v.
H ussam O ^) have recommended that a person domiciled in England or Scotland should
have capacity to enter a marriage outside the United Kingdom which, though polygamous
in  îorm, is monogamous in fact, i.e. a potentially polygamous marriage.H 9)
1 3- Ibid, 133 ,
1 4 “ A nlen, 2nd-cd., p .445; C live & W ilson , The Law o f  Husbami and Wife in Scotland, Edinburgh, 
(1974), p. 149; C heshire & N orth, 12th-cd.p.608; C ollier, Conjlict o f  L fftw cCam bndge Uni Press,
(1987) P .276; Grin estin, The Conflict o f l.a w s:  Private Internationa/1.aw,7lh  cd, London, Sw eet & 
M axwell, (1974), p. 242 .
1 5 - Lendtnni r. Chakravarti, 1929 S .L .T .9 6 ,9 9 . In Radwan v R adw an{hio .2) [1973] Earn, 
35.Cum niing-B riicc .1. Held that a woman dom iciled in England had capacity to contract an actually  
polygam ous m arriage with a man dom iciled in Egypt at the Egyptian Consulate General in Paris. He 
based his decision on the ground that capacity  to  contract a polygam ous m arriage is governed by the 
hnv o f the intended m atrim onial home, which, in that case, was Egypt, C riticised in D icey & M orris, 
D icey and M orris on the Conjlict o f  Laws, by Lawrence Collins and others, 1 Ith-cd, London, Stevens 
& Sons Ltd, (]987),.p .66fl; and S cc,l2 th -cd , London, Sweet & M axwell, (1993), p. 700; D avid Pearl, 
C apacity For Polygam y, (1973) C .L .J. 43; K arslcn, Capacity to Contract A Polygam oas M arriage  
( 1973 ) 36 M .L.Rcv. 291 ; Jam es, Polygamy and Capacity to M arry {\9 1 9 )  42 M .L.Rcv. 533.
I 6- There is no equivalent in Scotland o f section 1 1(d).
1 7- L.aw C om .N o.l46&  Scots Law Com N o.96 (1985), Polygam ous M arriage-C apacity to Contract A
Polygamous Marriage and Related Issues, paras. 2 .21, 4.2-4.8.
I 8- ] 19831 Fam .26 In thi.s case, the husband and w ile were M uslim b\' religion. They were m arried in
Pakistan in accordance with the Pakistani law. At the time o f the cerem ony the husband was dom iciled
in England and the wile in Pakistan. T he parties cam e to England and the wife petitioned fo ra  decree o f
jud ic ia l separation. The husband contended that (he m arriage was void under section 11(d) o f the
M atrimonial Causes Act 1973. The Court o f Appeal held that the m airiagc was m onogam ous. T heir
\ icw was that a m arriage can (miy be potentially polygam ous for the purpose o f section 11(d) if one o f
the parties has the capacity to m any  a second spouse. Since the hu.sband by English law has no such
capacit}' and the wile by Pakistani law has also no such capacity, the m arriage was m onogam ous and 
\aiid .
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The law which determines whether the marriage is monogamous or polygamous has 
not yet been settled beyond all doubt. It has sometimes been suggested that the law of 
domicile should deteimine the nature of maii'iage.!"®) On the other hand, another view 
appears to be in favour of the Lex Loci Celebrationis^^ B and academic opinion seems to 
support this.G It follows from this view that, if a Muslim domiciled in Iraq, marries in 
England or Scotland, in accordance with English or Scottish formalities, the marriage will 
be monogamous, whereas according to Iraqi law his marriage is potentially polygamous.
Another issue may arise which needs to be briefly considered, and that is the case of 
recognition of polygamous marriage in order to grant divorce or other relief. It has been 
seen, that until 1972, the parties to actually and potentially polygamous marriages were 
unable to obtain decrees of divorce in England, this is not because it is contrary to public 
policy to recognise polygamous marriage but because "the matrimonial law of this country 
is adapted to the Christian marriage, and it is wholly inapplicable to polygamy".(23)
This view was followed in Scotland and the Court of Session refused to grant 
matrimonial relief to parties to a polygamous m a r r i a g e . ( 2  4 )  This rule was abolished by
1 9- Cheshire & North, 13lh cd., p. 621; Anton, 2nd cd,.p.449.
2 0 -  Warrender v.Vti//7w/<T{ 1835) 2 Cl & F in, 488 , 535; Harvey v. Farnie{WH2) 8 A .C  4 3 ; D e  
Reneville r  D e Renevil!e{]94H) P. 100, Lord G reene M .R .; A li v .A//11960} P  564  al 567, 577; 
R/iss V.  Rtis.s [1964] P.35I al 326; Hnssain v .H i(ssaia[\9H3] Fam 26; See, C heshire & N orth, I2 th  
od., p. 610; Dicey & M orris,! 1th cd., p .65 l ; 12th cd., p.689; Collier, o  p .cil., p.277.
2 1 -  Risk  V .  Risk  [1951] P .50; M a cD ou gall v .C h itn a v is ,\9 3 1 , S .C . 390; Lee v A m u  [1969] P 14
t e r  Cairns .1, at P. 20  \Qureshi v. Q u resh i\\9 n i]  Fam  \13 \C h eiti v. C h etti{\9 i)9 \ P. 67; Ohochuku 
V.  O hochuku\\9a')\ Î W .L .R .183; Lemlrum v.Chakravarti, 1929, S .L .T . 96. See, Jam es, (1979) 42 
M .L.Rcv. 533 at 537; D avid Pearl, Polygam y for English dom iciliaries{\9^ 3) C .L.J. 270; M orris, 
The Conjliei o f  Laws cd, London. S te \cns & Sons, (1984), p. 177; M orris, M orris: The Conflict 
o f  Laws, by McClcaii, 4 ih-cd, London, Sweet & M axwell, (1993), p. j70.
2 2 - Che.shirc & N orth, 12th cd.. p, 612; Dice y & M o n ts , l l t h  cd., p. 651; J2th cd., p. 989; C liv  & 
WilscMi, op .c il.. p. 184; WollT, o p .ic t., pp. 3 18, 3 1 9 ; M orris, The R ecogn ition  o f  Polygam ous  
M arriages in Lnglish Law ,(]953) 66  Har.L.R, 961 al 976; A nion, (1967), p. 267 at 273; N orth , The 
Private International Law o f  M atritnonial Cati.ses in The British Isles and The R epublic o f  Ireland, 
A m sterdam , ( 1977), p. 108; Beckett, The Recognition o f  Polygamous M arriage under English Law, 
(1932) 48 L.Q.Rew 341 at 356.
2 3- Hyde v .Hyde (1866) L.R. 1 P & D 130 at 135;North, op.cit., {1977), p. 107.
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marnagethe Matrimonial Proceedings [Polygamous Marriages] Act 1972. A polygamous 
will be recognised in England and Scotland as a valid marriage for most purposes unless 
there is strong reason to the con trary /:^) and the courts shall not be precluded from 
giantmg a decree of divorce or other relief by reason only that the marriage to which the 
proceeding relates was entered into under a law which permits polygam y/: 6)
II- The Methods and Causes of Divorce
A- Iraq
Under the Iraqi law marriage may be dissolved, during the lifetime of the parties 
iheretoY^^ ( 1)- by the act of patties, i.e. by the husband, or by the wife duly authorized 
by her husband, (2)- by mutual consent, (3)- by .ludlcial decree.
1 - Divorce by the act of Parties
In Classical Islamic law, the dissolution of marriage by the act of parties is called rahq.
It may be defined as "the dissolution of a valid marriage contract forthwith or at a later day 
by the husband or his wife duly authorized by him to do so, using the word talaq, a 
derivative or a synonym th e re o f.^ » ) Generally speaking, any husband of sound mind 
has the right at any time to terminate the marital relationship without assigning any cause, 
by pronouncing m laq"\ divorce you". This formula used by the husband for the 
pronoiiiicenient of talaq includes the medium of expression, e.g. by word of mouth, in 
2 4 . Mul,a,,m u,d  r S„„a. 1956. S.C. 366; C In c & W dson, op .cil., p. 146; Anton, op.ict, {1067). p.
2 S - C o llie r, op .c it., p. 380; .Inircy. Im m ilm -iion to Tlw C onflict o f  [m w s . L ondon, BiiUcrvvorlh.s
(1988)..p. 57.
M nlrimoniui C auses Act 1973, S .47 <1) (2). re-enacting  M atrim onial P roceedings [Polygam ous 
M arria^e,,| Act , J7„. loi Scotl;tnd;Scc, M alrim onial P roeccdings(polygam ons M arriages) Act 1972, 
S.2 as am ended b\' Fam ily Law (Scoiland) Act 1985, S ch cd .l; Onolmmclic v. O nahrm tdie  [1978] 8 
Fam. 107; Rcschoto  e. Rc.,cl,oto\ 1978] 3 AII.E.R. 385 al 389; M orris. 3rd cd p. 181 ; 4lh ed .. p. 180; 
C lnc& tv ilsnn , op.cit.. p. 147; N orth, op.cil.. (1977), p. 108; Dicey & M orris, l l t h  ed.. p .677; 12th 
ed.. p. 703; Cheshirc& N orth. 12th cd., p. 628; Collier, op.cit., p,280; Anton, 2nd cd ., p. 447.
2 7- A bbas. M ,, op.cit. P. 127.
-  *■ has been adopted by Iraqi t.aw . See, Ari.34( I ) o f the 1959 Personal S tatus Code.
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writing, gesture for him who is i n c a p n b v .  of either of them or by the grammatical
construction, e.g. if you commit adultery you shall be d i v o r c e d " . ( 2  9 )
aIn Hanafi Iaw /3 0) intention is unnecessary and the mere use by the husband of
foimula of lahq, in drunkenness or under compulsion, is valid.(^ U The wife need not
be present, nor be given notice of the intention to talaq her. talaq can be performed in
H a n a f law without any reference to any court or other authority. The trip le
pronouncement o( talaq is lawful, although s i n f u l . ( 3 2 )  However, in Shia law(^3) ftie
pronouncement ofialaq by the husband in drunkenness or compulsion is invalid. The
requirement of witnesses is necessary and the triple pronouncement of talaq is not 
permissible.!'*"*)
The pronouncement of Uilaq may be either revocable or irrevocable.OS) The 
revocable takiq does not dissolve marriage until the period o f  Mda is com pleted/»«) The 
husband can at any time revoke the sentence either by express words or by conduct,
without the necessity of a new contract or a new dower and even without the w ife’s
consent.!'^ *7)
- 9  Abba.s, M ,, op .cit., p. [32; N asir, op .cil., p. 106; B ltagy, Family Law, E gypt, (1986), v .I n. 
349.([n Arabic).
3 0- A School o f Islam ic Law.
3 1- See, M ustapha, Z , D iv o r c e .\ .2 B aghdad,( I984)P .7 (In  A rabic); Fyzcc, Outline o f  M uham m adan
/ / n r , 2nd cd, London, 1955. P. 127; F itzgerald, op.cit. P.73.
3 2* See, Fyzxc, op.cit.p. 130.
3 3- A School o f Islam ic law.
3 4- A bbas, M. op.cit.p. 134.
3 5- A n .38  or The 1959 Personal S tatus Code; A bbas, M , op.cit., pp. 137, 138; Fyzcc, op. ch ., pp. 128,
129; Bltagy, op.cil., p. 413.
3 6- The word U l ,  m eans to count; in thi.s case, it ,s  the counting o f  days and m onths. Bv dc llnh ion  it 
IS a  «a,lin g  period o f abstinence, or a specified term during which the w ife shall rem ain unm arried after 
the dissolution o f  m arriage by divorce, death o r  any other form of separation under certain condition 
T he perod o f M b . generally is three m onths from  the date o f declaralion o r if  the wom an is pregnant, 
Linlil delivery. Sec. Ntisir, op.cit., p. [32; Art. 48  o f the 1959 Personal Status Code 
3 7- Art.38(1).
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The irrevocable talaq dissolves the marriage immediately without any waiting period. 
This form of talaq is made either when no intercourse has taken place or when the period 
o f  Idda has expired in the revocable talaq without resumption of conjugal relations.!^ 
The irrevocable talaq is subdivided into minor, Bain bainoon sughra, and major, Bain  
bainoon kubraS^^) The effect of the minor talaq is that the husband's rights over the 
wife cease at once and cannot be resumed without remarriage under a new contract for a 
new dower and subject to her consent.MO) The effect of the major talaq is that the 
husband can only remarry her[ previous wife] after she has been duly married to another 
and her marriage has been duly dissolved or the second husband has died and she has 
finished her idda. 1)
As we have mentioned above, the act of talaq may be either by the husband or by the 
wife. In the case of the wife, the husband has the power to delegate his own right of 
pronouncing talaq to the wife herself in the marriage contract or thereafter. The Iraqi law 
has adopted these general principles in Islamic law but with some modification. Article 
35(1) provides that "A formula of talaq pronounced by one who is drunk, insane, acting 
under compulsion, or oblivious of what he is doing by reason of anger, old age or illness, 
shall not be of any legal effect".!"*:) Article 39(1) provides that "He who desires to talaq 
his wife must commence proceeding in the court to demand that this be effected, and must 
seek a judgm ent accordingly". The effect of this provision is, however, considerably 
softened by the proviso that if he cannot take the matter to the court, then he must register 
the talaq during the course of the Idda period. Article 39(2) provides that "the marriage 
certificate will remain valid in law until it is annulled by the court".(4 ))
3  8 -  ArL38(2).
3  9 -  A rl.38(2); See, A bbas, M ., op .cit., pp. 138,139; Fyzee, op .cit., pp. 130, 131, F itzgerald , op .cit., p.
74.
4 0 -  A rt.3 8 (2 )(l)  See, B ltagy, o p .c i t ,  p. 413; A bbas, M ., o p .c it ,  p. 138.
4 1 -  A rt.38  (2) (2); See, B ltagy, op.cil., p. 414; A bbas, M ,, o p .c it ,  pp. 139,140 .
4 2 -  See, M ustapha, Z , o p .c it ,  15, 24, 31 , 55  ; A bbas, M ., o p .c it ,  p. 135.
4  3 -  A bbas, M ., o p .c it ,  p. 143.
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It is submitted that article 39 is enacted for procedural and statistical purposes and 
therefore it does not change the fact that talaq shall take effect from the time of the 
pronouncement even if it takes place outside the courts and the husband does not 
commence proceedings to register the talaq, because under Iraqi law the right of tahq 
belongs only to the husband and the courts cannot prevent him from doing so if  he wishes. 
It is the duty of the courts to recognise and register the talaqS^ 4)
2 - Divorce by Mutual Consent
The dissolution of marriage by the mutual consent of the parties is called Khula. It 
means the wife gives the husband something for her redemption. For the khula to be valid, 
the husband must have legal capacity to pronounce talaq and the woman must be a lawful 
object thereof.(4 5) The three essential conditions of khula are: (1) Mutual consent of the 
parties. (2) Awad  dower [return] passing from the wife to the husband for her 
redemption. (3) Must take place before the court.
3- Divorce by Judicial Decree
Here, we shall deal with the actual intervention by the court to effect dissolution of 
marriage. This is called tafriq.i^^) In Classical Islamic law, tajriq can be brought as a 
demand of each of the spouses when reason for divorce is a v a i l a b l e . ( 4  7 )  With the 
exception of Al-Dhahiria,^^^) Islamic doctrines are generally agreed on tajriq though 
they differ on the justification for tafriqJ^^^) The right of tafriq is not confined to the 
wife. Certain Islamic doctrines have given this right to the husband too when the wife has 
been the cause of the deterioration of the marriage life.(5 0) This has been done to save the 
4  4 -  Ibid, 130.
4 5 -  A rt.46, o f  T he 1959 Persnal S tatus Code; M ustapha, Z, op.cit., p. 138; N asir, op.cit., p. 111.
4 6 -  F or m ore details. See, A bbas, R .Y ., op.cit.
4 7 -  A bbas, M ., op .cit., p. 145; M ustapha, Z , o p .c i t ,  p. 181; N asir, o p .c i t ,  p. 114; B ltagy, o p .c i t ,  p. 
276.
4 8 -  A School o f Islam ic L aw , See, A bbas, R .Y ., o p .c i t ,  p. 10; M ustapha, Z , o p .c i t ,  p. 185; B ltagy , 
op .cit., P .277.
4 9 -  See, A bbas, R .Y ., o p .c it ,  P.9.
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husband any financial burden he might incur if he unilaterally caused the t a l a q *) Iraqi 
law has followed, with certain differences the Islamic law in enumerating the reasons for 
tap'iq as follows:
a- Reasons Entitling Both Spouses to Obtain Tafriq
Iraqi law gives the right to either spouse to apply to the court for tafriq for the 
following reasons:
( 1 ) That the respondent has committed adultery/^ :)
(2 ) Marriage contract being solemnized without the courts' permission before either 
spouse completes 18 years of age/^^)
(3 )  Marriage being contracted outside the court through coercion, and consummation 
having occurred/^ 4)
(4 )  Under article 41, both spouses have the right to ask the court for tajriq in the event 
of any dispute between them. The article provides, that the court, before passing the decree 
of divorce must attempt to reconcile the spouses by constituting a council for two or if 
necessary three arbitrators. Thereafter, if the court is convinced of the continuation of the 
dissension and fails to reconcile the spouses and the husband refuses to pronounce talaq, 
then the court shall grant tafriq
b- Reasons Entitling a Wife Only to Obtain Tafriq
A wife under article 43 shall be entitled to obtain a decree of divorce on any one or 
more of the following reasons:
( 1 ) That the husband has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of three years or 
upwards.
5 0- Ibid, P. 185.
5 1-  A bbas, R .Y ., op.cit., p. 20.
5  2 -  A rt.40(2) o f  The 1959 Personal S tatus C ode ,
5 3 -  Art.40(3).
5 4 -  A rt.40 (4).
5 5- See, A bbas, R .Y ., op .cit., p. 154 .
5 6 -  A rt.4 3 (l)(l) .
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(2) That the husband has deserted her for two years upwards without lawful reason 
even if his address is know n/^ 7)
(3 ) That the husband was impotent at the time of marriage and continues to be so/»*)
(4.) That the husband was suffering from disease of body o r mind as would make
married life dangerous for life /^  9)
(5 ) That the husband has tailed to pay her maintenance without a lawful reason for a 
period of 60 days upwards/^®)
B- E ngland
Until 1857 the ecclesiastical courts, in accordance with canon law, had no power to 
grant a decree of divorce a vinculo matrimonii for any cause arising after the 
marriage/* D They had power to grant a decree of a  separation a mensa et thoro on the 
grounds of adultery, cruelty and unnatural offences. The only way of obtaining divorce a 
vinculo was by private Act of Parliament by petition to the House of Lords following a 
divorce a uiensa el thoro in the ecclesiastical courts,!^ 2)
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, set up for the first time a civil court for divorce and 
matrimonial causes and gave it power to grant a decree of divorce a vinculo to the husband 
on the ground of adultery by his wife and to the wife on the grounds that her husband has 
been guilty of incestuous adultery, or of bigamy, or of rape, or of sodomy, or bestiality or
adultery coupled either with desertion for two years or upwards or with cruelty.!*») A
5 7- Ai1.43( 1)(2).
5 8- A rt.43(l)(4).
5 9- AM.43(1X6).
6 0- A rt.43(l)(7),
6 1- See, Crctney, P rinriple o f  Fam ily L a w :  4th cd,L ondon, Sweet & Maxvvcll( 1984) P .99 ; T o lsto y  &  
Kcnwoiihy, Totsioy on Divorce, London, 7th cd, (1971), p, 3.
61- See, Ruydcii, RaydmCs Law mu! Practice in Divorce ami Family Matters in at! Courts, 12th ed, 
London, B utlcm orlh.s, (1974). pp. 3 -4 ; I^a.s,singhiim, !mw and Principle in Matrimonial Cattses 2nd
ed., London, Bullcnvorlh, (1974), p. I ; H «lsb ,iry ,m A ,«ryh  Laws Fngiand. 4 ,h  cd, V. 13, London
Biittcrworth.s, (1975). p. 244,
* 3 -  S .27, ol Ihc M alrim onial C auses A ct 1857; Raydcn, op.cil., p. 7; H aisbury , op .c it., p. 272; Lee.
Divorce Law Reform in England, London, Owen, (1974), p. 14.
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cliange of much greater substance was made by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1 9 2 3 , ( * 4  
which abolished the distinction between the grounds on which a husband and wife 
respectively could petition for divorce and enabled a wife to seek a decree of divorce on the 
ground of her husband's adultery/*») The next important change came with the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1937 which introduced new grounds for divorce/* *)
The Divorce Reform Act 1969 abolished the grounds of divorce laid down in the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1965/*?) and enacted that the sole ground on which a petition 
for divorce might be presented to the court by either party to a marriage shall be that the 
marriage has broken down irretrievably/*») The 1969 A ct was subsequently
consolidated in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 which made no substantial change in the
law.(^9)
Section I (2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973(? «) provides that the court hearing a 
petition for divorce shall not hold the marriage to have broken down irietrievably unless the 
petitioner satisfies the court of one or more of the following facts, that is, to say-
(a ) that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it intolerable to
live with the respondent;
(b) that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably
be expected to live with the respondent;
(c ) that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of at least
two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition;
(d ) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period of at least
two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition and the respondent 
6 4- S .(]).
6 5- Passingham , op.cil., p. 2.
6 6 -  See, S .(2), Lee, op.cil., p. 17; Radyen, op.cil., p. 9; Passingham ; op.cil., p. 3.
6 7 -  See, S .( l) .
6 8- S .( l) ;  See, now 1(1) o f Ihc M alrim onial Causes A ct 1973.
6 9 -  See, Crctney, Elements o f  Fam ily Im w , London, 1987, p. 26.
7 0- Ibid, p. 30.
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consents to a decree being granted;
(e) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period of at least 
five years immediately preceding the presentation of petition.
Section 3(1) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 provides that "no 
petition for divorce shall be presented to the court before the expiration of the period of one 
year from the date of the m a r r i a g e .  "(7 1) Even if one or more of the facts in section 1(2) 
of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 are proved the court may nevertheless refuse to 
cli.ssolve the marriage: (i) if it is satisfied that the marriage has not broken down 
i r r e t r i e v a b l y 2) (p) if ^ decree nisi has been made on the basis of two years separation, 
it may be rescinded if the petitioner misled the respondent about any matter which the 
respondent took into account in deciding to consent to d i v o r c e ; ^  3) (ip) the court shall not 
make absolute a decree of divorce unless it has satisfied itself about the arrangement for any 
children of the family.
In 1990, the Law Commission published a report on Reform of the Ground for 
Divorce. They recommended
"(i) ihai irrciricM \blc breakdow n o f the m arriage should rem ain the sole ground for 
d i\o rcc;(ii)  that such breakdown should be established by the expiry  o f a m inim um  
period ol one year lo r consideration of the practical consequences w hich w ould result 
from a divorce and rcllcction upon w hether the breakdown in the m arital relationship is
iiTcpurable’'.G  5)
In December 1993, the Lord Chancellor published a consultation paper, [Looking to the
7 I- This period was three years in M atrim onial Causes Act 1973, S .3 (l) ; Sec, Cretncy, op.cil., p. 28.
7 2- S. 1(4) M atrim onial C auses A ct 1973. U should be noted that the co u rt has pow er to  ad journ  
proceedings to enable attem pts to be m ade effect a rcconcilution, S .6(2) M atrimonial Causes Act 1973, 
Sec, Crcteny, op.cit, p. 126.
73- S. iO (1) M atrim onial Causes y\cl 1973.
7 4- S.41 Ibid.
7 5- Law Com . Rep. N" 192, Fam iiy Im w : The Ground for D ivorce, 1990, para. 3 .48 ; See also. Law 
Com .D iscussion Paper' Facing the Future' 1988.
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F u t u r e ] which was concerned not only with the reform of the grounds for divorce 
and the procedures for dissolving a marriage but also with possible arrangements for 
extending the use of family mediation. The paper agreed that the present law of divorce is 
not working well and that it fails to meet the objective of a good divorce system. The paper 
is of the view that change should be considered. Accordingly, it sets out options for 
reform of the present divorce law. Mediation and opportunities for reconciliation and 
responsibilities of parties themselves in the making of suitable arrangements are keynotes.
C- Scotland
Since the sixteenth century, the Scottish courts have granted divorce a vinculo^'^ 
but the only grounds of divorce until 1938 were adultery and desertion. The Divorce 
(Scotland) Act 1938 added new grounds for divorce, i.e. incurable insanity,C^^) 
cruelty,!^ sodomy and b e s t i a l i t y . B y  the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, the court 
may grant decree of divorce only if it is established that the marriage has broken down 
irre tr iev ab ly .1) The Act of 1976 enumerates the grounds for divorce as f o l l o w s :2)
(a) since the date of the marriage the defender has committed adultery; or
(b ) since the date of the marriage the defender has at any time behaved(whether or not 
as a result of mental abnormality and whether such behaviour has been active or passive) in 
such a way that the pursuer cannot reasonably be expected to cohabit with the defender; or
(c ) the defender has wilfully and without reasonable cause deserted the pursuer; and 
during a continuous period of two years immediately succeeding the defender's desertion-
(i)  there has been no cohabitation between the parties, and
7 6 - L o rd  C h an ce llo r 's  D ep a rtm en t, A  C o n su lta tio n  P ap e r, 'Looking to the Future' M ediation  and the  
Ground for Divorce, D ecem b er, 1993.
7  7- F o r  m o re  de ta ils . See, F rase r,T rea fw e  on the Law o f  Husband and Wife According to Scottish Law, 
2nd  ed , V 2, E d in b u rg h , (1878 ), p. 1129.
7 8- S 1(1) (b).
7  9- S . l ( l ) ( c ) .
8 0 -  S . l ( l ) ( d ) ,  S ee , a lso . D iv o rce  A c t 1958 ; D iv o rce  (S co tlan d ) A c t 1 9 6 4 ; C liv e , The divorce Scotland  
A ct 1976, E d in b u rg h , W .G reen , (1 9 7 6 ), p. 1.
8 1 -  S . l ( l ) .
8  2 - S. 1(2).
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( ii)  the pursuer has not refused a genuine and reasonable offer by the defender to 
adhere, or
(d ) there has been no cohabitation between the parties at any time during a continuous 
period of two years after the date of the marriage and immediately preceding the bringing of 
the action and the defender consents to the granting of decree of divorce, or
(e ) there has no cohabitation between the parties at any time during a continuous period 
of five years after the date of the marriage and immediately preceding the bringing of the 
action.
In 1989, the Scottish Law Commission produced a report on Reform of the Ground for 
Divorce based on its view of the workings of the present divorce law. They recommended 
that
“ the  g round  fo r  d iv o rc e  sh o u ld  c o n tin u e  to  be th e  ir re tr ie v a b le  b re a k d o w n  o f  th e  
m arria g e  bu t th a t th e  p e rio d s  o f  sep a ra tio n  w h ich  can  b e  used  to  e stab lish  b reakdow n  
shou ld  be reduced  from  2  years to  1 y ea r (w h ere  th e  de fen d er consen ts to  the  d ivorce) and 
from  5  years to  2  years (w h ere  th e  d e fen d e r does n o t co nsen t)” . (*  3)
Provisions to implement this recommendation are included in the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Bill currently before Parliament.
Finally, it has been seen in English law that no petition for divorce shall be presented to 
the court before the expiration of the period of one year from the date of marriage. There is 
no such bar in Scotland.(^4)
8  3 -  S c o ts  L aw . C om . R ep  1 9 8 9 , Reform o f the Ground for Divorce', S ee  a lso , S c o ts  L aw  C om .
D iscu ssio n  P ap e r N L 85 , 1990, Family Law Pre^Consolidation Reform.pBxa. 8 .1 .
8  4 -  C live , op. c it., p. 4.
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Ï I Î“ The Persona! Law
Questions alfecling status are governed by the personal law, which differ from one 
legal system to another^® England and Scotland have adhered to the ancient regime of 
d o m i c i l e / 8  6) wbile Iraq has adopted nationality as the test of personal law in all the laws 
which deal with private international law matters, particularly the law of the Personal Status 
oi Foreigners 1931 and the Civil Code 19513^^) Both domicile and nationality are major 
connecting factors in matrimonial matters in the context of jurisdiction, choice of law and 
recognition, ft becomes necessary to consider briefly the legal concept of domicile and 
nationality.
A- Dom icile
It is not easy to give a satisfactory definition of domicile.!^ It is easier to describe 
thaîi define; it is regarded as the equivalent of a person’s permanent home.l^^) In 
Whicker \\ H ianeP^') Lord Cran worth has said: "By domicile we mean home, the 
permanent home; and if you do not understand your permanent, home, 1 am afraid that no 
illustration drawn from foreign writers or foreign languages will very much help you to 
it.'’^  ^E A person can have only one domicile at any time and no person can be without a 
domicile.
8 5- Sec, R abct, The Conflict o f  Laws: A Com parative Study, 2nd cd. U ni. o f  M ich ig an , (1 9 5 8 ), p. 109;
General Trohlenis o f  Private Internationa! Imw, (1974) HI H ag u e  R ecueil 139, 3 3 4 -3 9 1 , 
3 9 2 ; K en n e th  M ek N o rr ic , P ersonal Low: Concept and Developm ent, (1 9 8 3 ) S .L .T .(N cw s) 5 3 ;  
.Anton, 2nd  cd .. p. 121.
8  6- Che,shire & N orth , 12th cd ., p. 139 cl scq.
8 7- R aiîh  .A ll-K assi, N ationality and D om icile as Connecting Factor in Iraqi and English P riva te  
International ÎMWS, with pariicnlar Reference to the Laws o f  M arriage, U ni o f  L o n d o n , "P h .D  T h esis"  
(1961 ), p. 8.
8 8- D icey, The Conjlict o f lm v s :  6lh  cd , L ondon , S tevens (1947), p. 27; G ravcson , 7 ih  ed , p. 195.
8 9- C hesh ire . Private International Law, 6 ih  cd, O x fo rd , ( 1961), p, 165; A n ton , 2nd  cd , p. 161; M aher,
Internationa! Private Uiw: Ca,ses and Statutes, E d in b u rg h , W .G reen  &  S o n , ( 1985), p. 45.
9  0- ( 1858) 7 .H .L .C ., p. 124.
9 1- Ibid, at p. 160, C ritic ised  by G ra \ cson , op .c il , p. 185.
9 2- Vdny v. LV/f/v(1869) L .R .i Sc. &  D iv . 441 a i 4 57 ; M clelland v. Mclelland 1942 S .C . 5 0 2  a t 5 0 8 ;
LR.C v,B u !lock\\9d6\ IVV.L.R. 1178 a l 1184; Lawrence v. Lawrence [1985] Earn 106 a l 132. Sec
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1- Dom icile of O rig in
The English and Scots law ascribe to every person a domicile of origin from the 
raomenl of his birth. His domicile depends on the domicile of one of his parents at the time 
ol his birth, irrespective of where he was born or where his parents are residing.!)3) In 
the case of a legitimate child, this is his father's domicile at the date of the child's birth. In 
the case of an illegitimate child or a legitimate child born after the father's death, it is the 
mother's domicile at the date of the child's birth.04) i„ the case of a f o u n d l in g ,! )h is  
domicile of origin must be the country where he is found, and an adopted child's domicile 
of origin is determined as if he were the legitimate child of his adoptive parents.!) «) This 
is the only case in which domicile of origin is ascribed at a date later than birth.
2“ Dom icile of Choice
This kind of domicile requires two elements: an intention to reside indefinitely in a new
country and residence in that c o u n t r y d ^ ^ )  Presence of one only of these elements is
insufficient for acquiring a domicile of choice. Residence for the purpose of domicile was
defined by Nourse in LR.C v.Duchess o f  P o r t as "physical presence in the
country as an inhabitant of it.” Long residence suggests acquisition of domicile but is not
c o n c l u s i v e . 9) A domicile of choice can only be acquired if residence is l e g a l . (100)
al.so. O icey . op .c it. p. 84 ; Che.shirc &  N orth , 12th ed ., p. 140; A n to n , 2nd ed ., p. 128, W olff, o p .c it ., 
p. 107; Gravcson. o p .c it ., pp. 190, 191; W a lk e r, Principle o f  Scottish Private Law, 4 th  cd , V .l]  
O .xiord, (1988), p. 135; Ing lis, Conjlict o f  Laws, W elling ton , (1 9 5 9 ), p. 75.
9.?- V d m  V U d n y i \m n  L.R.I Sc.& Div 441 al 457; Dicey, op.cil. p! 88; Antou, op.cit... t.sl cd. p
167.
9 4- V dn\ V .  Udnyi 1869) L . R . I  SC  & D iv 441 al 457.
9 5- Ib id . C h esh ire  & N orth . 12ih cd , p, 140; W alk e r, o p .c il., p. 136; W astlake, A Treatise on Private
International Law. 7ih  cd L ondon , ( 1925), p. 248; D iccy  & M orris , 1 I th cd, p. 126.
9 6- S.3Q of ilK- Adopiiim (Scotland) Act of 1978; lor England. S.39 of the Adoption Act. 1976; Sec, 
Lan. Com.N''.H8; Scots Lao Com.N'\63, 19*5. for criticism of the proposals See, Fawcett, U m
Connnission Working Paper N o.88: the Law o f  Don\i<'ile, (1986) 4 9  M .L .R cv  .225.
9 7- D ic c \ ,  o p .e it, p .89; A n to n , 2nd  cd ,p ,!3 8 ; C h esh ire  &  N orth , 12th cd ., p. 142 ' W o lf f  o p c i t  p
1 0 1 .
9 8- 11982! Ch 3 14 at 319.
9 9 -  Liverpool IPn-af fnfirniary v .R am say,\930  S .C .(H .L ) 83 ; Lfenderson v. H e n d e rso n [l9 6 n  P .7 7  at
29
Those whose lesidence is precarious, and subject to Government order, may yet acquire a 
domicile, in England or Scotland, their intention (to stay as long as the Home Secretary 
permits) being sufficient for domicile purposes.!  ^® E
The degree of intention required to established a domicile of choice was considered by 
Scarman J. in the Re FukVs Estate (No.3)(D>-)
il a iiitin in ten d s to  re t inn  to  the lan d  o! h is  b irth  u p o n  a c le a r ly  fo re seen  an d  
reaso n ab ly  an tic ip a ted  co n tin g en cy , e.g . the end  o f  his jo b , the in ten tio n  req u ired  by  
law  IS lack in g ; bu t, if  he has in  m ind  o n ly  a v ag u e  p o ss ib ility , such  as m ak in g  a 
fortune, o r som e sen tim en t abou t dy ing  in the land o f  his fa thers, su ch  a sta te  o f m ind 
is co n sis ten t w ith  the  in ten tio n  req u ired  by law . B ut no c lea r line can  be d raw n; the 
u ltim ate  decis ion  in each case  j.s one o f  fact".
Both residence and intention must coincide at the relevant time.(^03) ^ result of the
rule that no person can have more than one domicile at the same time, a domicile of origin 
may became displaced by acquisition of a domicile of choice, and according to the rule that 
eveiy pet son must have one domicile at all times, a domicile of origin automatically 
icvivt s, wheie a pet son abandons his domicile ot choice by leaving the country and having 
no intention to go back to the country.G The unsatisfactory nature of the present rules 
of domicile has long been recognised! e.g. the retention of the concept of the domicile
7 9 ; /./E C . v.B u U o ck \\9 1 6 \, I W .L .R . 1 178 (C .A ), 
too- Crwkslum ks v.Crnickshaiiks{\951), 1 W .L .R .5 6 4 ; Pnliick v.A G  (1980] F a m .l ;  P ilk in g to n , 
Illegal Residence and the Acquisition o f  A domicile o f  Choice,{\98A) 33 I.C .L .Q .885 .
1 0  Î-  M ay V.  M ay 11943] 2 A L L .E .R . 146; Cnu'h r. C ruch\]945\ 2 A L L .E .R .5 4 5 . 
t 0 2 -  [1968] P .675  at 6 8 4 -6 8 5 ; a . Cramer v. C rm n cr(1 9 8 7 ] IF . L .R .I  16 (C .A ); Brown v. /qY;u>//(1982]3 
F .L .R .2 1 3  (C .A ).
1 03 - Bell V. Kennedy{\m?>) L .R .ÎS c . &  D iv ,3 0 7  at 320 .
1 0 4 -  Udny r.Wm (18 6 9 ) L .R .I S C .& .D IV , at 4 5 7 ; Tee v. Tee [1974] 1 W .L .R .2 I3  (C .A ); A n to n ,2 n d  
c d .,p .l3 2 ; M orris . 3 rd  cd .. p. 16; 4 th  cd .p . 14; G ravcson , 7th c d .p  . 197; C h esh ire  &  N o rth , 12th ed .p . 
157.
1 0 5 -  S ec , th e  First R eport o f  the Private International Law Com m ittee f \9 5 4 ) .  D iscussed  G rav cso n , 
Refortn o f  the Law o f  D o m ic ile ,{ \9 5 A )  7 0  L .Q .R c v .4 9 2 ; S to n e , The Fnglish  C on cept o f  
D om icile,[\95A ) 17 M .L .R cv . 2 4 4  at 246 ; D o m ic ile  B ill.N ". 1 .(1 9 5 8 ); D o m ic ile  B ill.N L 2 ( 1959). 
D i.seusscd, M an n . (1 9 5 9 ) 8 I .C .L .Q .4 5 7 ; The Seventh R eport o f  the P riva te  In ternational Law  
Com m ittee on D om icile, (1963) D iscu ssed . M ann, (1963 ) 121 .C .L .Q .1 3 2 6 ; L aw  C om . W .P .N o .8 8
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of origin has led to the doctrine of the revival of that domicile, with the result that a person 
may die domiciled in a country which he has never visited.
The Law Commissions have recently reviewed the present rules of domicile and 
lecommended that domicile should continue to be used as a connecting factor in the law of 
England and S c o t l a n d , ! b u t  that it should be reformed since the present rules lead to 
artificiality and uncertainty. The main recommendations are: the domicile of a person under 
the age of 16 should be determined as follows: (a) where he has his home with both his 
parents, his domicile should be the same as and change with the domicile of; (i) his parents 
where their domiciles are the same or (ii) his mother if the domicile of his parents are 
different; (b) where he has his home with one parent only his domicile should be the same 
as and change with the domicile of that parent; and (c) in any other case he should be 
domiciled in the country with which he is for the time being most closely connected.! 107) 
The domicile of a child at birth should be determined in the same way as his domicile at any 
other time before he reaches the age of 16.(10 8) The domicile of origin should be 
abolished. The doctrine of the revival of the domicile received at birth should be abolished 
and replaced by a rule to the effect that an adult's domicile should continue until he obtains 
another domicile.! * 0 9) The latest unofficial information, however, is that this attempt to 
reform domicile rules, as earlier attempts before the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings 
Act 1973, is set to fail because of the tax implications of changing domicile law in such a 
way that it will be easier to establish that an individual is domiciled in the United Kingdom.
& Scots Law Com C.m N".63 ( 1985): Law Com N". 168 & S co ts Law  Com  N". 107, Private 
Internatiouallm v: The Law o f  /.W ,/r//c \(1 9 8 7 ); North, Reform, Bui not Revolution .'General Course 
on Private International Iaiw, ( 1990) I Hague Recueil 13, 26 ct esq; North, (1993) p.5
1 0 6 -  Law C om .N L 168 & Scot Law Com. No. 107.para.3.12.
1 0 7 - Paras.4.13-4.16.
1 0 8 -  Para.4.24.
1 0 9 -  Para.5.25.
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3- Domicile of M arried Women
At the common taw the domicile of a married woman was the same as the domicile of 
her husband and it the husband changed his domicile she shared the new o n e .G 10) 
continued to take her husband's domicile until the marriage was dissolved by divorce or by 
death and she could not acquire a new domicile or resume her domicile even if the husband 
had committed a matrimonial offence!  ^* E or they were judicaliy separated! i 12) ca- jf 
the marriage was voidable.! » * Under the old law if the marriage was void there was no 
change c.v lege in the domicile of woman. If the marriage was voidable the wife took the 
husband s domicile until decree of nullity was pronounced and retained until she took steps
to change it. This rule is strangely anachronistic and was criticised as "the last barbarous 
relic of a wife's servitude."! * ! 4)
Prior to 1974, several attempts were made to reform the domicile of a married woman. 
The Private International Law Committee!* * had recommended that "the domicile of a 
fuarried woman shall be that of her husband: provided that a married woman who has been 
sepaialed from her husband by the order of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be treated 
as a single woman". The matter was also considered by the Royal Commission on 
Marriage and Divorce which recommended that a wife who is living separate and apart 
from her husband should be entitled to acquire a separate domicile for the purpose of 
establishing jurisdiction in divorce.G * G
î 10- WoKT, op.ch .p. 121; D iccy, op.cit.p . 107; S tone, (1954) 17 M .L.Rcv. p p .246, 247; A nton, 2nd 
cd.p.] 7.3.
I I I- Lord Advoraie v.JaJJreyl [921] 1 A.C 146.
1 1 2 - Mackimion'sTrNsicms In /andfàw efu(e.\92()S .C  (H .l.)  171, 174, !7 5 ; L ow  v J .o w  (1891)
19R. I 15, .44 ,6^’//. ybr A/Zj(T/u v  t9 2 6 | A .C .444: f  ord Advorafe v.JaJfi‘e y [ l9 2 \]  lA .C  146; 
G nucson . 7th cd P.217; WoliT, op ,.cit.p. 121.
I I 3- l)e  Renevide v. De Reiievillc |] 9 4 8 | P. 100; Grm cson, op.cil,.p. 215.
I I 4- (Vwv V. Formoxal 1963| P .259, / a t  Lord D enning M.R at 267; Adam s v. Adam s 11971J P. 118 at
216.
1 J 5- Comd (^X)68)1954. Draft Code o f (he Law o f D om icile. A rt.3; See, also  The Seventh Report o f  the
Private Infenuitional Law. Com d. 1955 ( 1963).Cf,Gravcson. (1954) 70  L .Q .R cv 500; S tone, (1954)
17 M .L.Rcw 236; Mann, The D om icile Bills, (1963) 12 I.C .L.Q . 1326.
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ïn 1972, the Law ComniissionsG * 7) stressed vigorously support for a separate 
domicile of a married woman, although its recommendation was only in relation to 
jurisdictional purposes. "We are in danger of being the last country to cling to an 
obviously anachronistic and unjust rule."G * 8)
The outcome of all these efforts was the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 
1973. This provided that from I .lanuary 1974 a married woman should have her own 
independent domicde.G * 9) The Act is not retrospective. This means the common law 
rule applies to the domicile of women married before 1974. If, immediately before 1974, a 
woman was married and then had her husband's domicile by dependence, she is to be 
regarded as retaining that domicile as her domicile of choice, unless and until she acquires 
another domicile of choice or her domicile of origin revives on or after 1 January 
1 9 7 4 ^ 1 2 0 ) However, this rule will disappear if the recommendations of the Law 
Commissions are implemented by legislation.! *:*)
The question where a person is domiciled is determined according to English law, if the 
question arises in England, and according to Scottish law, if the question arises in
Scotland.!*: 2) All matters pertaining to domicile as a connecting factor are the province of
the forum! * 22)
1 1 6- Comd 9678 ( 1954) para. 825.
1 1 7 Law Com W .P.N  .28 ham'dy Law: Jnrisdiciion in M atrim onial Causes (other than nullity) (1970) 
para.s.39-44; Law Com. Rcp.N ".48, Family Law :Jm isdiction in M atrim onial C auses,(1912) paras. 
27-32; Scots Law Com. M em orandum .N M 3, para.35; Scots Law Com. NL25, Fam ily Law: Report 
on Jm isdictton in Consistorial Causes Affecting M atrimonial StalusX\912) para,s. 53-58.
1 I 8- Law Com W.P. ML28. para.40.
1 I 9- S .i(  1); F„r Com m entary, See. H artly .&  K arslcn, Tlw Do,male m,d Molnmonial Proceedmss Ac,
I 1974) _)7 M .L .R c\. 179; T hom pson , Domicile of DepeiideiiccTIie Las, Remnant o f A Relic’ 
(I9S .3),3 : I.C .L.Q. 237,
1 2 0 . S.U21; See, I.R.C.e. Duchess o f  P o iH a m n m 2 ]  C h .3 l4 . Crilici.scti by W ade. DomicUetA Re 
esmnmdhm o f  Cenain Rates, (19*3) 32 I.C .L .Q . I. and Sec. Carter. (1982) 53 B .Y .B .I.L . 295  a l 
296; Thom pson ( 1983) 32 I.C .L.Q . 237; Cheshire & North, 12th ed.. pp. 163, 164,
12 1- Lau- Com. N" 168 & Scots- E iw  Com. No. 107, para. 8-7.
1 2 3 -  See, North, op.cit., (1977), p.8.
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An exception has been established to this rule in relation to the law of matrimonial 
c a u s e s . T h e  Family Law Act 1986(^2^) provides that a foreign divorce, annulment 
or legal separation must be recognised if obtained in a country in which either spouse was 
domiciled either according to the law of that country in family matters or according to the 
law of the part of the United Kingdom in which the question of recognition arises. This 
means that the courts in England and Scotland must examine the private international law 
domicile rules of the foreign country to determine the domicile of die spouses.U 26)
B- Nationality
Under Iraqi law, nationality may be defined as a legal and political concept which links 
a person to a particular state.U 2 7 )  It is either of origin or of choice. Nationality of origin 
may be defined as the nationality acquired by a person at the moment of birth either by the 
Jus sanguinis or by the Jus soli. Nationality of choice, on the other hand, is every 
nationality which is usually acquired by a person during his life,G28) eidier by his own 
free will as in the case of naturalization or automatically as a consequence of some legal act 
as in the case of marriage.(l 29)
1- Nationality of Origin
Iraqi law ascribes Iraqi nationality of origin to every person as following:
(a) if his father, at the time of his birth, was an Iraqi national!I ^  0)
(b) if he was bom of  Iraqi mother and, at the time of his birth, his father was unknown
1 2 3 -  Annesley, Re, D avidson  v. A n n esley[\926 \ Ch. 692
124- See, also Civil Jurisdiction and Judgm ents A cts 1982 and 1991.S.41, See, Infra, 311.
125- S,46(l)(b)(ii) and(2)(b) and  5 ; See also, R ecognition o f  D ivorces and  Legal Separations A ct 1971, 
SS.3(2) and 6;See, Infra, 173.
1 2 6 -  See, N orth, op .cit.,(1977), p. 8.
127- H am m ed M ustapha, Principle o f  P riva te International Law: 2nd ed ., B aghdad (1970), p. 170 (In 
Arabic)
1 2 8 -  A ll-K assi, op.cit., p. 51.
1 2 9 -  Ibid.
1 3 0 -  A rt.4 ( l)  o f the Iraqi N ationality  C ode, NP 43  o f 1963; A ll- D aw ody, Private InternationallMW, 
Baghdad, (1970), p. 266.
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or stateless.!^ ^  E
(c) if he was bom in Iraq and at the time of his birth his parents were unknown.! 1  ^2)
2- Nationality of Choice
Nationality of choice of Iraq may be acquired by,
(a) any person who was born outside the Iraqi territory of Iraqi mother, and at the date 
of his birth, his father was unknown.!*
(b) a foreign wife has the right to acquire her Iraqi husband's nationality on condition 
that her request should be brought after the expiration of the period of three years from the 
date of marriage and that she is residing in Iraq and that the Minister of the Internal must 
approve her request.!* ^ 4)
(e) the third case of nationality of choice of Iraq is naturalization. The requirements for 
naturalization are: (i) the applicant must be of full age and capacity; (ii) he must be resident 
in Iraq; (iii) he must be of good behaviour and intend to live in I r a q . ! * 2 5 )
The status and capacities of Iraqi nationals are governed by Iraqi law, irrespective of 
their domicile or residence and in the case of foreigners their status and capacities are 
governed by their personal law so long as they do not become Iraqi n a t io n a ls . ! *  2  6)
It is well established that each state has the right to determine under its own law who 
are its nationals and any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a 
particular state must be determined in accordance with the law of that state and no state is
entitled to determine the conditions on which a person becomes a national of a foreign state
1 3 1 -  Art.4(2).
13  2- A rt.4 (3 ).
1 3 3 -  Art. 5.
1 3 4 -  A rt 12(4); A ll-D aw ody, op .cit,, p. 19; A ll-K assi, o p .c it , p. 57.
13 5- Art. 10, 11, 12; See, Law N” 206 o f  1964; 147 of 1968; 131 of 1972; A ll- D aw ody, op .cit., p. 333; 
All -K assi, op.cit., p. 58.
1 3 6 -  Art. 18 o f the 1959 Civil C ode; A rt.l  o f  the Law  o f 1931; A bdul w hahed K , Personal Status in Iraqi 
Private International Law, (1977) Uni o f B aghdad, p. 6  (In A rabic); A ll-H adaw y, Conflict o f  Laws in 
Iraqi Private Internatinal Law, Baghdad, 2nd-ed, Uni of Baghdad (1972), p. 158 (In A rabic); A zzedeen 
Abdallah, Private InternatinalLawi, 6th ed., Egypt, (1969), p. 211 (In A rabic).
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or withdraw nationality from foreigners belonging to a foreign state/* 2?) Thus, no other
law than that of Iraqi law determines whether or not a certain individual is an Iraqi 
n a t i o n a l / * 2 8 )  These principles, which gave each state the right to determine the 
acquisition and loss of nationality may lead to difficulties in cases of stateless persons and 
dual nationality.
3- S tateless P ersons
A person who lacks nationality under the law of any state is called stateless/* 2 9) Such 
a situation may arise either from birth or as a result of marriage or from a political event 
such as the position of refugees/* 40) Despite the fact that many steps have been taken to 
eliimnate ot jeduce this problem, t is still common/ * 41) as nationality cannot be
applied for those persons, it becomes necessary that the nationality be supplemented by 
another connecting factor. Some countries have adopted the domicile or habitual residence 
or in the absence of domicile or habitual residence, have provided that the temporary 
residence should be decisive.! * 42)
13 7- i\\\..\{2) of the United Nations Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict o f  
Nationality Laws (1930) L .N .D .oc, 24; W eis, Nationalitv and Statelessness in International Law, 
2nd cd, ( 1079),.pp. 65-94; Oppenheimer v. Cattertnole [1976] A.C. 249.
1 3 8 - Iraqi .Nationality Code No.43 o f 1963; A ll-D w ady, op.cit,, p. 67; H am m ed M ustapha, op .cil., p.
182; Lex Patrhe pre-em inent in these matters is also accepted and adopted in England and Scotland.
1 3 9 - W eis, op.cil., p. 161; P-Ahm\\,.Marriagenml Divorce in Comparative Conflicl of Uiws, Netherland,
(1J74). p. 90, A ll-H adw ay, op.cil., p. 154; A ll-D wady, op.cit., p. 72; H am m ed M ustapha, op.cit., p. 
194.
1 4 0 - Article 1 of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees {[95\)  defines Refugees as 
any  person w ho "ow ing to w ell-founded fear o f being persecuted for reasons o f race, re lig io n , 
nationality, m em bership ol a particular .social group or political opinion, is outside the country  o f his 
nationality and i.s unable or. ow ing to .such fear, is unwilling to a\ ail h im self o f  the protection  o f  that 
country; or who, not ha\ ing a nationality and being outside the country o f his form er habitual residence 
as a result ol such events, is unable or ow ing to such fear, is unwilling to return to  it".
1 4 1- Sec, c.g, United Notions Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality 
Laws.(l930); A rtic le .7; Protocol Relating to Certain Cases o f Statelessness [The H ague, 1930] 
Untied Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1951).U .N .T .S .,V ol. 139, p. 137 Art,
12 (2)(3)(4) of the Iraqi Nationality Ccxic No.43 o f 1963.
1 4 2 -  Sec, A n .12(1) o f the New York Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954); 
kvL\2{\) of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Re fugees{\95\).
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Article 33(1) of the Iraqi Civil Code provides that "in the case of a person of unknown 
nationality the law to be applied will be decided by the court". However, there is general 
agreement in Iraq to substitute domicile (habitual residence) as the relevant connecting 
factor for stateless persons.(143) There is no doubt that this solution is sound in principle 
since it is in accordance with the interests both of the person concerned and of the country 
in which he is actually living and normally has the centre of his material interests.
4- Dual Nationality
The second issue in conflict of nationality is dual or plural nationality: "a person holds 
two or more nationalities. "(*44) Such a situation may arise either from birth or as a result 
of marriage or naturalization. Many steps also have been taken to eliminate or to reduce 
this problem, but it is still common.!*45) dealing with dual nationality a distinction 
between the cases must be considered, viz whether one of the nationalities involved is that 
of the forum state or all nationalities are foreign.
In the case of one of the nationalities being that of the forum state, the most accepted 
view is that the nationality of the forum should be c o n s i d e r e d . ! *  46) Article 33(2) of the 
Iraqi Civil Code provides that "Iraqi law shall apply, however, i f  a person is deemed in 
Iraq to be of Iraqi nationality and is at the same time deemed by one or more foreign states 
to be a national of that or those states".
In the case where all nationalities are foreign, one view has advocated the law of the 
country of which the person is not only national, but where he also has his domicile or
1 4 3 “ A ll-H adw ay, op.cit,, p. 154.
*44“ See, W eis, op .cit., p. 169; Palsson, op .cit., (1974), p. 82; A Il-D aw ady, op.cit., p. 88; A ll-H adw ay, 
op .cit., p. 153.
145“ See, U nited N ations Convention on R eduction o f  C ases o f  M ultip le N ation a lity  an d  M ilitary  
O bliga tion  in C ases o f  M u ltip le  Nationality.{19SU) U .N . Vol. 6 2 4 , .p. 2 2 1 ; U nited N ations  
Convention on Certain Q uestions Relating to the Conflict o f  N ationality Law s  (1930); A rticles 11 
and 35 o f the Iraqi N ationality Code No.43 o f 1963.
146- A rt. 3 o f  the U nited N ations C onvention on Certain  Q uestions R elating to the C onflict o f  
N ationality Laws.(1930)
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habitual r e s i d e n c e . ( l  ^ 7 )  Another view favours the nationality of the country with which in 
the circumstances the person concerned is in fact most closely connected. In other words, 
this view selects from several nationalities, the effective nationality. The court must take 
into account many factors in order to select the effective nationality, e.g the domicile or 
habitual residence of the person concerned, where he conducted his business and where he 
exercised his political rights, his language, the last nationality etc.l^^S)
Article 33(1) of the Iraqi Civil Code provides that "in the case of a person of plural 
nationality the law to be applied will be decided by the court". However, there is general 
agreement in Iraq to select the effective nationality.( 149)
5- Nationality of a Married Woman
Under the 1924 Nationality Code a foreign woman by marriage automatically acquires 
the nationality of her Iraqi husband and an Iraqi woman would lose her nationality by 
marrying a f o r e i g n e r . ( l ^ O )  This rule was abolished to effect that the nationality of a 
married woman remains unaffected if she marries an Iraqi national,(l^U but in this case 
she has the right to acquire Iraqi nationality on condition that her request shall be brought 
after the expiration of the period of three years from the date of marriage and that she is 
residing in Iraq and that the Minister of the Interior must approve her request.(15 2) Qn the 
other hand, an Iraqi woman will not lose her nationality by marrying unless she acquires
her husband's n a t i o n a l i t y . ( l S 3 )
1 4 7 -  A rt.5  of the United Nations Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict o f 
Nationality Lavr^.( 1930)
1 4 8 -  W eis, op.cil., p. 169.
1 4 9 -  A ll-H adw ay, op.cil., p. 154; H am m ed M oustapha, op. cit., p. 193
1 5 0 -  Art. 17.
1 5 1 -  Art. 12 o f the Iraqi N ationality Code o f 1963.
1 5 2 -  Ibid, Art. 1 2 (4 )(b ).
1 5  3- Ibid, Art. 12(2).
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C- The Merits and Demerits of Nationality and Domicile
Various reasons have been invoked to justify the doctrine of nationality as a connecting 
factor in Iraqi law, namely that the system of nationality is based on the idea that every 
individual is more deeply rooted in his nation than his home.(l^4) The courts should in 
the first place offer protection to the interests of its own nationals.(l 5 5) Nationality is more 
stable and easier to ascertain than domicile because a change of nationality involves a public
acL(136)
Having regard to the nature of Iraqi matrimonial law, it is thought that nationality is a 
proper connecting factor and should not be replaced generally by domicile. The law of 
personal status depends mainly on the Islamic religious principles, and it is therefore 
beyond any doubt that acceptance of domicile would lead to the application of Islamic 
religious rule to persons belonging to another religious denomination. It is also difficult to 
accept the application of the law of domicile in cases of an Iraqi businessman domiciled in a 
country whose law does not permit e.g. divorce or polygamy. Nationality provides the 
most realistic connecting factor in such cases.
There are clearly many cases in which the principle of nationality provides no solution. 
The extreme, and unfortunately still common, examples of this are the cases of dual 
nationality and of stateless persons, whereas under the British law of domicile every person 
has one and only one d o m i c i l e . ( l  ^ 7 )  Although the Iraqi law does not establish clear rules 
to deal with such cases, one must not place too much emphasis on this point to devoid the 
merits of nationality at least in the context of Iraqi law.
15 4- A ll-kassi, op .cil., p. 55.
1 5 5 -  A il-H adaw y, op.cil., p. 152.
1 5 6 -  Ibid, pp. 152-153.
1 5 7 -  W eis, The United N ations Convention on the Reduction o f  Statelessness, (1962) l l .I .C .L .Q . 1073; 
Cheshire &  N orth, 12th ed., p. 167; G raveson, 7 lh  ed., p. 190.
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Nationality has been rejected by England and Scotland as a connecting f a c t o r / 8) 
is only adopted by the Family Law Act 1986^^^) in the case of recognition of divorces, 
annulments and legal separations. As we shall discuss later, the nationality as a connecting 
factor in this area is inapplicable if the divorce is obtained where there are no proceedings, 
such as divorce by K h u ld ^^^)  or by bare TalaqS^^^) This divorce could only be 
recognised on the basis of d o m i c i l e . !   ^^ 2 )
Academic opinion in Britain appears to be against the doctrine of nationality. Professor 
Anton has said "nationality may require the application to a man, against his own wishes 
and desires, of the laws of a country to escape from which he has perhaps risked his 
life."(163) The main arguments advanced to support the principle of domicile as a test of 
personal law are that 'domicile' generally means that country in which a man has 
established his permanent home and it is taken to follow that it is the law of that home to 
which he should be subject.! 1 ^  4) Secondly, domicile is the only test which can be used if 
the country of nationality comprises different units which each have different systems of 
law. Hence, "the expression 'national law ’ when applied to a British subject is 
meaningless. It is one system in England, another in Scotland."!^
The main difficulty with the domicile as a test of personal law is that it can lead to an 
unrealistic and anomalous result due to the doctrine of the revival of domicile of origin, and
1 5 8 -  Law C oni.W .P  N °2 8 , (1972), pp. 14, 15; Law  Com  NL48, (1972) paras. 19-20; S cot Law  Com. 
N L25, (1972), paras. 32, 36 ; N iboyet v .N iboyet (1878) 4  P  D 1 at 19; G raveson, 7 th  ed ., 316; 
N orth, op.cit., (1977), p. 9; (1993), pp. 62-63
1 5 9 -  S .46 (l)(b )(iii)  o f  the Fam ily Law A ct 1986; S .3 ( l)(b )  o f the R ecognition of D ivorces and Lagal 
Separations A ct 1911-Jmlyka vJm lyka  [1969] 1 A.C .33;Q iiaziv.Q uazi [1980] A .C , 7 4 4  a t 805, 813, 
821; T he Royal C om m ission on M arriage and D ivorce, Report 1951-55, Com. 9678.
1 6 0 -  Quazi V. Qiiazi [1980] A .C .744  a t 824.
1 6 1 -  C/trtHf//mryv. C/irtKf//m?y [1985] Pam . 19.
1 6 2 -  S .46(2)(b) o f the Fam ily Law A ct 1986
1 6 3 -  Private International Law , 1967, p. 160.
1 6 4 -  K enneth M ck Norrie, (1983) S.L .T . 56
1 6 5 -  Cheshire& N orth, 12th ed., p. 166; M orris, 4th ed., p.33; Re O'keefe [1940] Ch 124.
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due to the difficulty in losing a domicile of origin in the first place. The domicile of a 
person is not always easily ascertainable because of the weight attached to the intention of 
the person concerned. Proof of a person's intentions is the most difficult element of all to 
prove. Another difficulty with the domicile is that long residence is in itself of no avail.
Thus, neither domicile nor nationality allow the personal law to work properly to 
provide certainty both for the individual concerned and for those with whom he has legal 
relationships. Dr. North has pointed out that "as determinants of the personal law, 
nationality yields a predictable but frequently an inappropriate law; domicile yields an 
appropriate but frequently an unpredictable law."(1^6)
The countries which are subject to this thesis appear to be against any substantial 
change in the present rule of personal law. The Law Commissions have recently examined 
the point under discussion and recommended that domicile should continue to be used as a 
connecting factor in the laws of England and Scotland and any general substitution of 
habitual residence or nationality for domicile is unacceptable.
Finally, it is interesting to note that if legislation is sought to implement the recent 
proposals of the Law Commissions for reform of the law of domicile, then domicile as a 
test of personal law will be more workable and there will be a greater chance of a person’s 
status being governed by the law of the country with which he has a genuine connection.
1 6 6 -  Cheshire & N orth, 12th ed., p. 167
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CHAPTER TWO 
Jurisdiction Over Divorce Proceedings
The means by which a divorce may be obtained vary considerably, for they are 
determined by the law of the forum, i.e the law of the country where divorce is 
sought/1) In England and Scotland, for instance, divorce is obtainable only through 
the institution of judicial proceedings before a competent authority, i.e court of law ,(2) 
and therefore any extra-judicial proceedings are ineffective to dissolve the marriage/3) 
A divorce, according to Iraqi law, may be obtained either by judicial proceedings, or extra­
judicial proceedings such as mutual consent, or without any proceedings such as taktq.
In the vast majority of cases no jurisdiction problem arises and the question of which 
court has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings and pronounce a decree of divorce is purely 
one of the internal matter of domestic law. The problem arises only in cases which involve 
a foreign element and therefore, the question of jurisdiction is not which court of any 
particular country should have jurisdiction but which country can claim the power to do so 
on principles of conflict of laws.
The mles relating to jurisdiction in this subject matter also vary considerably from one 
legal system to another. This difference depends on what theory is adopted in various legal 
systems, but there is a degree of similarity in approach, viz, that any bases of jurisdiction 
ought to serve the interests of the country concerned, and of the parties and to ensure that a
1- W olff, 2nd ed., p. 369; P a lsso n , International E ncyclopedia o f  C om parative îjaw, V. i l l  P riva te  
InternationallMw, Chapter 16, M arriage and Divorce, (1974), p. 154.
2- T h is  C o u rt is the C o u rt o f  S ession  and  S h e riff  C ourt in  re la tio n  to  S co tlan d , D o m ic ile  and  
M atrim onial Proceedings A ct 1973, SS. 7(1) and 8 as am ended by the D ivorce Jurisdiction; C ourt Fees 
and Legal A id (Scotland) A ct 1983; the H igh C ourt and, in undefended cases, a  D ivorce C ounty  Court: 
M atrim onial and F am ily  P roceedings A ct 1984, S .33; D om icile and M atim onial P roceed ings A ct 
1973, S .5 (l)  as am ended by M atrim onial and Fam ily Proceedings A ct 1984, S ch ed .l, para. 17.
3 -  S .44  o f the F am ily  Law  A ct 1986; C on trast w ith  ea rlier position  o f  Q iireshi v. Qureshi 11971] P.
315, See, infra, 184.
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decree granted in the exercise of that jurisdiction would be recognised in other 
countries/4)
The grounds of jurisdiction in action of persomm^^^ do not apply to  cases 
involving the question of status!^*) and an action of divorce, is treated as an action in rem 
and a decree of divorce is a judgement in rem  which binds not only the parties but all the 
world and is entitled to universal recognition/7) These considerations must be taken 
into account in deciding whether the jurisdiction of any court is to be founded upon 
celebration of marriage within the territorial jurisdiction or upon actual presence or 
temporary residence of one or both parties at the time of the proceedings or upon the 
nationality or domicile of the parties. The law of England and Scotland has long adopted 
domicile as the major connecting factor in matrimonial causes and it was early established 
as the main basis of divorce jurisdiction. The law on jurisdiction in divorce is now to be 
found in the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973. In Iraq, nationality has been 
regarded as the main basis in divorce jurisdiction. Under the 1951 Iraqi Civil Code the 
Iraqi court was also given jurisdiction to grant divorce when the foreigner resided in Iraq at 
the time of proceedings irrespective of the residence and the nationality of the other party.
This chapter is principally concerned with the jurisdiction of the English, Scottish and 
Iraqi courts in divorce suit to find out in what circumstances the courts have jurisdiction to 
grant a decree of divorce, and whether the existing bases of jurisdiction are capable of 
diminishing 'forum- shopping' and of avoiding, the creation of 'limping marriages', and of 
anomalies and hardship. Further questions need to be considered, e.g since the bases of
4 -  Law  Com.W.P.N® 28  Fam ily Law : Jurisdiction in M atrim onial Causes (O ther than N ullity), para,
13; Law Com, Rep, N“ AS.Family Law: Jurisdiction in M atrim onial Causes, paras. 7-10; Scots Law  
Com . N" 25. Fam ily Law : R eport on Jurisdiction  in Consistorial Causes affecting M atrim onial 
Status, para. 7.
5 - A n  action in  personam  m ay be defined  as an  action brought against a person  to com pel to  do  a 
particular th ing , e .g ., the paym ent o f  a  debt; o r to  com pel him  not to  do som ething, e. g, when an 
injunction is sought; see D icey & M orris, 11th ed, p. 264.
6 - Thom son &  M iddleton, M anual o f  the Court o f  Session Procedure, Edinburgh, (1937), p. 181.
7 - See, in  nullity , Salvesen v.A dm im slrator o f  Austrian property  1927 A .C .541.
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jurisdiction vary considerably from one legal system to another, the possibilities of 
conflicts of jurisdiction will arise. Thus, it is quite possible for the Scottish or English 
court to have jurisdiction on the basis of domicile or habitual residence, and the Iraqi court 
on the basis of nationality, over the same marriage. While the law in England and Scotland 
has established rules to deal with this problem, Iraqi law has completely ignored it. This 
chapter will be divided as follows: I- Jurisdiction o f the English and Scottish Courts. II- 
Jurisdiction of the Iraqi Courts. HI- Conflicts of Jurisdiction.
I- Jurisdiction o f the English and Scottish Courts
The question of jurisdiction in actions of divorce in England did not arise until 1858 
when the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 conferred upon the courts for the first time power 
to grant a judicial divorce a vinculo. Before the 1857 Act, the ecclesiastical courts had no 
power to grant a complete divorce. The only way was by private Act of Parliament.!*) 
The 1857 Act made no reference at all to the bases of divorce jurisdiction!^) and then 
English judges had to find some bases of jurisdiction for their new power. Section 22 of 
the 1857 Act expressed that relief should be given as nearly as may be on the same 
principle on which the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction. The result was that various 
bases of divorce jurisdiction were exercised by English courts. After a long period of 
uncertainty, it was eventually laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that 
"according to international law, the domicile for the time being of the married pair affords 
the only true test of jurisdiction to dissolve their marriage".!^ 9)
The law of Scotland indicates that the development of the rules of jurisdiction in actions 
of divorce began in the sixteenth century and the courts exercised jurisdiction on various 
bases. The law was also clarified by the principle of domicile.! 11) Because the concept
8 - Graveson, 7th ed, p. 28 L
9 -  D icey & M orris, 11th ed, p  .681; 12th ed., p. 713; M orris, 4th ed., p. 180.
1 0 -  M esurier v. Le M esurier[l% 95\ A .C . 517 a t R 540.
1 1 - WarrendervWarrender{\%3S) 2  C 1.&  Fin, 488.
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of domicile is somewhat technical or artificial and because of the refusal of English and 
Scots law to give in any circumstance to a wife the right to acquire an independent 
domicile, difficulties arose. In particular the cases of a married woman whose husband had 
deserted her and acquired a new domicile, or a woman who had married a man domiciled 
abroad! 1 or of those persons who had lived in England or Scotland for some time but 
whose future intentions were uncertain, were likely to give rise to difficulty. Several 
attempts were made to reform the law. The reform culminated in the Domicile and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 which introduced the exclusive jurisdictional bases 
throughout the United Kingdom, i.e domicile or one year's habitual residence of either 
p a r t y . !  13) jt is interesting to study firstly the common law position and secondly the 
statutory provisions.
A- Common Law Jurisdictional Bases
The value of an examination of the law prior to the Domicile and M atrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1973 is that it can provide an attempt to arrive at an appreciation of the 
nature of the new bases and of the permissible scope and function of a jurisdiction basis. 
Attention is focused only upon the main jurisdictional bases before 1974.
1- Place of Celebration of Marriage
There is no clear-cut authority for the proposition that the making of a contract of 
marriage confers jurisdiction upon the courts of the place where the contract was made. 
Nevertheless, before the passing of the Matrimonial Causes A ct 1857 this basis had 
received a certain amount of support in English courts.!^ 4) T^e place of celebration of 
marriage as a jurisdictional basis was influenced by the old idea of marriage as a contract 
and divorce as the rescission of a contract.! 1 It follows that the/om m  celebrationis is
1 2- Mackimion's Trustees v.Inlm td R evenue,1920  S .C .(H  L) 171, 175; Att^ Gen fo r  A l berta v  . C ook  
(1926) A .C. 444.
1 3 - 8.5(2) for England and 8 .7(2) for Scotland.
1 4 -  R V.  L o lley  (1812) 1 R u .&  M y. 2 3 7  a t 2 3 9 ; T ovey  v. L in d sa y {\S 1 3 )I  D ow .643 a t 651 ; 
M cCarthy  v. D ecaix  (1831) 2  R u.&  My. 614.
1 5 -  D icey, 6th ed, p. 217; Palsson , o p .c i t ,  p. 122; Bar,The llieo ry  and Practice o f  Private International
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qualified to decide on all matters of divorce and when the law of the fonun cel-jhrationis 
does not allow divorce the marriage will not be dissolved anywhere.
It is argued that because the courts of the place of celebration of a marriage are 
competent to pronounce upon the validity in form of marriage they should also be 
competent to dissolve it. It has been pointed out that this view is unacceptable because "the 
reasons which lead to the selection of the Locus celebrationis as the forum to determine the 
validity in form of a marriage have no bearing on the questions which arise in a suit of a 
divorce."! Ï
It is difficult to argue the use of the Lex Loci Ceicb-ationis as a ground of jurisdiction 
in divorce, just because it was accepted as such in nullity action,!* 7) at a time when such 
a ground has waned away according to the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 
1973, Moreover, the country of celebration has no interest in assuming jurisdiction in 
cases where the celebration of marriage in such a country was accidental and the parties 
have no strong connection with the Lex CelebrationisSL *)
It is argued that the application of the Locus celebrationis has some advantages in that 
it may protect the court and the parties from some problems relating to proving the domicile 
or residence of parties and under this system there is complete harmony between the choice 
of law and jurisdiction. This argument is illusory and immediately is negated by the 
thought that the Locus celebrationis qua forum  has no strong case to apply its own law to 
grounds of divorce!* unless there are other stronger factors linking at least one o f the
Law, Hannover, 2nd cd, (1889), p. 384.
1 6 G[Mcrk\^c,ConJiirt o f  JurisdictUm in M atriinom al Sidfs, (1938) 19 B.Y .I.L. 25.
17- Simonin v.M alkio  ( I8 6 0 ) 2 S\v.&Tr.67;PadoIecchi(iv.Padolec(:hia(]H6T) A ll. E .R  863 . T h is  did  
nol app ly  ir  the m arriage w as v o id ab le , R oss Sm ith  v .R oss S m ith [\9 6 3 \ A .C  280; Corbet! 
v.Corbe(t[ 1957] 1 W .L .R .486; Prawdziclazarska v. Prawdziriazarska, 1954 S .L .T .4 1.
I 8- Jack V. Jack  (1862) 24 D. 467; Shaw  v. G onld  (1868) L.R. 3 H .L. 55; Harvey v. Farnie (1882) 8 
A PP.C as. 43; De R eneville  v. D e R eneville  [1948] P. 100; Bennie v. Bennie [1949] 21 Scot.Jur. 
481; Law Com. W .P. N" 28; Law Com. Rep. N" 48; Scot Law Com . N ” 25; Report o f  the R oyal 
Commission on M arriage and Divorce. 1956, Cm nd. 9678.
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parties to the forum. The Locus Celebrationis has fallen from favour in divorce conflict 
rules. Not only is it not a ground of jurisdiction under the Domicile and Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1973 but neither is it a ground of recognition in terms of Family Law Act 
1 9 8 6 .(2 0 ) (These provisions apply also to ntillity Jurisdiction and recognition).
2 - Locus o f the M atrimonial Offence
The Locus of the matrimonial offence as a jurisdictional basis reflects the fact that
divorce is a penalty inflicted by the state for offence against the marriage relation.
According to this view, divorce questions, therefore, must be decided by the law of the
country where the matrimonial offence is committed, i.e. Lex Loci D elec ti.01) Support
in favour of applying the Locus of the matrimonial offence seems, it is argued, to be found
in earlier Scottish cases. In several cases Scottish courts assumed jurisdiction simply on
the ground that adultery had been committed in Scotland.and the defender was personally
cited there.(22) In Christian v. Chris,ian.O^) for instance. Lord Cuninghame has 
pointed out that;
"The lb, urn Ildccli is generally a ju st and often a necessary foundation o f  jurisd iction .
The hustxuid can gel no warrant to com pel his wife to return to England. In many cases 
the guilt o f an erring spouse can be m ost effectively and at least expense, especially  in 
the case o f the humble and poor panics, proved on the .spot, 1 concur with the first Lord 
Meadovvbank in the case o f  U tterton in lS I  I, where he gave a c lea r opinion that the 
lorum  detecli was generally a relevant ground of jurisdiction."
Contrast nullity giounds peitaining to lorm al invalidity; Nochhnson v. Nachimson  11930] p. 217- 
Starkowski v. AUoruey General f 1954] A.C. 155; PontlceUi v. PonticelU  [ 1958] P. 204.
2 0 -  Contrast ea rlie r nu llity  cases o f  C orbett v. C orbett (19371 1 W .L .R  48fi; I'rawdriclazors/ta e
Pr({W{lzicfazan'kaA954 S.L .T . 41
2 1- See Dicey. 6th ed., p. 217; Palsson, op.ict., p. 122; Rabcl. The Cm JIir, o f  U m :  A Cotnporative
SliKly, 2nd ed., V. l ,  (1958), p. 425.
2 2 .  Shields V. Shields (1848) 15 D. 142; W M e r  v. W ,/fe r(1 8 4 4 ) 17 Scot-Jur. 87  at 8 8 ; Hat,,,ah  v. 
Hamitth. 1926 S .L .T . 370; Crabtree v. Crabtree 1929 S .L .T . CTS-Matiderson v. Stitherlaad. (1899)
1 F. 621 at 629-630; Slewarf v. Stewarf, 1905 S.L.T. 688 at 670.
2 3 -  (1851) 13 D. 1149 at 1153.
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This ground ofjurisdiction was maintained even after the domicile of the husband was 
established as a jurisdictional basis in divorce actions to cover cases where the matrimonial 
offence took place in Scotland and the husband was domiciled there at the time the 
matnmonial offence was committed, but later abandoned his Scottish domicile/24)
In England there seem to be no reported English decision concerned mainly with 
actions of divorce on this ground. Professor Dicey(2S) pointed out that the fact that a 
matnmonial offence was committed in England does not confer jurisdiction upon the 
English court in an action of divorce. However, in Niboyet v N i b o y e t the Locus 
of matrimonial offence was regarded as supporting a claim to jurisdiction when coupled 
with other grounds. .lames L.J. statea mat: "1 do not think that I am overruling any English 
case... in laying down that where and while the matrimonial home is England, and the 
wrong is done here, then the English jurisdiction exists and the English law ought to be 
apphed."«2 7i the same line of argument Cotton L.J. said: "resident founded 
jurisdiction in divorce by the fact not just that the respondent had been resident in 
England... but also by the fact that, it must be remembered... that the adultery... was 
committed in England."!^*)
The Locus of the matrimonial offence as a ground ofjurisdiction was criticised in the 
earlier Scottish cases. In Jack  v. JackS'^^) for instance, it was held that: "the mere fact 
that adultery has been committed within its territory, cannot entitle it (Scottish court) to deal 
W'ith the status of parties not otherwise subject to its law."
It is difficult to argue in favour of the use of the Locus of the matrimonial offence as a
2 4- Clark V. Clark, 1967 S.L.T. .3 19.
2 5- D iccy, op .cit., p. 217: M ordaitm  v. M oncreijfe ( 1874) L.R. 2 S. C. & Div.  3 7 4 ; W ilsion  v.
WUsioa (1872) L.R, 2 P.& D. 435.
2 6- (1878) 4 P.O. 1.
2 7- At 9.
2 8- At 21.
2 9- ( 1862) 24 D. 475 at 478: P ill v. Piu  (1862) 1 M. l06;,S7f7vcr/ v. Slavert, (1882) 9 R .519:
r. I / )w  ( 1891) 19 R I 15; Fraser, op.cit., p. 1289.
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jurisdictional ground in divorce action, for the divorce purpose is not to provide a remedy 
only to the innocent spouse for a matrimonial wrong committed by the other. The modem 
idea is that divorce should be available to either spouse when the marriage has irretrievably 
broken down. Divorce is therefore the act by which a state dissolves the marriage status. 
It is submitted that matters of status should be governed by a legal system which has a 
serious interest in determining the status of the parties. The Locus of the matrimonial 
offence seems to be inconsistent with this general rule, and, for this reason, decree of 
divorce proceedings founded upon this ground of jurisdiction may not attract recognition 
abroad. Accordingly, the Law Commissions!^®) did not recommend its inclusion and the 
Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 excluded it as a basis of jurisdiction. 
Moreover, the Locus of matrimonial offence has also fallen out of divorce recognition in 
terms of the Family Law Act 1986.
3" Residence as A Basis of Jurisdiction
As a result of the different nature of the respective laws of England and Scotland upon 
the subject of divorce, the courts in Scotland faced a number of applications for divorce 
made by English parties in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Some of them 
established Scottish domicile and others resided for some time. The question therefore, 
was whether such residence might be regarded as conferring jurisdiction on the Scottish 
court.
In Uttorton v. Tew sh f^  1) the marriage was celebrated in England between English
parties. The husband had, many years afterwards, abandoned his wife and gone to
Scotland. The wife petitioned the Consistorial Court in Edinburgh for divorce against her
husband. The majority of the judges dismissed the petition upon the ground that the
husband had not acquired a bona fid e  permanent domicile in Scotland. Accordingly, a
short residential period in Scotland should not be sufficient to found jurisdiction in divorce
3 0- U iw  Com. N° 48, Para. 58; Scot Law  Com . N° 25, para. 9.
3 1» (1811) Fergusson's Rep. 55
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actions. The Court of Session, reversing the decree, held that there was jurisdiction on the
basis of residence and suggested that;
"(he dim es, ob ligations and righ ls lo redress w rongs incident to that rela tion , as 
recognised by the law o t  Scotland attach on all m arried persons liv ing  w ith in  the 
tcrritoiy, and subject to that law w hercsoc\ er their m arriage m ay have been celebrated; 
that jurisdiction or right and duly o f the courts o f Scotland to adm inister justice in such 
m atters over persons not natural born sub jects arises from  the person sued being 
resident within the territory at the time o f their citation and appearance or being duly 
domiciled, and being properly cited. A ccordingly, at the instance o f  petition having a  
sullicicnt m lercst and title and proceedings in due form o f,., if the law refirscd to  apply 
its rules to the rela tions o f husband and w ife ... am ong foreigners in this coun trv .
Scotland could not be deemed a cis ilized countiy^",!^ 2)
The decision was followed in several casesO^) a^d approved by Lord Moncrieff in 
Rin^ei 1 . ChuichillS- “*) The learned judge appeared throughout his judgment to be 
happy with this test and showed a marked inclination in favour of the jurisdiction against a 
defender who had been resident in Scotland for forty days before the action was raised and 
the summons was served. He said: "it is settled that if the defender in an action of divorce
has been resident for forty days within Scotland he is amenable to the jurisdiction of this
court."!^^)
However, these cases ceased to represent the law of Scotland and about the middle of
the nineteenth century were abandoned and replaced by the principle of the matrimonial
domicile.(3 6) It is interesting to observe that in the notable House of Lords decision of 
S/iaw V. G oulcOD  the English view that a Scottish divorce, obtained after the husband
3 2" Ibid al ,58.
3 .Î- Show  I'. Show (1851) 13 D. 819; horresu-r v. l-o rresrer(ifm )  6 D. 1358; See. Fraser, op .cil. p 
1290; Story. Com m auarks on ,he O m jlk , o f U,ws. Foreign and Dom esik. in Regard io Coninux  
Rtghis and Remedies. 2nd cd, London. (1841), p. 273; Diinain & Dykc.s, The Principle o f  Civil
Jurisdinkw As applied in the Law ofScoUand, ( 1911), p. 160.
3 4- (1840) 2 D . 307.
3 5- Ibid, 309.
3 6- Jack V. Jack (1862) 24 D, 475; Low v. Low (1891) 19 R. 115; infra, 51.
3 7- (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 55.
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(upon payment ) had resided for forty days in Scotland so as to confer jurisdiction on the 
Court ol Session, was unacceptable; hence the children of the wife's second marriage to a 
Scotsman were illegitimate in the eyes of English law, and could not succeed under an 
English will.
In the earlier English cases, jurisdiction was found on residence on the analogy of the 
old ecclesiastical jurisdiction to grant the limited divorce a mensa et îhoro. In Niboyet 
v.NihoyetS^^^ for instance, a Frenchman and English woman married in 1856 at 
Gibraltar according to English form. The husband, who had never lost his domicile of 
origin , was residing in England when the wife filed a petition for divorce alleging adultery 
coupled with desertion. The majority of the Court of Appeal, reversing the judgm ent 
below, held that there was jurisdiction on the basis of residence on the ground that the mere 
lesidence of the husband conferred jurisdiction on the ecclesiastical courts in matters of 
judical separation, and other matrimonial causes and consequently that after the 1857 Act 
was passed, jurisdiction in divorce might be exercised in the same circumstances although 
the husband was domiciled abroad.!^
It seems from the decided cases that the courts accepted jurisdiction generally without
discussion as to the character of the residence required to found jurisdiction. There was no
insistence upon immobility of residence, not even in the sense of lengthy duration. The
courts also did not distinguish between the residence of the husband and wife, petitioner or
respondent. The bona fide  resident, not casual nor as a traveller, was sufficient to found 
jurisdiction.!'*®!
The dominance of residence was but short-lived , for in 1895, in Le Mesurier y.Le
Mesurieri^^ the Privy Council disapproved the decision in N iboyet v. N iboyet and
3 8- (1878) 4.P.D . 1, discussed by Moi n s, Cases on Private International Law, 4 lh ed., O xford, (1968), 
p. 107; Brodie v. Bradie (1862) 2 Sw.&  Tr. 259 al 263.
3 9- Al, 6. 22, Sec, Brctt.L .J's opinion, w ho dissented the m ajority o f the Court o f A ppeal, al p. 9.
4 0- Brodie v-. Brodie{]i362) 2 Sw.&  Tr. 259 at 263.
4 1 -  [18951 A.C. 517 at 531.
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advised that: "jijt is not doubtful that there may be residence without domicile sufficient to 
sustain a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, for separation or for aliment; but it does not 
follow that such residence must also give jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage".
It is worthy of note, however, when the principle of domicile became weakened, 
residence was reintroduced as a basis ofjurisdiction but this time with a qualification. The 
most recent formulation of the residence is "habitual". This will be discussed later.!^^)
4- Matrimonial Domicile
Marriage, according to this basis, is a contract, having civil effects and correlative 
rights and duties, the observance and enforcement of which concern the well-being of the 
state itself. The grounds of its dissolution affects the morals and polity of the state. 
Divorce questions, therefore, must be decided by the law of the country where the parties 
have their h o m e , 3 )  i .e., the place of residence of the married pair for the time.
"But the true inquiry, I apprehend, in  every such  case is, w here is the  hom e o r seat o f 
the m arriage for the tim e, w here are the spouses actually resident if  they be together, o r 
if  from  any cause they are separate, w hat is the place in w hich they are under obligation  
to com e together, and renew , or com m ence, their cohabitation as m an and wife"!'* 4)
Matrimonial domicile as a basis of divorce jurisdiction had been adopted by the Scottish 
courts in the middle of the nineteenth century. It was foreshadowed in Shields v. 
Shieldsl^^^) and was first formulated and applied in Jack  v. Jaclj^^^  in which both 
parties were Scottish, and after their marriage they continued to live together in Scotland 
until the year 1855, when the husband went to America, the wife continuing to reside in 
Scotland. Four and a half years afterwards the husband, whilst still in America, brought an 
action in Scotland founded on adultery committed by his wife.
4  2- See, Infra, 67.
4  3- Jack  V. Jack  (1862) 24  D. 467  a t 488.
4 4 -  Ib id ,p e r  L .J .C .Inglis at p ,A ^ \W ilso n  v.W ih on  (1872) 10 M. 573 at 577.
4 5 -  (1852) 15 D. 142.
4 6 -  (1862) 24  D. 467; d iscussed by: B urnet, M atrim onial D om icile in JuisdicHon fo r  D ivorce ,(1895) 7  
Jur. 251.
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Lords Neaves and Mackenzie having decided that domicile was the only foundation of 
jurisdiction in divorce, distinguished between the domicile of tlie husband and the domicile 
of married pair. Their Lordships concluded that: "in order to found jurisdiction in cases of 
divorce, we do not think it always necessary that the parties should have domicile in 
Scotland sufficient to regulate succession"/'*^) Since the proper domicile of the parties 
was in Scotland it followed that the court had jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage, and also 
that the remarks quoted must be regarded as obiter.
This ground ofjurisdiction was subsequently applied by the second Division in several 
cases/4*) In Pitt v. PittS^^^  for instance, the court, reversing Lord Kinloch below, 
held that there was jurisdiction on the ground that the husband's residence in Scotland had 
been such as to make that country the domicile of marriage.
The useful concept of matrimonial domicile fell into abeyance in England after Le 
Mesurier until Indyka v. In d yka f^^ )  when Lord Reid saw advantages in this doctrine 
and remarked that in many cases he found:
"it easier to say w hat am ounted to  a  m atrim onial hom e than to  say w hether there was 
th a t anim us m onendi n ec essa ry  to  c re a te  a  d o m ic ile  o f  choice."!®  *) H e  
recom m ended, "reviving the o ld  conception o f the m atrim onial hom e and ., .holding that 
"if the court w here that hom e is grants decree o f  d ivorce, we should recognise that 
decree".!® ^)
The principle of matrimonial home as stated in the earlier Scottish cases was a liberal 
and welcomed approach. There is no doubt that the combination of the unity of domicile 
rule with, in England, the adherence to a restrictive view of jurisdiction resulted in 
hardship. However, it seems that the main difficulty of this basis lies in defining the nature
4  7- Jack  V. Jack  (1862) 24 D. 467  a t 488.
4 8 -  Hume v. Hume (1862) 2 4  D. 1342, 1343; H ook v. Hook  (1862) 24  D. 488 , 489.
4 9 -  (1862) 1 M . 106, 119.
5 0 -  [1967] 2 A L L E R . 689.
5 I -  Ibid, at 699.
5 2- Ibid, at 702; See, Infra, 146.
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of the residence sufficient for the purpose and to fix the matrimonial home where parties are 
living in different countries, and to fix it in law when no matrimonial domicile in fact has 
been yet e s t a b l i s h e d / ® 3) p iff  for instance, the court fixed the
matrimonial home in Scotland, despite the fact that the wife had never been there. Here in 
the facts of this case one would think matrimonial home is a misnomer. Moreover, to 
apply the matrimonial domicile might require the court to assume jurisdiction in cases 
where there is no current connection between the parties and the forum. This seems to be 
contrary to the general principle for the assumption of jurisdiction, viz that divorce should 
not be granted to persons without real and substantial ties with a forum.!® 5) the same 
line of argument Lord Watson rejected any notion that jurisdiction could be founded on the 
existence of a matrimonial home, remarking that:
"it w ould  be very  rash  to  a ffirm  th a t, acco rd in g  to  th e  law  o f  S co tland  m ere  
m atrim onial dom icile affords any ground for ju risd iction  to  divorce. There is no  trace o f 
the doctrine to be found in the institutes o f  Scottish  law  o r  in the ea rlier decisions o f 
the court."!®®)
5: Domicile of the Husband at the Commencement of Proceedings
The tendency of the courts to hold that the domicile of the husband at the time of the 
commencement of proceedings is the only proper ground of jurisdiction in actions of 
divorce emerged shortly after the passing of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857/®'^ ) In 
Wilson V . W / /S O /2 ,! ®  *) for instance. Lord Penzance said:
5 3- See, Burnet, (1895) 7  Jur. 251 255.
5 4- (1862) 1 M.106.
5 5- Scot Law Com. N'* 25, para. 38.
5 6 -  Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [1895] A .C . 517 a t 534; Jack v. Jack (1862), 24  D. 4 7 5 , per Lord 
D eas, a t 534; Low v.Low (1891) 19 R. 115; Dombrowitzk v. Dombrowitzk (1895) 22  R. 9 0 6 ; 
Toylor v. Taylor (1883) 21 S .L .R . 18; Hunter v,/7fr«/(?r(1893)30S.L.R .915;5/avcri( v. Staverl 
(1882), 9 R. 5 19 ; Manderson v. Sutherland{ 1899) 1 F. 621; See, A nton, 1st ed , pp. 31 1 , 312 ; 
D uncan & D ykes, op.cit., p. 162; F raser, op .cit., p. 1277.
5 7- Tollemach v.Tollemach (1859) 1 Sw .& Tr. 557; Ratcliff v.Ratcliff (IS59) 29  L .J.P .&  M  171.
5 8- (1872) L .R  2 P&  D 435  at 442 ; Niboyet v. Niboyet (1878) 4  P .D  1 per B rett L .J a t 25 ; Bater v. 
Bater [1906] P. 209
54
"U IS the  s trong  in c lin a tio n  o f  m y ow n o p in io n  that the on ly  fa ir an d  sa tis la c to ry  ru le  
to ad o p t on  this m atte r o f  ju r isd ic tio n  is to insist upon the parties  in  all cases re fe rrin g  
the ir m atnm om a! d iffe rences to the cou rt o f  the coun try  in w hich they arc  dom iciled".
1 he leading authority for this principle is Le Mesurier v. Le Me.iurierS^^) which was 
followed in Scotland within a few years.(«<» The facts were: The husband was a British 
subject domiciled in England and the wife was domiciled before her marriage in France. 
The husband instituted proceedings for divorce from his wife where he had been residing 
in Ceylon for more than nine years. A district court granted decree nisi.. The wife pleaded 
that the district court had nojurisdiction. The case went to the Court of Appeal of Ceylon 
which reversed the decision of the district court. The husband appealed to the Privy 
Council on the ground that the Ceyion court had jurisdiction and he based his appeal on the 
grounds that, although he had retained his English domicile of origin, Ceylon was the 
domicile of marriage. Lord Watson having rejected the Scottish view of matrimonial 
domicile,(« 1) suggested that: "the domicile for the time being of the married pair affords 
the only true test of jurisdiction to dissolve their m a r r i a g e " . («2)
It IS clear for argument that the justification of the principle of domicile as a basis of 
jurisdiction relied on the fact that marriage and divorce are questions of personal status, 
namely marriage is a contract which creates or constitutes a special status, so divorce is the 
act by which, a state through a public authority, dissolves or puts an end to the marriage 
status. The law then which enables a court to decree an alteration in the status of husband 
or wife as such, is the law of the country to which by domicile they owe obedience, the 
only court which can decree by virtue of such law being a court of that c ou n t ry . 3)
The principle of domicile as the sole test of jurisdiction was universally accepted by 
S9-  [18951 A.C. 517.
6 0- Mamfersonv. Sutherland, 1899.1 F .621 .
6  ! - Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [IS95] A .C . 5 1 7  a t 534,
6 2- Ibid, a t 540.
6 3 -  D iccy& M om .s, 911, cd., p. 301: Wc.stlake. op.cil., p. 86; Gravcscm. C owparali.e C on jlic  o f  
Selecled Essays. V. I . (1977). p. 268; Nihoyel v. Nihoyet (1878) 4  P.D 1 /w ,  Brett L.J. a( p. 25.
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English and Scottish c o n r t s ( « 4 )  and it followed from it that there should be only one test 
of jurisdiction and only one court capable of dissolving a particular marriage i.e the court of 
the parties' domicile. In the words of Lord Haldane: "nothing short of a full juridical
domicile within its jurisdiction can justify a British court in pronouncing a decree of
divorce"/^
The place where the parties had resided,(««) their nationality,^?) where the
marriage took place,(6«) their submission to jurisdiction(«9) and the motive in acquiring
thedomicde(7 0) g^e irrelevant. It is submitted that the rule in U  Mesurier v. Le Mesurier
did not established the law on a rational and satisfactory basis. The case itself illustrates
clearly enough the diff.cullies with this solution to the problem. The emphasis on the fact
that jurisdiction in divorce actions belongs exclusively to the courts of domicile coupled
the rigid rules governing the acquisition and loss of domicile led to obvious
inconvenience and frequent difficulties for some persons. Here were parties who had
resided for more than nine years in Ceylon. Both Ceylon and England had provisions of
law under which divorce might be granted on a showing of the facts which were actually
present in that case. Yel, the decision was that the courts of Ceylon, where the parties
were, could not grant that divorce. The proceedings could be brought only in England,
many^ s a n d s  of miles away, with an obviously great increase in the expense, difficulty
6 4 -  Duncan & Dyke.,, op .ci,.. p. 164; Falconbridgc. cn ,he C o,,flic, o f  U nrs. Toronlo, (1947),
p .612, Wasilakc, op.cit., p .84; Che.,lure, The In ien im hiM l Validity o f  D ivorce  (1945) 61 L.Q.Rev. 
356; Anion, \t i^ < :A ..p .3 \5 ^ \^ ie [y .l> r o h le im o fD h m c e J ,,m d ic ,io ,,r i\9 S l)  1 I C L Q  7993, 03, '  
Cook. The , .ag ira i and Legal lU ves o f  the Conflict o f  Lav,s. Combndge. (1942), p. 4.58; Orisvvold’ 
l> tyorce.l„n sd icllo ,,a ,,dR ecap,i,io ,, o f  D ivorce Decree.s: A Contparatlve Stady. (1965) 65 H.LRcv.' 
193; .Morn.,. Ca.ve.y on Private Interna,ional Law, p. , 14: G nnc.son, 7lh cd p. 2 8 1 - North op ci I
(1977), p 25. ’ ■'iui, up .cu ,
6 5- Ixmi Advocate v, Jaffrey f 1921} ! A.C. 146 at 152.
6 6- Goidder v. Goukier ( 1892} P. 240.
6 7- Nihoyet v. Niboyet (1878) 4  P.D. 1.
« 8- Ihown V.  Brown, 1967 S.L.T. 44; (k m ld v . G™W.1968 S.L.T. 98.
1 ”■ «.V "'n«ll9291 P. 1; Cotnntell v. C otnntell
f 1964(1 3 Ali.E.R. 255.
7 0- Marchant v. Marchant, 1948 S.L.T. 143.
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and delay involved in achieving the result which was basically authorised by the law of 
either country. The Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Acts (1920-1950)(7 •) 
removed this particular injustice in relation to persons residing in territories to which the 
Acts applied. By these Acts it was clearly recognised that a divorce might be granted by the
court of a state in which the parties were not domiciled.
It IS  also clear that this rule when coupled with the long established British view that the 
married woman [until 1st January 1974] shared her husband's domicile during the 
mamageC 2) meant English and Scottish courts had no jurisdiction to entertain an action 
of divorce by the wife unless the husband was domiciled in the jurisdiction at the time of 
proceedings or as far as Scotland is concerned, at the time the matrimonial offence was 
committed. The result of this led to hardship to a wife whose husband deserted her and 
acquired a new domicile, or a woman who had married a man domiciled abroad.!? 3)
It is not surprising that steps had to be taken to remove this hardship and to give a wife
relief. Sir Gorell Barnes P. in Ogden y. O g d e n ,O A )  though he asserted that there was
no real exception to the principle that jurisdiction to grant divorce depends on domicile,
then advised a remedy for the deserted wife by regarding the pre-marriage domicile as
sufricieiit to found jurisdiction. The learned judge also would give a remedy to a wife
whose mamage was declared to be void by the court of the husband’s domicile. In this
case a woman would be a wife in her own country but not in her husband's domicile. He
advised "to treat her as having a domicile in her own country which would be sufficient to
7 1- See. D icey, 6 th ed., pp. 379, 380; G risw old , (1965) 65 H ar L .R ev 197; .Anton, l.st ed , p. 313 ; 
GiaVLSon, 71 h cd., p. 285 , N oted in (1951) 4  l.C .L .Q . 247; Keyes v. Keyes (1921) P. 204. These 
A cts ha\'c been replaced by Ihc Fam ily Law A cl 1986. S .68 (2) and Schcd, 2.
7 2 -  Maekimwn's Tnislees v. M a n d  Revenue. 1920 S .C  (H .L ) 171; Low v. Low  (1891) 19 R 115 . 
Ah-G en-for M h em  v. Cook  11926, A .C  4 44 ; lx,rd Advocate v. Gnffrey [1921] 1 A C 147- 
Oanlmaitev. Gar,I,wade 11964] P. 356; O raveson. (1954) 70 L .Q .Rev. 500; WoKT, op.ict., p. 1 2 , ! 
A nton,. Lst ed., p. 173: N orth, op.cil., (1993), p. 58.
7 3- Dicey, 6 ih ed., p. 232; Cheshire, (1945 61 L.Q.Rev. 3 5 7 .
7 4- [1908] R  46  at 81; v. Armylage [18981 P. 168 at 185.
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support a suit".(?3) The effect oï Ogden y. Ogdm  was given in two undefended cases, 
Suithaws V. StathalosOf,) and De montaigu v. De monlaigu.aV  In both cases, the 
husband, who was domiciled abroad, deserted his wife and obtained a decree of nullity 
from the court ol his domicile on the ground that the marriage which took place in England 
was formally invalid by the lex domicilii. In both cases English court granted a decree of 
divorce to the wife although her husband was domiciled abroad at the time o f the 
proceedings. In the later case. Sir Samuel Evans P. expressed:
"I think it is better, where necessary, in a  case like this, to m ake an exception from  the 
ordinajy rule that dom icile governs these cases and to grant a decree as a practical way 
ol giving the petitioner w ile  the redress to which she is entitled.
These decisions did not go long unchallenged. The first reaction came from the House 
of Lords in the Scottish appeal of Lord Advocate v. Jqffrey,09) m which it was decided 
that the mere existence of grounds of a divorce or separation is not of itself enough to 
enable a wife to set up a separate domicile. Hence the Scottish court had no jurisdiction to 
entertain a divorce petition by a wife whose husband had acquired a new domicile, despite
the alleged desertion and adultery he had committed.
On the same lines, it was held in Att-Gen for Alberta v. that a wife
judicially separated from her husband was not entitled to petition for divorce in any other
country but that of her husband’s domicile. Effect was given to these cases in H v. 
/ / . ( 3  1) and Herd v. HerdS^^) which finally repudiated the decisions in Ogden v.
7 5 -  Ogden v. OM -«119081 P. 46 a t 82. A llhough this is an inlerc.sling approach o f Ogden, the decision
ilsd l is a notoiiously bad one in the conOict o f laws.
7 6- [191.3] P, 46.
7 7- 11913] P. 154.
7 8- Ibid, at 156.
7 9- [19211 I A .C. 146; See also, cases as M ackinnon’s Trustees v. Inland Revenue, 1920 S .C  (H .L)
171, Sec, M ackinnon, Lcf/ti/mg Casrs in the Internationa! Private Ixtw o f  Scotland, p. 7 .
8 0- 11926] A.C. 444; discussed in (1926) 40 H ar.L.Rev. 134.
S Ï -  [1928] P. 206.
8 2- [1936] P. 206.
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OgdenS^ Stathatos v. Stadmtos^^ "*) and De montalgu v. De montaiguS^
The failure of judicial opinion to remove the hardship of a married woman prompted 
legislative action to remedy the situation and Parliament interfered by introducing the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1 9 3 7 , which provided in Section 13 that where a wife had 
been deserted by her husband or where her husband had been deported from the United 
Kingdom, and the husband was immediately before the desertion or deportation domiciled 
in England, the court should have jurisdiction for the purpose of any proceedings 
concerned with divorce notwithstanding that the husband was no longer domiciled in 
England/^ The Act did not extend to Scotland, because such a jurisdictional basis 
existed already/^
The Scottish rule and the 1937 Act were a clear departure from the underlying rule in 
the Le Mesurier's case. They were not broad enough, however, to cover certain cases, 
particularly the cases where the husband was domiciled abroad at the time of desertion, or 
the cases when the husband removed from England or Scotland, acquiring a domicile 
elsewhere, and thereupon committed a matrimonial offence in his new domicile.
The result was the Matrimonial Causes (War Marriages) Act 1944, which was passed 
to meet the numerous cases of women marrying men resident but not domiciled in England 
and Scotland. In effect jurisdiction under this Act was based on the continued residence of
S 3 -  [1908] P. 46.
8 4 -  [1913] P. 46.
8 5 -  [1913] P. 154.
8 6- See, C heshire, (1945) 61 L .Q .R ev. 358; S tone, (1954) 17 M .L .R ev. 246; Falconbridge, op .c il., p. 
615; G risw old, (1965) 65  H ar.L  Rev. 198; N orth, op.cit., (1977), p. 27.
8 7 -  R e-enacted as S. 18 ( l) (a ) ,  8 .4 0  ( l) (a ) ,  8 .46  ( l) (a ) ,  M atrim onial C auses A cts. 1950, 1965, 1973, 
respectively, repealed by D om icile and M atrim onial Proceedings A ct 1973, Schedule, 6.
8 8 -  Appleby v. Appleby (1882) 19 S .L .T . 682; Hammv. Hanna (1895) 3 S .L .T . 163; Light v. Light, 
1903, 11 S .L .T . 100\ Main V. Main, 1912, 1 S .L .T . 493; Mangriilkar v. Mangrulkar, 1933 S.C . 
2 39 ; Redding v. Redding (1888) 15 R. 1104; Cordon v. Cordon (1847) 9  D. 1293; Croswell v. 
Croswell (1881) 8  R. 901; See, F raser, op.cit., p. 1289; D uncan & D ykes, op.cit., p. 170.
8 9- AM  V. C,D (1845) 7  D. 556; Cordon v. Cordon (1847) 9  D. 1293; D icey, 6th ed, p. 234; W olff, 
op. cit., p. 77.
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the wife in England and Scotland. The Act was of a temporary nature which applied only 
to marriage celebrated during the war period, 1939-1950, between a husband at the time of 
marriage, domiciled abroad and a wife who was immediately before the marriage domiciled 
in England or Scotland. The court should have jurisdiction as if both parties were at all 
material times domiciled in England or Scotland.(^
The Committee on Piocedure in Matrimonial Causes reported that the previous Acts did 
not go far enough to meet the case of a married woman.(^ 1) The result was the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) A ct 1949(^^) which created a new basis of 
jurisdiction without reference to domicile and operated only where the husband was not 
domiciled elsewhere in the British Isles. The Act entitled the courts to have jurisdiction in 
proceedings by a wife notwithstanding that the husband was not domiciled in England or 
Scotland if she was resident in England and Scotland and had been ordinarily resident there 
for a period of three years immediately preceding the commencement of the proceedings 
and the husband was not domiciled in any other part of the United Kingdom or in the 
Channel Islands or the Isle of Man.(^
Although the Act mitigated the most serious hardship occasioned by the rule in the Le 
Mesurier^ it is submitted that it did not establish the law on a satisfactory basis. It created 
a state of discrimination between sexes: while the wife could raise an action against her 
husband upon her residence, a cross-action by the husband would appear to be 
i n c o m p e t e n t . ( ^ 4 )  Moreover, the use of the words 'resident' and 'ordinarily resident' 
caused difficulties over the meaning of both terms and the character of the residence
9 0- G reen, The Matrimonial Causes (War Marriages) Appointed Day, Order 1950, (1950) 3 In 't .L  Q 
417; Lately, (1952) 1 L C L .Q . 221.
9 1 -  Final Report, Com d, 7024, p. 30.
9 2- D iscussed by G raveson, (1950) 3 In't. L .Q .371.
9 3- S .l  (1) Re-enacted as S .1 8 ( l) (b ) ,  S .40  ( l ) ( b ) ,  S .46  ( l) (b )  M atrim onial C auses A cts 1950, 1965, 
1973 respectively .R epealed by D om icile and M atrim onial P roceed ings A c t 1973, S chedu le ,6. F or 
Scotland, See, S .2 (1) repealed by D om icile and M atrim onial A ct 1973.
9 4 -  Levett v. Levetit [1957] P. 156; Tursi v. Tursi [1958] P. 54.
60
required to tound jurisdiction.
At one time it was said that ordinary residence means little more than simple 
residence.*».') In Hopkins v. H opkinsf^^)  Pilcher J. had Interpreted the word 
ordinarily resident with direct reference to the rule in income tax cases*»?) and he 
expressed the view that the addition of the word ordinarily added nothing of legal 
significance to the requirement of residence and there is no ground for applying a different 
meaning to the words resident and ordinarily resident over a defined period. The wife in 
this case had lived in Canada with her husband for five months and during this period 
neither she nor her husband had any home of their own in England, then she returned to 
England where she immediately instituted proceedings for divorce on the ground of cruelty 
and desertion. The action was dismissed on the fact that the period of three years had been 
broken in the sense that no connection with England was maintained for the five months, 
her residence and ordinary residence was with her husband in Canada within the meaning 
of the 1949 Act and therefore, she was not ordinarily resident in England during the three 
years immediately preceding the commencement of the proceeding.
A similar approach was adopted in the Scottish case of Land v. LandO^) where it 
was held that the wife's residence for two months in Holland prevented her from being 
regarded as ordinarily resident in Scotland because "when she left Scotland she did no^ 
leave there a home of her own. She left a single room which she had in her sister's home
and so far as the evidence goes she never returned there. It cannot, therefore, be said that
she left or retained a home in S c o t l a n d " / 9  9)
» . '-  G ricw . Adoplion A C  I95R: Some con /U c Im pU ca,U ,„M 959) 8 l.C .L .Q . 569; Anton, 2n cd, p. 
» 6- [19511 R  n 6 ;S c c ,  M ann, (1954) 3 l.C .L .Q . 685; Farnw orlh, (1951) 67 L .Q .Rev. 32; note, (1950)
9 7 -  l.R.C. V. t.y.mghi [19281 A.C. 244, Leven v. / .« .C .E [  19281 A .C .2I7 .
9 8 -  1962. 8.L. r. 316. Contrast with C ah etv . Cabel, 1974 S.L.T. 295
9 9- Ib id . }x>r L ord W hcallcy , iil 317.
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A contrary view was suggested, namely that ordinarily resident means something more 
than mere physical presence, in other words, physical presence with some decree of 
continuity. On the other hand, uninterrupted presence is not necessary and temporary 
absence may be innocuous!I ** )^as where a wife joined her husband for some weeks abroad 
on holiday or even spent months with him while he worked abroad provided she did not 
sever her connection with the forum court.
The meaning was considered by Karminski J. in Stransky v, Stransky^^^D  in which 
the wife spent fifteen months of three years in Munich, where her husband had been 
employed for some time. During the whole period of those years, she had maintained a flat 
in London where the parties lived from time to time and she had never let the flat and had 
kept it ready for occupation as a permanent home during the absences abroad.
The learned judge interpreted the meaning of ordinarily resident, using the decisions on 
income tax points as of assistance only. He concluded that the use of the two terms in the 
1949 Act was not either meaningless or accidental. The term of resident must be at the time 
of the institution of proceedings and the term ordinarily resident as a requirement of the 
preceding three years.
It is clear that one of the difficulties about ordinary residence as a basis of jurisdiction in 
an action of divorce is that it was interpreted with reference to the income tax cases. It is 
submitted that the term residence must be interpreted in every case in accordance with the 
object and intent of the Act in which it occurs.!^ ® Since the income tax cases deal with 
different words from those in the context of the 1949 Act, it follows that it is undesirable to 
import the decisions of the meaning of residence for tax purpose into family law. The
1 0 0 -  Cheshire & N orth , 12th ed ., p. 169; N orth, op .cit., (1977), pp. 12-13; M cC lean, The Meaning of 
Reisdence, (1962) 11 l.C .L .Q . 1153, 1161, 1166; D icey & M orris, 9 th  ed., p. 301.
10 1 -[1 9 5 4 ] P. 428; discussed by M ann, (1954) 3 l.C .L .Q . 685; Macrae v, Macrae [1949] P. 397; Cabel 
V. Cabel, 1974 S .L .T . 295; Lewis v. Lewis [1956] 1 A LL.E .R . 375; d iscussed by B olm , (1956) 5 
l.C .L .Q . 290; R v. Barnet I.x>ndon Borough, ex pshah [1983] 2 A LL.E .R . 309.
1 0 2 -  A nton, 2nd ed., p. 198.
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relevant question in tax law is whether a person is subject to a particular country's tax laws 
which may demand an answer quite different from whether a person should be able to 
invoke the jurisdiction of a particular country. The necessary degree of connection may 
well be higher in jurisdiction than in tax cases. ( 1 If Parliament had intended such a 
result then it is difficult to follow the view that the word ordinarily added nothing of legal 
significance to the requirement of residence. In the absence of a specified period, the 
expression of ordinary appears superfluous but when a period of three years is required 
then that expression is relevant and must be given its natural meaning to indicate that a 
jurisdiction should not be invoked without real and substantial connection and if that 
connection was established a jurisdiction should not be ignored simply because the wife 
spent some time abroad.
The jurisdictional basis of ordinary residence has been abolished and replaced by 
habitual residence of either party for one year.!^®4) An important question is whether 
habitual residence is a stronger or weaker connecting factor than ordinary residence. This 
question will be discussed later.
B- Statutory Jurisdictional Bases
The jurisdiction o f the courts at common law to entertain petitions for divorce had 
grown in a haphazard manner. It was uncertain, complex and anomalous in many respects. 
It is generally agreed that a person with a real and substantial connection with a country 
should be able to invoke the jurisdiction of that country. Although it is not easy to define a 
test as to what constitutes such connection, it is submitted that a long residence in a country 
satisfies any reasonable test of real and substantial connection.!^ The common law 
jurisdictional bases failed to meet such a test. Thus, persons who lived in England and 
Scotland but whose future intentions were too uncertain to establish domicile there, were 
unable to obtain divorce. It is equally true that in order to discourage "forum-shopping"
103- H all, (1975) 24  l.C .L .Q . 1 a t 26.
1 0 4 -  SS.5 (2)(b), 7  (2)(b) o f  the D om icile and M atrim onal Proceedings A ctl973 .
1 0 5 -  See, Infra, 147.
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and to avoid the creation of "limping marriages'' a person with no real and substantial 
connection with a country should not be able to invoke the jurisdiction of that country. The 
common law jurisdictional bases failed to achieve these objectives. Thus, as a result of the 
technical rules of domicile, a person may be regarded as being domiciled in England and 
Scotland which he has never visited and with which he has no real social connection. 
Nevertheless, he was able to invokejurisdiction on the ground of his domicile of origin.
Similarly, the Scottish jurisdictional basis of matrimonial offence might be ciiticised as 
affording relief to wives who no longer reside in Scotland, with the result that decrees of 
divoice proceeding upon it might be refused recognition abroad.
I he common taw jurisdictional bases created a state of discrimination between husband 
and wife. While the wife could raise an action for divorce based upon her own residence, a 
cross-petition by the husband would appear to be incompetent.*» ««) Similarly, while the 
hiKsband could raise an action based upon his own independently ascertained domicile, an
action by the wife on this ground was unacceptable.
In 1972, the question of jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings was examined by the 
Law Commissions.*'®?) They recommended the abolition of the common law and 
statutory jurisdictional bases, and the enactment of a new statute containing all the rules 
relating to the jurisdiction m matrimonial proceedings; a recommendation which has been 
implemented in the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act I973.*'#*) This Act 
introduced the exclusive jurisdictional bases in actions of divorce and other consistorial
causes throughout the United Kingdom, i.e., domicile or one year's habitual residence of
either p a r t y . 09)
1 0 6 -  fx've// P. I.eve/// [1957) P. 15rt.
1 0 7 -  U ,w  Com. W.P.N" 28; Law Com. Rep. N" 48; Scots Law Com. N” 28; Memorndum N" 13.
I f)8- The ,-\ci came into lorcc Iron, 1st January 1974. See. Leslie, ./«r/.vrf/rtiu,, /„ C om istorM  Cousev 
Afjeclmg M,„rimonk,t Sum s, (1973) S.L.T. (N ew s) 21; C live, The New Law on JnrhdkUon in
Divorce, (1973) S.L.T. (News) 249; H artley & Kar.slen, (1974) 37 M .L.Rev. 183.
1 Ol 0 9 -  SS.5 (2) loi England and 7 (2) for Scotland, N othing affect,s the court's ju risd ic tion  to certain any 
proceedings begun before January L 1974, .S S .6 (4 )(b ), 12(b).
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1- Conflict Between Domicile and Nationality
The question before the Law Commissions was whether there was any m erit in 
adopting nationality as an alternative to domicile or should domicile be retained? In the 
earlier Scottish case of Brunsdon  v, DunlopS^^^^) the Court of Session held that 
nationality was not a sufficient connecting factor to justify the Scottish court in involving 
itself in the status of parties not domiciled or resident in Scotland. An opposite view was 
taken in the English case of Dond  v. Dond (1^1) and had been preceded in Deck  v. 
Decld^ 12) where it had been held that divorce could be granted on the ground that "both 
parties were natural bom English subjects,., and the allegiance could not be shaken off by 
change of domicile. The husband therefore, although he became domiciled in America, 
continued liable to be affected by law of his native country,"
These cases as Dr, Cheshire said "have never been treated with respect".(H ^) 
However, nationality as a basis o f jurisd iction  was disapproved in N iboyet v, 
Niboyet^^^^) and ever since the courts have never relied on it in exercising divorce 
jurisdiction.
The Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce saw advantages in the principle of 
nationality in that it would allow people to resort to the British courts who would otherwise 
be debarred from such access and recommended that the courts should have jurisdiction to 
hear a divorce suit if the petitioner was a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, and 
was domiciled in a country the law of which referred the question of personal status to be 
detemrined by the law of his national state and did not permit divorce to be granted on the 
basis of his domicile or residence.!^ 15)
1 1 0 -  (1789) Fergusson's Rep, 260.
1 1 1 -  (i8 6 0 ) 2 Sw. &  Tr. 93,927.
1 1 2 -  (1860) 2 Sw .&  Tr. 90, 926  a t 927.
1 1 3 -  C heshire, (1945) 61 L .Q .Rev. 355; M orris, 2nd ed., p. 136.
1 1 4 -  (1 8 7 8 )4  P.D. 1 at 25.
1 1 5 -  1956 C om .9678 , paras. 811 , 840 -844 . F o r com m en tary  See, M ann, (1958) 21 M .L .R ev . 1; 
G rodecld, Recent D evelopm en t in N ullity Jurisdiction , (1957) 20  M .L .R ev , 566 ; W illiam  L atey ,
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The Law Commissions, when considering this matter, expressed their concern that if 
nationality sufficed there arose a risk of 'forum shopping’. They pointed out that 
nationality is not a strong connecting factor to justify the person's status being determined 
by the court of that country, particularly in the United Kingdom. Here a person who is a 
citizen of this country "will have a choice of three courts in which to petition for divorce 
and might select a court in a part with which neither party has or had any connection".(I I *)
Furthermore, the principle of nationality, on the one hand led to more than one court 
having jurisdiction to dissolve the same marriage such as in the case of double nationality. 
On the other hand, it led to absence of remedies for persons who are stateless. In the result 
the Law Commissions recommended! 1  ^?) that nationality should not be introduced as a 
ground of jurisdiction in actions of divorce, even in the restricted circumstances proposed 
by the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce.
Although adopting nationality as the prime connecting factor in the place of domicile is 
unwelcome, it is submitted that the reasons given by the Law Commissions are not free 
from doubt. The point that nationality is a weak or inadequate connecting factor in that it 
would allow a person to invoke the jurisdiction of a country which he has never visited and 
with which he has no real social connections is inconvenient in that the domicile principle in 
certain circumstances would also allow a person to invoke the jurisdiction of the English 
and Scottish court which he may never have visited.
The argument that a citizen of the United Kingdom would have a choice of several 
jurisdictions is academic. Although England and Scotland have their own legal systems, it 
is submitted that the English substantive law of divorce is substantially similar to that in
Q.C, (1956) 5 l.C .L .Q . 499. Professor G utteridge advocated the princip le o f nationality  as a  basis of
jurisd ic tion  in condition that the lex fo r i  should govern the grounds o f  divorce, (1938) 19 B .Y .B .I.L .
38.
1 1 6 -  U w  Com . Rep. 48, para. 22; Law  Com. W .P. N® 28, para. 34 ; Scots Law  Com . N“ 23, para 34.
1 1 7 -  Law  Com. N“ 48 , para. 25; Scots Law  Com. 25 ,.para 36,
66
Scotland. Accordingly, it is thought that an Englishman would resort to the English courts 
and a Scotsman to the Scottish courts, In any event, nationality is a stronger connecting 
factor than habitual residence for one year of either party. In principle, one year is not a 
long period of time, particularly when the personal law of the parties is not to be applied, 
and it does not denote a substantial connection. It allows a pereon deliberately to choose to 
reside temporarily within the jurisdiction with a view to taking advantage of its law of 
divorce, A nationality on the other hand may not be changed simply because a person so 
wishes to obtain divorce, since a change of nationality involves a public act.
The recommendation of the Royal Commission on M arriage and Divorce that 
nationality should be a ground in an action of divorce in certain ciiCmiistances*"*) is 
attractive since it would allow a remedy to those who are domiciled abroad but still holding
British nationality, A decree of divorce founded upon such a ground of jurisdiction will
receive wide recognition abroad.
2 - The Suprem acy o f Domicile
Having rejected nationality as a ground o f jurisdiction, the Law Commissions 
concluded that domicile should be retained as a ground even if a general residential ground 
was also adopted,*' ' ») Despite the defects of domicile, the Law Commissions pointed out 
that jurisdiction based upon it will often achieve the basic objectives oT rules of jurisdiction 
m divorce actions, namely those of including persons with substantial connection with the 
forum and of excluding persons without those connections,*' 20) Thus, domicile meets 
the needs of persons who are permanently settled in England and Scotland, Moreover, 
jurisdiction based on the domicile principle meets the needs o f persons who, for business
OT other reasons, reside abroad but who still retain their domicile. Hence, the Scottish Law
1 1 S- paras. 81 L 840-844.
I 19 Law Com. N 48, paras. 17-26; Scots Law Com. N'" 25, paras. 48 -64 ;.Leslie, (1973) S.L .T . (News)
-1 ,  C In c , ( 1973) S.L.T. (News) 249; Hartley, & Karstcn,. (1974) 37 M .L.Rev. 183.
1 2 0 - .Scots L.™ Com, N" 25. para, 4S: Law  Com. N" 48, para,7; C heshire & N orth, I2lh cd p 634 '
North, op.cil., ( 1993). p. 62.
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Commission pointed out:
"It is traditional and common for Scotsmen to pursue careers in other parts o f the 
United Kingdom and in foreign countries with the fixed intention, nevertheless, o f  
returning to Scotland at a later stage of their lives. In many cases, their children are 
being educated in Scotland and they retain strong social connections there. In these 
circumstances, it would seem wrong to deny them resort to the Scottish court to 
determine their matrimonial status, paiticularly since tliey may be resident in countries 
which regard nationality as the appropriate criterion for jurisdiction in consistorial 
actions and whose courts might expect them to have their matrimonial affairs dealt with 
by the courts of the state of their nationality".!1 21)
Since a married woman can acquire a domicile independently of her husband,! 12 2) the 
Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 states that the domicile of the husband or 
that of the wife at the time of the commencement of proceedings founds jurisdiction in a 
divorce action brought by either p a r t y . ! 1 2 3 )
As has been mentioned earlier, domicile as a connecting factor does not necessarily 
indicate a sufficient connection between the parties and the forum to justify applying its 
law. However, if the proposals of the Law C o m m i s s i o n s ! 124) t o reform the present rules 
of domicile are implemented by legislation, then this anomalous result will be removed and 
only persons with a genuine connection can raise divorce actions.(at least under the 
jurisdictional basis of domicile).
3- Habitual Residence as A Basis of Jurisdiction
The domicile principle as a sole basis of jurisdiction is too narrow. It does not meet the 
needs of persons who have been living in England and Scotland for some time but whose 
future intentions are uncertain. There is much to be said for making residence a further 
basis to enable such persons to invoke the divorce jurisdiction. But what sort of residence, 
and for how long? The Law Commissions emphasised that the new basis should be
1 2 1 - Ibid, para. 51.
1 2 2 - S .l o f the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973. Supra, 31.
1 2 3 - S.5 (2)(a) for England and S.7 (2)(a) for Scotland.
1 24- Law Com. N“ 168 & Scots Law Com. 107; See, supra, 30.
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sufficiently stringent to discourage forum shopping and to ensure that English and Scottish 
divorces should be readily recognised abroad and indicate stability of ties within the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . !  1 2 5 )  Accordingly, the Law Commissions considered three adjectives, viz 
permanent, ordinary, habitual. The first was thought to be objectionable as suggesting an 
intention to settle which is at least as strong as that required for a change of d o m i c i l e . !  1 2  6 )  
The second was rejected to avoid the restrictive effect of Hopkins v. Hopkins^^'^D and 
Land v, LaW!128) and to avoid tying the law on jurisdiction too closely to the law of 
taxation.(12 In the result the Law Commissions concluded that the appropriate adjective
of residence is one which "may continue despite limited period of absence", and "is more 
than occasional or casual residence whatever the period "and that this could be correctly 
described by using the term "habitual r e s i d e n c e " . ! !  2 0 )
Although the general idea is that the adjective 'habitual' refers to a residence of a certain
stability in a country, it is not free from difficulties to define. It has been said that habitual
residence is the same as domicile or the centre of the social relations of an individual.!! 2 !)
Dr.Graveson argues that habitual residence is "Lying midway between domicile and
residence... differs from ordinary residence in its quality of continuing for substantial
period and from domicile in its lack of the need for permanence".!! 2 2)
125» Law Com. Rep, N*^48, paras. 7-10; Law Com W.P. N®28, pai'a. 13; Scots Law Com. 25, paras.
65-79.
126- Law Com. Rep. N"48, para. 53.
1 2 7 - [1951] P. 116; See, supra, 60.
1 2 8 - 1962 S.L.T. 316; See, supra, 60.
1 2 9 - Scots Law Com. N° 25, para. 71; Clive, (1973) S.L.T. (News) 249.
1 3 0 - Law Com. Rep. N®48, para. 42. The notion of habitual residence appears in the early work of the 
Hague conference on private international law. It has increasingly adopted by the International 
Conventions, e.g. Hague Convention on Guardianship (1952), on Adoption (1964), on Recognition of  
Divorces and Legal Separations (1970), on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction(1980). 
The concept has been employed in many areas of English and Scots law, e.g. SS. 15,28 Matrimonial 
and Family Proceedings Act 1984, See, infra, 96; S.46 Family law Act 1986, See, infra, 171; Child 
Abduction and Custody Act 1985.
131- Palsson, op.cit., (1978),.p. 77; North, op.cit,, (1977), p. 14; Mc'lean, Recognition o f Family 
Judgments in the Commonwealth, London, (1984), p. 29.
1 3 2 - Graveson, 7th ed., p. 194.
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This view was reinforced by Lane J. in Cruse v, in which the learned
Judge accepted the argument that habitual residence "is similar to the residence normally 
required as a part ot domicile, although in habitual residence there is no need for the 
element of animus which is necessary in domicile". Habitual residence required the present 
intention to reside not the future intention as in domicile and this ought to be assumed from 
the fact of continuous residence.! * 24)
Habitual residence in contrast to domicile cannot be conferred on a person by the 
operation of law. There is no habitual residence of origin or habitual residence of 
dependence. It is a question of fact whereas domicile is a legal c o n c e p t . ! !  2 5 )  Moreover, a 
person can be habitually resident in more than one p l a c e . ( 1 2 6 )  However, such duality of 
habitual residence has been rejected in the context of Child Abduction cases when Lord 
President (Hope) in Dickson v. D/c/cvouH 27) held that: "[a] person can, we think, have 
only one habitual residence at any one time". It is interesting to note that the learned judge 
in this case appears to accept that a person can be without a habitual r e s i d e n c e . !  1 2 8 )
The nature of residence requires of its being habitual that it must not be temporary or of 
a secondary nature. Habitual denotes a regular physical presence which must endure for
1 3 3 - [19741 2 A L L .E .R  940; discussed by Hall, G .,f 1975) l.C .L .Q . 1 ; Parry, (1975) C .B .R .L . I l l  135;
N ote, (1974) 4  F am ily  law  152. T h is  case co n cern ed  w ith  the concep t as em p loyed  in th e  R eco g n itio n  
ol D ivorces and Legal S epara tions A ct 1971); Sec now . F am ily  L aw  A ct 1986.
13 4- Law  C om . Rep. N " 4 8 , para . 42 ; C hesh ire  & N orth , 12th cd ., p. 170.
13  5- Sru/hoN V. Snim rni 1990 S .C .L .R . 55 7  at 58 1 ; C. v. S. [1990] 2 A li.E .R . 4 4 9  a t 4 5 4 ; Re J (A 
Minor) ( Ahdurlion: C usiody Rights) [1990 ] 3 W .L .R .4 9 2 ; C h esh ire  &  N o rth , 12lh ed.', p. 170; 
M c 'lean , o p .e il.. p. 31 ; C live, 3 rd  ed ., p. 6 1 1.
1 3 6 - Cheshire & North, 12th ed., p. 170; C live. 3rd ed., p. 613; Hall, (1975) l.C.L.Q. 1 at 27. It has
al.so been said that a person can be o rd in a rily  residen t in more than one p lace ; LR.C. v.Lysaght [1928] 
A .C .2 3 4 ; Hopkins v. H opkins [1951] P. I 16; R v. narnet London Borough, ex p  Shah [1983} 2  
A .C . 3 0 9  at 342 ; Brit to v. Secretary o f  Stase fo r  the Home Department [ 1984] I m m  A R  93.
1 3 7 -  [1990] S .C .L .R . 693  a t 703 . D iscu ssed  by, E lizab e th  B .C raw fo rd , '^Habitual R esidence o f  the 
Child" Ay the connection fa c to r  in ch i/d  Abduction Cases: A consideration o f  Recent. C ases,{1992) 2 
J .R  111 a t 182. S u ch  d u a li ty  has a lso  been  re jec ted  in the conte.M o f  a d o p tio n , S ec  B lo m , The 
Adoption Act 196S and the Conjlict o f  Laws, {\9 1 3 ) 22 l.C .L .Q . 109, 135-136.
1 3 8 -  Ibid at 703 ; See. E !i/.abcth B. C raw fo rd , (1992 )2  J R  177 at 187.
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some time. In Oimdjian v. O u n d jk n ir im  French J. states that habitual residence does 
not require continual physical presence in a country and can continue despite a considerable 
period of absence. In this case the judge held that the respondent was habitually resident in 
England for the purpose of divorce jurisdiction even though she spent 149 days of the 
relevant year elsewhere. While a person can cease to be habitually resident in a single day 
by leaving the country and having no intention to go back to it,( M») it is submitted that it is 
not easy to decide how long this period of residence must be to establish "habitual". In V. 
V. B (A minor) (Abduction),* > 4 D an habitual residence was acquired after less than three 
months residence in Australia. The same view had been previously taken in Dickson v. 
Dickson^ 142) when Lord Caplan held that: "the child had lived for two months in England 
.. .a considerable period in the life of a young child .. .it is difficult to see where else could 
be described as his normal home during that period". On the other hand, Lord President 
(Hope) took the view that: "a habitual residence is one which is being enjoyed voluntarily 
for the time being and with the settled intention that it should continue for some time".*'43)
This view is supported by the House of Lords in 7(Arninor) (Abduction: Ctistody 
Rights)* 14 4 )  where it was held that residence for an "appreciable period of time and settled 
intention" to reside on a long term basis are needed for acquisition of a new habitual 
residence. When the words "habitually resident" must be satisfied at a particular time as in 
the cases above (Child Custody and Child Abduction) and in relation to the recognition of 
foreign divorces under the Family Law Act 1986 the period of habitual residence is 
irrelevant. What is decisive is whether the residence may be accounted habitual. It is 
submitted that the court must look at the nature of the residence o f the person's life to 
decide whetherornot habitual residence was acquired at the relevant date. Hence a person
1 3 9 -  f 1980] 10  F am ily  L aw  90  at 9 1.
1 4 0 -  Dirhson v. Dickson 1990, S.C.L.R. 693 al 699; C. r  .S'. fl990] 2 ALL.E.R. 4 4 9  at 4 5 4
1 4 1 -  [1991] F .L .R . 266,
1 4  2- IÎ9 9 0 ]  S .C .L .R . 693 at 700.
1 4 3 -  Tbici, a i7 0 3 .
1 4 4 -  [1990] 2 A .C . 562  al 578-579 .
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may be accounted habitually resident in a country even though he is not resident there at a 
particular time.
Under the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 the word habitual residence 
in England and Scotland throughout a one year period ending with the date on which 
divorce proceedings wei*e begunt^^^) refers not only to the quality of residence but also to 
its quantity. This means that for the purpose of divorce jurisdiction a person must be both 
habitually resident in England or Scotland and this residence must have lasted for the year 
immediately preceding the commencement of the proceedings. A person cannot be 
habitually resident in England and Scotland throughout a year if he has never been there at 
all during that yean(146) the other hand, a person who has lived for a year in England 
and Scotland may be habitually resident throughout the year. The stability and duration of 
ties with England and Scotland are important factors by virtue of which residence can be 
characterized as habitual.
Conflicting views have been expressed judicially and academically on the question as to 
whether habitual residence is different from ordinary residence. One view suggested that 
"the essential difference lies in that ordinary residence does not require the element of 
habitation which is crucial to habitual residence" .(147) In the same line of argument it was 
said that "habitual residence differs from ordinary residence in its quality of continuity for a 
substantial p e r i o d " .048) Support for this view it is submitted is to be found in Cruse v.
in which Lane J. thought that:
"ordinary residence is different from habitual residence in that the latter is something 
more than the former and similar to the residence nonnaUy required as part of domicile, 
although in habitual residence there is no need for element of animus which is 
necessary in domicile".
1 4 5 - SS.5 (2)(b), 7 (2)(b).
146- Cf, Timibnll v. Inland Revenue (1904) 7  F. 1; See, Clive, op .c it, p. 612; and also, 1973 S.L.T. 
(News) 249.
147- Hall, (1975) I.C.L.Q. 1 at 27
148- Graveson, 7th ed., p. 194; Hartley & Karsten, (1974) 37 M.L.Rev. 183.
1 4 9 - [1974] 2 ALL.E.R. 940 at 943; Hack v. Hack\\916\ 6 Family Law 177.
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A contrary view was expressed by the House of Lords in R v. Barnet London 
Borough ex p  ShahO^«> in which Lord Scarman concluded that: "ordinarily resident" 
meant that the person must be habitually and normally resident here, apart from temporary
or occasional absences of long or short duration".
I'he same view was adopted by Bush J. who accepted jurisdiction to hear a petition 
filed by a husband who arrived in England in Atigust 1981 and who had been granted 
limited leave to remain until June 1984. His Lordship referred with approval to the
decision of the House of Lords in the Shah case and said:
In m y v iew , there  is no  real d is tin c tio n  to be d raw n  betw een  o rd in a ry  an d  h ab itua l 
residence . It m ay  be tha t in so m e c ircu m stan ces  a  m an  m ay be  h ab itu a lly  re s id en t 
w ith o u t b e in g  o rd in a rily  re s id en t, but I c an n o t a t the  m om en t c o n c e iv e  o f  su ch  a 
s itu a tio n ... H ab itua lly  m eans settled  prac tice  o r usually , o r, in o th e r w ords, the sam e as 
o idinary lesidcnce , a vo lu iita iy  residence w ith a degree o f  settled  pu rp o se ."(  ^^  f)
This
Dickson c. Dickson{\S2) said:
' affirmed in recent Abduction cases when Lord President (Hope) in
"In our op in ion  a  hab itua l res id en ce  i.s one  w hich  is being  en jo y ed  vo lu n ta rily  fo r the  
tim e being  an d  w ith  se ttled  in te n tio n  tha t it shou ld  c o n tin u e  fo r  so m e tim e . T h e  
concept is the sam e lo r  all practical pu rposes as that o f  o rd inary  residence".
Although the equation of the two terms was welcomed by some a c a d e m i c s !  *  ^3 )  j (  
was the view of the Law Commission,(1*4) doubt must be expressed as to whether the 
cases on ordinary residence are a reliable guide to the meaning of habitual residence in the 
context of divorcejurisdiction.(I**) Professor Anton has said: "The equation of 'ordinary
residence' with 'habitual residence' brings with it the danger that rules appropriate to the
1 5 0 - |1 9 8 3 |2 A .C . 309iU 342.
1 5 1 -  Kapur v. Kapur \^9m\ F .L .R . 920  at 926.
1 5 2 -  f I9 9 0 j S .C .L .R . 693 a t 703 ; Sec a lso  V. B (A Minor) ( Ahdiction] [1991] F .L .R . 2 2 6
153- Cheshire & North, I2lh cd„ p. 170; Bloni„{ 1973) 22 I.C.L.Q. 136; M'clean & PalcheU, Englhh
Jurisdiclion in Adopfiou, (1970) 19 I.C .L .Q . 1 a t 16.
1 5 4 -  L aw  C om . Rep. N" 48 , para. 42.
1 5 5 -  C live, 3rd cd ., p. 612.
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former concept will be applied unthinkingly to the l a t t e r " , U 5 6 )
In the light of the House of Lords decision in the Shah case, it seems that if a person is 
ordinarily resident in England or Scotland for one year then he will also have been 
habitually resident here for the same p e r i o d , U 5 7 )  jf  this is correct, one consequence of 
this is that such a person can invoke the divorce jurisdiction of the English and Scottish 
courts. This is an undesirable result since there is much force in the fear that ordinary 
residence for one year may come to mean no more than p r e s e n c e .^  5  8)
A question may arise, namely was the substitution of one year's habitual residence for 
three years ordinary residence reasonable? The Scots Law Commission concluded in 
favour of a period of one year as follows:
"No length of residence is by itself a clear guaiantee of the durability of a person's ties 
with a country, and the need to ensure dumbility of connection must be balanced against 
the need to ensure that a spouse whose marriage has in fact broken down should not 
have to wait too long for his matrimonial affairs to be regularised. Nor does any period 
of time afford a clear guarantee against forum-shopping. But the fact is that few people 
will be both able and willing to reside in Scotland for more than a year simply to lake 
advantage of our divorce or ancillary provision. Most people have to work to earn a 
living and in some cases immigration controls and the need to obtain work-permits 
would be a barrier. For the few, there are other countries with less strict rules of 
procedural and substantive law in the realm of divorce. We agree, loo, that the period 
selected should be one likely to attract recognition abroad”. H
Against this argument one might strongly argue that the longer a person remains in a 
country the greater the likelihood of establishing strong ties with the society concerned. 
Accordingly, a period of one year is too short to distinguish effectively between persons 
who are bona fide  habitually resident in this country and those who came to England or
1 5 6 - Anton, op. cit., pp. 149, 152; R. v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, exp. Siggws[l9S5\ Imm.A.R.
14.
1 5 7 - Clive, 3rd ed., p. 612, n. 14; cf, Kapur v. Kapur [1984] F.LR. 920 at 926.
1 5 8 - See, cases like Hopkins v. Hopkins [1951] P. 116; Ijind v. Land 1962, S.L.T. 316; See, supm, 60.
1 5 9 - Scots Law Com. N® 25, para. 78
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Scotland seeking to obtain a divorce decree. (1^^) Relying on the matter of fact that 
English and Scottish courts apply the lex fori rule in divorce c a s e s , U 6 l )  a period of one 
year is not a sufficient connecting factor to justify the application of the law of the forum, 
since it allows a person deliberately to choose to reside temporarily with a view to take 
advantage of English and Scots divorce law. Conflict lawyers continue to disagree on the 
strength of meaning of habitual when applied to residence. In any event this period is too 
short.(l ® 2) In the light of the House of Lords decision in the Shah case, it seems that the 
jurisdictional basis of three years ordinary residence by the wife under the 1949 A ct is a 
stronger connecting factor than habitual residence of either party for one year under the 
1973 Act,
/
/
Another query arises: whether the jurisdiction should be founded upon the habitual 
residence of both parties or upon that of the petitioner or respondent or either of them. It is 
submitted that habitual residence of both parties within the jurisdiction is impractical, for 
the introduction of such jurisdictional basis is aimed to meet the needs of spouses one of 
whom perhaps must work abroad,! or to help the spouse deserted in Britain.
It is commonly recognised in so many legal systems that the forum courts may assume 
jurisdiction on the ground that the respondent is habitually resident within its jurisdictional 
competence. This acceptable jurisdiction rule has been firmly adopted in the Hague 
Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Divorces and Legal Separations of 1970, for it 
provides clearly that a foreign divorce shall be recognised if the respondent is habitually 
resident in the forum country when the proceedings are begun,!^ ^  and therefore it would 
seem to be an acceptable choice of jurisdictional rule.
1 6 0 “ Wade, Residence As a Jurisdiction basis on English Conflict of L m w s  Relating to Matrimonial 
Carnes, University of Hull, (1974), p. 186.
1 6 1 “ See, Infra, Chapter Three.
162 -See, Leslie, 1973 S.L.T. (News) 21 at 23.
1 6 3 - Memomndum N° 13, para. 46.
164“ Art. 2(1).
75
The petitioner's habitual residence has been also adopted by this Convention as a basis 
ol recognition of foreign divorces and legal separationU^S) this residence, unlike the 
foïmei jurisdiction rule, must be accompanied by a reinforcing factor, viz, either that it 
should continue for not less than one year im m ediately prior to the date of 
proceedings! 166) or that the spouses last habitually resided together there.! 16 7) ^aw
Commission declined to follow the Hague Convention in distinguishing between the 
petitioner and the respondent and it was held that habitual residence should be treated as a 
ground of jurisdiction equal in weight to domicile.!» 68) xhe Domicile and Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1973 accepted this view when it stated clearly that the habitual residence of 
the husband or that of the wife at the time of the commencement of proceedings found 
jurisdiction in a divorce action brought by either party. ( » 69)
M ateria l Tim e
The question of what time the connecting factor must be found is very important,
because it follows that jurisdiction may be acquired or lost or that a marriage which was
valid at the date of the contract may became invalid or vice versa, by a change of the
connecting factor. !» 70) ^ t  one time it was said that the connecting factor must be satisfied
at the date of the commencement of the proceedings and exist at the date of the decree of
d iv o r c e .!» 7») On the other hand, some argument exists in favour of the view that the
connecting factor must be found at the time when the proceedings are commenced, not at
the later time when the case is tried!» 7 2) and a change of connecting factor, therefore is
im m aterial(»7 3) and the  court w ill retain its ju risd iction .!»  7 4) “T h e  ju stif ic a tio n  for such  
1 6 5- A rl. 2(2).
16  6- A ll. 2(2)(a).
Î 6 7 -  A lt. 2 (2 )(b ); c l. M atrim onial and  F am ily  P roceed ings A ct 1984, Part IV.
1 6 8 -  U w  C om . Rep. N" 48 , p a ra  4 7 ; S co ts Law C om . 25. para. 83.
» 6 9 “ S .5  (2)(b) lo r  E ngland  and  S .7  f2 )(b ) fo r Scotland .
!70-  PaLs.son. o p .c it., ( 1978), p. 120.
» 7 1- Hnrvcy v Farnie ( 1880) L  R 5  P .D . 153 at, 162.
I 7 2 -  Che.shirc, 6 ih  cd ., p. 384.
1 7 3 -  D icey  & M orris , I Uh cd, p. 6 83 ; 12(1, c d „  p. 71 4 ; A „u ,n , 1st cd , p. 3 1 6 ; D u n can &  D)-kc,s, o p .c it ..
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rules, as Dr North has said, is to prevent one spouse , over whom the court has jurisdiction 
when the proceedings are commenced, from frustrating the objectives of a petitioner, 
domiciled and resident abroad, by abandoning his domicile before the trial in order to 
prevent the case being heard”.! » 7
The Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 makes it clear that the domicile 
and habitual residence as connecting factors in divorce proceedings must be satisfied at the 
date when the proceedings are begun and any change after that is immaterial. However, 
there is an exception to this general rule relating to cross-proceedings where the connecting 
factor must be found either at the time of the original proceedings or of the cross- 
proceedings.! » 76) ^  {g interesting to note that prior to 1973 the jurisdiction of English and 
Scottish courts did not extend to a cross-petition presented by the respondent. Thus, in 
Leveîî V’. Levett and Smith,D7'I) an Englishman domiciled in England married a German 
woman resident in Germany. The wife left the husband and went to live in Germany. She 
presented a petition in Germany for the dissolution of her marriage on the ground of her 
husband's cruelty. The husband in those proceedings cross-petitioned for divorce on the 
ground ol the wife's adultery. The German court granted a decree to the husband and 
dismissed the wife's petition. The husband presented a petition asking the English court 
for a declaration that the divorce granted by the German court had validly dissolved his 
marriage. The court dismissed the petition holding that Section 18 (l)(b ) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 was enacted to enable a wife to obtain relief which she could 
not otherwise get and did not confer a right on a husband respondent to a wife's 
proceedings to present a cross-petition.
p. 156,
1 7 4 - / .  eon v. Uu)n\ 1967] P .2 7 5  al 284,
1 7 5- O p .c iL , p. 29.
1 7 6 -  S S .5  (5), 7 (5 ) o f  Ihc D om ic ile  and  M atrim o n ia l P ro ceed in g s  A ct 1973 ; 8 .4 7  (1 ) o f  th e  F am ily  law  
A ct 1986; S .4  ( I ) o f  the R ecogn ition  o f  D ivo rces and  U g a i  S ep ara tio n s  A ct 1971 ; C h c rh irc  &  N o rth , 
I2 lh  cd ., p. 654 ; C live , 3 rd  cd ., p. 6 63 ; M orris , 4 th  cd ., p. 182.
17 7 - 1 1957] P. 156, 168; ap p lied  in Russet! v. Russet! and Reotuick[\957] P. 375 .
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This rule is clearly unsatisfactory if its effect is that, where a husband finds a competent 
divorce action directed against him in any country, he should not be be able to raise a 
cross-petition t h e r e . ( 1 7 8 )  This rule prevents the courts from considering all the issues 
between the p a r t i e s . ! ^ 7 9 )  The cross-petition seems to be increasingly recognised in 
modem law, e.g. it is accepted by article 4  of the Hague Convention on the Recognition of 
Divorces and Legal S e p a r a t i o n s . ! ^ * 0 )  Since 1 9 7 4 ,  the Domicile and M atrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1 9 7 3  makes provisions for jurisdiction to be assumed in a cross- 
petition.H * 1) if three conditions exist: firstly, that the court had jurisdiction to entertain 
the original petition by reason of the grounds laid down in sections 5(2) or 7(2); secondly, 
that the original petition is still p e n d i n g ; ! ^ ® ^ )  thirdly, the cross-petition must be brought in 
respect of the same marriage.
The 1973 Act provides that the court also has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for 
divorce by the extension of the rule of cross-proceedings itself,! e.g. a wife petitions 
an English court for judicial separation on the ground of her habitual residence there at the 
time when the proceedings are begun, but before the petition is heard she abandons her 
English residence. A cross-petition for nullity is brought by the husband. The court will
have jurisdiction if the proceedings for judicial separation are pending. The proceedings
for judicial separation are abandoned. The husband (the cross- petitioner) changes his 
cross-petition from nullity to divorce. In this case the court will have jurisdiction if the 
nullity cross-petition is still pending even though neither party is domiciled or habitually 
resident in England at the time when the cross-petition for nullity and for divorce are 
begun.!! ^ 4) It may be convenient to mention that the 1973 Act conferred to the courts
178- Memorandum, N" 13, para. 49.
179- Law Com. Rep. N® 48, para. 48.
1 8 0 - See, S.47 of the Family Law Act 1986.
1 8 1 - Hartley & Karsten, (1974) 37 M.LRev. 184; Clive, 3rd ed., p. 613; Rayden, op.cit., p. 50; Palsson, 
op.cit., (1978), p. 122.
182- See, S. 12 (4).
1 8 3 - This is seen from the parenthetic phrase in SS.5 (5), 7  (5), 13 (5) (' or of this subsection').
184- Morris, 3th ed., p. 190.
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further jurisdiction. This appears in the case where the proceedings are brought by the 
same petitioner. For instance, a wife, who is domiciled and habitually resident in Scotland, 
petitions for judicial separation. She abandons her domicile and habitual residence, while 
the judicial separation proceedings are pending, and decides to petition for divorce. The 
court will have jurisdiction over divorce by reason of its jurisdiction over judicial 
separation.!!*^)
H- Jurisdiction of the Iraqi Court
Until the beginning of this century there were no explicit rules regulating civil 
jurisdiction in the international sector. It was clearly held that the general statutory 
provisions governing the domestic cases applied also to conflict c a s e s . ! !  *6) it is only 
much later with the increase in international mobility after the first world war that the Iraqi 
government saw the practical need for establishing new rules setting out the grounds upon 
which the forum court may assume jurisdiction in cases involving foreign elements.
The 1925 Iraqi Constitution stated that the Iraqi court may assume jurisdiction in 
criminal and civil proceedings over all persons living in Iraq at the time when the 
proceedings began without distinguishing between nationals and foreigners or petitioners 
or r e s p o n d e n t s . ! !  *7) it is therefore clear beyond any doubt that an Iraqi court might 
assume jurisdiction in divorce proceedings on the basis of either party's residence in Iraq at 
the time of the commencement of the proceedings.
The 1931 Code governing the personal status of foreigners established for the first time 
civil courts!!**) alongside the existing religious courts!!*^) to deal with personal status
18 5 - North, op.cit., (1977), p. 31; Clive, 3rd ed., p. 613,
1 8 6 - Civil and Comtnerial Procedure Code 1879.
1 8 7 -  Arl. 73.
18 8 - Art.2; See, also, Art, 33 of the Civil Procedure Code 1968; Art.22 of the Judicature Act N" 160 of 
1979; The Religions Courts for the Christian and Mosaic Denominations Act N” 32 of 1947; 
Armenian Orthodox Act N'*70 of 1931. In 1948 the jurisdiction for Catholic Denomination was
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matters concerning foreigners. The test to define the powers of civil and religious courts in 
divorce proceedings depends on the religion to which the parties b e l o n g . ! » 9 0 )
Muslim Iiaqi nationals!» 9 \) and foreigners, as well as Muslim foreigners who are subject 
to the civil law in their country, such as Turkey, have recourse to the Iraqi civil courts, 
whereas Iraqi Muslims and Muslims foreigners who are subject to Islamic law in their 
country, such as Egypt, have recourse to the religious courts. The difficulty is in the case 
where the husband is Muslim and the wife is not. The question arising here concerns the 
jurisdictional competence, i.e which court has power to entertain divorce proceedings? The 
law was silent, but according to the Islamic general rules they have recourse to the religious 
courts. However, this option merely seeks to cater for religious sensibilities, for there is 
no difieience in the choice ol law/ adopted by the different courts. In all cases the courts 
principally apply the national law of the husband.! » 9 2) The 1931 Code made no reference 
at all to the basis of divorce jurisdiction but the courts continued to grant a divorce on the 
ground of eithei party s residence in Iraq at the time of the proceedings by virtue of article 
73 of the 1925 Iraqi Constitution.
The 1951 Iraqi Civil Code has made important changes as far as the jurisdictional rules
are concerned. 1 his Code has adopted the principle of nationality as the test of the personal
law! » 9 3) the major connecting factor in civil jurisdiction as well as the traditional basis 
of residence.
transferred  to the C i\ i! C ourts, .to, N N " 2646 . 1948, and in 19.51 the Religious co u rts  fo r  the Mosaic 
w as abolished  and the ju risd ic tion  w as iran.sfcrrcd to  the C i\ i l  C o u rts , Jo , N" 2927 , 1951; A b b as, M . 
o p .c it., p. 160.
1 8 9 -  A lts  26 -28  Jud ica tu re  .Act N" 160 ot 1979; A rt. 3(K) C i\ il P rocedure C ode 1968; S ee , Faricd  F atyan , 
Conflu-î oj laws ( 1973) 2  J. Jan 26 ; A dam -A l N adaw y , Civil Procedings Law, B aghdad , (1 9 8 8 ), p. 
93 (In  A rab ic); A ll-H adw ay , o p .c it., p. 236.
1 90 - A dam -A l N adaw y, o p .c it., p. 93
19  1- S uch  ju r isd ic tio n  is ex e rc ised  by C a th o lic , A rcm cn ian  O rth o d o x  A c t N '' 8 7  o f  1963; S y rian  
O rthodox  A ct N" 107 o f  1963.
1 9  2- Infra , chap 3.
1 9  3- A rt. 18, See, supra, 34
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There are now only two grounds o f jurisdiction over divorce proceedings, i.e . 
nationality!!^4) and residence.!!
A- Nationality as A Basis of Jurisdiction
The text of article 14 reveals that the Iraqi nationality of the respondent at the time 
divorce proceedings are commenced is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Iraqi 
courts.!! ^  <î) This article can give rise to difficulties of knowing exactly the position of the 
converse case namely, where the petitioner only is the holder of Iraqi nationality at the time 
of the proceedings. It is submitted that a narrow interpretation of article 14 leads to a clear 
result that the Iraqi nationality of the petitioner is not a sufficient ground for exercising 
jurisdiction. This result is unsound and illogical. The nationality of the petitioner should 
be a sufficient ground equally with that of the respondent. This view is consistent with the 
accepted rule in Iraq namely, that the status and capacities of Iraqi nationals are governed 
by the Iraqi law and with the view that the court of the forum (nationality) is the appropriate 
court to afford protection o f its nationals. It is equally clear that a decree of divorce 
proceeding upon the nationality of the petitioner is always worthy of recognition 
abroad.!!^?)
Accordingly, the wording of article 14 should be interpreted to the effect that the Iraqi 
courts should have jurisdiction to entertain divorce proceedings if either the petitioner or the 
respondent is an Iraqi national at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. It is 
therefore, immaterial which of the parties -petitioner or respondent, husband or wife- has 
the Iraqi nationality, and so are the domicile and residence of the parties.!! It is also 
immaterial that the Iraqi national may, under the law of some foreign country, also be a 
national of that country.!!^ Hence it is submitted that nationality as a head of jurisdiction
1 9 4 - Art. 14.
1 9 5 - Art. 15.
1 9 6 - All-Nadawy. op.cit., p. 77; All-Hadway, op.ict., p. 238.
1 9 7 - See, S.46 o f the Family Law Act 1986 and Art. 2 o f the Hague Convention on Recognition o f  
Foricgn Divorces and Legal Separations o f 1970; See, Infra, 171.
1 9 8 - All-Hadway, op.ict., p. 238.
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may lead to more than one court having jurisdiction to dissolve the same marriage. The 
systematic preference for Iraqi nationality appears arbitrary and difficult to justify and it 
may lead to the granting of divorce in Iraq to persons who are most closely connected with 
a foreign country. The nationality of Iraq in the case under discussion should not be a 
sufficient ground of jurisdiction unless the person concerned is most closely connected 
with Iraq.
B- Residence as A Basis of Jurisdiction
Article 15 of the Iraqi Civil Code 1951 provides that the courts will assume jurisdiction 
in cases involving a foreign national if he is the respondent and happens to be within Iraqi 
territory. It is interesting to underline that the wording of article 15.(happens to be within 
Iraqi territory) is inconclusive and irrational, for it gives rise to a wide interpretation. It has 
been argued that a mere presence within the territory for a few days is sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction upon the courts.!^»*»!)
This view seems to be based on the territorial theory by virtue of which a state assumes 
jurisdiction over all persons and things within its frontiers. This view is strongly criticised 
and stigmatised as unworthy to apply in cases of divorce, for dissolution of marriage 
involves a change of status that affects not only the parties but also the society to which 
they belong. The aim of this article was to avoid the difficulties which might arise from the 
principle of nationality if it were to be treated as the only basis of divorce jurisdiction, and 
to meet the needs of spouses neither of whom was an Iraqi national at the time of the 
proceedings. It is a matter of policy which requires that the words "happens to be within 
Iraqi territory" be interpreted with a view to ensuring that a decree proceeding upon this 
basis receives a wide recognition. Accordingly, the words "happens to be within Iraqi 
territory" must indicate stability o f ties within Iraq and must be construed to mean domicile. 
It is important to emphasise that the Iraqi law uses the term domicile to mean the same as
1 9 9 -  Cf, Torok v. Torok [1973] 3 All.E.R. 1001.
2 0 0 -  All-Hadway, op.cit,p. 236.
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habitual residence.!^»» !) The residence that confers jurisdiction under article 15 is that of 
the respondent. The residence of the petitioner is not a sufficient ground. This restriction 
was not to be found in the 1925 Iraqi Constitution. It is hard to understand the policy 
behind this restriction. However» if the policy is to avoid 'forum-shopping', one might 
strongly argue that this risk should not be exaggerated, unlike the position in English and 
Scots law, in the context of Iraqi law. For the Iraqi courts in exercising jurisdiction over 
divorce proceedings have regard to the personal law of the parties.!^
It seems that the jurisdictional basis of residence under article 15 is not working well as 
an additional basis in divorce actions to avoid the difficulties arising from the principle of 
nationality. Thus, one consequence of this article is that stateless persons and political 
refugees cannot invoke Iraqi courts even if they have been living in Iraq for a long time. 
However, it is thought that the Iraqi courts can assume jurisdiction over stateless persons 
and political refugees by virtue of article 30 of the 1951 Civil Code. This provides that "the 
principles of private international law apply in the case of a conflict of laws for which no 
provision is made in the preceding articles". The New York Convention of 1954 Relating 
to the Status of Stateless Persons!^**) and Geneva Convention of 1951 Relating to the 
Status of R e fu g ee s !^ * p ro v id e  clearly that in the contracting state in which he has his 
habitual residence, such a person shall enjoy the same treatment as a national in matters 
pertaining to access to the court. This solution has been adopted by several legal 
sy stem s!^ !» an d  according to article 30, the Iraqi courts should treat those persons on an 
equal footing with Iraqis in invoking jurisdiction if they are domiciled (habitually resident) 
in Iraq.
2 0 1 -  Article 42 of the 1951 Civil Code describes domicile as "the place where a person temporally or 
permanently resides, and a person may have more than one domicile at the same time". See, Hammed 
Mostapha, op.cit., p ,46.
2 0 2 -  See, Infra Chapter 3
2 0 3 -  Art. 16.
2 0 4 -  Art. 16.
2 0 5 -  See, Palsson, op.cit,, (1978), p, 120.
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Material Time
It is the rule in Iraqi law that the jurisdictional grounds under articles 14 and 15 must be 
satisfied at the time of the commencement of proceedings. As soon as the action is 
considered instituted the jurisdiction established at this moment remains fixed and any 
change later is immaterial. It is interesting to note that the Iraqi law, unlike some legal 
nationality s y s t e m s , ( 2 0 6 )  rejected the proposition that the Iraqi nationality at the time of 
marriage is a sufficient ground for assuming jurisdiction.!^* 7) It is submitted that the Iraqi 
solution is sound, for the Iraqi court has no interest in assuming jurisdiction in cases where 
neither party is an Iraqi national or resident in Iraq at the time of proceedings.
However, there is one exception to the general rule that the jurisdictional bases must be 
found at the time of the proceedings and that is in relation to the cross-petition where the 
jurisdictional bases must be satisfied either at the time of the original proceedings or the 
cross proceedings. The Iraqi law gave the respondent the right to raise a cross-petition and 
the petitioner to a supplemental petition provided that the court had jurisdiction to entertain 
the original petition on the ground of nationality or residence and that a petition is still 
pending in respect of the same marriage.!^**)
I ll  Conflicts of Jurisdiction
The widening and the difference of the bases of jurisdiction in the Domicile and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 and in the 1951 Iraqi Civil Code created the likelihood 
of concurrent proceedings in different jurisdictions in relation to the same marriage. Thus, 
under the present jurisdictional rules it is quite possible for the English court to have 
jurisdiction on the basis of domicile, and the Scottish court on the ground of habitual 
residence, or both on the basis of domicile or habitual residence and the Iraqi court on the
206- See, art. 3(7) of the Egyptian Procedure Code; Azzedeen Abdallah, op.cit,, p. 683.
207- It should be noted that the Iraqi nationality at the time of marriage is considered as a choice of law
rule. See, Infra, Chapter Three
208- Arts. 66,67 and 86 of the 1969 Civil Procedure Code. See also, Adam All-Nadway, op.cit., p. 17
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This passage was described by Lord Shaw of Dunfermline in Société du Gaz de Paris 
V .  Armateurs Français "the foundation of the whole d o c t r i n e " . ( 2 1 4 )  case Lord
Sumner stated that: "the object, under the words 'forum non conveniens' is to find the 
forum which is the more suitable for the ends of justice and is preferable because pursuit of 
the litigation in that forum is more likely to secure those ends".!^ !
Although the doctrine of forum  non conveniens had been widely applied in non 
matrimonial cases, it has been said that it is generally inappropriate to actions affecting the 
status of persons domiciled in Scotland, such as divorce(2l«) in relation to which the 
Scottish courts not only claim jurisdiction, but claim exclusive jurisdiction in such 
cases!^!7) Even when the 1973 Act extended the jurisdiction of Scots courts to those 
habitually resident there, it has been argued that the plea of forum  non conveniens is 
inappropriate because the circumstances where it may be applied are too narrow and the 
balance of convenience to the parties is not enough,!^ ! *)
It submitted that if  too much emphasis is placed on the interests of all the parties, then 
forum  non conveniens becomes almost redundant.!^ ! The emphasis should not be on 
the interests of the parties but on the ends of j u s t i c e . ( 2 2 0 )  England, an English court
2 1 4 - 1926 S.C (R C ) 13 at 19.
2 1 5 - Ibid at 22. See also In Sim v. Robinow (1892 ) 19 R. 665 at 668. Lord Kinnear staled that "the plea 
ean never be sustained unless the court is satisfied that there is some other tribunal, having competent 
jurisdiction in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests o f all the parties and for the 
ends of justice". This view has been adopted by the House o f Lords in SpUiada Maritime Crop v. 
Consulex Ltd [1986] 3 W.L.R. 972 at %3 and in DeDampierre v. De Dampierre[l9S7] 2 W.L.R. 
1006. See, infra, 93.
2 1 6 -  Marchant V. Marcfmnt 1948 S.L.T. 143.
2 1 7 -  Anton, 1st ed, p. 149; 2nd ed., p. 462. The pleas o f forum nomconvenietis were considered in 
actions affecting the status of persons domiciled in Scotland over which the Scottish court did not 
claim exclusive jurisdiction, as in action for custody of child, see Mclean v. Mclean 1947 S.C. 79; 
Babington v.Babington 1955 S.C. 115, and in action for declaration of nullity of marriage, Balshaw 
V. Balshawl961 S.C. 63; See, Anton, 1st ed., p. 153.
2 1 8 - Scots Law Com, N” 25, para. 135; Memorandum, N° 13, para. 59.
2 1 9 -  Beaumont, Conflict o f Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: Forum non co7iveniem, (1987) 36  I.C.L.Q. 
116 at 119.
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has an inherent jurisdiction, reinforced by s t a t u t e , (2 21) to stay any proceedings of which it 
is properly seized. Until the decision of the House of Lords in The A t l a n t i c the 
general principle upon which the courts acted to stay proceedings was stated by Scott L.J. 
in St Pierre v. South Amei'ican Stores L/ri(223)
"(1) A mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of  
the advantages of prosecuting his action in an English court if it is otherwise properly 
brought. The right of access to the King's court must not be lightly refused. (2) In 
order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive and other negative:
(a) the defendant must satisfy the court that the continuance of the action would work 
an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or would be an abuse 
of the process of the court in some other way; and (b) the stay must not cause an 
injustice to the plaintiff. On both the burden of proof is on the defendant".
This test was liberalized first by the House of Lords in The Atlantic 5/ar(224) and, 
secondly in Macshannon v. Rockware Glass L/<^,!225) the latter case Lord Diplock 
restated the second part of Scott L.J.'s formulation in the following way:
"(2) In order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive and the 
other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the court that there is another forum to 
whose jurisdiction he is amenable in which justice can be done between the parties at 
substantially less inconvenience or expense, and (b) the stay must not deprive the 
plaintiff of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage which would be available to him 
if he invoked the jurisdiction of the English c o u r t " . (2 2 6 )
Although the House of Lords in these decisions declined to adopt the principle of 
forum  non conveniens as part of English law, it should be noted that in Macshannon v. 
Rockwat'e Glass Lf<^(227) it was recognised that the reformulation in these decisions of
2 2 0 -  Société du Gaz de Paris V, Armateurs Français 1926 S.C (H.C) 13; Robinson v. Robinson's 
Trustees 1930 S.C. (H.C) 20 at 24; Scots Law Com. N® 25, paras. 52-53.
2 2  I- Supreme Court of Jurisdiction [Consolidation] Act 1925, 8.41, See now 8.49(3) o f the Supreme 
Court Act 1981; Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, 8.49; Cf. R.S.C.Ord. 18, r.l9.
2 2 2 -  [1974] A.C. 436.
2 2 3 - [1936] 1 K.B. 382 at 398 (C.A).
2 2 4 - [1974] A.C .436.
2 2 5 -  [1978] A.C. 795.
2 2 6 -  Ibid, at 812.
the principles on which the English court acted was not far removed in practice from the 
principle of forum non conveniens
The formulation of the principle by Lord Diplock in Macshannon v. Rockware Glass 
Lidi229) was in practice modified by subsequent cases. In The Abidin DaverT^^^) the 
first part of Lord Diplock's test was replaced by the requirement that there was another 
forum "with which the action has the most real and substantial connection"(23 %) the 
second part was restated to effect that the existence of a legitimate advantage to the plaintiff 
of the proceedings continuing in England was not decisive and that where the two parts of 
the test conflicted, the balance of justice was to determine whether a stay should be granted.
The principles applicable to staying of action on the basis of forum non conveniences 
have been restated and modified in SpUiada Maritime Corp v. Cansulex Lord
Goff restated the principles as follows:
"(a) The basic principle is that a slay will only be granted on the ground of forum non 
conveniens where the court is satisfied that there is sonic other available forum, having 
conqxtcnt jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, i.e. in 
which the case ma>’ be tried more suitably for the interests of ail the parties and the 
ends of justice, (b)... in general the burden of proof rests on the defendant to persuade 
the court to exercise its discretion to grant a stay..,, if the court is satisfied that there is 
another available forum which is prima facie the appropriate forum for the trial of the 
action, the burden will then shift to the plaintiff to show that there are special 
circumstances by reason of which justice requires that the trial should nevertheless take
2 2 7 - [1978] A.C. 795.
2 2 8 - Ibid, at pp. 812 (Lord Diplock), 822 {Lord Fraser) and Hesperides Hotels Ltd v. Aegean Turkish 
Holidays Ltd, |1979| A.C.568 at pp. 573 (Lord Wilbcrforcc), 544 (Lord Fraser) and Sec, Dicey & 
Morris, 11 th ed., p. 392.
2 2 9 - [1978] A.C. 795.
2 3 0-11984] A.C. 398 at 409, 415; Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v. Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] A.C. 
50.
23 1- Or by the requirement that there was another forum which was the "natural forum" Macshannon v.
Rockware Glass Ltd [1978] A.C. 795 at 829 ]/w  Lord Keith].
23  2- [1986] 3 W.L.R. 972; Diccy&Morris, 12th cd., p. 402; Collier, (1987) C.L.J.33; Rhona Schuz, 
The further implication of SpUiada in light of Recent case law: Stays in Matritnonia! Proceedings, 
(1986) 36 I.C.L.Q. 374.
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place in this country...T do not think that the court should be deterred from granting a 
stay of proceedings.... .simply because the plaintiff will be deprived of such advantage, 
pto\ idcd that the court is satislicd that substantial justice will be done in the available 
appropriate forum.
Tims, Lx>rd Goff had dearly  explained that the principle of forum  non conveniens 
which had become established in Scotland was now available in England in choosing the 
appropriate fonini. It is also now quite clear that the court should look first to see what 
factors there are which connect the case with another forum. Once that has been done and 
pnmafacie there is a more appropriate forum on the basis of that connection, then unless 
there are circumstances by reason of which justice requires that that should not be the 
forum, that should ordinarily be the appropriate forum.. The mere fact that the plaintiff has 
a legitimate personal or juridical advantage in proceedings in England is not decisive: regard 
must be had to the interest of all the parties and the end.s of justice.
It is inter esting to note that prior to the 1973 Act, the inherent power of the High Court 
to stay proceedings extended to divorce actions. In Sealey y. Callon.O^'*) a wife 
petitioned the English court for divorce on the basis of her three year^ ordinary residence in 
England immediately before the commencement of the proceedings. The husband, 
domiciled and resident in South Africa, subsequently started divorce proceedings there and 
applied to the English court for a stay of the wife's action. He argued that any decree 
granted by an English court would not be recognised in South Africa whereas a South 
Africain decree, being from the courts of the parties' domicile, would be recognised in 
England. The court referred with approval to the Scott L .J.’s dictum holding that a stay 
should not be given on the ground that the wife would not be able to get maintenance award 
m South Africa, whereas in English divorce proceedings she would be able to get
m a in te n a n c e .!"  3 5)
2 3 3 - Ibid, at 985-86 and 991.
23 4- [1953] P. 135.
2 3 5 - It slKjuld be noted that bct'ovc 1984 the courts in England and Scotland had no power to grant 
linancial relief alter récognition of an ovcr.sca.s di\ orcc. However, this inability ha,s been removed by 
the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, See, infra. Chapter Seven.
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B- Statutory Stays or Sists
The 1973 Act established two kinds of staying or si sting proceedings namely, 
obligatory stays, mandatory sists and discretionary stays or sists. The test or distinction 
between these two kinds is whether conflicting divorce proceedings are pending 
insidef^^^) or outside the British Isles.f^^^) In both kinds there is an obligation on 
parties to matrimonial proceedings in England, and anyone who has entered appearance in 
consistorial action in Scotland to furnish particulars of any proceedingsC^^®) in respect of 
that marriage or affecting its v a l i d i t y , ( 2 3  9 )  which he is aware of being carried on in another 
jurisdiction.^^"*®) The duty continues so long as the E nglish  m atrim onial 
p r o c e e d i n g s ! ^ 4 1 )  are pending and the trial or the first t r i a K ^ ^ Z )  tias not begun, or any 
c o n s i s t o r i a l  a c t i o n ! ^ 4  3 )  pending in a Scottish court and the proof in that action has not 
b e g u n . ! ^ 4 4 )  at any time after the beginning of the trial, first trial or proof, it is shown 
that the person concerned has failed to perform his duty, the court may exercise its 
discretionary power to grant a stay or sist.(^45)
2 3 6 -  T h is m eans any o f the fo llow ing  countries: E ngland, W ales, Scotland, N orthern  Ire land , Jersey, 
G uernsey and the Isle o f  M an (the reference to Guernsey being treated as including A lderney and Sark), 
Sched 1, para. 3(2), Sched 3, para. 3(2).
2 3 7 -  Sched 1, para. 3(1); Sched 3, para, 3(1).
2 3 8 -  Sched 1, paras. 5 and 6; Sched 3, paras. 5  and 6.
2 3 9 -  Sched 1, para. 7(B); Sched 3, para. 7(B ); Fam ily Proceedings R ules 1991, it. 2.3, 2 .15(4), 2.27 (4), 
App. 2, para. l(j).
2 4 0 -  Sched 1, para. 7(a); Sched 3, para. 7(a). T he phrase o f 'another jurisdiction* m eans in any country
outside England and W ales, Sched 1, para. 3(1); for Scotland m eans in any country ouside Scotland,
Sched 3 , para. 3(1).
2 4 1 -  Sched 1, para. 2.
2 4 2 -  Shed 1, paras. 8(1), 9(1). T rial o f  a prelim inary issue o f ju risd ic tion  does not constitu te trial o f the 
proceedings for this purpose; See, S ched 1, para. 4(1) "R eferences to  the trial o r firs t trial in  any 
proceedings do not include reference to  the separate trial o f an  issue as to jurisdiction only".
2 4 3 -  Sched 3, para. 2.
2 4 4 -  Sched 3, paras. 8  and 9(1), In any action in  the C ourt o f Session o r a  S heriff C ourt neither the 
taking o f evidence on com m ission  nor a separate proof relating  to  any prelim inary  p le a  shall be 
regarded as part o f the proof in the action, Sched 3, para. 4  (a).
2 4 5 -  Sched 1, para. 9(4); Sched 3, pam. 9 (4 ) .
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An obligatory or discretionary stay may be discharged or recalled on the application of 
one of the parties to the proceedings, if it appears to the court that the other proceedings are 
stayed or concluded or that a party to those other proceedings, has delayed unreasonably in 
p r o s e c u t i n g  t h e m . ! ^ 46) jf  obligatory stay or mandatory sist has been discharged or 
recalled, the court cannot be required again to make an obligatory or mandatory stay or sist 
in respect of the same action, though there is no bar to the court discretion to stay or
s i s t . ! ^ 4 7 )
1- Discretionary Stays or Sists
The 1973 Act states that a court in England or Scotland has a discretionary power, 
either on its motion or on the application of a party to the marriage,(248) to stay or sist an 
action of divorce if, before the beginning of the t r i a l , ! ^ 4 9 )  or proof, it appears to the court 
that any proceedings!^^®) in respect of the marriage in question or capable of affecting its 
validity or subsistence!^^ 1) are continuing in another jurisdiction!^^ ^ ) and that the balance 
of the fairness (including convenience) as between the parties is such that is appropriate for 
those other proceedings to be disposed of before further steps are taken in the English or 
Scottish proceedings. In assessing the balance of fairness and convenience the court must 
have regard to all factors appearing to be relevant including the convenience of witnesses 
and any delay or expense which may result from the proceedings being stayed or sisted or
2 4 6 -  Sched 1, para, 10(1); Sched 3 , para. 10(1); Fam ily Proceedings Rules 1991, r. 2.27(5).
2 4 7 -  Sched 1, para. 10(2); Sched 3 , para. 10 (2 ) ,
2 4 8 -  D icey &  M orris, 11th ed., p. 782; 12th ed.,p. 802; M orris, 4th-ed., p. 206.
2 4 9 “  T he m eaning of the phrase"before the beginning o f the trial" w as considered in Thyssen-Bornemhza 
y.Thyssen-Bornemisza  [1985] 2  F .L .R . 670. T he husband contended that since there had already been 
hearings in relation to interim  custody and financial relief the trial had already started and that therefore 
the court no longer had ju risd ic tion  to grant a stay. T he C ourt o f A ppeal held tha t the w ord 'trial' 
referred only to  the trial o f the issue in the m ain suit and not to o ther hearings.
2 5 0 -  These are defined as proceedings for divorce, separation, nulity  and declarations as to  the validity  of 
m arriage; Sched 1, para. 2; Sched 3 , para. 2.
2 5 1 »  In K apur  v. Kapur [1984] F .L .R . 9 2 0  a t 922  it has been  held tha t p roceed ings in  In d ia  fo r 
m aintenance and fo r in junction to  allow  the w ife to reccupy the m atrim onial hom e do no t affect the  
validity  or subsistence o f  the  m arriage.
2 5 2 -  This m ean any country outside the U nited K ingdom ; Sched 1, para. 3 (1); Sched 3, para. 3 (1).
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not being stayed or sisted.!^^^)
The balance of fairness and convenience between the parties depends on the facts of 
each case. It is interesting to consider the case law to show how the courts draw this 
balance. In M ytton  v. M yttonS^^^^  it was pointed out that comparing the remedies 
offered by one forum with those offered by another was neither an attractive nor a helpful 
exercise in terms of fairness, because what was fair for one party may seem to have an 
equal and opposite effect on the other/^^^) The real issue lying behind the application for 
a stay was plainly a question of the ancillary relief. The balance of fairness seemed in 
favour of not staying the English proceedings because the Swiss court would not be able to 
make an effective order concerning the matrimonial home in England.
In Shemshadfard v. ShemshadfardS^^^^ the parties were Iranian and had entered into 
a polygamous marriage in Iran in 1974. They came to England with their child in 1977, 
where after two years the marriage broke down. The wife petitioned for divorce in 
England in 1979. The husband returned to Iran and started proceedings in the Iranian court 
seeking a certificate of non compatibility and in 1980 he petitioned for English proceedings 
to be stayed. The facts of this case were much more complex than a simple comparison of 
the remedies by way of ancillary relief in the Mytton case. In assessing the balance of 
fairness and convenience the court required to consider all relevant matters such as, the 
availability of witnesses, the cultural background of the parties, the language in which the 
proceedings would be conducted, the possibility of the dissolution of the marriage itself 
and custody of children as well as the ancillary relief.!^
Having regard to all these factors, the court decided that the balance of fairness and 
convenience was in favour of the English proceedings because the burden on the wife of
2 5 3 -  Sched 1, para. 9; Sched 3, para. 9; Fam ily  Proceedings Rules 1991, r. 2.27(2).
2 5 4 -  [1977] 7  Fam  Law. 244. D iscussed by Beaum ont, (1987) 3 6 1.C.L.Q. 123.
2 5 5 -  Ibid, a t 245.
2 5 6 -  [1981] I AI1.E.R. 726.
2 5 7 -  Ibid, at 734.
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taking witnesses to Iran would be greater than on the husband in bringing them to 
E n g l a n d . ! ^ T h e  wife had acquired a western culture. The husband would be unlikely 
to defend the English proceedings in regard to the wife's allegations of unreasonable 
behaviour and if he obtained a certificate of incompatibility he would be relieved of all 
obligation to maintain the wife and she would have no protection under Iranian law.(^^^)
The cases above were decided at the time when the English courts had no power to 
grant financial relief after a foreign divorce. This inability was removed by the Matrimonial 
and Family Proceedings Act 1984.!^^®) Therefore, one might have thought that the 
questions of such remedies abroad will be less significant in deciding whether or not to stay 
divorce proceedings, but in Gadd v. jt was pointed out that the provisions of
the 1984Act, although relevant and a factor to be taken into account, should not be given 
any great weight in assessing the balance of fairness and convenience. The parties were 
British nationals who m am ed in the Bahamas and lived in France and Monaco until the 
marriage broke down. The wife returned to England where she became domiciled and 
petitioned for divorce, A month later the husband filed a petition for divorce in Monaco on 
the ground of desertion and sought a stay of the English proceedings.
It was argued in favour of the stay proceedings that the balance of fairness and 
convenience fell in favour of all issues being determined in Monaco since the parties had 
lived in France or Monaco for the past 11 years. There was no evidence before the court as 
to the difference in remedies, especially in relation to financial provision, between English 
and Monégasque laws. The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument on the ground that 
the purpose of a discretionary stay in the schedule 1 of the 1973 Act is not to ensure that the 
divorce proceedings are heard in a country with which the marriage is most closely 
connected but to determine the balance of fairness.
2SH- Cf, M itchell v, M itchell 1993 S .L .T . 123; See, Infra, 95.
2 5 9 -  See, Rhona Schuz, (1989 )381 .C .L .Q . 951.
2 6 0 -  See, part III in relation to  England and part IV in relation to Scotland, See, infra. C hapter Seven
2 6 1 -  [1985] 1 A11.E.R.58; K  v. K  [1986] 2 F .L .R , 111.
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In assessing the balance of fairness the court referred to Lord Diplock's formulation in 
Macshannon v. Rockware Glass and noted that his Lordship had later made it
clear that the loss of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage could amount to an 
i n j u s t i c e . ! 2 < > 3 )  Although the degree of relevance of Lord Diplock's formulation to 
application for a stay in divorce proceedings under the 1973 Act was not explained clearly 
by the Court of Appeal, it should be noted that all the court had done was equate 
the'balance of justice’ mentioned in the Macshannon case with the 'balance of fairness' in 
the schedule (1) para 9 and decided that justice required that a stay should not be granted 
because under the law of Monaco the wife would be in a much less favorable position than 
under English law. She would not be entitled to any capital provision or any property 
adjustment and generally she would suffer financially.
The Court of Appeal's approach in applying the inherent jurisdiction to application for a 
stay in divorce proceedings under the 1973 Act might be criticised on the ground that it is 
not very helpful in assessing the balance of justice to compare the remedies offered by one 
forum with those offered by another because what was fair for one party may seem to have 
an equal and opposite effect on the other.!^ ^  4) [t is quite clear from the judgment that in 
assessing the balance of fairness too much emphasis was placed on 'legitimate personal or 
juridical advantage' to the wife in English proceedings and little on the factors mentioned in 
the 1973 Act.!265) ^  jg submitted that Lord Diplock's formulation would narrow the
statutory framework for staying divorce proceedings established in the 1973 Act and would 
not help the courts to assess the balance of fairness.!^®
In the light of the decision of the House of Lords in De Dampierre v. De 
Dampien'eS^^^^ the Court of Appeal's approach in Gadd v. Gadd(^^^^ can no longer be
2 6 2 -  See, Supra, 86.
2 6 3 -  B eaum ont, (1987) 36  I.C .L .Q . 123 a t 127.
2 6 4 -  M ytton  v. M ytton  [1977] 7 Fam  Law  244.
2 6 5 -  See, K  v, K  [1986] 2 F .L.R . 111.
2 6 6 -  B eaum ont, (1987) 36  I.C .L .Q . 123 a t 127.
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supported merely on the basis that a stay would deprive the wife of the legitim ate 
advantages of obtaining financial relief. The question of the availability of financial relief 
was given less weight in De Dampierre v. De D a m p i e r r e in which the House of 
Lords applied the principle of forum  non conveniens as set out in Spiliada Maritime Carp 
V .  Cansulex L id s 'll  and allowed an appeal by a French husband who had raised an 
action for divorce against his French wife in France and had been refused a sist to stay the 
wife’s action for divorce in England. The connection with France was much stronger than 
that with England, but the wife, as the party arguably, principally responsible for the 
marriage breakdown, would face less well in French divorce proceedings if this were 
established.
Applying Spiliada test it was found that French was the appropriate jurisdiction for the 
case to be heard. The parties were both French nationals who had been married in France 
and still had significant connections with France. The wife’s connections with England 
were tenuous and she voluntarily severed all connection before instituting her English 
divorce proceedings. She now lived in the United States and had no connection with 
England. Although the husband was still living in England this was for business reasons. 
He owned substantial property in France and maintained very strong links with that 
country. A stay should be granted unless justice required that the case be heard in England. 
The mere fact that the wife had a legitimate personal or juridical advantage in proceedings in 
England did not mean that justice could not be done in French court.!^? B
The decision of the House of Lords in De Dampierre v. De D m n p ie r r e S ^ '^ has 
recently been applied in the Scottish case of Mitchell v. M itchell,{21 in which the
2 6 7 -  [1987] 2 W .L.R. 1006. D iscussed by K unztik , Staying and Restraining Actions: The Application 
and Limits of Forum non Conveniens, (1987) C .L .J. 406; R hona Schuz, (1989) 38  I.C .L.Q . 946.
2 6 8 -  [1985] 1 AI1.E.R.
2 6 9 -  [1987] 2 W .L.R. 1006.
2 7 0 -  [1986] 3 .W .L .R .972.
2 7 1 -  De Dampierre V. De Dampierre [1987] 2 W .L.R . 1006 at 1018.
2 7 2 -  [1987] 2 W .L.R. 1006.
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Scottish court decided that a sist should not be granted, taking the view that the overall 
connection of the marriage was with Scotland. The parties were married in Scotland in 
1977 and lived there together for about 12 years until they went to France in 1989 and lived 
together there for about 15 months before they separated in 1990. They are British 
nationals, their respective, backgrounds are Scottish and by far the greater part of their 
married life was spent living together in S c o t l a n d . ( 2 7 4 )
Thus, the application of the Spiliacia test to matrimonial proceedings made it clear that 
the courts should identify first the forum with which the dispute was most closely 
connected. Although the 1973 Act does not seek to give priority to this factor, and one 
might have thought that there is a potential conflict between the statutory test and the 
Spiliada test, it is submitted that the conflict is in form rather than real because both tests 
clearly involve the same aim of determining where the case could most suitably be heard for 
the ends of justice.
On the other hand, a potential area of conflict between the two tests can be seen in the 
terms of questions of convenience, expense and delay. It will be remembered that in 
assessing the balance of fairness and convenience the court must have regard to all factors 
appearing to be relevant including the convenience of witnesses and any delay or expense 
which may result from the proceedings being stayed or sisted or not being stayed or 
s i s t e d . U n d e r  the Spiliada test these factors can only be relevant if they would 
prevent substantial justice being done in the foreign forum. Although these factors may 
affect the connection with a forum, it should be noted that they will have be weighted 
against other factors such as the residence of the parties.!-
2 7  3- 1993 S.L.T. 123,
2 7 4 -  Ibid, at 126.
2 7 5 -  Schcd Î, para. 9 ; Schcd 3, para. 9.
2 7  6- Spiliada M aritime Crop  r. C onsu les L id  11986] 3 AII.E.R. 843 at 856; Rhona Schuz, Stay iu 
MalriftionialProceedings, ( 1989) 19 Fam ily.Law  438 at 441.
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However, in the light of the Scottish case of Mitchell v, M itchelli' ^ ' ^ i t  seems that the 
Spiliada test will sufficiently satisfy the statutory requirem ent to take into account 
convenience, expense and delay. In this case the Scottish court considered that the 
convenience of witnesses was not a factor making it more appropriate that the action be 
heard in France. The main factor was to consider the overall connection of the marriage 
with the jurisdiction in question.!^*^*)
The application of the principle o f forum  non conveniens to matrimonial cases 
represents the unity of principle in jurisdictional discretion in both matrimonial and non 
matrimonial cases(^^9) and this would make the statutory test redundant.!^*®)
2- Obligatory Stays or Mandatory Sists
It is the duty of the English!^^^) and Scottish!^*^) courts to stay or sist divorce
proceedings if, before the beginning of the trial, first trial or the beginning of the proof, the
court is satisfied on the application of a party to a m a r r ia g e , ( 2 8 3 )  that proceedings for
divorce or nullity of marriage are continuing in respect of the relevant marriage in another
British I s l e s ' j u r i s d i c t i o n . ! ^ ®  4 )  Moreover, the court also must be satisfied that certain
additional requirements are complied with, namely, (a) that the parties to the marriage have
resided together after its celebration and; (b) that the place where they resided together
when the proceedings in the court where begun or, if they did not then reside together,
where they last resided together before those proceedings were begun, is in that
jurisdiction; and (c) that either of the said parties was habitually resident in that jurisdiction
tliroughout the year ending with the date on which they last resided together before the date
3 7 7 -  1993 S.L.T. 123 .
2 7 8  -Ibid, at 126-27.
27 9- K unziik, (1987) C .L .J, 407; R hona Schuz, (1989) 38  I.C .L .Q . 953; A fu ll d iscussion o f  Scottish  
forum  non conveniem  principles is to  be  found in  D e M ulder v. Jadrmiska Liuijska 1989 S .L .T . 269.
2 8 0 -  Schuz, (1989) 38  I.C .L .Q . 949; (1989) Fam .Law  438  a t 443.
2 8 1 -  Sched 1, para. 8; Fam ily Proceedings Rules 1991, r. 2.27(1).
2 8 2 -  Sched 3, para. 8,
2 8 3 -  N ot on  the Court's ow n m otion; cf, d iscretionary stay o r sist, supra
28 4 -  Sched 1, para. 3(2); Sched 3 , para. 3(2).
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on which the proceedings were begun. The object of the obligatory stay is mainly to 
ensure that divorce proceedings are heard in the more appropriate forum, i.e. the country 
with which the marriage is closely connected.
3- The Effect of Stay or Sist on Ancillary Orders
The 1973 Act contains elaborate provisions to deal with the effect of stay or sist divorce 
proceedings in a "related jurisdiction". The provisions m ay be summed up as 
follows: (2®^)
(a) The courts have no power to make any orders for maintenance of a spouse pending 
suit, or for periodical payments or the payments of lump sums or for custody and education 
for children or restraining a person from removing a child out of jurisdiction or out of 
custody, care or control of another person,!^®^)
(b) If such orders, other than a lump sum, have already been made, they will lapse 
after expiration of three months from the date when the stay is imposed or the sist comes 
into operation, unless the stay is previously removed or the sist is recalled.!^®®)
(c) The courts have power in some circumstances to make or extend orders in 
connection with the stayed or sisted proceedings if they consider it necessary to do so as in 
the case of necessity or urgency.!^®
(d) If an order for periodical payments for a spouse or child or for the custody or 
education of a child has been made in the other British proceedings then any order in the
2 8 5 -  Law  Com. Rep. N®48, para. 85; D icey  &  M o m s, 11th ed., p. 781; C live, 3rd  ed., p. 616  ; A nton, 
2nd ed., p. 463.
2 8 6 -  D icey & M orris, 11th ed., p. 783 ; 12th ed ., p. 804; C live, 3 rd  ed., p. 618; A nton, op .c it., p. 465; 
H alsbury, op.cit., p. 369; Radyen, op .cit., p. 71.
2 8 7 -  Sched 1, para. 11 as am ended by Children A ct 1989 Sched 13, para. 33 ; for Scotland, Sched3, para.
11; D icey &  M orris, 11th ed., p. 783; 12th ed., p. 805; Clive, 3rd ed., p. 618; A nton, 2nd ed., p. 465.
2 8 8 -  Sched 1, para. l l(2 )(b ) ; S c h e d 3, para ll(2 )(b ) .
2 8 9 -  Sched 1, para. 11 (2)(c); Sched 3, para. ll(2 )(c ) .
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stayed or sisted proceedings ceases to have effect when the stay is imposed or the sist 
comes into operation or when the other court's order comes into force, and no such order 
may be made even in the case of urgency, and any order of the other court has no effect on 
a previous order of the English or Scottish courts in relation to the same child in matters of 
a lump sum payment for the child or restraining a person from removing a child out of 
jurisdiction or out of custody, care or control of another person.!^
(e) The 1973 Act makes clear that nothing affects any power of the courts to vary or 
discharge or recall an ancillary order, or to enforce it for any period when it is or was in 
force, or to make an ancillary order in connection with proceedings which were but are no 
longer stayed or sisted.!^^
The amount of detail a study of the subject of conflicting jurisdictions necessitates 
makes it all the more surprising that there is no equivalent chapter in Iraqi law. It has been 
said that since the present jurisdictional divorce bases are designed to protect and ensure 
justice to Iraqi nationals, rules to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction are unnecessary 
This argument raises doubts in cases where no Iraqi national is involved in the 
proceedings. The absence of such rules may encourage parties to take advantage of the 
Iraqi law, prolong proceedings, and substantially increase expenses as well as produce 
conflict of decisions. It is submitted that nothing in the Iraqi law prejudices any power to 
stay proceedings. A stay should be granted if the court thinks that justice requires the case 
to be heard in a foreign court. The above discussion of the English and Scottish rules can 
provide guidelines to Iraqi courts to establish a system of staying proceedings.
2 9 0 '  Sched 1, para. 11(1)(3) as am ended by Children A ct 1989, Sched 13, para. 33; for Scotland, Sched 3, 
para. 11 (3).
2 9 1 -  Sched 1, para. 11(5) ; Sched 3 , pam 11(4).
2 9 2 -  A zzedeen Abdallah, op.cit., p. 746.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Choice of Law Rule in Divorce
It is the view both in England and Scotland that when the courts have jurisdiction in 
divorce proceedings, they apply exclusively their own laws to determine whether a divorce 
should be granted. Any other legal system, it is submitted, is irrelevant. In Iraq, while 
reference is made in principle to the national law of the husband as the law to govern 
divorce, this system has been restricted in favour of the application of the Iraqi law in 
several cases.
The Hague Convention to regulate the Conflict of Laws and Jurisdiction in Regard to 
Divorce and Separation of 1902 provided a double-barrelled choice of law rule, requiring 
both the lex fori and the lexpatriae to be satisfied. This Convention was denounced by 
certain countries because of difficulties with its interpretation. It is now regarded as 
outdated. The Hague Convention on Recognition of Foreign Divorces and Legal 
Separations of 1970 does not deal with choice of law rules because its scope is limited only 
to questions relating to recognition.
It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the choice of law rule to find out why one 
system of law should be preferred to another. The choice of law rule means substantive 
law, the law that determines the grounds for divorce, the influence of conditions, defences, 
bars, etc. Matters relating to procedure will be beyond the scope of this chapter, because it 
is submitted universally that these matters are governed by the law of the forum. This 
chapter will consider choice of law as follows:
I - Choice of Law in England and Scotland.
II Choice of Law in Iraq.
I ll -  Evaluation of the Choice of Law Rules.
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I- Choice of Law Rule in England and Scotland
In contrast to issues concerning jurisdiction to grant relief and whether a foreign decree 
of divorce should be recognised, which attract judical and academic opinion, the question 
of choice of the applicable law to determine whether relief should be granted has been 
largely neglected and has been treated purely as a jurisdiction question. In other words, the 
question of choice of law in divorce is always dependent on that of jurisdiction and no 
separation has been made between them. Thus, the courts have disregarded whatever 
grounds of divorce might be available to the parties in their own country and have always 
applied their own laws in cases heard by therndU
In England, when domicile was the only basis of jurisdiction the problem o f choice o f  
law could not be said to arise, simply because the lex fori was invariably the lex domicilii 
and no choice between them needed to be made. What was questionable was whether 
English law was applied as the lex domicilii or as the lex fori.O') The attitude of the 
courts reveals that in the majority of cases this was as the lex domicilii. O) This attitude 
might be justified on the ground that divorce was regarded as a question of status and 
questions of status demand not only the e.xclusive jurisdiction of courts, but the application 
of the personal law of the parties by those courts. M)
In Scotland the position seems to be that the Scottish courts applied Scots law as the 
lex fori whatever the personal law of the parties,!®) despite the fact that Scottish courts
I - D iccy & Mon-is. I 111, ed .. p. « 4 ;  I2lh cd.. p. 720; M orris, 4lh ed.. p. 184; Mende.s D acosla, (1968)
46 Can Bar R c i, 277; Craic.son, op.cit.. (1977), p. 105; N orth. Development o f Rnle.t o f Private
liilenm tinni hm> in the I'iekl o f  Pmnilv Law. ( 1980) ] H ague R ecueil,9  at 77, 78; .Sec, also N orth 
(1993), p. 68.
2- C hesh ire  & N orth , 11 ih cd ., pp  632 ,633 .
3 - Ij)rd  Advocaie.v J a f f r e y \ \9 2 \ \  I A C. 146 at 152.
4- North, Private Internatkmat Law o f  Matrmtonktl Causes in the Briti.sh Isiattti and Repnhlic o f
Irelandd\911), p. 146; G ravcson , 7 th  cd , p. 286;
5 -  C live, 2nd  cd ., p. 619.
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had jurisdiction to entertain divorce proceedings on grounds other than the husband's
d o m i c i l e . I n  Jack  v. J a c k p ^  jurisdiction had been taken on the ground of
matrimonial domicile. The court applied Scots law without any consideration of the
personal law of the parties. Lords Weaves and Mackenzie justified the application of the 
Scots law by saying:
no consistorial court, in any countiy , ever, so far as \vc arc aw are, adm insters foreign 
law in the m atter o f  divorce. Such a court will take cognizance o f foreign law in the 
prool of m aniage; but, in decreeing the dissolution o f a marriage well contracted, it will 
not do so. A Scottish court will not grant a divorce to French o r Prussian parties upon 
French o r Prussian grounds. It will, in every case in which it has ju risd ic tion , decree a 
divorce upon those grounds only w hich arc held sufficient by its own law."!®)
The same view was followed in England, when the courts applied English law as the 
lex fori in cases where the husband was no longer domiciled in England at the time of the 
proceedings. For instance, in M W e r  v. N ihoyetS^) the court took jurisdiction on the 
basis of residence and applied English law as the lex fo r i  despite the fact that the 
husband's personal law was French.
The application of the lex fori to determine whether a divorce should be granted where 
neither spouse is domiciled within the jurisdiction might be justified on the ground that the 
judges were influenced by Savigny’s view that divorce touches fundamental forum  
conceptions of morality, religion and public policy.!*®) Choice of law in divorce 
becomes acute, with the statutory creation of extra-domiciliary jurisdiction,!* *) but it 
must be admitted that the courts have shown little awareness of the difficulties and have 
applied their own law without explanation or reference to any rule of choice of law.!* 2)
6 - Christian v. C im stian {\1&5\) 13 D. 1149; iMck v. Lack 1926, S.L.T. 656.
7 -  (1862) 24 D. 467.
8 -  Ibid, at 475.
9- (1878) 4  P.O. 1 a l9 .
1 0- Savigny, A Treatise On The Conflict o f  Laws and the Litnlis o f  their O peration in Respect o f  P lace  
and Titne, Gulhrie's Tran.sl, 2nd cd., Edinburgh, (1880), p. 298; W olff, 2nd cd., p. 374.
1 1- C heshire & N orth, 12th cd., p. 639; G ravcson, op .cil., (1977), p. 107, A nton, 2nd ed, p. 465; 
M endcs Dacost. ( 1968) 46 Can Bar Rev, p. 277.
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Under Section 13 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1937, the English court was given 
jurisdiction to entertain divorce proceedings where a wife had been deserted by her 
husband or he had been deported, if he had been domiciled in England prior to his 
desertion or deportation. The Act was silent as to whether the applicable law to grant 
divorce under such a jurisdiction should be determined by reference to the lex fo ri or the 
lex domicilii. The issue came before the Court of Appeal in Zanelli V. TanellUG^^ in 
which a husband, an Italian national, domiciled in England had married an English woman 
and lived with her in England. Later he deserted her and resumed his Italian domicile. The 
wife petitioned for divorce. The court granted a decree of divorce by applying English law, 
without taking into consideration Italian law, i.e the lex domicilii of the parties by virtue of 
which divorce was legally impossible. Although the facts of this case may justify  the 
application of the lex fo ri because the wife's domicile of origin prior to the marriage was 
English and it is inconvenient and undesirable to bind her by a dead marriage, it is 
submitted nevertheless that the application of lex fo ri creates lim ping marriages'. The 
Matrimonial Causes [War Marriages] Act 1944 was also silent on choice of law rule. The 
absence of this rule produced no difficulties and the courts continued to follow the decision 
of the Court of Appeal in Zanelli v. Zanelli. The result in this case was formally 
confirmed by the Law Reform [Miscellaneous Provisions] Act 1949 in the following terms;
"In any proceedings in w hich the court has ju risd ic tion  by v irtue o f  this A ct o r under 
the 1937, 1944 A cts, the issues shall be determ ined in accordance w ith the law  w hich 
w ould be applicable thereto  if both  parties w ere dom iciled  in E ngland o r [Scotland] at 
the tim e o f the proceedings."!*
It is interesting to note that the effect of this statutory choice of law rule was confined 
only to limited cases which fall within those provisions and did not cover cases which were 
brought by a husband or a wife on the basis of domicile (admittedly, there, the problem
1 2 -  Gravcson, (1950) 3 In 't L .Q . 321.
1 3 - [1 9 4 8 ]6 4 T .L .R . 312.
1 4 - See,.S . 1(4) fo r E ngland  and 8 .2 (4 )  fo r  S co tla n d ; R e -en ac ted  as  8 .1 8 (3 ) , S  4 0  (2 ) S .4 6  (2) 
M atrim onial C auses A cts, 1950, 1965, 1973 respectively, repealed by S. 17(2) o f and Sched, 6 to the 
D om icile and M atrim onial Proceedings A c t1973.
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would not arise). However, this limitation had no effect in practice because in all cases the 
courts applied their own laws.!*
The Domicile and M atrim onial Proceedings A ct 1973 repealed the statutory 
jurisdictional ground!* and established new exclusive jurisdictional rules based on 
domicile or habitual residence of either party.!* 7) Since a wife under this Act can acquire 
a domicile independent from that of her husband,!*®) it follows that the spouses may 
have different domiciles and thus the lex domicilii may no longer coincide with the lex 
fori. Accordingly the problem of choice of law rule will arise and the need for such a rule 
becomes necessary, because it is quite possible that the lex fori contains grounds for 
divorce not recognised as such by the law of domicile. Conversely, a divorce may be 
sought in the English and Scottish courts on grounds so recognised by the law of domicile 
but which are not recognised by the lex fori and then how will the choice of law process 
be resolved? When the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 
abolished the statutory choice of law rule, which had been introduced under the 1949 Act, 
they made no provision for choice of law. It was recommended that such a provision was 
unnecessary and the courts must continue to have regard only for the law of the 
forum.!* )^
In the absence of statutory provision dealing with this issue, it is submitted that the 
choice of law process is to be resolved by reference to the lex fori. This conclusion is 
consistent with the attitude of the courts in practice where the law of the forum had been 
applied in cases in which the lex domicilii no longer coincided with the lex fori.O'
Moreover, section 14 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 permits the English courts to
1 5- Graveson, 7th  ed., p. 385.
1 6 - S. 17(2) o f and Sched, 6.
1 7 -  SS.5(2),7(2).
18- S . l .
1 9 -  Law  Com. Rep. N° 48, paras. 103, 108; Scots Law Com .N ” 25, paras. 24, 30.
2 0 -  TunelU v. Zanelli [1984] 46  T .L .R .; .Jack v. Jack  (1862) 24 D. 467  a t 475.
104
apply foreign law to determine the validity of a marriage. This Act contains no such 
provision in matters ol divorce, so the Act indicates that a divorce petition is always 
governed by the lex fori, even when the parties are both domiciled abroad.!^ D If the 
lexfofi is the chosen law, then that will determine the permissibility and grounds on which 
a party may obtain a divorce, the nature of r e l i e f ! ^ a n d  conditions upon which the 
decree will be granted.
The result of this system is that the courts will disregard the law of the parties at the 
time of divorce proceedings,!^^) the lex loci celebrationisP^) the law of the place 
where the matrimonial offence is committed,!^ 5) or the law of the parties at such time. In 
C^.epek V. CzepekS^^'t the English court granted a decree of divorce to the husband on 
the giound of desertion which was not a ground under his personal law when the alleged 
desertion took place in Poland. In Pratt v. Pratt the court considered the husband’s 
petition on the ground ol desertion by his wife, although this was not a ground for divorce 
in English law before the time of l i t ig a t io n .8)
It seems unjust and anomalous to divorce a person for conduct which is not a ground
lor divorce according to his personal law. Divorce should not be granted on facts which
were not wrong!ul according to the personal law when they o c c u r r e d . ( 2 9 )  However, it is 
2 1- Ncirlh, op.cit .p.(lQ77) p. 177.
2 2 -C h \c , op.cil p .619. The lorum  will consider ils own approach to the gran ting , o r not, o f  financial 
pro\ ision after foreign divorce; M atnnonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (alleviating the problem  
found and solved on that cx'calion in Tarok v. Torok [ 1973] 3A II.E .R .100I; See, infra. Chapter 7.
2 3- ZaueUi v. Z.aneeli (1948] 6 4 T .L .R . 312.
2 4- This law was adopted in earlier cases when English court contended that a m am age concluded in 
England could only be di.ssoh cd by English law. See, supra, 44.
2 5- Inlloh  V’. / uUoh (1861) 23 D. 639; Czepek  r. Czxpek | I962] 3 ALL.E.R. 990.
2 6- 119621 3 All E.R. 990 at, 992.
2 7 - [1939] A .C 417; In Chapman v. C /wp/nnn] 1938(1 A11.E.R635 and Green v. (treen  [1939] 3 
ALL.E.R. 89; the court granted a decree o f di\ orce on the basis o f facts which occurred before they were 
made a cause lor di\ orcc and the legislation is not in terms given retroactive operation.
2 8- This ground was introduced as a cause o f divorce fo the first time by S .l  o f the M atrim onial Causes 
Act 1937. For history of this ground, See, Radyen, op.cit, p. 230.
2 9 - See, Mann, (195^1) 31 B.Y .B .I.L ., 247.
105
the view of academic authorities that the lex fori should determine all questions in divorce 
proceedings and any other legal system is completely irrelevant.!^ ®) Professor Dicey 
justified the rejection of the personal law on this point on the ground that: "divorce is not a 
punishment for a wrong but a determination by the state it is not in the public interest that a 
particular marriage should continue".!^ *)
The learned author's view seems to reflect the attitude of English courts that the 
dissolution of marriage is very much a matter of English public policy. However, since the 
choice of law has an effect on questions of recognition and enforcement of judgements by 
other courts, it is submitted that consideration should also be given to the interest of the 
parties or to the interest of their country. The talk only about the interest of English society 
may lead to the denial of an English decree abroad which would create a 'limping 
marriage'; the negative consequences of which cannot be ignored.
II- Choice of Law Rule in Iraq
Contrary to the English and Scots law which uses lex fori as the appropriate choice of 
law rule for determining the permissibility and grounds for divorce, the Iraqi law has, in 
principle, rejected the lex fo r i  in favour of the lex patriae. The two questions of 
jurisdiction and choice of law in matters of divorce are distinguished as a matter of course 
and the Iraqi courts do not automatically apply Iraqi law. Rather consideration is given to 
the lexpatriae. However, there are certain significant exceptions, infra, which result in a 
homeward tendency. Before the Civil Code of 1951, there was no specific provisions 
regarding choice of law rule in divorce cases. The matter was subject to the general rule in 
article 1 of the law of 1931 which provided that "In deciding matters of personal status 
regarding foreigners, in which it is customary to apply the law of another country, the court 
of Iraq will apply the same, in accordance with usages of private international law, but so
3 0- Cheshire &  N orth, 10th ed., pp. 365 , 366.
3 1- D icey & M orris, 9th ed., p. 313.
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that the personal law of any person shall mean the law of the state of which he is a 
national"/^
The choice of law rule in matters of dissolution of marriage was clarified by article 
19(3) of the Civil Code which provided that "TaJaq, Judicial divorce and Separation are 
subject to the law of the country to which the husband belongs either at the time of talaq or 
of the commencement of the legal proceedings”. The application of the national law of the 
husband has been restricted in favour of the Iraqi law in cases when either of the spouses 
possesses Iraqi nationality, or when its application is contrary to public policy or morality 
in Iraq
Unlike the lex fo r  the application of the personal law in divorce cases is not easy. In 
Iraqi law, for instance, the application of the national law may give rise to difficulties which 
ai e related to the determination of the appropriate national law in cases where the spouses 
have different nationalities, the cases where one of the spouses has a double nationality, the 
cases where the spouses belong to a composite legal system, and where the spouses are 
stateless. Further, the question arises whether the reference to the national law should be to 
the substantive law only or should it include the conflict rules in that law.
A- The Principle: Application of The L ex  Patriae
The principle of submission of divorce to the parties’ national law has been adopted at
the beginning of this centui^ by civil law countries and has been embodied in the Hague
Divorce Convention of 1902.1^ Under the Convention, the pronouncing of a decree o f
divorce must conform with the national law of the parties and with the lex fo riS^  5)
3 2- See, also  Art. 73  o f  the C ode o f  1925; F arid  Fatyn, op.cit., p. 27; A ll-H adw ay, opi.cit., p. 31.
3 3- See, Infra, 109.
3 4 -  A rt .l ,  and 8 ; See, G utteridge, (1938) 19 B .Y .B .L 30; Rabel, op.cit., p. 461.
3  5- A rticle 1 provided that "M arried persons m ay apply  fo r a  d ivorce p rov ided  the law  o f  the  sta te  to  
w hich they belong (national law) and the law  o f  the place w here the application  is m ade both perm it 
divorce". A rticle 2  provided that "D ivorce m ay be granted on ly  if  obtainable in the particular case under 
both the national law  o f the spouses and the law  o f  the place w here the application is m ade, though on 
different grounds".
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other words, the Convention deprives the parties who are foreigners from obtaining a 
divorce in the court of their domicile, if their national law forbids it or tlie ground upon 
which the divorce is claimed is not recognised by their national law. Thus, under the 
double requirements foreigners could not obtain divorce unknown to the foram nor could 
divorce be obtained if the national law did not permit dissolution of marriage during the life 
time of both parties.
The principle of cumulation under the Hague Convention to grant divorce did not 
necessarily mean that the grounds for divorce must be identical in both the lex patriae and 
the lex fori. It is submitted that it was sufficient if  divorce was obtainable in a particular 
case under both laws, though on different grounds. Thus, a divorce might be granted to 
the foreigner on the ground of desertion, although this ground did not constitute a ground 
for divorce by the lex fori; provided that divorce was obtainable in the lex fori on another 
ground such as, injures graves.!^
The solution in Iraq is, on one hand, that the Iraqi law follows the view embodied in 
the Hague Convetion that the granting of divorce must be in accordance with the lex 
patriae. On the other hand, the conjunction with lex fo r i  embodied in the Hague 
convention is rejected by Iraqi I a w .(3  7) This means that a divorce may be granted on the 
grounds found in the lex patriae but not in the Iraqi law or on grounds not even recognised 
by Iraqi law.l^*) Hence, it seems that the Iraqi approach is consistent with the English 
and Scottish view in the limited sense that the right to divorce and the grounds for divorce 
are decided by one law. While this law is the lex fori in England and Scotland, it is the 
lexpatriae in Iraq.
3 6 -  Rabel, o p .c it ,  p
3 7 -  AII-Hadway, op
468; G utteridge, (1938) 19B .Y .B .L . 30, 32.
c i t ,  p. 175; A bbas, M ., o p .c it ,  p. 17; A bdulW hahed, K ., o p .c it , p. 35.
3 8 -  T his rule is subject to  public policy. See, infra, 110.
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1- The Lex Patriae: Means the Law of the Husband
The principle of submitting the choice of law rule in divorce cases to the lexpatriae 
presents difficulties where the parties are subject to different nationalities. Various legal 
systems have adopted various methods to solve the problem either by reference to the 
husband's nationality, or to the law of the nationality of the petitioner or to the last common 
domicile or to the last common nationality. The last criterion was considered by the Hague 
Convention of 1902 when article 8 provided that "where the spouses are of different 
nationality, their national law shall be considered to be the law of their last common 
nationality".
The text of article 19(3) of Iraqi Civil Code indicates that the choice of law rule in cases 
where the parties have different nationalities is the national law of the husband only, 
irrespective of the wife's national law. To justify this system, it has been said, that it is the 
simplest one and most convenient in practice, because under this system divorce is 
governed by one law and therefore, it will avoid for the court the difficulties arising from 
the application of the principle of cumulation.!^
The simplicity of this system in practice should not prevail over justice and interests of 
the parties. Moreover, this system is arbitrary because it ignores the modern idea of 
equality of the parties. It is submitted that this system is inconsistent with the Iraqi 
Constitutional Code and the Iraqi Nationality Code and with the Conventions containing 
provisions as to equality of sexes.!^®) The hardship of this system in practice can be 
seen in cases where a woman married a person whose national law does not permit divorce 
or a person who obtains after the marriage naturalization in a foreign country whose laws 
deprive the parties from obtaining divorce as a way to dissolve the marriage.
3 9 -  AII-Hadway, op.cit., p. 175; Palsson, op.cit., (1978), p. 130.
4 0 -  A rt.3  o f the C onvention on the N ationality  o f  M arried W om an o f  1958; A rt. 12(1) o f  the Iraqi 
N ationality  Code N° 43 o f 1963;W eis, op.cit., p. 97.
4 1 -  A bdul W hahed, K ., op.cit., p. 38.
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As regards the cases where the husband has more than one nationality at the time of the 
proceedings, the Iraqi law has adopted the solution that divorce must be determined by the 
Iraqi law whenever one of the nationalities involved thereof is that of the Iraqi s t a t e . ( 4  2 ) 
This rule is anomalous because of its nationalistic bias. It is thought that the effective 
nationality should prevail because it represents the country with which the person 
concerned is most closely connected. On the other hand, the law is silent upon which 
nationality the court must select in cases where neither of the nationalities is Iraqi. The 
view of the Iraqi academics suggest that the effective nationality is the appropriate solution 
in such cases.
2- The Exception to the Law of the Husband
The principle by virtue of which the permissibility and grounds for divorce is 
determined by the husband's national law has become subject to various exceptions in 
favour of the Iraqi law. These exceptions can be seen in cases where one of the parties was 
an Iraqi national at the time of the marriage ceremony, where the application of the foreign 
law is contrary to public policy and where the husband is stateless at the time of the 
proceedings.
a- Possession of Iraqi Nationality
Article 19 (5) of Iraqi Civil Code provides clearly that divorce is determined by Iraqi 
law if one of the parties is an Iraqi at the time of the marriage, notwithstanding the parties' 
personal law at the time of the proceedings.!^'*) It has been argued that this exception 
protects mainly the wife whose nationality was Iraqi at the time of the marriage ceremony in 
case the husband acquires a nationality the law of which does not permit divorce and 
therefore, to prevent evasion of the law governing the marriage at the time when the 
contract took place. This is because the wife acquired according to Iraqi law a right to
4 2- Art.33(2) of the 1959 Civil Code; All-Hadway, op.cit., p. 153.
4 3 - Hammed Moustapha, op.cit, p. 193; All-Hadawy, op.cit., p. 154.
44 - Abdul Whahed, K., op.cit, p. 41.
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divorce when she entered the contract of marriage, that cannot be denied by the fact that the 
husband changes his nationality.!^^)
It should be noted that the application of article 19 (5) is not limited to cases where the 
wives were Iraqi at the time of the marriage. Moreover, the case where the husband 
acquires a new nationality by virtue of which divorce is permitted, or the change of 
nationality is not based on any evasive intention is left open.!^^)
This exception is anomalous for there is no sound policy reason that might justify the 
application of Iraqi law to parties neither of whom is a holder of Iraqi nationality at the time 
of divorce proceedings. One might also argue that it is hard and illogical to accept this rule 
for its nationalistic bias, inasmuch as Iraqi courts would never recognise a foreign divorce 
granted in the same circumstances where an Iraqi national is involved. It is thought that 
protection of the wives in cases where the husband acquires a new nationality for evasive 
purposes can be achieved by the use of the public policy principle. However, this 
exception is limited in practice since the Iraqi nationality at the time of marriage is not a 
sufficent ground for divorce p r o c e e d in g s . ! ^  7)
b- Public Policy
It is a well settled principle in private international law that the applicable law in any
case must be disregarded if it is contrary to the lex fo ri public policy. To this extent,
article 32 of the Iraqi Civil Code provides clearly that the provisions of a foreign law
applicable by virtue of the preceding articles of the Code shall not be applied if they are
contrary to public policy and morality in Iraq. Determination of whether the relevant
4 5 - All Hadway, op.cit., p. 175, Cf, generally Drammeh v.Drammeh (1970) 78 Ceylon L.W. 55, P.C, 
where wife had 'contracted' for a monogamous marriage.
4 6- It is interesting to see that in Scotland a change of domicile to secure a divorce was able to be made, 
provided that the court took the view that the usual domicile requirements were present,i.e in the days 
when divorce jurisdiction depended on domicile alone. See, Carswell v, Carswell (1881) 8 R. 9o l;  
Stavert v. Stavert (1882) 9 R. 519; Morton v. Morton (1831) 10 S. 162.
4 7- See, Supra, 80.
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foreign law is contrary to public policy is left to the courts' discretionary powers.!^*) It 
is generally submitted that the relevant foreign law is contrary to public policy in cases 
where both or one of the parties, whose personal law forbids divorce, is converted to 
Islam. In such cases, the courts apply Iraqi law without any consideration of the personal 
law of the parties. The application of Iraqi law in such cases might be justified on the 
ground that Muslims always have the right to divorce irrespective of the personal law or of 
where they are domiciled or residing and depriving a Muslim of this right is contrary to 
public policy and morality.!^ The Iraqi law is applicable even if the conversion is to 
secure divorce, because it is not the duty of the courts to investigate why the person 
concerned converted his religion. Although this exception has been established for 
religious considerations, it is noteworthy that it creates 'limping marriages', because it is 
unlikely that the Iraqi decree will be recognised in the country to which the parties belong. 
Moreover, it promotes 'forum-shopping' by making divorce easier for those whose 
personal law does not permit it.
c- Stateless Person
It has been mentioned earlier!^ <*) that the Iraqi law is silent about the question by 
which law the personal status of stateless persons should be determined. However, the 
view in Iraq suggests that the law of domicile (habitual residence) of the husband should 
determine the status and capacity of stateless persons. Accordingly, Iraqi law applies over 
divorce proceedings when brought either by the husband or the wife, if the husband is 
stateless and has his domicile [habitual residence] in Iraq at the time of the proceedings, 
even if the wife has nationality of a foreign state.!^ 1)
4 8 - Abdul Whahed, K., op.cit, p. 40.
4 9 - All-Hadway, op.cit., p. 99; Azzedeen Abdallah, op.cit., p. 538.
5 0- See, Supra, 35.
5  1 -  Arts.30 and 33(1) of the 1959 Civil Code; All-Hadway, op.cit., p. 154.
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B- Composite Legal System
The principle that divorce is governed by the national law of the husband presents 
difficulties in cases where this law is a composite legal system. Here, the domestic laws 
are either territorial, i.e., they apply in different legal districts, or personal in character, i.e 
several legal systems applicable throughout the entire territory of the state, but govern only 
a specific category of persons according to their religion or ethnic origin.!^ The 
question therefore is which legal system within the composite state applies:? To deal with 
this question, one might distinguish two different situations depending on whether the law 
in the composite state is based on personal or territorial criteria.
1- Composite Legal System Based on Personal Criteria
In many countries, the law of divorce depends on membership of a certain religious 
community or other personal criteria, namely class, caste or race.(^ Such a system may 
be found in India and African countries. In Arab countries, for instance, divorce is 
governed by the religious principles to which the parties belong. However, article 31(2) of 
the 1951 Iraqi Civil Code provides clearly that the applicable law where the choice of law 
rules refer to a composite legal system must be determined by the internal conflict rules of 
the state concerned. This article shows that the Iraqi court shall call the foreign law in aid 
to determine the applicable law, whether the law of the composite state is based on the 
national law or domiciliary law of the person concerned. On the other hand, this article is 
silent as far as the case where the composite legal system has no internal conflict rules. It is 
submitted that no difficulties arise inasmuch as the Iraqi conflict rule is quite sufficient in 
itself to solve such a case. This is because it refers to the national law of the husband in 
such a state, a reference that can be construed as a reference to the particular set of rules 
applicable under the domestic law of the state to which the husband belongs. Let us
5 2- EdoardVitta, In.Enc.Com.l.vol, III, chap.9, International Conflict o f Laws, 1985, p. 3; Kurt.
Lipstein & Istvan .Szaszy, In. Enc. Com. 1., vol. Ill,.chap. 10 International Conflict of Laws, 1985, p.
3; Palsson, op.cit., (1974), p. 95; Azzedeen Abdallah, op cit., p. 179.
5 3- Rabel, op.cit., p. 134; Palsson, op, cit., (1978), p. 141 ; Azzzedeen Abdallah, op.cit., p. 18.
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suppose that an Egyptian woman petitions for a divorce before an Iraqi court which 
assumed jurisdiction on the ground that the husband was resident in Iraq. Applying Iraqi 
conflict rule the court must apply Egyptian law, i.e the husband's national law, by virtue of 
which divorce is governed by the religious principle to which the parties belong. The judge 
therefore must inquire whether the husband is a Muslim, a Christian or a Jew in order to 
determine the applicable law.
2- Composite Legal System Based on Territorial Criteria
The foremost example of this type of legal system is the United Kingdom. Here the 
territory is divided into two parts where two main law districts are formed, namely England 
(including Wales) and Scotland.!^ Conflicts between the territorial laws of this region 
are determined by the courts operating within that region which apply the same conflict 
rules as in international conflict of laws. Since the test of nationality in such states is of a 
little use and it is impossible to connect the British national, for instance, with one local 
district rather than with another on the strength of their nationality, reference to the national 
law is insufficient and therefore should be supplemented by other complementary 
criteria.!^ Article 31(2) of the 1951 Iraqi Civil Code places this kind of composite legal 
system on equal footing with composite legal systems based on personal criteria, even 
though they are different in nature and character. According to this article, however, the 
Iraqi court should respect and apply the law district determined by the internal conflict rules 
of the national law appointed by the relevant Iraqi choice of law rule.
This approach proves insufficient to ascertain the applicable law if the designated state
has no internal conflict rules. It is generally submitted that the place where the interested
person is domiciled may serve as a criteria to determine the applicable law. W hen
considering a divorce suit of a British couple, for instance, the Iraqi court should inquire
about the husband's domicile in order to determine the applicable law. It is therefore clear
5 4- There is also the legal system of Northern Ireland, but that is beyond the scope of this thesis.
5 5- Consider, e.g the well kowon Renvoi case of Re O'kee/e [1940] Ch. 124.
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that the court should apply Scots law if it is established that the husband is domiciled in 
Scotland. The remaining question requiring consideration here is where the husband's 
domicile is situated outside the United Kingdom, say for example, in Iraq, In this case, it 
is argued, the court should apply the law of the last domicile within the country of his 
nationality.!^
C- Renvoi
The Iraqi conflict rules, as we have seen, refer the matter of choice of law in divorce to 
the national law of the husband. The question which requires examination here is whether 
reference to the husband's national law means a reference to the domestic law, or to the 
conflict of law rules as well as the internal ones. This question is discussed by academic 
authorities under the principle which is called 'renvoi'.!^ 7)
Renvoi may arise when the relevant choice of law rule under the personal law of the 
parties, applicable according to the lex fori conflict rule, refers to the lex fori or to a third 
state law as being the applicable law. The renvoi problem presents itself in two different 
forms, namely, remission, a reference to the lex fori, and transmission which is a 
reference to the law of a third state.!^*) It is interesting to emphasise that renvoi in its 
remission form has been accepted in the 1 9 3 1  Act regulating civil status of foreigners in 
l r a q . ! 5  9 )  Conversely, the 1 9 5 1  Iraqi Civil Code, abolishing the 1 9 3 1  Act, has completely 
rejected renvoi in both forms. To this extent, article 3 1 ( 1 )  of the 1 9 5 1  Code states, and it is 
5 6- Azzedeen Abdallah, op.cit., p. 192.
57 - Three theories have been suggested for the solution of the Renvoi problem, namely, (1) the internal 
law theory, (2) partial Renvoi, Renvoi or single Renvoi theory, (3) the foreign court law theory or 
Total Renvoi or Double Renvoi theory. More details. See, Georges, L.S., In. Enc. Com. law, vol. Ill, 
chap. 6, Private International Law, 1988; Dicey & Morris, 11th ed., p. 73; Cheshire & North, 12th 
ed., p. 60; Abdul-Hamied Washy, Private International Law In Iraq,B 2igh&àd, (1940), p. 159 (In 
Arabic); The Hague Convention of 1902 rejected Renvoi, but this principle was adopted by the Renvoi 
Convention [Convention for regulating the conflict between national law and the law of domicile o f  
1955]. This Convention was only ratified by two States, Belgium and Netherlands; as five ratification 
were required for its entry into force, it never become effective.
5 8 - Palsson, op.cit., (1978), p. 143.
59 - Art. 1.
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too clear for argument, that the internal provisions of the relevant foreign law are applicable 
to the exclusion of its conflict of law provisions.!^
The main justification advanced by academic authorities in support of this view is that 
the law of personal status in Iraq depends mainly on the Islamic religious principles. It is 
therefore beyond any doubt that acceptance of renvoi in this situation would lead to the 
application of Islamic religious rules to persons belonging to another religious 
denomination.!^ 1)
D- Material Time
Although the dissolution of marriage by talaq does not require constitution of an action 
before the court,!*» the Iraqi law contains provisions regulating the choice of law rules 
in talaq as well as the dissolution of marriage by judicial proceedings. According to article 
19(3) of the 1951 Code, however, Wag and judicial divorce are treated on an equal footing 
as far as choice of law rules are concerned. This article states clearly that talaq, judicial 
divorce and separation are determined by the husband's national law at the time when talaq 
is pronounced or when the legal proceedings are begun.
As regards dissolution of marriage by judicial proceedings, the court should apply the 
husband's national law at the time of institution of the legal proceedings, notwithstanding 
that the husband subsequently acquires a new nationality before the decree is pronounced. 
It is note worthy that this rule applies to every single case unless one of the parties was an 
Iraqi national at the time of the marriage, a case where the supremacy of Iraqi law overrides 
the effect of the general choice of law rule.!*»
6 0- Farid Fatyan, op.cit., p. 48; All-Hadway, op.cit., p. 97. 
6 1 - Azzedeen Abdallah, op.cit., p. 158.
6 2- Arts.35(l) and 39 (1)(2) of the 1959 Personal Status Code.
6 3 - All Hadawy, op.cit., p. 175; Abdul Whahed, op.cit., p. 44.
116
III- Evaluation of the Choice of Law Rules
At the present date, judicial and academic opinions in England and Scotland appear to 
support the application of the lex fo r i  to determine the permissibility and grounds of 
divorce. It is interesting to note the recommendations of the English and Scottish Law 
Commissions on this matter. The English Law Commission recommended that: "It is our 
strongly held view that practical considerations should prevail and that, notwithstanding the 
theoretical arguments to the contrary, the grounds of, and defences to, a divorce suit heard 
in this country should continue to be those of English l a w . "(64) The Scottish Law 
Commission recommended on the same lines that: "[n]o change should be made in the 
present rules whereby (a) the internal law of Scotland is applied in determining the 
substantive rules in an action of divorce".(6 S)
As regards Iraqi law, on the other hand, the strongly held view is that the application of 
the husband's national law at the time of the proceedings, as a principle, to determine a 
divorce suit remains unchallengeable. This principle is not applicable, however, if either 
party is an Iraqi national at the time of the ceremony or the personal law of the husband is 
contrary to Iraqi public policy. Consideration must be given then, to an analysis of the 
arguments for and against the two doctrines of choice of law rules.
The application of the lex fori has been theoretically justified by Savigny on the ground 
that divorce is imperative in nature inasmuch as it expresses a moral conception of an 
absolute value. The learned writer has clearly stated that:
"Divorce is distinguished from the legal institution relative to property, by the 
circumstance that the laws relating to it depend on the moral nature of marriage, and 
therefore have in themselves strictly a positive character, Hence the judge, in a case of 
divorce, must follow only the law of his country, without respect to the other relations
of the spouses".(6 6)
64- Law Com, Rep, N" 48, para. 105. 
6  5 -  Scots Law Com., N °  25, para. 30.
117
Within the same line of reasoning, Professor W olff justified the application of English 
law in divorce suits solely on the ground that: "the question of the conditions under which 
the nuptial tie may be loosened or destroyed touches fundamental conceptions of morality, 
religion and public policy",(6 7)
It is undoubtedly clear that the policy justification for the application of the lex fori on 
morality and public policy considerations is reasonable if there is a strong connection 
between the parties and the forum's society. But when the connection is not so strong, 
especially when jurisdiction is based on habitual residence for one year of one party only, it 
is submitted that the public policy considerations can hardly justify the application of the 
lex fori because, it is thought, the application of the personal law in such cases would not 
offend the forum's notions of morality and public policy. Thus, the application of the lex. 
fori in such cases may not reflect the marital relationship within the forum's s o c i e t y . ( 6  8)
Another argument advanced in support of this view is that divorce remedies are special 
or equitable, and cannot therefore be exercised except by the courts of the state establishing 
the r e m e d y . ( 6  9 )  To this extent Story has pointed out that divorce, unlike nullity, is so 
closely bound up with remedies as to merit a procedural classification to which the lex fori 
should be applied.(^O) This justification may be criticised on the ground that divorce is 
not a merely procedural matter, but it is a matter of substantive nature that effects the status 
of the parties.
Another jusitification for the lex fori approach seems to be derived from the statutory
66- Savigny, op.cit., p. 298.
6 7- W olff, op.cit., p. 374. The jugment of Lords Weaves and Mackenzi, referred to above, for the
application o f the Scots law seems to be based on the same view.
6 8 - Cheslùre & North, 12th ed., p. 640; North, (1980) I Hague Recueil 83, 84; Cf. Delictual cases where 
the forum had no interest or a lesser interest in the case (cf,lack oO interest of Maltese law in Boys v. 
Chaplin [1971] A.C. 356.
6 9 - Rabel, op.cit., p. 454.
7 0- Story, op.cit., p. 298; Fleming, Evasion o f Imw  and Divorce Adjudication,{1952) 1 I.L.C.Q. 381 at
383.
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nature of divorce. This view appears to be influenced by the old theory that statutes should 
only be accorded territorial effect.C^ The fallacy of this argument lies in the fact that 
there is no obvious and logical policy reason that might induce the treatment of divorce in a 
different way than the other questions related to personal status, e.g., nullity is governed in 
certain cases by the lex causae
In practice, it has been said, to justify the application of the lex fori, that it would be 
highly inconvenient and undesirable to apply foreign law in divorce proceedings, because it 
would cause difficulties regarding proof in divorce petitions, most of w hich are 
undefended. Such proof is more complicated and expensive in England and Scotland than 
in other legal systems, so reference to foreign law would prolong proceedings and 
substantially increase expenses. Further difficulty arises in obtaining expert evidence of 
foreign l a w . ( 7  3 )  There is no doubt that the application of the lex fo ri is less costly and 
puts the judge at ease, particularly in the legal systems where foreign law is treated as a 
mere fact. However, the ease of application of the lex fo ri should not prevail over the 
interest of the parties.
It has been argued also that the application of the lex fori will avoid the court having
further difficulties arising from the application of the lex domicilii. Since a wife can
acquire an independent domicile,!^ 4) the spouses may have different domiciles. It is
therefore quite possible that the law of one spouse permits divorce and the other does not.
This may give rise to the problem of which party's domiciliary law would be applied.
Moreover, the difficulty may remain pending even if the parties have a common domicile,
for there is a possibility that domicile may be differently defined from one country to
another, a fact that requires examination of the private international law of the parties’
7 1 - Dicey & Morris, 9th ed., p. 312; Palsson, op.cit., (1978), p. 126; Rabel, op.cit., p. 454.
7 2* Palsson,.op.cit., (1978), p. 126.
7 3 - Law Com. Rep. 48, para. 104; Law Com, W.P. N” 28, para. 83; Scots Law Com. N® 25, para.
25; Cheshire & North, 11th ed, p. 634; North, (1980) I Hague Recueil 82; Anton, 2n ed., p 467,
74" S .l o f the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973.
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d o m i c i l e , (7 5) Dr. Morris, one of the leading authorities in the subject, being in favour of 
the lex fori approach, states clearly that: "to require English courts to dissolve marriage on 
exotic loreign grounds would be distasteful to the judges and unacceptable to public
o p i n i o n " . ( 7  6 )
Although there is a good policy in favour of applying the lex fori, it is submitted that 
the powerful arguments in favour of the application of the lex domicilii cannot be ignored. 
The nature of a decree of divorce as affecting status appears to demand the application of 
the lex domicihiS^'I) With the broader jurisdictional rules, the lex domicilii becomes 
necessary to reduce the evils of 'limping marriage' and forum-shopping'. On the same 
line of reasoning, the Royal Commission on Marriage and D i v o r c e ( 7  8 )  criticised the 1 9 4 9  
Act which based jurisdiction on three years' residence o f  a wife on the ground that the 
personal law of the parties had been completely ignored, a factual situation that would 
undermine the universal recognition of the English or Scottish divorces. The Royal 
Commission, however, submitted in clear tenus that if jurisdiction was based on residence 
combined with the application of the parties' personal l a w , ( 7  9 )  the English or Scottish 
divorce would be recognised abroad, on condition that divorce should not be granted 
unless the personal law ol both parties recognised as sufficient ground for divorce a ground 
substantially similar to that on which a divorce is sought in England or Scotland, or would 
allow the applicant, to be obtain a divorce on some other grounds.
Although it may be argued that the Royal Commission's particular argument in 
criticising the 1949 Act which had been enacted to provide a remedy in a particular
7 5- S co ls L aw  C om . N" 25 . para. 29.
7 6- M orris , 3 rd  cd ., p. 192; 4 lh  cd ., p. 185.
7 7- G ravcson . 7ih cd., p. 286; W cin traub , Conmienhny on the Conflia of I m w s , 2nd ed ., pp. 3 7 3 , 74.
7 8- C om d, N" 9678 ; S ee a lso , R eport ol' the  D epart m en tal C om m ittee  on A d m in is tra tio n  o f  the L aw  o f  
D ir o rec and N ullity  o f  M arriage in E ngland  and W ales, C om d N P 7024  [The D enning  com m ittee].
7 9- Personal law m eans the law  o f the d o m ic ile  un less tha t law  regarded  the law  o f  a p erson 's  n a tio n a lity
a.s his o r her personal law , in w hich case it w o u ld  be the law  o f nation ialily . paras. 836 , 839.
8 0-  Paras. 8 2 7 -8 3 5 ; co m p a re  w ith  G u tte r id g e , (1 9 3 8 ) 19 B .Y .I.L , 3 8 , w ho  su g g es ted  tha t n a tio n a lity
•should be a basis o f  ju r isd ic tio n , bu t that the grounds o f  d ivorce should  be governed  by the Jexfori.
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situation, i.e., desertion and therefore a wide international recognition was not of pressing 
concern to a deserted wife who intended to remain in Scotland or England, it is submitted 
that the recommendation in principle tends to the application of the personal law when, 
divorce jurisdiction is broadened to allow courts to grant divorce on grounds other than 
domicile, and so to reduce 'limping marriages' and 'forum-shopping'. As it has been 
mentioned earlier, habitual residence under the present law would not end the forum- 
shopping, particularly when the meaning of this term is still under active discussion. A one 
year qualification is not enough because it is not difficult for people to stay for one year to 
obtain divorce. Moreover, there is another difficulty with this jurisdictional basis in that the 
decree proceeding upon it may be denied recognition abroad, especially in the country of 
domicile. Accordingly, the recommendation of the Royal Commission that consideration 
must be given to the personal law of the parties seems to be sound in the context of the 
present law of jurisdiction.
The lex domicilii has been widely accepted as a good law to test the validity of 
marriage. Admitting that the dissolution of marriage is not less substantial than its creation, 
one might say that the lex domicilii should play an active role in its dissolution. The 
argument that it is difficult to prove foreign law or to obtain expert evidence is not sufficient 
to obliterate the interests of the parties concerned i.e., if one can identify the interests of the 
parties: are they opposing? It may be possible to say (in many cases) that their interests are 
to obtain a divorce generally recognised as valid. Moreover, the argument that the 
application of lex domicilii would lead to difficulties where the parties have different 
domiciles is also not convincing. This problem can be resolved by adopting a choice of 
law rule that ensures the balance of interests between the com peting laws. If it is 
impossible to achieve this as in cases where divorce is permitted by one domiciliary law but 
not under the other, reference must be made to another system. Some academic authorities 
indeed suggested the scales should be in favour of applying the law of the petitioner's 
domicile, for it is the only law that would protect his interests. (** D The last actual 
8 1- Seidelson, Interest Analysis and Divorce Action, (1971) 21 Buffalo Rev., 315, 331-332.
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matrimonial home of the parties has been favoured by some other.
As regards the Iraqi choice of law rules, it is said that the application of the lexpatriae 
has certain advantages, namely, it creates a more stable connecting factor, and provides a 
more effective safeguard against evasion of laws and the creation of 'lim ping 
marriage'.(* Since the legal position of persons must be the same everywhere or at 
least that must be our aim and hope, it would be unjust and impractical to determine it by 
different laws in different countries. A further argument in support of the lexpatriae is 
based on the fact that since the law of divorce in Iraq depends on Islamic principles, it 
would be undesirable to  apply Iraqi law to persons belonging to another religious 
denomination simply because their case happens to be adjudicated before Iraqi courts.
The lexpatfiae approach provides no objective solution to cases of stateless persons, 
and where the parties have more than one nationality. Recently, as a result of political 
crisis, millions of people have lost their nationality or they are unable to prove their 
nationality. Although the view in Iraq is that nationality should be supplemented by 
another connecting factor, it is submitted that such a connecting factor has not been settled 
yet. In some cases reference has been made to Iraqi law, in others to the law of domicile 
and sometimes to the law of the effective nationality.
The reference to the national law of the husband to determine divorce in cases where the
parties have different nationalities is unacceptable in modem times, for the equality between
the sexes and the principle that the wife can acquire an independent nationality are
established. In practice, the difficulty of this system can be seen in cases where the wife's
personal law does not recognise the Iraqi decree with the result the legal status of the parties
will be different in different countries. Accordingly, reference must also.be made to the
national law of the wife to ensure the balance of the interest between the parties and to
8 2 -  Prevezer, D ivorce in the Conflict o f  Laws, (1954) 7  C urrent Legal Problem , 114 a t 122.
8 3- A il-H dw ay, op.cit., p. 175.
122
permit justice to be done. In general it may be fair to say that, in the subject of choice of 
law (in contrast with that of conflicting jurisdictions), Iraqi law is well-developed, and 
seemingly liberal, but that, on examination, there is a discernible homeward and husband- 
favoring bias.
To conclude one might submit that both the choice of law rules in the United Kingdom 
and in Iraq have undesirable consequences on the parties as far as recognition and capacity 
to marry are concerned. It would be possible therefore to say that in cases involving a 
foreign element, the common personal law of the parties should determine the divorce suit. 
If, however, the parties have different personal laws, divorce should be determined by the 
petitioner's personal law, and the decree should not be granted unless there is a strong 
possibility of its recognition by the respondent's personal law, or the interests of both 
parties require the dissolution of the marriage. This choice of law rule would reduce the 
problems of 'limping marriages' and 'forum-shopping', particularly in cases where 
jurisdiction is based on one year's habitual residence in English and Scots law and mere 
residence in Iraqi law.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Recognition of Foreign Divorces
Before 1972, the recognition of foreign divorces in England and Scotland was 
generally governed by common law rules. These had been developed since the nineteenth 
century, and the most important development had occurred in the second half o f this 
century as a result of the extension of the domestic jurisdictional rules. In 1967, the House 
of Lords in Indyka  v, suggested various bases for recognition which
rendered the law complex and uncertain in a field of law where certainty is highly desirable. 
The Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971, as amended by the Domicile 
and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, introduced new rules for recognition based on the 
1970 Hague Convention provisions and the retention of certain common law rules. This 
approach was a source of criticism and in 1984 the English and Scottish Law Commissions 
published a joint report on the recognition of foreign nullity decrees. They also examined 
the rules of recognition of divorces and legal separations contained in the 1971 Act. They 
recommended the abolition of the 1971 Act, and the enactment of a new statute containing 
ail the mles relating to the recognition of divorces, annulments and legal separations. The 
recommendations of the Law Commissions were finally implemented by the Family Law 
Act 1986 in part II but not completely since the liberal suggestion to assimilate divorces 
obtained otherwise than by proceedings to those obtained by proceedings has been rejected.
In contrast the Iraqi law contains no specific statutory provisions dealing with this 
subject. On the other hand, enforcement of civil and commercial judgments are subject to 
the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Code 1928 and the Enforcement of Arab Judgments 
Treaty 1952. Academic authorities, however, have expressed different speculative views 
as to whether the 1928 Code and the 1952 Arab treaty should be applied to the recognition 
of divorces. The purpose of this chapter is to scrutinise the recognition rules in order to
1- [1967] 2AI1.E.R 689.
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find out in which circumstances a foreign divorce should be recognised, and whether such 
rules are effective as far as the avoidance of limping marriages is concerned. The rules for 
recognition of divorces will be considered as follows: I-  English and Scottish Rules for 
Recognition of Foreign Divorces.II- Iraqi Rules Relating to the Recognition of Foreign 
Divorces.
I- English and Scottish Rules for Recognition of Foreign Divorces.
Since a distinction is drawn between divorces which are obtained by means of 
proceedings and those which are not, and as different recognition rules are provided for 
both categories,!^) the two categories are considered separately. We shall assume for 
the discussion in point (A) below that the foreign divorce in question has been granted by a 
court of law. The recognition of divorces obtained by means other than the court of law 
will be discussed in point (B) below under the title of recognition of extra-judicial divorces.
A- Recognition of Divorces Granted by a Court of Law
1 - Common Law Recognition Rules
It is worthy of note that the English courts were confronted with recognition problems 
many years before they had to face problems as to when they could themselves assume 
divorce jurisdiction. The difference between the English and Scots substantive laws on the 
subject of divorce prior to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 led the parties to an English 
marriage to cross the border into Scotland to obtain a divorce. At that time, Scottish courts 
held that a short residence in Scotland was sufficient to give them jurisdiction to dissolve 
marriage,!^) and from time to time the courts asserted and exercised a jurisdiction upon a 
variety of bases to dissolve marriages which had taken place in England.^) The 
dissolution of English marriages by the Scottish courts raised an important question: would
2- Contrast, S .46 (1) w ith S .46 (2) o f  the Fam ily Law A ct 1986.
3 - U ttorton  v. Tewsh  (1811) F ergusson 's  R r.55 ; R inger  v. Churchill (1840) 2 D 3 0 7 ; Show  v.
Show  (1851) 13 D 819; Forrester v, Forrester (1844) 6  D  1358.
4 - Christian  v. Christian (1851) 13 U 49;P itt v. P itt (1862) 1 M  106
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English courts recognise the validity of a Scots divorce? The question seems to have first 
undergone discussion in the case ol R.v LoUeyS^^ In that case the Scots decree was 
rejected on the ground that no sentence of any foreign court could dissolve an English 
marriage. The court considered that the questions of divorce ought to be decided by the 
lex Loci conlractus, which could mean in the case under discussion, that a marriage 
contracted in England could only be dissolved in England, which at that time would only be 
by the Act of Parliament. It was suggested that the English court refused to recognise the 
Scots decree, not because of the indissoluble character of an English marriage but because 
Loi ley had never established a Scottish domicile and therefore, an English court might 
recognise a foreign divorce granted by a court of domicile. This suggestion had been 
dismissed in Sd'carthy v. DecciixS’^ l when Lord Brougham held that the decree of the 
Danish court based on domicile was of no elTect; in dissolving an English marriage.
Domicile as A Basis o f Recognition
The effect of Lolley's case gradually disappeared when the courts began to establish 
domicile as a basis of recognition of foreign divorces, particularly after the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1857 came into force. In Ccinway v. BcazleyS^^ Lolley's case was treated 
as not concluding the point where the divorce was granted in the domicile. Although the 
decision in this case was against the validity of the divorce, the court held that if a foreign 
domicile had been acquired the court of such domicile could dissolve an English marriage. 
Similarily, in Warrender v. Warrender^^'i although the recognition of the divorce 
elsewhere was not strictly relevant, the House of Lords decided that the Scottish courts had 
Jutisdiclion to grant divorce in a case where the husband was domiciled in Scotland even if 
the marriage had been celebrated in England.
5 - (1812) 1 RII & M y 237; Tovey r. Lindsay (1813) 1 Dow 643; M 'carthy v. D ecaix  (1831) 2 Ru & 
M \ 614.
6 - Harvey v. Farnie (1880) 5 l-.R .P .D  153.
7- (1831) 2 Ru & My 614.
8 - (1831) 3 Hagy Eccl 639.
9 -  [ 18.35) 2 C1& Fin.488.
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Aftei 1857, the indissoluble character ot an English marriage disappeared and the effect 
of this fact was noticeable shortly in Dolphin v. R o h i n s D O )  and Shaw v. GouldS^D  
In the toi mer case, recognition was ret used to a Scots decree granted to parties not bona 
fide  domiciled in Scotland. Lord Cran worth stated that: "the Scottish courts had no power 
to dissolve an English marriage where the parties are not really dom iciled in 
Scotland".! I :)  In the latter case, the House of Lord decided that a Scots divorce would 
not be recognised because the residence in Scotland did not involve the acquisition of a 
Scots domicile. Lord Westbury strongly urged the inconvenience of referring to the lex 
hdcontractus of marriage on the subject of divorce. His Lordship held that:
"the pf)sU!on that the tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisd iction  to dissolve the 
m m riugc o f its own subjects, is cornpetent to pronounce a sim ilar decree between 
English subjects who were married in England but who bel'ore, and at the tim e of, the 
suit are perm anently  dom iciled w ithin the jurisd iction  of such foreign tribunal, such 
decree being made in a bona fid e  suit w ithout collusion o r consent, is a position  
consistent w ith all the English decisions, although it m ay not be consistent w ith the 
icsolulion com m only cited as the resolution ol the judges in L ollcv’s case."!^
Another step lo give up the ghost of Lolley's case and to support the divorce
pronounced in the court of domicile was taken in Harvey v. F arnie.O  4) i„ which it was
held that:
|l |h e  E nglish  court will recognise as valid  the decision  o f  a com peten t foreign 
Christian tribunal dissolving the m arriage between a  dom iciled native in the country  
u here such tribunal has jurisd iction , and an English woman, when the decree of divorce 
is not impeached by any species o f collusion or fraud. And this although the m arriage 
may have been solemnised in England and m ay have been dissolved for a cause which 
v\-ould h a \c  been insulTicient lo obtain a dix'orce in England."!^ ^1
1 0- ( 1859) 7 H .L  390.
1 I- {1868) L  R 3 H.L 55.
I 2- Dolphin  v. Robins (18.59) 7 H .L 390 at 4^14; R v. Russel f 19011 A.C. 446.
I 3~ .S7/UU- V. Gould ( ] mH)  LR 3 H L 55 at 85.
1 4 ( 1882) 8 App Cas 43; Bo fer v. Baler [ 1906| P. 209 at 232.
1 5- Marvy r. Farnie ( 1882) 8 App Cas 43 at 47.
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It is submitted that the decision in Le Mesurier v. Le M esurieA^^^ is a good 
authority to support the proposition that a divorce granted by the court of domicile would 
receive recognition in England, Their Lordships appear to have been influenced largely by 
what was said in Shaw  v. Gould as to the basis of recognition of foreign divorce. Lord 
Watson who cited with approval Lord Westbury's view said: "when the jurisdiction of the 
court is exercised according to the rules of private international law, as in the case where 
the parties have their domicile within its forum, its decree dissolving their marriage ought to 
be recognised by the tribunals of every civilised country".!^
In Scotland, although judicial divorce has been available since the sixteenth century, the 
rules for recognition of divorces developed at about the same time as the English rules. 
Since Le Mesurier v. Le M e s u r i e r Scots law has accepted that the court of the 
domicile of the husband at the commencement of the action is, in principle, the true court of 
jurisdiction for a decree of dissolution of marriage by divorce. Accordingly, the law of 
recognition was formulated upon this principle and therefore, the courts followed the view, 
of the English authorities, that a foreign divorce would be recognised if it was obtained in 
the country in which the husband was domiciled in the sense of the Scots law. In 
Humphrey v. Humphrey,T  Lord Moncrieff stated:
"W here the parties have been th roughout dom iciled abroad, the C ourts o f  this country  
w ould give effec t to  a  decree  o f  d ivorce  p ronounced  by the C ourt o f the fo re ign  
dom icile, although it m ight be  g ran ted  upon a ground on w hich  the C ourt o f  th is 
country  w ould not grant d ivorce to  persons dom iciled  here, provided alw ays that the 
ground o f d ivorce w as no t repugnant to  the standard  o f m orality  recogn ised  by a 
civilised and C hristian State".
1 6 -  [1895] A .C 517.
1 7 - Ibid, at 527.
1 8 -  [1895] A .C  517.
1 9 - (1895) 3 S .L .T  151 a t 152; C alderv . CaWer, 1901.8 S .L .T 330; Crabtree v. C rabtree,1929. 8 S .L .T  
675; Scott v. S co tt,l9 1 3  S .L .T  632.
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b- Divorce Recognised by a Court o f Domicile
Since a decree of divorce affects status and all matters of status are subject to the law of 
domicile,!-0) it was held to follow that a divorce granted in a court other than that of 
domicile would be recognised if it was recognised by the court of that domicile. The case 
which established this rule is Armitage v. Attarney-GeneralS^D  which Mrs. Gilling, 
an Englishwoman married in England Mr. Gilling, an American citizen domiciled in New 
Yoik, but temporarily resident in England. Eight years later the wife went to Yankton, in 
the state of South Dakota, and one of her objects in doing so was to institute proceedings 
there for divorce. After residing for 90 days there, she obtained a decree of divorce from 
the court of the state of South Dakota. Later on she married an Englishman domiciled in 
England named Armitage. She then petitioned the English court for a declaration that her 
second marriage was valid. On the facts of the case, the English court found that the 
husband s domicile of origin was at all material times in New York and by operation of 
law, the w ifes domicile at the time of the South Dakota decree was in New York. The 
wife acquired a domicile in South Dakota in the New York sense, but not in the English 
sense, hence insufficient to entitle the decree of divorce granted to her in South Dakota to 
be recognised in England on ordinary reasoning. However, expert evidence was shown 
that in the state of New York the divorce would be recognised as valid.
Sir Gorell Barnes P. who held that the English court should recognise the South Dakota 
decree, asked himself "Are we in this country to recognise the validity of a divorce which is 
recognised as valid by the law of the husband"? Relying on the fact that the question of 
personal status depends on the law of domicile, the learned judge then concluded that "In 
my view, this question must be answered in the affirmative".!2 2)
2 0- Diccy & M orris, 8th cd , P. 3 II ; Cheshire, 6ih ed, .P..395.
2 1 -[1906] P. 135. D iscussed M orris, IWogmiion of Divorces Grcmted outside the Domicile, (1946) 24 
Can.B ar.R c\ 71 ; Raphael Tuck, Recognitiofi of Foreign Divorces: A Reply to A criticism, ( 1947) 25  
Can.B ar Re\- 226.
2 2 -A l, 141. 142.
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This case was followed in Clark v. Clarkk'^^) and its principle was recognised in 
Cass V. where an English court refused to recognise the South Dakota decree
because it was proved that the law of Massachusetts, where the husband was domiciled, 
would not have recognised it. Armitage v. A.G  was followed in. the Scottish case of 
Mckay v. Wallsf^^)  in which Lord Birnam held that the Iowa decree must be 
recognised as valid m Scotland because there was evidence that such a decree would be 
recognised as valid in the state of the husband's domicile, i.e. New York.
In the light of the discussion above, it appears that no foreign divorce would be 
recognised unless jurisdiction had been assumed on the basis of domicile in the English or 
Scottish sense. Since a wife could not acquire a separate domicile from that of her 
husband,(26) the principle of recognition was that a divorce pronounced by a foreign 
court would be recognised as valid if the husband was at the time of proceedings domiciled 
in the country where the divorce was granted or in a country where such a divorce was 
recognised. Therefore, nothing less than domicile is sufficient,(27) even though the 
parties are foreigners who were married abroad. Nationality, residence and the place of 
celebration of marriage are irrelevant. Moreover, if the courts consider that the foreign 
court had jurisdiction on the basis of domicile, the grounds of divorce in the foreign forum
are irrelevant.(2 8)
2 3- [1921] 3 7 T .L .R 8 I5 .
2 4- 1(910] 26.T.L.R305.
2 5 -  1951 S .L .T  (Notes) 6 ; Perin v. Pehn, 1950 S .L .T  51; Dujjes v. Duffes, 1971 S .L .T  (N otes) 83; 
See, D uncan & D ykes, o p .c il .p 166; W alton, Husband and Wife According lo ihe Law o f  
Scotland3YÛ~cé. Edinburgh, W .Green & Son (1951), P. 368; W estlake, op.cit.p. 86.
2 6 See, Supra, 3 1.
2 7 -  But See, Colonial and O ther T errito ries (D ivorce Jurisdiction) A cts 1926-1950. T hese A cts arc 
repealed by the Family Law Act 1986, 8 .68  (2) and Schcd, 2.
2 8 - / ) a / . r  r. JW cr 11906] P .209 at 217; v. ( ,882 ) 8  A pp C as; w
(1899) 1 P62\-M etzger  r. Metzger [1937] P. 19; Humphrey v. Humphreys TR (1895) 3 S .L .T I5 1 ;
I c/in I. Ic/ in 1950 S .L .T  51 , C D v. A B 1908 S .C  737 ,739; Westergoard v, Weslergoard 1914 
S.C 977; See, Dicey & M orris, 12 ed, p.730; W cst[ake, op.cil.P . 97; W ebb, The Old order diangetlc 
Travers v. Hollev: Reinterpreted (1967) 16 I.C .L .Q .997  at 1004; N orth, op .c il.(1977) P. 158; 
M c'Ican, op.cit.P. 37.
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Il is clear that the law as to recognition of foreign divorces was a mirror image of the 
domestic jurisdictional rules. The symmetry between divorce jurisdiction and the 
recognition ol loreign, divorces provided no solution to divorces granted on a jurisdictional 
basis other than domicile. Many countries in the World have adopted nationality or 
lesidence as a basis for divorce jurisdiction. To refuse recognition to divorce obtained in 
such circumstances is to increase the number of "limping mamages" and to cause hardship 
to the person affected.(2 9) the time when the Le Mesurier case was decided Bar had 
written that:
"In action ol divorce-unlcss there Is sonic express enactm ent to the contrary- the judge 
ol the dom icile o r nationality  is the only com petent judge". And he adds"A decree o f 
di\'o rce, therefore, pronounced by any o ther judge than a judge o f the dom ic ile  or 
nationality, is to be regarded in all other countries as inoperative".!^ 0)
Although Lord Watson quoted Bar in the Le Mesurier case, his Lordship entirely 
ignored nationality and enunciated the principle that domicile should be the exclusive test as 
he thought this was consistent with the practice in all civilised countries. Lord Reid in 
Indyka v. fndyka(^ L suspected that the rule in Le Mesurier would keep English law in 
line with other civilised practice.'Tt is just possible" his Lordship suggests "that [the Privy 
Council 1 were actuated by the hope, common in Victorian times, that if England showed 
the way, others would see the light and follow; if so, any such hope has been grievously 
disappointed."
Qn the lact that divorce jurisdiction is exercised on different bases in different
2 9- See, Royal C om m ission on M arriage and D ivorce, 1951-55, Com . 9678 .P .226 ; G ordon  Bale,
Recognuion of Foreign Decrees-A "Proper Forum" A Forum wilk which the Petitioner has 
Snhsiuntial and Real Cotmeciion in Indyka v. Indyka (1968) 46 Can.Bar.Rcv 11.3 at 116.
3 0 Bar, op.cil.pp. 382 ,383; Deck v. Deck ( I8 6 0 ) 2 SW  & T R .90  suggested  that n a tionality  w as a
jurisdictional basis lor divorce in England, and there arc statem ents in Metzger v. Melzf^er[l937] P. 19
at 22-25.28-29 conveying the notion that the decree o f the courts o f the parties' nationality  should  be 
recognised.
3 1- (19671 2 A ll.E .R  689 at 700.
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countnes, the House of Lords indicated that the courts should no longer delude themselves 
with the comforting thought that domicile is the determinant of the personal law of persons 
in all countries and that jurisdiction to grant divorce is based primarily on domicile. 
Thereupon, Le Mc.vuriV should not be followed in so far as it laid .down a rule that only 
decrees of the courts o f the domicile should be recognised.<32) Accordingly, the 
principle of domicile in the Indyka case lost its position as the only basis of recognition of 
divorces when their Lordships set out an "entirely new test or tests of recognition"(3 3) as 
we shall see later. So far as domicile at the present discussion is concerned, it is interesting 
to note that although the House of Lords approach was to depart from the old principle that 
domicile should be the only basis of recognition, their Lordships agreed, with varying 
degiees of emphasis, that domicile must remain the primary basis. Moreover, Lord 
Pearson was prepared to recognise a foreign divorce granted by a court of domicile 
according to a less exacting definition than that applied in England. Since some countries 
allow a wife to acquire domicile separate from that of her husband for the purpose of suing 
for divorce, his Lordship suggested that there was no reason for refusing recognition of 
divorce obtained in such c ircu m stan ces .4)
This approach has been achieved incidentally in the Family Law Act 1986 in which a 
loreign divorce will be recognised if either party at the date of the commencement o f  the 
proceedings was domiciled, either in the United Kingdom or foreign sense, in the country 
where the divorce was obtained.(35) This provision recognises and accepts that the 
essential rules or components of domicile vary (even) among those countries o f the world 
which adopt domicile as the personal law.
As regards the rule of Armitage v. A.G. all their Lordships(3«) except Lord Reid
3 Z -W ebb, (19fi7) 16 I.C .L .Q .997 at 1003; Gordon Bale, (1968) 46  Can.Bar.Rcv 113 at 120.
3 3- Angelo u. Angelo j l9 6 8 | I W .L.R 401 at 405; Brown v. Brown [1968] 2 W .L .R .969 
3 4~Imlyka v. Indyka []9 6 7 | 2A11E.R 689 m 730,731 ; See, Lipslein (1967) G.L.J183.
3 5- S .46 ( I)  (2) and (5); See, also  S.3 (2) ol the 1971 A ct; M essina  v. Smith  [1970] P .322 a t 339;
Lawrence v. Lawrence [1985] 2 A iI.E.R .733 at 745.
3 6 -  Indyka v. Indyka [1967] 2 A ll.E .R  689 at 706  Lord M orris at 714  per L ord P earce at 126 per
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agreed that this rule must be maintained as supplementary to the jurisdiction of the court of 
domicile. There is no doubt that this rule enabled many divorces granted in some countries 
to be recognised in England and Scotland, although the parties were not domiciled in the 
country where the divorce was granted. In practice, this rule is regarded as a good step to 
reduce the number ot 'limping marriages"!^ Most academic authorities welcomed this 
rule(^^S) and it remained a good law until 1986 when the Family Law Act 1986 abolished 
it following the lecommendation of the Law Commissions!^^) for reasons which will be 
considered later.(4 0)
c- Recognition Based on Travers v. Holley Rule
Fiom 1937 Ltcriutory provisions existed within the Uiuted Kingdom conferring
jurisdiction on bases other than domicile in special cases of hardship, viz. the Acts of
1937,1944 and 1949. This departure from the domicile principle raised the question
whether the courts would recognise decrees granted by a non-domiciliary court, but under
ciicumstances wheie the English and Scottish courts have themselves the power to entertain
jurisdiction.!4 IJ It was argued that the general rule requiring domicile as the test to
determine the validity of foreign divorces should remain without change, because the Acts
of 1937 and 1949 contained no provisions in regard to recognition of foreign divorces. If
the rule of recognition was to be changed, it should be changed by legislation, as was done
in the 1944 Act.!42) This approach received support from the Scottish courts in Warden 
U ird Wiibcrforcc.
3 7-M orris, ( 1946) 24 Can.Bar.Rc\'.71 at 81 : Falconbridge, op.cil.P.619.
3 8- W estlake, op.cil.pp .86. 87; Falcon bridge, op.cil p .617; Raphael T uck, (1947) 25 Can.B ar.R cv 226; 
Cheshire. 6ih ed., p. 394. The acUial decision was criliciscd by Dr. Morris, ( 1946) 24  C an.B ar.R cv.7 1 
at 75. 7 he case was w rongly decided and that the doctrine is an inadequate m itigation of the iron-clad 
rule that jurisdiclitMi to di\ orcc depends upon dom icile alone".
3 9- Law Com No. 137 & Scot Law  Com No. 88. Recognition o f  Foreign NiillUy D ecrees and Related
Matters paras 6.24-6.30.
4 0- Sec Infra, 161,
4 1  -See, Caste), \a lid ity o J  Loreign D ecrees Based on Jnhsdicfionai Ground not R ecogn ised in English  
Law a t the Time when Obtained, ( 1967) 45 Can Bar Rev 14o al 142.
4 2- Dtcey, 6th cd , pp. 315-316 ; C heshire, (1945) 61 L Q Rev 368; Cl’ J.G ow , Travers v. H ollev:
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V.  W ardenS^^) in which Lord Strachan refused to recognise a divorce obtained by the 
wife from the courts of Nevada on the jurisdictional basis of six weeks' residence, on the 
ground that Nevada was not the court of the husband's domicile. The learned judge said:
"The A ct o f 1949 extends the  ju risd ic tion  o f the C ourt o f S ession , bu t it m akes no 
provision w hatever in regard to the  recognition o f foreign decrees o f  divorce. H ad it 
been the in tention  o f P arliam ent that the law as to the recognition  o f  foreign decrees 
should also be changed, som e provision to that effect w ould have been m a d e " . ( 4  4 )
The argument based on the intention of Parliament seems unconvincing because it is
submitted that the law relating to the recognition of divorces was judge made law. There
was no reason why the courts should not recognise divorces granted on jurisdictional bases
similar to that conferred on the English and Scottish courts by the 1937 and 1949 Acts. To
recognise such decrees was to promote a better understanding in the international sphere
and possibly to secure wider recognition of English and Scottish decrees. One commentator
was writing that "If the facts are such that the courts of the forum would have jurisdiction,
on proper cause, to grant a divorce, then it is my submission that it should recognise a
divorce granted elsewhere on the basis of the same facts-regardless of any question o f
d o m i c i l e . " ( 4  5 )  The Court of Appeal accepted this argument, embodying the principle that
the English court should recognise a foreign divorce decree obtained in jurisdictional
Recognition o f Foreign Divorces-Domidle, (1954) 3 I .C .L .Q .1 5 2  a l 154; S .4  o f  the 1944 A ct 
provided that the English and Scottish courts are to recognise any decree o r order m ade by v irtue o f  this 
A ct o r by v irtue o f any law of H er M ajesty 's dom inions outside the U nited K ingdom , o r o f  any B ritish 
protected state, which has been declared by o rder in council to be a law substantially  corresponding to  
the provision m ade in  respect o f  G reat B ritain  by the A ct, p rovided  tha t rec ip roc ity  o f  trea tm en t is 
granted to English  o r Scottish decrees. This A ct is repealed by the Fam ily Law  A ct 1986, S.68  (2) and 
Sched.2.
4 3 -  1951 S .C .508.
4 4 -  Ibid, at 511.
4 5 -  G risw old , (1965) 65  H .L .R 193 at 227 -228 ; W estlake, op .cit.p . 84; G raveson , Arnold v. Arnold: 
Divorce-Recognition of Foreign Decrees Based on Residence {1951) 6 I.C .L .Q .3 5 1 a t 3 5 2 ; M ann , 
Recognition o f Foreign Divorces, (1954) 17 M .L .R ev  79  ; W ick e n s , Recognition o f Foreign 
Divorces-Domicile,{\945) 23 C an .B ar.R cv .244  a t 247 ; Kennedy, "Reciprocity" in the Recognition 
of Foreign Judgments: the Implication of Travers v. Holley (1953) 32  Can.B ar.R ev.359.
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circumstances where, mutatis mutandis, the English court would have had jurisdiction.
The leading case in this point is Travers v. Holley (46) in which a husband and wife, 
domiciled in England, after their marriage emigrated in 1938 to Sydney, New South Wales, 
where the husband was held to have acquired a domicile of choice. In 1940, he abandoned 
both his wife and his domicile and returned to England. In 1943, the wife petitioned the 
court of New South Wales for divorce on the ground of his desertion. The decree was 
granted and made absolute in 1944. The court of New South Wales assumed jurisdiction 
under section 16 (a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1937, which is substantially identical to 
English section 13 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1937. Later, the husband, whose second 
maiTiage provea unsatisfactory, petitioned the English courts for divorce from the first wile 
on the ground that he had never acquired a domicile of choice in New South Wales and 
therefore, that the decree granted by the court of that state was invalid. This raised the 
direct issue of the recognition of the New South Wales divorce.
The Court of Appeal, without considering Warden v. Warded^'^) held that the 
decree, though not given by the court of the domicile, must be recognised as valid. Both 
Somervell L.J. and Hodson L.J. pointed out the relevant provisions of the two Matrimonial 
Causes Acts; although different in wording, the result for the present purpose was the 
same. Hodson L.J. said:
"It m ust surely be that what entitles an E nglish court to assum e jurisd ic tion , m ust be 
equally edective in the case of a foreign court. I would say that where, as here, there is 
in substance reciprcKity, it would be contrary to principle and inconsistent w ith com ity 
if the courts o f this country were to refuse to recognise a ju risd ic tion  w hich mutatis 
mutandis they claim  for themselves. " (4 ^ )
4 6  -11953) P .246; D iscussed, T hom as, Note on Travers  v. H olley, (1954) 3K C .L .Q 156; G ow , The 
External Effects o f  the Travers  v. H olley Doctrine (1954) 3 L C .L .Q 152; C hon, (1958) 7 I.C .L .Q  
637. It was applied in Carr v, C arr  [1955] I W .L .R  422; Jackman v. Jackm an\\956]  R eported in 
11957] 2 W .L.R  317; Brown  v. Brown  [1968] 2 A ll.E .R  11.
4 7- 1951 S .C .508.
4 8  Travers v. Holley [1953] P.246 at 259.
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The decision in Travers v. Holley was a significant development in the common law 
and its precedent value in removing much hardship cannot be d e n i e d . ( 4 9 )  y ^ e  decision 
was also a significant forward step in the spirit of internationalism. It had the effect of 
equating the rule for recognition with the jurisdictional rules. This was likely to help in the 
avoidance of "limping marriages". It is interesting to note that all the judges in the House of 
Lords in the Indyka case agreed that Travers v. Holley was rightly decided and its 
doctrine received approval by the three judges. In the view of Lord Morris the decision 
followed "quite naturally" and " was both reasonable and d e s i r a b l e " . ( 5  0 )  Lord Pearce 
said "It has worked well and it has removed much hardship. In my opinion it would be 
wrong to overrule or narrow it. One should rather broaden it" (51) Qn the other hand, 
Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce disapproved of the rigidity of the doctrine of Travers v. 
Holley. Lord Reid was of the view that the doctrine would not lead to a rational 
development of the law. To adopt this doctrine with regard to the 1949 Act would lead to 
very undesirable c o n s e q u e n c e s . ! ^ - )  Lord Reid's criticism would seem to stem from his 
disapproval of the domestic jurisdictional rules. Having roundly condemned these rules, it 
ÎS not surprising that he condemned a recognition rule based thereon. Lord Wilberforce did 
not find it necessary to discuss this case since he said that he was in general agreement with 
what Lord Reid had said about it. In his view the rule should be demoted to "no more than 
a general working principle that changes in domestic jurisdiction should be taken into 
account by the courts in decisions as to what foreign decrees they will recognise."!^ 3)
Another criticism of Travers v. Holley came from Lord Morris who rejected the 
justification of this rule on the principle of reciprocity which is given by Hodson L.J.:
4 9 -  Kennedy, Recognition o f  Foreign D ivorces: The Effect o f  Travers u. Holley, (1955) 4  I .C .L .Q .389 ;
( 195.3) 32 Can.Bar.Rev.361 ; M ann, (1954) 17 M .L .R ev 79 ; Z iegel, Foreign D ivorces, (1953) 31
Can.Bar.Rcv. 1077; Gow, (1954) 3 I.C .L .Q 152; Graveson, ( 1954) 17 M .L.Rev 501.
5 0- Indyka v. Indyka ( 1967) 2 A ll.E .R  689 al 708.
5 1” Ibid, al 715; Sec also, at 729 (X'r Lord Pcmscm.
5 2 “ Ibid, at 696.
5 3- Ibid, at 727.
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T here is peril in assum ing lhal only our rules are rational and justifiab le . Looking 
back upon the course o f Judicial decisions, it is readily seen that though doctrine 
e\ olvcd one way, it might quite easily ha\ c c v o b e d  another. This leads me to the \'iew  
that no essential or fundamental superiority o f our basis for jurisd iction  can be claim ed 
over all others.
Some academic opinion(^ argued that the decision in Travers v. Holley was bad 
law on the ground that it was inconsistent with the decision of the House of Lords in 
Shaw  p. G oulé^^)  and with the judgment of the Privy Council in Le Mesurier v. Le 
MesurierS^I) This kind of argument is unacceptable because it is submitted that at the 
time of the Scottish divorce in Shaw v, Goulch an English marriage was absolutely 
indissoluble except by private Act of Parliament. Therefore, how could any question of 
reciprocity in regmd to the it^ognition of foreign divorce possibly have arisen in such 
ciicumstances? On the other hand, the Court of Appeal did not act against the Le Mesurier 
case. In any event, Shaw v. Goukh raises many subtle questions, and is a case about 
which much has been written; the decision in Le Mesurier it could be argued, held back the 
development of the law for many years. What the court did in Travers v. LloUey was that 
both Somervell L.J. and Hodson L.J. cited a dictum of Lord Watson:
A decree ol divorce a \in e u lo  pronounced by a court whose ju risd ic tion  is so le ly  
d c ro c d  (rom som e rule o f m unicipal law  p ecu lia r to its fo rum , cannot, w hen it 
entrenches upon the interests o f any country to w hose tribunals the spouses w ere 
amenable, claim  c.k ira-terri tori a! authority".!^
And they pointed out that the New South Wales court was not exercising a jurisdiction
solely deiived trom a rule ot municipal law peculiar to its forum and that therefore Lord
Watson's dictum did not apply. In other words, the Court of Appeal was able to employ
this negative passage ot Lord Watson in a positive and affirmative sense to uphold the New
5 4 -Ibid, at 708; See also, D ip îœ k  L..I.in the Court o f Appeal |" 19661 3 A ll.E .R  583 at 587.
5 5 -Blackburn, Rcwo^nUkm o f  Foreign D ivorces: The I f  feet o f  Travers v. H olley, (1954) 17 M .L .R ev 
4 7 1 1 Thom as, (1953 ) 3 .I.C .L .Q  156.
5 6 - (1868) L.R .3H .L55.
5 7- 11895] A.C.517.
5 8-/.C Mesurier v. Le M esurier \ 1895] A .C .517 at 528.
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South Wales decree. Hodson L..I. said that "the principle laid down and followed since the
Le Mesift iei case must, I think, be interpreted in the light of the legislation which has
extended the power of the courts of this country in the case of a person not. domiciled 
here".f^9)
In Scotland, as Professor Anton pointed out,(6 0) [t ^ot clear whether the rule in 
Travets v. //cZ/cv formed part of the law. There were no reported cases dealing with this 
rule until the decisions mGalhraith y. GalbmiM^^) and Bain v. BainS^^) in which 
the înciyka case was followed. The statement of Lord W heatley in Galbraith v. 
Galbraithi^^) may lead us to think that the Scottish court would recognise the foreign 
divorce on the principle ot Travers v. Holley. His Lordship in deciding the case before 
him referred to the decision of the House of Lords in the Indyka case and said that
"that was an English case dealing with English law, but I do  not believe that dilTerenl 
considerations and argum ents would have prevailed if the case had been a Scottish one, 
involving as it did questions o f private international law. W hile technically  that 
decision is not binding on Scottish courts, the opinions expressed by their Lordships 
m ust be regarded as being ot the highest standing and persuasion. W hile the law s o f 
Scotland and England are separate and self-contained system s, and are accordingly  
capable of being different, it would be m ost unfortunate if the principle o f  recognition 
of foreign jurisdiction w ere to be different in the two countries."
On the same point the Law Commissions concluded that the approval fay various 
members of the House of Lords in Indyka of the principle of Travers v. Holley might 
cause the Scottish court to adopt it.(6 4)
5 9- Travers v. Holley [1953] at 257.
6 0 -2nd- cd., P. 468.
6 1-  1971, S.C.65.
6 2- 1971, S.C. 146.
6 3- 1971, S.C .65 at 68.
6 4- Law Com .No. 34 & Scots Law Com No. 16. p. 3.
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1- M odeiïi Interpretation of Travets v, Holley
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Travers v Holley meant the formulation of the 
new rule in the field of recognition of foreign divorces according to which a decree of 
divorce pronounced by a foreign court was recognised as valid if it was founded on 
circumstances in which a court in the United Kingdom would assume j u r i s d i c t i o n . ( 6 5 )  
This rule raised the question of whether the English court should seek similarity of 
jurisdictional requirement in the English law and the relevant foreign law or whether the 
English court could look at the actual facts of the case on which the foreign decree had been 
granted to decide whether mutatis mutandis the English court would be enabled to assume 
jurisdiction on these facts.(6 6)
In Dunne v. SabanS^'^^ Davies J.who adopted the principle of seeking similarity in 
the specific provisions, found that there was no sufficient degree of similarity between the 
jurisdiction exercised by the Florida court and that under section 18 (1) (a) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 and so he refused recognition of a decree granted by the 
Florida court to a wife deserted by a husband domiciled there until the resumption of his 
English domicile of origin. The Florida court based its jurisdiction on the ground of 
domicile [a domicile separate from that of her husband, as is permitted in the United States] 
plus 90 days' residence. Although the wife had been resident in Florida for two years 
immediately preceding the presentation of her petition, the learned judge limited himself to 
looking at the substantial similarity in statutory provision as to jurisdiction and it was 
sufficient for him that the period of residence required of the wife under the law of Florida-
90 days-bore no adequate resemblance to the three years’ period which is the foundation of
6 5- .Mann, (1954) 17 .M.L.Rev 79.
6 6 See, G ia\'cson, Arnold v. A rnoid-D ivorce Recognilion o f  Foreign D ecrees Based on Residence (1957)
6 I.C .L .Q .35].
6 7- 119551 P. 178. D iscussed Thom as, (1955) 4  1.C.L.Q .220; Sinclair, (1954) 31 B .Y .B .I.L .472; Carter,
( 1959) 35 B .Y .B .I.L .226; Kennedy M ecogniîkm o f  Foreign Divorces: The Effect o f  Travers  v. Holley, 
(1955) 4 I.C .L .Q .389 .
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the extraordinary competence of an English court.
Apart from this case the rule in Travers v, Holley had developed in a liberal manner 
and was moving forward, namely from the jurisdictional requirement to the factual 
p o s i t i o n . ( 6  8 )  This developm ent was in itia ted  in Robins on-Scott v. Robinson-  
ScottS^^) which established that the true rule in Travers v, Holley is not that an English 
court will recognise a foreign divorce when the rule by virtue of which the foreign court 
assumes jurisdiction is similar to a rule which would confer jurisdiction on an English court 
but rather that an English court will recognise a foreign divorce wherever the circumstances 
were similar to those in which an English court would assume jurisdiction. It is the facts of 
the case not the content of the jurisdictional rules which must be investigated/^ The 
facts in that case were: The husband, of British nationality and domiciled at all material time 
in England, married in Switzerland a Swiss woman who all her life had been domiciled in 
Switzerland and never left that country even after her marriage. There was a short 
honeymoon in Switzerland after which the husband returned to England and the parties 
never lived together again. The wife obtained a decree of divorce in the District court of 
Zurich, the court assuming jurisdiction on the basis that the wife had, in the circumstances, 
acquired a separate domicile from that o f her husband and that her domicile was in the 
canton of Zurich. The Zurich court was informed that by English law the domicile of the 
wife would remain that of her husband during the marriage, notwithstanding her separation 
from him, but nevertheless the court applied the provisions of the Swiss Civil Code, which 
allowed her to acquire a separate domicile, and assumed jurisdiction upon that basis. Four 
years later the husband petitioned in England for a declaration that his marriage had been 
validly dissolved by the Swiss decree,
6 8 -  See, G raveson, 6 th  ed , p. 318.
6 9 -  [1958] P .71; discussed C arter, (1959) 35  B .Y .B .I.L .265; W ebb, (1958) 21 M .L .R ev 169; G raveson, 
(1958) 7 I.C .L .Q .166 . F ollow ed in  M anning v. Manning [1958] P. 112; discussed C arter, (1958) 35  
B .Y .B .LL .267; W ebb. (1958) 7  I.C .L .Q .374.
7  0 -  Castel, (1967) 46  C an.B ar.R ev 144; C arter, (1958) 3 5  B .Y .B .I.L .265; W ebb, Lossening the Bonds  
o f  Lord Advocate v.Jaffrey, (1958) 21 M .L .R ev. 169 a t 171; (1952) 2  L C .L .Q .324; D icey &  M orris, 
8th~ed.p.313; C heshire &  N orth, 8th ed , p. 359.
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Although the jurisdiction of the Zurich court was based on a concept of domicile wholly 
unrecognised by English law, Karniinski J. nevertheless recognised the Swiss divorce on 
the ground that the wife had been resident in Switzerland for at least three years 
immediately preceding the presentation of her petition. The learned judge cited the 
Griswold's statementf? II and noted that the Court of Appeal in Travers v. Holley had
lifted the heavy hand of the Le Mesurier case or at least mitigated its weight. The learned
judge then said:
Ashcrc, in fa d . there has been three years residence by a wife in the territo ry  o f the 
foreign court assum ing jurisd ic tion  in a su it for dissolution, the English court should 
accept that as a grotm d for c.xercising ju risd ic tion  because it w ould itself accept 
jiiristiiction on p rœ l ol sim ilar residence in England. It is not essential for recognition 
b\- this court that the foreign court should assum e jurisdiction on the grounds laid down 
by section 18 of the M atrim onial C auses A ct 1950. It is sufficien t that facts exist 
which would enable the English court to assume jurisdiction."CZ
Katminski J. considered the period of three years to be essentiat/^ 3) In dealing with 
Dunne v. SabanP*'> he pointed out that the wife in thi.s case had been resident in Florida
7 I- ( 1051 ) M  H |„-.L.R. 193 1,1 231 ”If ihc hcm y  l,a„d o f the Mesurier case can be lif,ed-as to  a point 
H hich w as never decided in lhal case-llic coiiits should have little d ifficu lty  in conclud ing  that a
com m on law slate may properly recognise a foreign divorce granted under the factual circum stances
where it would i tseif grant a di\ orcc.''
7 2- At, 88.
7 3 Ibid at 87. In the H ouse of Lords in the Imfyka case [1967] 2 A ll.E .R . 689 , none o f their Lordships 
u a s  prepared to grant recognition on the basis o f residence other than that falling under the Travers v. 
Ho/ley. Lord Pearce did not c.xpress a final opinion on this point and Lord Pearson rejected recognition 
on the basis ol merely residential qmüification. Lord Reid and Lord W ilbcrforce expressed considerable 
lehictancc to accept it as a general basis w ithout qualification. Thus, Lord Reid would recognise it if 
the w dc u a s  habitually resident in a foreign country and had no present intention o f leaving it, but he 
ould exclude cases where the spouses went to a countiy  where divorce is easy and stayed only a few 
years (o obtain do-orcc, at pp.7 0 2 .7 0 3 ; Ange/o v. Angela  [1968] I W .L .R .40 l;fT e/v7 ;y  v. W efsby 
11970] 2 A11.E.R.467. Lord W ilbcrforce would recognise d i\o rc c  given to wives by the court o f iheir 
rc.sidcncc w hcre\'cr a real and substantial connection is shown between the petitioner and the country 
cxerci.sing jurisdiction, but he placed on future courts the duty to consider the length and quality  o f  the 
residence, at p.727.
7 4 -1 )9 5 5 ] P. 178.
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for more than two years before the proceedings commenced, whereas in the case before 
him the wife had been resident in Zurich for over three years. The learned judge then 
agreed with Davies J. that an English court should recognise the right of a foreign court to 
encroach upon the principle of domicile only to the extent to which an English court also 
does. On the other hand, he disagreed with Mr. Commissioner Latey in Arnold v. 
Arnold that the period of residence by the law of a foreign court to found 
jurisdiction is immaterial.(76) He thought rather that if similarity is the basis of 
recognition, there must be similarity in facts thought not in term inology.^?) Thus, the 
rule in Travers v. Holley was refined by Karminski.J to the effect that it was sufficient for 
the English court to recognise a foreign divorce if the facts of the case were such as would 
enable the English court to assume jurisdiction even if the foreign court did not assume 
jurisdiction on grounds similar to those in English law.
2- Strict Interpretation of Travers v. Holley
Although the rule in Travers v. Holley had developed in a liberal manner, it is 
interesting to note, on the other hand that the English courts in some cases interpreted this 
rule strictly because the recognition of foreign divorces in such cases would go much 
further than the principle embodied in Travers v. H o lle y .G Thus in Levett v. Levett 
and Smith G the English court refused to recognise the German decree on the ground 
that It had been obtained by the husband, as a result of the view that the English legislation 
of 1950 was designed to provide relief for the wife and had no application to the situation 
where a divorce was granted to a husband. The House of Lords in the Indyka case 
accepted this view and concluded that the husband's residence, even if of more than three
7 5  -[19571 P.237; discussed Gravcrson, (1957) 6 I,C.L.Q .351.
7 6 - 1 bid III 253.
7 7- Sec. Carter. (1958) 35 B .Y .B .I.L .265, 266;W ebb, ( 1958) 21 M .L.Rev 171.
7 8 -Grav eson, 7th ed , p. 309.
7 9 -  119571 p. 156; follow ed in R ussell v. Russell [1957] P.375; cf, Tij<wir v. T ijanic  [1968] P. 181 in 
wiitch the court recognised a foreign decree granted join tly  to both parties, the relevant factor, however, 
being the wife's residence; See, M ackinnon, ( 1970) 49  Can.Bar.Rev.716 at 720.
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years, would not constitute a basis for r e c o g n i t i o n / * 0) seems that Travers v. Holley 
created an untidy recognition situation in its differentiation between men and women and 
the House of Lords put the male in an inferior position in so far as recognition of foreign 
divorces is concerned/* D The justification for this distinction was put by Lord 
W ilbcrforce on the ground that "the husband retains his domicile and the right to 
change. "(* 2) Having changed his domicile, he should have petitioned in England.!» 3)
A nother strict in terpre ta tion  of this rule was found in Mounthatten v .
MoimthaîîenS^^) In 1958, there was an attempt to create a more extensive recognition
principle, by combining the rule of Travers v. Holley and the doctrine in Armitage v.
but this attempt failed when Davies T refused to extend the rule of Travers v.
Holley beyond its present limit. Accordingly, a foreign divorce would not be recognised
just because it would be recognised in the jurisdiction where the wife had been resident for
three years.!» <») In this case, the husband domiciled in England, married in 1950. The
couple hved m New York and in 1952 the husband returned to England and he alleged that
his wife refused to follow him. The wife travelled to Mexico and petitioned for a divorce
on May 21, 1954. A decree was granted on May 22, 1954. The Mexican court assumed
jurisdiction on the grounds that the wife was resident in Mexico and that both parties had
submitted to the jurisdiction. It was proved that the Mexican divorce would be recognised
by the court of New York, where the wife was ordinarily resident from 1950 until the date
of the English proceedings, in which the husband asked for a declaration that the Mexican
8 0 -C l, Mum  V . M um  11970] 2 A Ü .E.R .516; See, ihc position under SS.3 (2) and 46 o f  the 1971 A ct 
and the Family Law Act 1986 respectively, infra 137.
8 1- Imlyka v. Indyka [1967] 2 Ali.E. R .689 at 715.
S 2 -Ibid at 726.
S 3 - W ade,"/o  be Resident or not to be Reside m" Recognition o f  Foreign D ecrees o f  D ivorce, (1969) 32 
M .L.Rev 441 at 442.
S 4  -119591 P .43; .iiscLisscJ C arter, (1958) 35  B .Y .B .I.L .269; W ebb, (1958) 8  I .C .L ,Q .4 0 4 ; Lip,slein,
( 1959) C .L .J .lO a tH ; cf, M ather v. M ahoney [1968J1 W .L.R .1773 infra.
8 5 -11906] P. 135 supra 128.
8 6- M 'cleaii, op.cil.. p. 42.
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decree had vaiidily dissolved his marriage. He argued that if England would recognise a 
foreign divorce in cases where the domicile would recognise it, England should also 
lecognise a decree il the place where the wife had been resident for three years or more 
would do so, because English legislation allowed a wife to petition for divorce in England 
when she had been resident there for at least three years.
Davies,J. rejected this argument on the ground that the recognition of foreign divorces
IS exclusively governed by domicile and therefore, the statutory exception introduced by
statute must be narrowly construed. Hence, a decree recognised by a court recognised by
the court of the domicile is one step too far for the English rule to operate. Lord Pearce was
the only member of the House of Lords in the Indyka case to comment -n  the
Mountbaften case. His Lordship said: "Davies J. rightly refused to apply the principle of
Annitage to the wife's court of residence, since, though we acknowledge its right to grant
her a divorce, in appropriate cases there seems no adequate reason to regard it as the arbiter
on her personal law in other respects".!* ?) One can ask oneself what Davies J. achieved
by refusing to combine the effect of the Armitage case with that of Travers v. Holley.
I heie is no doubt that the Learned judge created more limping marriages when he treated
the couple as still married in England while they were regarded as divorced in the United 
States.!**)
D- Recognition Based on Indyka r, Indyka
The last common law development and more radical principle in the field of recognition
ol foreign divorces was found in Indyka v. Indyka.i^ i n  which the House of Lords,
lor the first time, was called upon to consider whether or not a foreign decree not granted 
* 7- bidvka v. Indyka \ I967j 2 AI I.E. R .689 at 7 )7 .
8 8 -S cc , Kuhn-F-rciitid, The Growth o f  Inierniionalism  in English P rivate Intertm tionai Law. (1960) 
Lionel C oiicn Lee lure. H ebrew . Uni v o f Jueusa lem . P.34; C heshire , 6th cd , p. 400.
8 9 -  119671 2 A lt.E .R .689 ; |1 9 6 7 ) 3 VV.L.R.5jO; |.1969| 1 A .C .33 ; di.scussed W illiam  L aley , 
Q .C .Récognition of Foreign D ecree o f  D ivo rces  (1967) 16 I .C .L .Q .9 8 2 ; W ebb, (1967) 16 
I.C .L .Q .997: N o rth . Recognition o f  Foreign D ivorces D ecrees, (1 % 8 ) 31 M .L .R ev .257; M ann, 
Recognition o f  Foreign D ivorces (1968) 84 L.Q.Rev. 18; Lipstcin, (1967) C .L.J.182.
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by the law of domicile should be recognised. Their Lordships went far beyond an 
appraisal of the Travers v. Holley rule. They made a complete re-examination and re-
appraisal of the law of recognition.
The parties married in Czechoslovakia in 1938, both being Czech citizens. The 
husband had left Czechoslovakia at the beginning of the War and acquired a domicile of 
choice in England in 1946. The wife, who had always resided in Czechoslovakia, was 
granted a decree ot divorce in January 1949, which became final in February 1949. In 
1959 the husband married an English woman domiciled in England. Six years later, she 
petitioned for divorce in England on the grounds of cruelty. In his defence, the husband 
alleged that the Czech divorce was not recognised in England since he was domiciled in 
England at the time when it was made and therefore, his second marriage was invalid. On 
the question of the validity of the English marriage, Latey J. at first in s ta n c e ,0) held that 
the Czech decree pronounced in 1949 was not valid in English law, with the result that 
there was no marriage to dissolve. He made a declaration of nullity. On appeal by the 
second wife, his decision was reversed by a majority of the Court of Appeal.(!> D The 
husband appealed to the House of Lords.
It was not clear from the judgments whether jurisdiction under Czech law depended on
the nationality of the parties or the residence of the wife or both, but it had nothing to do
with domicile in the English sense, because the husband and therefore, in the view of the
English forum, his first wile, were domiciled in England at the time of the proceedings in
Czechoslovakia. The essential question before their Lordships was whether the English
court would recognise the Czech decree. The conclusion was not only that the Czech
decree should be r e c o g n i s e d ( 9  2) but there was general acceptance among all members of
the House of Lords that the rules of recognition should be more broadly based than in 
9 0- [1966] 1 A1I.E.R.781.
9 1- 11966] 2 A1I.E,R.583; discussed Castel, ( 1967) 45 Can.Bar.Rev. 140.
9 1- See, North, (1968) 31 M .L.Rcv.257at 258.
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Travers v. Holley, and each "of their Lordships expresses much the same broad view of 
what should be the new recognition rule, although stating it in quite different terms."(9 3)
It IS submitted that the Czech decree was recognised b e c a u s e :4) (j)  the wife was
ordinarily resident in Czechoslovakia for three years immediately preceding the institution 
ot the proceedings there, and it was immaterial that the decree was granted before the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1949 came into force.(9 5) The Czech decree was 
granted several months before the 1949 Act came into force. This raised the question of 
time,viz whether the principle of Travers v. Holley could be made retrospective to 
divorces granted before the coming into effect of the statutes extending the domestic 
jurisdiction.Latey J .  at first instance(9 6 )  a^d Russel L . J .  in the Court of AppeaK^?) held 
that the rule in Travers v. Holley could not be invoked to cover foreign decrees granted 
before the English law was extended. Lord Denning M.R.(^») and Diplock L . J . ( 9  9) 
the Court of Appeal took the view that the principle of Travers v, Holley could be made 
retroactive to divorces granted before the date of the statutory extensions of the domestic 
jurisdiction. Lord Denning M.R. pointed out that the principle of Travers v. Hollev was 
judge made- law, and nothing else; and the judge could make it retrospective if it was just 
and proper so to do. In his opinion, it was the policy of the English law that it should be 
so.DOO) Diplock L . J .  based his decision on the public policy of avoiding limping 
marriages.!^ In sum, the House of Lords has approved the view that the operation of
9 3 -  Angelo v. A n g e h \\9 m \  ] W.L.R.401 al 4 0 3 , /a tO m ircx l,J.
94-W illiam  Lalcy, (1967) 16 I.C.L.Q.at 982; Morris, Amr, p.152;
Gra\ cson, 7ih ed, p. 316.
9 5- {1967) 2 A li.E .R .689 at 708 /at Lord M orris, at 718 /v r  Lord Pearce, at 741 /at  Lord Pearson.
9 6-11966] Î AÜ.E.R.781.
) 1  -[1966] 3 A ll.E .R .583 at 591; See, D icey & M orris. 7ih ed , p. 322; MorrI.s, (1966) 15 ! C L Q 422 
at 425.
9 8 f 1966] 3 A1I.E.R.583 at 584-586.
9 9 -  Ibid at 587-591; See, Grodccki, (1958) 35 B.Y.B.I.L.63; Korah,
(1957) 20 M.L.RCV. 278 at 280; Webb, (1958) 17 I.C.L.Q.384; Cowcn & DaCosla,
Mairimonial Causes Jurisdiclion (J96J), p .86.
10 0  1 bid at 586.
1 0 1 - Ibid at 59] ; cl, 5 9 2 per Russel L.J.
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the English recognition rule based on Travers v, Holley is retrospective,
(ii) Czechoslovakia was the last matrimonial home of the parties and the petitioner 
continued to live there after her husband left. Lord Reid was the only member to advocate 
the old conception of the matrimonial home. It would be a test available to both husband 
and wife, though his Lordship made it clear that it would continue in favour of a deserted 
wife/1®^)
(iii) Czechoslovakia was the national law of the parties. All the members of the House 
of Lords, except Lord Reid, agreed, with varying of emphasis, that nationality should be a 
basis of recognition of foreign divorces.< 1 ^ L o r d  Pearce held that decrees of the court of 
the nationality, when jurisdiction was taken on the ground of the nationality, should be 
recognised.!!®^) His Lordship would also recognise a foreign divorce, if it w as 
recognised by the court of either spouse's nationality by virtue of the rule of Armitage v . 
A . L o r d  Pearson agreed with Lord Pearce in recognising, subject to appropriate 
limitation, a divorce granted on the basis of nationality. His Lordship was also prepared to 
extend recognition to the assumption of jurisdiction based on a separate nationality allowed 
to a married woman for the purpose of matrimonial proceedings, but nationality in his view 
was insufficient to found jurisdiction if, e.g there was no longer any real and substantial 
connection between the petitioner and the country of nationality.!! ®7) Lord Wilbcrforce 
appears to have been prepared to recognise nationality as a connecting factor, but combined 
102 -[1967] 2 A li.E .R .689 a t 708 , 716, 718, 731.
103- Ibid at 699-703; W ebb, (1967) 16 L C .L .Q .lO ll at 1012; L ipstein , (1967) C .L .J.183 a t 184; N orth , 
(1967) 31 M .L .Rev. a t 274; M ann, (1968) 8 4  L .Q .R ev .a t 20 ; c f, generally  the m atrim onia l hom e 
argum ent found before 1895 {Le M esurier) supra, 51.
104- See, N orth, (1967) 31 M .L.Rev. a t 272; G ordon Bale, (1968) 46 C an .B ar.R ev.at 116; M ann, (1968) 
84  L .Q .R ev .a t 21. B efore Indyka case, English court recognised G erm an divorce on the ground o f 
nationality  in M etzger v. M c/zgcr[1936] 3 A ll.E .R .130. T h is case w as neither discussed in  the H ouse 
o f Lords, nor, apparently, cited to the court.
105 -A t, 718.
106 -Ibid at 718; See also. T he Royal C om m ission on M arriage and D ivorce, Com d.9678.p. 204, 226.
1 0 7 -Ibid at 730-731.
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with other factors, like residence/!®») Lord Morris was of the opinion that nationality 
was a connecting factor which in the case before him justified the recognition of the Czech 
decree/!®^)
There is no doubt that the approach of the House of Lords in extending the law of 
recognition to comprehend divorces granted by a court where the parties are nationals 
would amount to a reasonable exercise of the duty of the courts to reduce limping 
marriages. It is submitted on the other hand that the view of the House of Lords in 
deciding in favour of nationality as a basis in recognising foreign divorces was not clear, 
because each member expresses his view of nationality in general and without attempting to 
solve difficulties which may arise with this basis, as in cases where the parties have 
different nationalities or one of them has more than one nationality or in cases where the 
law of nationality is a composite state.
(iv) Finally, the Czech divorce was recognised because there was a real and substantial 
connection between the petitioner and the country in which the divorce was granted. What 
is a real and substantial connection, and what constitutes the minimum relationship between 
the parties and the jurisdiction granting divorce which qualify as a substantial and real 
connection?!!!®) Some guide-lines were laid down in the Indyka case itse lf and 
thereafter the courts developed and gave more specific content to this term. Lord 
Wilbcrforce said:
"How far should this relaxation go? In  m y opinion, it w ould be in  accordance w ith the 
developm ent that I have m entioned and w ith the trend o f  the leg isla tion - m ain ly  our 
ow n but also that o f o ther countries w ith  sim ilar social system s- to  recognise d ivorce 
g iven  to  w ives by  the cou rts  o f  th e ir  residence w herever a  rea l and  su b stan tia l 
connection is show n betw een the petitioner and the coun try , o r te rrito ry , exercising  
jurisd iction . I use this expression so as to  enable the courts, w ho m ust decide each case, 
to  consider both the length and quality  o f  the residence and to  take in to  account such
1 0 8 -  Ibid at 726.
1 0 9 -Ibid a t 708.
1 1 0-See, G ordon Bale, (1968) 46  Can.B ar.R ev 122, 123.
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other lactors as nationality which m ay reinforce the connection. Equally  they w ould 
enable the courts (as they habitually do  w ithout d ifficulty) to reject residence o f the 
passage or residence, to use the descriptive expression of the older cases, resorted to by- 
pet sons who properly should seek relief here for the purpose o f obtaining relief which 
our courts would not g ive ."!! * !)
(
AUhough a real and substantial connection! 1 12) did not constitute the ratio decidendi 
of the majority m the Indyka case and some individual judges have expressed 
doubts,!! ! it has come to be accepted in many cases as embodying the ratio and was a 
basis for recognition/! 14) In the cases immediately following Indyka, the judges did not 
expressly state what the ratio was. Thus, Ormrod J. in Angelo v. Angelo.D^^) appears 
to accept counsel's formulation of the ratio decidendi. He stated that:
"each o f their Lordships expresses much the sam e broad view o f  w hat should  be the
new- recognition rule, although stating it in quite different terms. Counsel subm its that
the real ratio decidendi o f  that case probably is to be found in Lord M orris o f B orth-
Y -G ests speech, in w hich he speaks o f it being necessary for the party  obtaining the
decree to have a real and substantial connection  w ith the country  pronouncing  the 
decicc”.! !  !
Since Mather v. Mahoneg  11 ^) and Blair v. Blair, ( 118) the courts generally accepted
n  1- At, 727: See afso, at 731 per Lord Pearson.
11 2- The m eaning of this term was exam ined in Alexander v. Alexander, f 1969J 113 S .O .L .J.344; w here
iccognition was granted to a decree of the court o f a jurisdiction in which the wife had resided for a bout
eighteen months, K arm inski L.J. said "when she com m enced proceedings, the w ife had a real and
substantial connection with Ohio. Because she w ent there with her children, to jo in  her parents there,
the connection was a 'real one'. It was ' substantial' because she had gone to the United States on a
perm anent o r Im m igrant’s visa. M oreover, since she had obtained the decree of divorce, she had been
lo 'ing in Ohio as the wife o f the co-respondent. It was proper to recognise the O hio decree as a valid 
decree o f dissolution o f the marriage."
1 13  Ormrod J. in Messim, v. Sm ilh  11971] P .322 ai 336; Bagnull J. in ü m  v. GuUin [1976] Fnm 155
at 159.
I 14- Dicey & M onis, 8th-ed., p. 318.
H 5 -  11967)3 AI1.E.R.314.
1 1 6 -  Ibid at 315.
II  7 -11968] 1 W .L.R .1773 at 1775.
u s  -119681 1 W.L.R.221 al 226; Brow,, v. Brow,, 1I968 | 2 W .L.R.969 al 972; M a y fiM  v. M a y fîM
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that the real and substantial connection was the ratio decidendi of the Indyka case and 
expressly stated this in Welsby v. W elsbyS^^^^ where Cairns J, said: "putting it very 
briefly, the actual decision in Indyka  v, Indyka was that a decree could be recognised by 
our courts if the petitioner had a real and substantial connection with the country whose 
court granted the d e c r e e " / !  20)
1- Judicial Interpretation of A Real and Substantial Connection
The principle of a real and substantial connection as a basis for recognition had been
judicially explored and given more liberal interpretation than in Indyka  itself. In Angelo
V.  A n g e l o , ^ real and substantial connection was held to exist where the wife
returned to her native country where she lived all her life except during her marriage and
soon afterwards started divorce proceedings. In this case the question before Ormrod,J.
was whether a decree granted by the court of the wife's nationality after six months'
residence within that jurisdiction would be recognised. It is submitted that such a decree
could not have been recognised before the House of Lords decision in the Indyka case
because it was not granted by the court of domicile in the English sense and did not fall
within the rule o f Travers v. Holley. However, Ormrod,J. noted t h a t ! ! 2 2) "the law as to
recognition of foreign decrees underwent an abrupt change a week ago when the House of
Lords gave their decision in Indyka  v. Indyka". The learned judge therefore, examined
various bases suggested by the House of Lords and concluded that recognition should be
given on the ground that the wife is a German national and she is clearly habitually resident
within the jurisdiction of the German court granting the d e c r e e . ! ! 2 3 )  i n  those
[1969] P. 119 a t 121; A lexander v. A l exatider [1967] 113 S .O .L .J 334 ; K im tsler  v. K im tsler  [1969] 
1 W .L .R .1506.
1 1 9  -[1970] 2 A1LE.R.467. In this case the court accepted the residence lo r  som e tw o years befo re  the 
decree, w ith evidence that it had continued thereafter as a test for recognition.
1 2 0  -Ibid at 468.
1 2 1  -[1967] 3 A ll.E .R  314; discussed W ebb, Recognition o f  Foreign D ivorces: The p o s t Indyka position  
( based on Angelo  v. Angelo and P eters  v. P eters) (1968) 17 I.C .L .Q .209.
1 2 2 - Ibid, a t 315.
1 2 3  -Ib id , a t 3 1 7 ; In  p e te rs  v. P e ters  [1967] 3 A11.E.R.318 a t 32 0 , d iscu ssed  W ebb, (1 9 6 8 ) 17
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circumstances, Ormrod J. said "she seems to me cleaxly to fall within the test proposed by 
all ol their Lordships in the Indyka c a s e " / ! 24)
it has been seen that any decree obtained by the husband would not be recognised 
unless granted by the court of domicile or recognised by that court. This position was 
changed in Blair v. B lairM ^^) in which the husband's English domicile of origin was 
supplanted by a domicile of choice in Nor^^ay, where he married a Norwegian national of 
life long residence. The matrimonial home was established at Oslo. After two and a half 
years the family moved to England where the husband engaged on a two year course. No 
intention to abandon Norway was evinced. However, while he was still in England, his 
wife, having returned to Norway, became pregnant by another man, and it was then that 
the husband's domiciliary intention changed and his English domicile of origin revived. In 
response to her request for a divorce, the husband instructed his Norwegian attorney to 
petition the Norwegian court for divorce. In 1963, the Oslo court granted a decree and in 
1967 he petitioned the English court for a declaration that the Norwegian divorce had 
validly dissolved the marriage. Cumming-Bruce J. accepted the expert evidence that the 
Norwegian court had assumed jurisdiction on the ground that the wife had been bora and 
was settled in Norway and that Norway was at all times intended to be the country of the 
matrimonial l i o m e . H  26) The learned judge observed that after the /nc/yAa case it is open:
to an English court al lirsl instance to consider all facts appertaining to the grant o f a 
tlccrcc by a  loreign court, whether to a husband or to a wife, and to determ ine whether, 
in spite ol the iact that there was no dom icile o f a petitioner husband at the date o f the 
_______ institution of proceedings, the decree should be recognised."! ! 2 7 )
I .C .L .Q .2 I2 , W rangham , J.held  that the m ore fact that a m arriage i.s ce lebrated  in a particu la r 
jun.sdtction i.s not enough to create a re a l and substantial connection between a petitioning spouse and 
that jurisdiction.
1 2 4  - A t ,  3 1 8 .
1 2 5 - (19681 3 A ll.E .R . 639 discirs.sed W ade. (1969) 32 M .L .R ev .4 4 i; M ackinnon, (1970) 4 8  C an 
Bar. Row 716.
1 2 6  -Ibid, at 641.
1 2 7 - Ibid, at 642.
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The facts considered relevant by the Learned judge were that until a few weeks before
the nistJtution of proceedings, the husband had been both domiciled in and had a real and
substantial connection with Norway, and at the time of the proceedings, he was unaware of
the loss, according to English law, of his Norwegian domicile. Accordingly, the judge
concluded that on these facts it was "appropriate and just to allow recognition to the decree
granted to the husband by the Oslo court although he had just ceased to be domiciled in 
Norway,"(12^*)
This decision was followed in M um v. in which the English court
recognised the decree granted to the husband after less than three years' residence within 
the jurisdiction of the ecurt of Virginia. In Mayfield v. M ayfieidM ^^) the English court 
went further than Blair v. Blair, when the divorce was recognised even though the 
petitioner husband had no connection with the granting country. Simon P. justified his 
decision on the ground that the fact that the petitioner was the husband, and had no
connection, was immaterial as long as the wife had this connection. The learned judge
concluded that:
W hat is the material taci is that the G erm an decree operated on the status o f the wife, 
vvlio had such close, sui>siantial and real connection. I t  it operated on the status o f  the
wife and should Ix recognised as such W e should recognise the decree as also operating
on the status o f the husband." (1 3 1 )
2 - Armitage v, A,G and A Real and Substantial Connection
It may be recalled that in Moimîbaîten v. MoimtbattenM^^) Davies J. refused to 
combine the rule in Travers v. with that in Armitage v. The
i 2 8 -  Ibid, at 643.
129-119701 2 AI1.E.R.5I6.
1.10- 11% 9) P. 119; discussed W ade. ( 1969) 32 tvt.L.Re\ 441 ; M acldnnon, (1970) 48  Can B ar Rev 774-
7Vnv,-„A V.  / l i r c W  ) % 9 | 3 A II.E .R .317; d iscussed  K arsten. M am m um re and Foreign D iv o r c e i
(1970) 33 M.L.ReN',205.
1 3 1 lbid,at 121.
Î 3 2 -11959] P.43.
Î 3 3 -  11953] p.246.
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justification for this was that the recognition of foreign divorces is exclusively governed by 
domicile and therefore, the exception introduced by statute must be narrowly construed. In 
the Indyka case, domicile had lost its position as the sole test of recognition and the new 
rule was that a foreign divorce would be recognised, if there was a  real and substantial 
connection between the parties and the country granting the divorce. The liberal 
interpretation of the new rule raised the possibility of an extension of the Armitage rule to 
decrees recognised in the country of real and substantial connection. This situation arose in 
Mather v, M a h o n e y in which the husband was domiciled in England and married in 
Italy a girl from Pennsylvania. After the marriage in 1961 the parties lived together for 
more than three years in Italy. The wife then deserted her husband and returned to 
Pennsylvania where she had lived most of her life. In 1965 she went to Nevada and 
obtained a divorce there. The husband petitioned the English court for a declaration that the 
Nevada divorce had validity dissolved the marriage.
Payne J. observed that the wife at all the time of the decree had a substantial connection
with Pennsylvania as Mrs. Indyka had with Czechoslovakia. Expert evidence was given to
him that the Nevada divorce would be recognised in Pennsylvania. The Learned judge then
held that as the Nevada decree would be recognised in the state of Pennsylvania with which
the wife had a real and substantial connection it must be recognised in E n g l a n d . ( l 3 6 )
Hence, the rule of Armitage v. A.G. which Davies J. refused to transfer to the country of
the wife's residence. Payne J. managed to transfer to the country of real and substantial 
connection.
While this result is a logical extension of the Armitage rule, the reasoning leaves
something to be desired. There is no apparent realization in the judgment that the Armitage
rule was being used at all. The case is not on all fours with Indyka, In Indyka the 
1 3 4 -11906] P. 135.
1 3 5  -11968] 1 W .L .R .1773; d iscussed, W ebb, (1969) 18 I.C .L .Q .453 ; Speucer v. Spencer-Cfiiirchill
(1970) j 14 Sol, Jo  806.
1 3 6 -  M ai her v. Mahoney [ 1968] I W .L.R. 1773 a I 1775.
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granting stale was the place of real and substantial connection where as in Mather v. 
Mahoney It was not , It is unfortunate that the judge in reaching an acceptable conclusion 
did not explicitly deal with the Armitage issue in this the first case where it had arisen since 
Indyka/137) The decision in Mather v. Mahoney appeared to be in direct conflict with 
the Mountbatten case, but was later reconciled by Ormrcd J. in Messina v. Sm ithS^^^) 
the last case under the Indyka approach. In this case the divorce was given to the wife by 
the Nevada court after six weeks' residence. The wife had been resident in the United 
States for six years. Evidence was given that the Nevada divorce would be recognised 
under American law, but there was no evidence at all as to the wife's connection with any 
specific state within the United States. Ormrod J. decided that to refuse recognition to the 
Nevada divorce would be "to produce an entirely artificial result which would in no way 
advance the cause of justice".!*
3" Indyka in Scotland
The statement of Lord Strachan in Warden v. W ardenS^^^) that only Parliament 
should alter the rules of divorce recognition was rejected by Lord Wheatley in Galbraith v. 
GalbraithM^^^ His Lordship believed that the law of Scotland should be more in 
harmony with the English law and the liberal view should be taken rather than the restricted 
traditional view. Lord Wheatley followed the decision in the Indyka case in the case 
before him and since then Indyka formed part of Scots law. The facts in Galbraith v. 
Gathrailhwere: The husband, domiciled in Scotland, married his wife, a Finnish national, 
in Scotland and lived with her in Scotland until she went to Finland, whence she did not 
return. After two years she obtained a decree of divorce in a Finnish court which exercised 
jurisdiction on the grounds of the wife's Finnish citizenship at the time of the marriage and,
137  -M ackinnon, (1970) 48  C an.B ar.R ev.724 at 727.
1 3 8  -11971] P.322.
139  -tbid, at 338.
140 -(195)) S.C.508.
1 4 1 - 1971, S.C .65.
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the husband having no known domicile in Finland, her residence within the district of the 
court. The husband raised an action in the Court of Session for divorce on the ground of 
desertion, or alternatively, for a declaration that the marriage had been validly dissolved by 
the Finnish decree of divorce. Although the Finnish court did not exercise jurisdiction on 
the ground of domicile in the Scottish sense, Lord Wheately held that recognition should be 
given because the wife appears to have satisfied the various tests suggested by the judges in 
the House of Lords in Indyka namely, that at the time of the Finnish proceedings the wife 
had been habitually resident within the jurisdiction and had no present intention of leaving 
Finland, she had a real and substantial connection with Finland and she was of Finnish 
nationality,!!^^)
This decision was followed in Bain v. jn which the court recognised the
divorce granted in Japan to the wife, a Japanese national, married in Japan to a Scots man 
domiciled in Scotland, The Japanese court exercised jurisdiction on the grounds that the 
wife was a Japanese national and that both parties had consented to have the case tried in 
Japan. Lord Robertson held that the decree should be recognised because" although the 
parties lived together for one day, in Japan, and never had a matrimonial home, the wife 
was a Japanese national, had lived her life in Japan and had been married in Japan, and 
such cohabitation between the parties as had taken place had been, in Japan. The wife thus 
satisfied virtually all of the tests suggested by various judges in the House of Lords in 
Indyka."!!
2- Statutory Recognition Rules
While there is no doubt that the decision of the House of Lords in the Indyka case 
represents a great movement forward in the spirit of internationalism and made the way 
easier for the United Kingdom to enter into the Hague Convention on the Recognition of 
Foreign Divorces and Legal Separations of 1970, it is submitted, on the other hand, that the
1 4 2 -Ibid, a t 68.
1 4 3 -  1971, S.C .146.
1 4 4  -At, 152.
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state of law became more complex and uncertain. The decision of the House of Lords did 
not make clear in what circumstances a foreign divorce would be recognised. Each judge 
expressed his view in general terms without attempting to set out clear rules for divorce 
recognition. The principle of real and substantial connection "is inherently vague and the 
source of much uncertainty where certainty is d e s i r a b l e " ! ! U n d e r  this principle the 
precise status of parties is uncertain. More parties might have to petition for a declaration to 
determine whether they were married or divorced.!!^**) It is submitted that the practical 
problem of whether to decide to recognise a foreign divorce fall preponderantly to the 
Registrar-General. The significance of such a question may also be relevant for some 
officials as for example Social Security and Immigration Staff. It follows that it is highly 
desirable as a matter of policy to have recognition rules which are simply framed and easy 
for the relevant officials to understand and apply.
Before the advent of rules dealing with financial relief after recognition of foreign 
divorces, the tendency of the courts to grant recognition whatever there was a real and 
substantial connection was a source of hardship and a n o m a l i e s . ! ! 47) legislative law 
reform was therefore clearly justified and highly desirable to remove the state of complexity 
and uncertainty imposed on the subject of recognition of foreign divorces by the decision of 
the House of Lords in the Indyka case.
In 1968 the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
adopted a Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations.!! 48)
1 4 5  -Law Com  No. 34  &  Scots Law Com  No. 16.para. 25.
1 4 6  -See, now for England, S .55 o f the Fam ily Law A ct 1986. There is no equivalent Scottish provision 
and the Scots Law Com  has sought views on the desirability o f introducing such a  provision.
1 4 7 -  Turczakv, Turczak [1969] 3 A11.E.R.317; See, now M atrim onial and Fam ily P roceedings A ct 1984 
and infra Chapter 7.
1 4 8  -For the te s t o f the C onven tion , See, C onference de la H age d ro it In ternationale  P rive: A ctes 
D ocum ents de la onzièm e Session (1971) V o l.l, p. 241; the Law Com  N o .34  &  the Scots L aw  Com  
No. 16 includes also  the text o f the C onvention; discussed A nton, The R ecognition o f  D ivorces and  
Legal Separations (1969) 18 I.C .L .Q .620.
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The Convention was implemented in the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separation Act 
1 9 7 1 (1 4 9 )  as amended by the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973.(1
The opportunity to make statutory codification of the rules relating to the recognition of 
foreign nullity decrees simitar to that of divorces and legal separations was not taken in 
197L because the 1971 Act was passed to implement the 1970 Hague Convention. The 
Convention did not deal with the question of foreign nullity recognition/* which 
continued to be governed by common Jaw recognition rules. The uncertainty of these rules 
and the tact that different recognition rules applied to divorce and nullity was a source of 
criticism!* In 1984 the Law Commissions in their report!* recommended that the 
law relating to foreign nullity should be placed on the same legislative basis as that 
concerning divorces and legal separations. They also recommended the abolition of the 
1971 Act. The result of those recommendations is part II of the Family Law Act 
19 8 6 .!* ^4) This Act replaced the 1971 Act and created an integrated set of recognition 
rules for divorces, annulments and legal separations.! *3 3)
1 4 9 - The Act im plem ented the rccom endations o f the Law Com N o.34 and the Scots Law Com  No. 16, on 
the Hague Convention on Recognition o f Foreign D ivorces and Legal Separations, (1970) Com .4542.
1 5 0 -  SS.2 and 15.
151 T he lea.sons wiiy the C onvention does not deal w ith the foreign nullity decrees are considered by the 
Uxw Com m issions, Sec, Law Com No. 137 & Scots Law Com N o.88 paras. 3.3-3. 13.
I 5 2- C aitct, (1979) 50 B.Y .B .I.L .250, 252; C ollier, Recognition o f  Foreign Nullity D ecrees-C apacity to 
M arry in the Conftiri o f  (1979) C .L .J.289, 290.
1 5 3  -l.inv Com No. 137 & Scots Law  Com No. 88
1 5 4 - The Fam ii) Law Act 1986 does not enact all the Law C om m ission's proposals; H ansord, Voi, 473, 
coL 1082 Lord Hailsham , Sec, infra, 197.
* ^ ^ ’ The decision of M aples v. M aples  |1987] 2 W .L.R.487, ended the debate on w hether o r not a foreign 
d i\ (M'ce is capable of recognition under part 1 o f the Foreign .Judgments (Reciprocal) A ct 1933, S 8. 
Latey J. slated clearly that section 8 (1 )  ol the 1933 Act did not apply to Judgm ents o f  marital status. 
Sec, D icey & M orris, 12th cd., p. 733; Jaffey , (1986) 5 C .J.Q .35; L ipstein , (1981) 40 C .L .J .2 0 I; 
Vervaeke v. .V///(//d 1983] 1 A .C . 145; D avid G ordon , op .c i t .p. 153; C f, the view  o f  the L aw  
Com m issions, Law Com No. 137 & Scots Law Com N o.88.para..6 4L
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a- Different Recognition Rules
In accordance with article 17 of the 1970 Hague Convention, which permits contracting 
States to apply recognition rules more favourable than those of the Convention, the 1986 
Act deals with an internal matter which was not considered by the 1970 Hague Convention, 
namely the recognition throughout the United Kingdom of decrees granted in any part of 
the British Islands/*^**) Accordingly the Act distinguishes between decrees obtained in 
the British Islands and those obtained outside the British Islands and provides for this 
purpose different recognition rules/*  ^  The underlying justification for adopting such a
rule is to avoid the absurdity of recognising truly foreign decrees more readily than British 
divorces!*^®) and to remove all the uncertainties created under the previous law, and more 
likely the problem of limping marriages. Moreover, the acceptance of specific recognition 
rules throughout the United Kingdom may also be justified on the ground that divorce 
jurisdictional bases are now the same throughout the United Kingdom/*
b- Divorces Obtained in the British Islands!*^®)
Prior to the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971, the recognition of
all English divorces in Scotland and vice versa was governed by common law rules.
Hence, it was quite settled that a divorce would not be rcognised if the ground upon which
the forum court assumed jurisdiction was not one which would be recognised in the
international sense. This position was partially altered by section 1 of the 1971 Act, for it
provided that "subject to section 8 of this Act (which states the grounds perm itting
recognition to be withheld)!*^*) the validity of a decree of divorce...granted after the
15  6 S .44 ; See also , S .l  ol the 1971 A ct as am ended by S 15 (2) o f  the D om icile  and  M atrim onial 
Proceedings A ct 1973.
1 5 7 -  C ontrast S .44  w ith S S .45-48; and S .l  w ith S S .2-6  o f  the 1971 Act.
1 5 8  -K arsten, (1972) 35 M .L .R ev 299.
1 5 9 -  See, Supra, Ch.2
1 6 0 -  T h e  term 'B ritish  Islands ' is defined  in 8 .5  o f  the In terp reta tion  A ct 1978; T he U nited  K ingdom  
(consisting o f E ngland and W ales, Scotland, and N orthern Ireland), the Channel Isles and the  Isle  o f  
M an. T h is definition is  identical to  the 'B ritish Isles' in  S. 10 (2) o f the 1971 Act.
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commencement of this section (i.e January 1, 1972) shall, if it was granted under the law 
of any part of the British Isles, be recognised throughout the United Kingdom."!*
Although this section clearly provided for the automatic recognition in Scotland of 
English divorces and vice versa and for automatic recognition in England and Scotland of 
divorces granted under the law of other parts of the British Isles, there was however, some 
controversy over the effect of this section. It was questionable whether this section would 
cover only a decree granted in and under the law of any part of the British Isles or would 
cover also a foreign divorce in which the foreign court had applied the law of some part of 
the British Isles.!* ^  This doubt came from the phrase "granted under the law of any part 
of the British Isles". It seems highly unlikely that Parliament intended to extend section 1 
to cover divorces granted e.g. by a court in Iraq simply because it applied Scots law as the 
law of the husband. However, the controversy upon the construction of section 1 and its 
scope has now been removed. Section 44 (2) states clearly that automatic recognition 
should be given throughout the United Kingdom to divorce granted only by a court of civil 
jurisdiction in any part of the British Islands.!* ^ 4)
The actual terms of section 1 of the 1971 Act limited its application to British divorces 
gmnted after the 1971 Act came into force. A divorce granted before that date continued to 
be governed by the common law rules, whereas the rest of the provisions of the 1971 Act 
concerning the recognition of divorces obtained outside the B ritish Isles w ere 
retrospective.!* This state of law might be criticised on the ground that it is undesirable 
to have different rules as to retrospectivity applicable in the same statute to divorces
1 6 1  -Anton, (1972) S .L .T .89; Eager, (1972) S .L .T .l; C live &  W ilson, 2nd-ed.p.673; N orth, op .d t.{1977) 
P. 168.Infra, ch.5.
1 6 2  -As am ended by the D om icile and M atrim onial Proceedings A ct 1973, S. 15 (2).
1 6 3  -D icey &  M orris, 11th ed , p. 687; N orth, op.cit.(1977) p. 167.
1 6 4  Subject to  S.51 (1) (a) and (2) (a), w hich states the grounds perm itting  recognition to  be w ithheld , 
infra, ch.5. It should be noted that extm  judicial divorces obtained in any part o f  the British Islands w ill 
be denied recognition in  E ngland and Scotland, S .44  (1), subject to  transitional provision, infra.214.
1 6 5 -S. 10 (4).
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obtained in the British Isles and to those obtained outside the British Isles/* This statz- 
of confusion has also been removed by the 1986 Act in making it clear that section 44(1) 
applies to all British divorces obtained before the date of the commencement of the 1986 
Act, i.e. April 4, 1988 whether granted before or after the commencement of section 1 of 
the 1971 Act as well as to divorces granted on or after the date of commencement of the 
1986 A ct/ *67) provided that the validity of such divorces had not already been decided by 
any competent court in the British Islands and would not affect any property rights 
established before the Act came into force.!*68) A divorce obtained within the British 
Islands may only be denied recognition on the grounds of Res Judicata or if there was no 
subsisting marriage between the parties!* 69) The other reasons for denying recognition to 
foreign divorces, such as the fact that the divorce is contrary to natural justice or to public 
policy will not be grounds for non-recognition of British divorces. The underlying 
Justification for this approach is to give faith and credit within the British Islands to divorce 
emanating from any of its courts and that the person challenging the validity of such a 
divorce ought to do so in the jurisdiction in which it was granted and not in that where 
recognition is sought.! * TO)
In his comments on section 1 of the 1971 Act [section 44 (2) of the 1986 Act] Mr.Eager
criticised strongly the removal of natural justice and public policy as grounds for non-
recognition of British divorces!* *) The learned writer argued that the courts are now
bound under this section to recognise a British divorce even if it was obtained e.g by fraud.
Although the Law Commissions made it clear that the aggrieved party in such
circumstances should seek his remedy in the court which granted the divorce, the learned
I 6 6  -See, the U'lvv Com No. 137 & (he Scots Law Com No. 88 para, 4.13.
16 7- S .52; M orris, 4lh cci., p. 187.
1 6 8 - S.52 (2) (a) and (b); Dicey & M orris, 12th cd., P. 728.
1 6 9  S.51 oi‘ the Family Law Act 1986 infra, ch.5.
1 7 0 -  A nton, RecognUion o f  D ivorces and i.e  ga l Separations Act 1971: Some possib le misconception, 
1972) S.L .T .89; North, op.cit.( 1977) p. 169.
1 7 l-Eâgcr, Recognition o f  D ivorces and Legal Separations Act 1971, ( 1972) S .L .T .L
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writer's argument seems to be right if the decision in Acutt v. AcuttGI'2*) correctly states 
the law of Scotland, bearing in mind the learned writer does not cite this case to support his 
argument. In this case it was held that the court in Scotland would not take jurisdiction 
over an action of reduction of one of its own divorces obtained by fraudulent evidence as to 
domicile and thus as to the jurisdiction of the court unless the defender was in fact subject 
to the jurisdiction. In the light of the fact that the Court of Session has now jurisdiction to 
entertain an action for reduction of any decree granted by a Scottish court, irrespective of 
the date of the d e c r e e , ! * T  3 )  seems there is no direct authority to support Eager's 
arguments.
c- Divorces Obtained Outside the British Islands (Overseas Divorces)
In dealing with recognition of divorces obtained outside the British Islands, the 1971 
Act drew a distinction between 'overseas divorces' and 'divorces obtained outside the 
British Isles' and applied different rules for recognition of each.!* 7 4) The recognition of 
overseas divorces is based on sections 2-5 im plem enting  the 1970 H ague 
Convention.!*75) Overseas divorces are defined as divorces which (a) have been obtained 
by means of judicial or other proceedings in any country outside the British Isles and (b) 
are effective under the law of that country.!* *^ 6)
A divorce falling within the above definition was recognised if, 'at the date of the 
institution of the proceedings in the country in which it was obtained', either spouse was 
habitually resident in that country!*7 7) ( or domiciled there if  the granting state used 
domicile as a jurisdiction ground for divorce) !*78) or a national of that country.!*? 9)
1 7 2 -  1936 S .C .386.
1 7 3  -Law Reform  (M iscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) A ct 1980, S .20.
1 7 4 -8 .1 0 ( 4 ) .  See, G raveson, 7 th ed , p. 294; A nton, (1972) S .L .T .89 ; Eager, (1972) S .L .T .2 ; M orris, 
2nd ed., p. 145; N orth, op.cil.(1977) p. 172; David Gordon, op.cit. 63.
1 7 5  -Arts. 1, 2 and 3 but w ith som e m odification discussed infra 171.
17 6 8.2 .
1 7 7 - 8 .3 ( 1 )  (a).
1 7 8 - 8 ,3 ( 2 ) .
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The recognition of 'divorces obtained outside the British Isles' is based on section 6 of 
the 1971 Act which preserves some of the common law and statutory rules contained in 
"any enactment other than this Act."!* ® **) Section 6 (1 ) defines the common law rules as 
"the rules of law relating to the recognition of divorces obtained in the country of the 
spouses' domicile or obtained elsewhere and recognised as valid in that country". The 
effect of this section is obvious: the rule in Travers v. 7/riZ/ey!*^*) and the test of a real 
and substantial connection in Indyka v. IndykaG^"^) are abolished on the ground that 
most cases to which they applied would fall within the provisions of the Act and because 
the principle of a real and substantial connection was a source of much uncertainty,!**^) 
A divorce could only be recognised under the rule in Le Mesurier v. Le MesurierG^^^ 
and its rider in Armitage v. A. G, !**^) The Act preserved these two rules on the ground 
that they were widely known and operated smoothly as a ground of recognition and they 
did not require expert evidence on the law of the foreign country in contrast to the 1970 
Hague Convention rule involving domicile enacted in section 3 (2 ).!* *5)
In contrast with sections 2-5, the only ground for recognition of foreign divorces under 
section 6 was domicile. Domicile here meant domicile in the British sense. Moreover, the 
accepted view was that section 6 did not require that such a divorce must be obtained by 
means of judicial or other proceedings!* * ?) Nor does it have to be effective under the law 
17 9 - 3 .3 ( 1 )  (b).
1 8 0  -S .6 (5) saves a num ber o f statutory provisions for recognition o f divorces: T he Colonial and O ther 
Territories (D ivorce Ju risd ic tio n ) A cts 1926-1950; sec tion  4  o f  the  M atrim on ia l C auses (W ar 
M airiages) A ct 1944. These A cts have been repealed by the Fam ialy Law A ct 1986, S.68 and Sched, 2.
1 8 1 -1 1 9 5 3 ] P.246.
1 8 2 -1 1 9 6 7 ] 2 A11.E.R.687.
183 -Law Com  No. 3 4  & Scots Law Com  No, 16 paras. 22-25.
184- [1895] A .C .517.
185- [1906] P. 135.
1 86-L aw  Com No. 3 4  & Scots Law Com  No. 16 para.20.
1 8 7  -North, op.cit.(1977) pp. 233 , 234; M orris, 2nd ed., p .205; C anton, The Court of Appeal and Non- 
Judicial Divorces, (1985) 48  M .L .R ev  2 1 2  a t 2 1 6 ; S m art, The Recognition of Extra-Judicial 
Divorces, (1985) 3 4  I.C .L .Q .396  at 397; fc, Viswalingham v. Viswlingham [1980] F .L .R .15  a t 19; 
David Gorden, (1986) 37 N .I.L.Q .151.
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of the country in which it was obtained/***) Under section 6 divorce would be 
recognised if
( 1 )-it was obtained in a country in which both spouses were domiciled or!* 89)
(2 )-it was obtained elsewhere and recognised as valid by the law of the country in 
which both spouses were domiciled. !*^®)
Since 1974 a married woman could acquire a domicile independent of that of her 
husband!*^*) and then the parties might be domiciled in different countries. This change 
had the effect of amending and extending section 6, but only to divorces obtained after 
January 1, 1974. Thus, rule (1) above was extended to cover the situation where the 
divorce was obtained in a country where one of the parties was domiciled at the time of the 
institution of the proceedings and was recognised as valid under the law of the domicile of 
the other party /*^2) And rule (2) above was extended to cover the situation where the 
divorce was obtained in a country where neither party was domiciled at the time of the 
institution of the proceedings but was recognised as valid under the law of each party’s 
separate domicile. !**3)
It is submitted that the 1971 Act was enacted to implement the 1970 Hague Convention 
and to remove all uncertainties on recognition of foreign divorces imposed by the decision 
of the House of Lords in the Indyka case. Unfortunately, it seems that the state of 
recognition of foreign divorces under common law was likely to be easier to ascertain than 
under this Act. The two-fold distinction between 'overseas divorces' and 'divorces 
obtained outside the British Isles' was not to be found neither in the 1970 Hague 
Convention nor in the common law rules. This distinction is at first sight obscure, and its
1 8 8  -Cf, S .2  (a) but See, Adam s v Adam s [1971j P. 188.
1 8 9 -S .6  (2) (a).
1 9 0 -8 .6 (2 )  (b).
1 9 1 -  D om icile and M atrim onial P roceedings A ct 1973, S .l.sup ra , 31,
1 9 2 -8 ,6 (3 )  (a).
1 9 3 -8 .6 (3 )  (b).
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basis unclean To the uninitiated they may both appear to be the same. But this is far from 
being the c a s e . ! * ^ 4 )  £ > j. North, had pointed out that although the phrase’ divorces
obtained outside the British Isles' includes 'overseas divorces', the casual observer might 
think that these phrases are synonymous whereas they were n o t . ! *  ^ 5 )  The distinction is 
not immediately apparent and is apt to be confusing. To qualify divorce as overseas 
divorce it must be obtained in a country outside the British Isles, but not all divorces 
obtained outside the British Isles would qualify as overseas divorces.
Although section 6 was designed to preserve the traditional British concept of domicile, 
it created uncertainties and anomalies, its application was a source of difficulty and judicial 
disagreement. Furthermore, this section was inconsistent with the policy of sections 2-5. 
Thus, a divorce could not be recognised under section 6 if one party was domiciled in the 
foreign country unless it would be recognised in the country where the other party was 
domiciled, whereas a divorce could be recognised under sections 2-5 on the basis o f 
habitual residence, nationality or domicile in the foreign sense of either party even if the law 
of the other would not recognise it.!*** 6)
Another anomaly resulting from section 6 is that if one spouse is domiciled in England
or Scotland, and the other e.g habitually resident in the country where the divorce was
obtained, recognition would be given to such a divorce under sections 2-5, whereas if one 
spouse was domiciled in England or Scotland and the other was domiciled in the foreign 
country in which the divorce was obtained, such a divorce could not be recognised under 
section 6 because recognition would involve c i r c u l a r  r e a s o n i n g . ! *^7)
It seemed that a more realistic approach was needed and that there was nothing contrary 
to public policy in abolishing the two-fold distinction between 'overseas divorces' and
1 94-L aw  Com  No. 137 & Scots L aw  C om  No. 88 para.6.3.
1 9 5  -North, op.cit.(1977) p. 172.
1 9 6  -Law Com No. 137 & Scots Law Com  No. 88  para.6.24.
1 9 7 -  D icey & M orris, 11th ed , p.701; Cheshire &  North, 10th ed , p. 373.
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'divorces obtained outside the British Isles’. The issue went before the Law Commissions 
to be discussed and after having examined thoroughly the question, they recommended the 
abolition of the two-fold distinction: the requirement in section 6 for recognition by the law 
of the domicile of the spouse who had not obtained the divorce and the possibility of the 
recognition of a divorce not obtained in the country of the spouses' domicile should be 
abandoned.!****) A divorce obtained in the country of the domicile of one spouse alone 
should be recognised.!*****) This recommendation, which has been implemented by the 
Family Law Act 1986,!^**®) is certainly acceptable. It clarifies the rules governing the 
recognition of foreign divorces by introducing one set of recognition rules applying to all 
divorces obtained by means of proceedings.
Definition o f overseas divorce'
In terms of the 1986 Act!^** *) an overseas divorce may be defined as one obtained in a 
country outside the British I s l a n d s ! ^ * * - )  by means of p r o c e e d i n g s ! ^ and effective under 
the law of the country in which it was o b t a i n e d . ! ^ * * 4 )  Thus, the 1986 Act requires three 
conditions to be satisfied in order to qualify a divorce as an overseas divorce. These are:
( 1 ) it must be obtained in a country outside the British Islands,
(2 ) it must be obtained by means of proceedings,
(3 ) it must be effective in the country where it was obtained.
In relation to condition (1) above the phrase' 'outside the British Islands" was 
interpreted in Radwan v. RadwanS^^^^ which was concerned with a talaq by the 
husband obtained in the Egyptian Consulate General in London. Cumming-Bruce J, held
1 9 8  -Law  Com No. 137 & Scots Law Com N o.88 para.6.3, 6 .6,.6.19, 6, 24-30.
1 9 9 - Ibid, para.6,26.
2 0 0 -S S .4 5 , 46(1) (4) (5).
2 0 1 - S S .4 5 a n d 4 6 ( l )  (a).
2 0 2  S.45.
2 0 3 -  S.46 ( 1 )"Prœ ccdings"m cans "judicial o r other proceedings" S.54 (1).
2 0 4 -  8 .4 6 (1 )  (a).
2 0 5  -f 19721 2 Family Law. 147.
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that the Egyptian Consulate General in London was English, not Egyptian, soil and that 
divorce was not a divorce obtained outside the British Islands/^O ^ In contrast with 
section 44, the phrase 'outside the British Islands' means that the divorce must be obtained 
in a country outside the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of M an/^®?) 
Hence, it is interesting to note that the 1986 Act applies equally to all foreign divorces and 
not merely to those obtained in countries which were parties to the 1970 Hague 
Convention/^®*) The policy justification for this rule being clear, namely to avoid the 
anomalous situation when a divorce would be recognised if obtained in a contracting state 
but would not be recognised if obtained, on the same jurisdictional facts, in a non­
contracting state, and to avoid further legislation to declare which states will adopt the 
Convention and which states will withdraw from the Convention/^®^)
Condition (2) above will be considered later because its effect is very important in 
connection with extra-judicial divorces and as we mentioned earlier, we have assumed for 
the moment that the overseas divorce in question has been granted by a court of law /^  1 ®) 
Therefore it remains to explain condition (3) above: What does 'effective under the law of 
the country in which the divorce is obtained' mean? This question raises two issues, 
namely the meaning of effectiveness and the meaning of country.
E ffectiveness
Neither the 1986 Act nor the 1970 Hague Convention defines a divorce. It is for the 
lex fo ri under general principles to characterise what constitutes a divorce.!^* *) It is 
submitted that not everything which terminates a marriage during the parties' life time will
3 0 6 -  Clive& W ilson, 2nd ed,, p. 675.
2 0 7  -See, the difinition o f the term 'British Islands' supra; S. 10 (2) o f the 1971 Act.
2 0 8 -  T he C onvention has been ratified  by A ustralia, Cyprus, C zechoslovakia, D enm ark, Egypt, F inland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, N orway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and U nited K ingdom .
2 0 9  -Law Com  N o.34  &  S cot Law C om  No. 16 p a ra l9 ; M c'lean, o p .c itp .8 2 .
2 1 0 -  See, Infra, 176.
2 1 1 -  Graveson, 7th-ed., p. 295.
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constitute a divorce. Under Iraqi law, for instance, if both parties are Muslims and the 
husband converts his religion, the marriage will be dissolved automatically. Hence, no one 
can say that this method of dissolution of marriage constitutes a divorce, simply because 
conversion of religion is not a cause for divorce under Iraqi law. In considering
whether such a method of dissolution of marriage constitutes a divorce under the 1986 Act, 
we may refer to Ormrod L.J. in Viswalingham v. ViswalinghamS^^^^ who held that a 
dissolution occurring automatically on the change of religion of one of the parties was "a 
form of dissolution of marriage by operation of law which cannot be fitted into our 
concepts of divorce or n u l l i t y . " ! ^ !  4 )
It is interesting to note that l)efore the 1986 Act, the c o u r t  o f  recognition (Scots or 
English) might have to decide a question of classification of a foreign decree as divorce or 
an annulment in its substance (as opposed to the name given to it by the granting state) 
because of course different (statutory or common law) rules of recognition obtained 
according to the true nature of the decree and difficulties were possible because the 
substantive laws of different legal systems vary as to the remedy to be available in a given 
situation. Since 1986 the recognition rules for divorces and annulments are the same and 
therefore the question of classification of a foreign decree as a divorce or an annulment 
becomes less important. The most important question is whether the foreign decree is 
within the meaning of part II of the 1986 Act. Hence, it is submitted that the recognition 
court must look at the substance of the foreign decree to decide whether it would fall within 
the meaning of the 1986 Act. If the determination of a marriage by the husband's unilateral 
decision to change his religion constitutes a divorce under the personal law, then the better 
view is that such a decree is within the meaning of the 1986 Act even if it cannot be fitted 
into the Scots or English concept of divorce or nullity.
However, the 1986 Act requires that a divorce must be effective. A divorce may be
2 1 2 -  Sec, Supra, 17.
215-119801 1 F.L.R .15.
2 1 4  -Ibid, al 18; cf, David Gordon, (1986) N .LL.Q .153.
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effective for some purposes but not for others. 'Effective' under section 46 means 
effective to dissolve the marriage.!^ * There is no general rule regulating when divorce 
becomes effective to dissolve the marriage. This is dependent on the law of the country in 
which the divorce is obtained. For instance, under Iraqi law divorce in some situations 
dissolves a marriage immediately,(216) but in others it does not until a period o fldda  has 
elapsed.!^*?) This means that such a divorce during the period o fld d a  is not effective 
because the husband has the right to resume the relationship during this period and 
therefore, it would not be recognised under the 1986 Act. In Torok v. Toz-o/c, 
Ormrod J.refused to recognise the Hungarian decree granted to the husband on the ground 
that the divorce did not satisfy the requirements of effectiveness because the appeal was still 
pending in Hungary and thus"the marriage has not yet been dissolved by the Hungarian 
court, and is therefore still to day subsisting."
Another example of legal ineffectiveness!^ * **) is if a divorce was granted by a court 
incompetent to deal with divorce or by a judge who had not been properly appointed: such 
a divorce would not be an overseas divorce. Thus, in Adams v. Adams a Southern 
Rhodesian divorce was refused recognition in England because the judge who pronounced 
it was not a judge de Jure of the High Court of Rhodesia.
The requirement of effectiveness was also to be found in the 1971 Act!^^ *) but did not 
apply to recognition on the domicile basis under section 6 because this section preserved 
the rule in Armitage v. A.G.!^^^) This rule was a legal obstacle to applying the
2 1 5 “ D icey & M orris, l l th -e d  , p. 696; 12th-ed , p. 733;MoiTis, 4th-ed., p. 191.
2 1 6-A rt.38 (2) o f the 1959 Iraqi Personal S tatus Code.
2 1 7-A rt.38 (1); Martin  v. Buret, 1939 S .L .T .479.
2 1 8  -[397311 W .L.R. 1066 at 1068.
2 1 9 -S e e , N orth, op.cit.(1977) p. 175; D icey & M orris, l l th -e d  p.696; 12th-ed.p. 733; C heshire & N orth, 
1 ) th-ed p. 654.
2 2 0 -  [1971] P. 188.
2 2 1 -  S .2 (b ).
2 2 2 -  [1906] P. 135.
168
effectiveness r e q u i r e m e n t / ^ T h e  requirement of effectiveness is certainly reasonable. 
It is consistent with the whole purpose which the Act aims to reach, namely to cure the 
mischief of limping marriages. It has also the effect of avoiding the undesirable result 
which might have arisen from  the recognition of divorce during the period of 
ineffectiveness. It has also the effect of avoiding unnecessary conflict between the lex fori 
and the lex causae when the question of remarriage of the person concerned arises before 
the recognition court/^^4)
Meaning of 'Country'
It has been seen that section 46 (1) requires that the divorce must be effective in the
country where it is obtained. A question may arise 'what is the meaning of country in this
context?' The 1986 Act does not define 'country' except to say that "it includes a colony or
other dependent territory of the United K i n g d o m .  "(22 5) There is no difficulty in defining a
country in the case where the divorce has been obtained in a country with a single system
of law. The difficulty however, is in the case where the divorce has been obtained in a
country comprising territories in which separate systems of law are in force in matters of
divorce, such as the United S t a t e s . ( 2 2 6 )  Does section 46 (1) mean that the divorce must
be effective in the individual territory, say Nevada where it was obtained or in the United
States as a whole? If the basis of the foreign court’s jurisdiction was habitual residence or
domicile, the divorce needs only to be effective under the law of the territory in which it
was o b t a i n e d ( 2 2 7 )  thus, in the above example, a divorce obtained in Nevada on the ground
2 2 3 -  Law Com No. 137 &  S cot Law  Com N o.88 paras 6.13, 6.26-6, 30.
2 2 4 “ Infra, ch.6.
2 2 5  S .54 (2), but for the purpose o f this A ct a  person shall be treated as a  national o f such a territory  only 
if it has a law o f citizenship o r nationality separate from  that o f the U nited K ingdom  and he is a citizen  
or national o f that territory under the law; Ibid, See, also S. 10 (3) o f the 1971 Act.
2 2 6 -  D icey &  M orris, l l th -e d  p.698, 12th-ed.p.736; C heshire & N orth, l l th -e d  p.655; C live &  W ilson, 
2nd-ed p.654; C ollier, op .c it.p .292 ; Jaffey , op .c it.p .64. T he d ifficu lties do not arise in  relation  to  
recognition o f divorces obtained in federal countries w hich have uniform  d ivorce laws, such as Canada 
(Divorce A ct 1968) and A ustralia ( Fam ily Law A ct 1975).
2 2 7  -S.49 (2); See also, 8 .3  (3) o f the 1971 Act.
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of habitual residence or domicile needs only to be effective under the law of Nevada*
What is the rule if the basis of the foreign court's jurisdiction was nationality? There 
was a problem with the 1971 Act in this case and views were divided on whether the 
divorce must be effective in the territory where it was obtained or must be effective under 
the law of the whole country. This problem came from the wording of section 3 (3 )  which 
provided that in relation to a country comprising territories in which different systems of 
law are in force in matters of divorce, the provisions of this section (those relating to 
habitual residence and domicile in the foreign sense)(^^*) shall have effect as if each 
territory was a separate country except those relating to n a t i o n a l i t y . ( 2 2 9 )  Thus, the 1971 
Act left the question of effectiveness open where the foreign court assumed jurisdiction on 
the ground of nationality. One view suggested that divorce in these circumstances only 
needed to be effective in the territory where it was o b t a i n e d . ( ^ 3 0 )  This approach was 
considered in Cruse v, ChittumS^^^^ where the Mississippi divorce was recognised in 
England although there was no evidence that it would be recognised under the whole law of 
the United States. Although this view put nationality in the same footing as domicile and 
habitual residence, it is not easy to follow, since it leads to an unacceptable result in that a 
divorce granted in e.g. one American State would be recognised here even if it would not 
be recognised in any other American State.
Dr.Morris suggested that no divorce could be recognised as an overseas divorce unless
it was effective throughout the composite stated^^^) This view indeed helps to bring
about a harmony of decisions between the courts of the recognition and the courts of
nationality but at the price that the courts in England and Scotland must examine the law of
2 2 8 -  8 .3(1) (a) and (2).
3 2 9 - 8 .3 ( 1 )  (b).
2 3 0 -  Clive &  W ilson, 2nd-ed pp. 654-656; See, Art. 13 of the 1970 H ague Convention.
2 3 1  -[1974] 2A 1I.E .R .940.
3 3 2 -  M orris, The Recognition o f American Divorces in England, (1975) 24  I.C .L .Q .641 a t 639-641;
M orris  &  N o rth , Cases and Materials on Private International Law, 1984, p .3 0 6 ; M e 'lean ,
op.cit.p .83; Art. 14 o f the 1970 H ague Convention.
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the composite state before giving recognition to a divorce obtained in an individual territory 
within that stated^^S)
This problem has now been removed. Section 49 states clearly that when the basis of 
the foreign court's jurisdiction is nationalityd^^^^ the divorce must be effective throughout 
the country in which it was obtained and the effectiveness under the law of some territory 
within the composite state is not sufficientd^^®) Section 49 (3) (b) makes a similar 
provision with regard to the effectiveness of the conversion into a divorce of a legal 
s e p a r a t i o n ( 2 3 6 )  obtained in a country of which one spouse was a national. This means that 
if a legal separation is converted into a divorce in a country comprising territories, the 
divorce resulting from the conversion must be effective throughout the country .12 3 7) On 
the other hand, if  the basis of the foreign court's jurisdiction is habitual residence or 
domicile, the divorce resulting from the conversion needs only to be effective under the law 
of the territory in which i t  was o b t a i n e d . 1 2 3 8 )
d- Jni’isdictional Bases
A divorce which satisfies the above requirements will be recognised if, 'at the date of 
the commencement of the p r o c e e d i n g s ' , ( 2 3 9 )  either party was habitually resident or 
domiciled in the country in which the divorce was obtained or was a national of that 
c o u n t r y . ( 2 4 0 )  contrast with the 1970 Hague Convention, the jurisdictional bases under 
the 1986 A ct are simplified. The 1970 Hague Convention sets out the complex 
jurisdictional grounds which have to be satisfied by tlie parties to a divorce before it may be
2 3 3 -C f, D avid G ordon, op.cit.p. 81.
2 3 4 -8 .4 6 (1 )  (b )(iii).
2 3 5  -8 .49  (3) (a); Law  Com No. 137 &  S cot Law Com  N o.88 p a ra 6 ,I6 ; C ollier, op .c it.293 ; D icey & 
M orris, 12th-ed.p.736; C heshire &  N orth, 1 Ith -ed  p. 657; Jaffey, op.cit.p. 64.
2 3 6  -8 .47  (2); See, infra, 175.
2 3 7  -Cheshire & N orth, 1 Ith -ed  , p, 657.
2 3 8  -8 .4 9 (2 ).
2 3 9 - S .4 6  (3) (a).
2 4 0 - 8 .4 6 ( 1 )  (b).
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recognised. Thus, while the habitual residence (domicile) of the respondent alone 
s u f f i c e s , ( 2 4 1 )  the habitual residence (domicile) of the petitioner must be accompanied by 
reinforcing factors viz either that it should continue for not less than one year immediately 
prior to the date of the p r o c e e d i n g s ( 2 4 2 )  or that the parties last habitually resided (common 
domicile) together t h e r e . ( 2 4 3 )
Again while the nationality of the respondent is never by itself a recognised ground of 
jurisdiction, the nationality of the petitioner suffices but only where there is a reinforcing 
factor of some k i n d . ( 2 4 4 )  These are; either that he had his habitual residence within his 
national state at the date of institution of the p r o c e e d i n g s , ( 2 4 5 )  or that he had habitually 
resided there for a continuous period of one year falling, at least in part, within the two 
years preceding the institution of the p r o c e e d i n g s , ( 2 4 6 )  or that the respondent has the 
nationality of the state of origin at the time of the institution of the p r o c e e d i n g s , ( 2 4  7 )  or that 
he was present within his national state at the date of institution of the proceedings and the 
spouses last habitually resided together in a state whose law, at that date did not provide for
d i v o r c e . ( 2 4 8 )
The approach of the 1986 Act in rejecting the reinforcing factors is more realistic and 
easier to understand and apply. It has the effect of giving wider recognition. The 
distinction between the nationality of the petitioner and that of the respondent seems to be 
unacceptable. In many countries, for instance in Iraq ,( 2 4 9 )  ^he nationality of the 
respondent is the main basis of divorce jurisdiction. The failure to recognise divorces
2 4 1 -  A r t .2 ( l) .
2 4 2 -  Art. 2 (2) (a).
2 4 3 -  A rt.2 (2 ) (b).
2 4 4  -Anion, (1968) 18 I.C .L .Q .630; 2nd-ed p. 470.
2 4 5 -  A rt.2(4) (a).
2 4 6 - A r t .2 (4 ) ( b ) .
2 4 7 -  Art. 2 (3).
2 4 8 -  A rt.2 (5) (a) (b).
2 4 9 -  Art. 14 supra, 80.
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granted on such a basis would lead to more limping marriages. Moreover, since Indyka v. 
/nff_y/ca,(250) nationality of one spouse was a sufficient basis for recognition and 
therefore, the acceptance of such a distinction means a retrograde step and the depriving of 
recognition for divorces which would be entitled to recognition under the Indyka
case,(2S 1)
In contrast with the domestic jurisdictional basis of habitual residence,(2S2) no length 
of period of residence is specified or required under the 1986 A c t The habitual residence 
of either party at the time of the commencement of the proceedings suffices for recognition 
of overseas divorces,(253) This means that habitual residence will always be a question of 
fact and degree. The Law Commissions justified the absence of a specific period for the 
recognition rules by arguing that the purpose of a period of one year in the domestic 
jurisdiction is to avoid forum-shopping, whereas at the stage of recognition the real 
problem is not to avoid forum-shopping, but to prevent limping marriages because at this 
stage the forum-shopping if any has already taken place.(254)
This formulation of words and sentiments may be specious to some extent. Why 
should forum-shopping be tolerated simply because it has taken place? On the other hand, 
if the Hague Convention and the Law Commissions genuinely seek a reduction in limping 
marriages, perhaps they should be prepared to grant recognition in a further case e.g. 
where jurisdiction has been assumed only on a few days residence, as in Iraqi law, but the 
choice of law adopted by the foreign court is acceptable to the recognition court.
Following the abolition of the two fold distinction between 'overseas divorces' and
2 5 0 -  [1967] 2 A11.E.R.689.
2 5 1 -  Law Com  N o.34 & Scot Law Com  No. 16 paras 27-30.
2 5 2 -  SS.5 (2) (b) and 7  (2) (b) o f the D om icile and M atrim onial Proceedings A ct 1973, supra ch.2.
2 5 3 -S .4 6  (1 (a) (i); S.3 (1) (a) of the 1971 A ct; Cruse v. Chittiim  [1974] 2  A11.E.R.940; B roit v. Broit, 
1972 (Note) 32; Hack  v. Hack [1976] 6  Fam ily  Law 177; Kendall v. Kendall [1977] 1 W .L .R .251 ; 
Anton, 2nd-ed.p. 475; C ilve, op.cit.p . 623.
2 5 4 -  Law Com N o.34 & Scot Law  Com  No. 16 para 29.
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'divorces obtained outside the British Isles' and the rule in Armiiage v. A the
1986 Act provides that domicile of either party at the time of the proceedings is sufficient 
ground for recognition of overseas d i v o r c e s . ( 2 S 6 )  Hence, domicile has two alternative 
meanings i.e domicile in the United Kingdom sense and domicile in the foreign s e n s e . ( 2 S 7 )  
When the domicile in the foreign sense has been adopted, the 1971 Act provided that an 
overseas divorce would only be recognised on this ground if the law of the country in 
which the divorce was obtained used this concept of domicile as a ground for divorce 
,jurisdiction.(258) The Law Commissions considered that this limitation was illogical and 
unnecessary on the ground that there was no such limitation on the recognition of divorces 
obtained in the countries of nationality or habitual residence of either party. Moreover, they 
argued that this limitation had no real effect in excluding the recognition of divorces 
obtained in countries with a very liberal concept of domicile e.g. 6 weeks residence 
(Nevada) if domicile is a jurisdictional basis there.(2S*>) This limitation has now been 
removed and there is no requirement under the 1986 Act that the foreign court should use 
domicile as a ground of Jurisdiction.(2«0) On the other hand, the Act restricted this 
concept of domicile to that in family matters because it is possible that a foreign country 
may have different concepts of d o m i c i l e . 1)
An overseas divorce will also be recognised if either party to the marriage at the date of 
the commencement of the proceedings was a national of a country in which the divorce was 
o b t a in e d .( 2 6 2 )  The Act does not define nationality.1263) ^  j^aves this to the accepted
2 5 5 -  [1906] P. 135.
2 5 6 - S .4 6 ( ! ) ( b )  (ii),
2 5 7 -  S.46 (5); Imlyka r. Indyka 11967] 2 A11.E.R.689 at 730,731 /x^ r Lord Pearson; Messina v. Smith 
119711 P.322 al 339 per O rm rod J.: fMwrence v. ÎMwrence [ |085) 2 A ii.E .R  733.
2 5 8  -S.3 (2); Anton, (1972) S.L.T.89.
2 5 9 -  Law Com No. 137 & Scot Law Com No.88 para. 6, 18.
2 6 0 -  8 .46 ( 1) ( b )  (ii) and (5); D icey & M om s, 1 Uh-ed p. 700; Anton, 2nd-ed p. 475.
2 6  1- 8 .46  (o). The United K ingdom  has special concept o f  dom icile since the Civil Jurisd ic tion  and 
Judgm ents Act 1982. for details See, Anton, Civil Jurisdiction in Scotland, 1984.
2 6 2  -S.46 ( 1) (a) (iii); Sec also, S.3 (1) (b) o f the 1971 Act.
2 6 3 -B u l Sec, S.54 (2): See also, S. 10 (3) o f the 1971 Act.
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view that a perspjVs nationality is a matter for the law of any state which claims him as a 
n a t i o n a l / T h e  Act also contains no rules dealing with cases of dual and multiple 
nationality. It seems however, that recognition will be given even if the person concerned 
has more than one nationality at the time of the p r o c e e d i n g s / 2 6 5 )  seems also 
recognition will be given even if the law of the second nationality does not permit divorce.
It is necessary for recognition of an overseas divorce that the connecting factor of 
domicile, habitual residence or nationality be in the country where the divorce was 
o b t a i n e d , ( 2 6 6 )  Section 3 (3) of the 1971 Act was not clear in the case where the foreign 
court in a composite state had assumed jurisdiction on the ground of nationality. In other 
words, would a divorce granted in an individual territory be recognised under section 3 (1 ) 
(b) of the 1971 Act on the ground of the composite state nationality? D r . M o r r i s ( 2 6 7 )  and 
D r . N o r t h ( 2 6 8 )  |^ad suggested that a divorce granted in an individual territory could not be 
recognised on the basis that either party was a national of the composite state, because each 
individual territory administers its own law and there is no nationality connecting the 
person concerned with the individual territory in which the divorce was granted. This view 
seems to be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act in a broadening of the recognition 
rules to reduce the danger of limping marriages. However, both D r . M o r r i s ( 2 6 9 )  and 
D r . N o r t h ( 2 7  0 )  bavg modified their view and they agree with what Professor Anton said: 
"The nationality of either spouse remains a general ground of jurisdiction irrespective of the 
territory within a country where the divorce is obtained."(271) This view has been
2 6  4 - Law Com No.34 & Scot Law Com No. 16 para 9; Oppeuheinter v. Caltermole f  1976] A.C.249.
2 6 5  In Torok v. Torok [1973J I W .L.R.1066, although the recognition was refused, Ormord J., admitted 
that the Hungarian court had jurisdiction within the meaning o f  section 3 (3) o f the 1971 Act 
i.e.nationality, despite the fact that the parties also possessed British nationality at the lime o f the 
proceedings in Hungary.
2 6 6  -S.46 (1).
2 6 7 -  Dicey & .Morris, 9th-cd p. 321,
2 6 8 -  Cheshire & North, 9lh-cd , p. 379; See aslo, Eager, (1971) S.L.T. I at 2.
2 6 9  -Morris, (1975) 24I.C .L .Q . 638; 4lh-ed.p. 193.
2 7 0 -  North, opci t ( 1977) p. 181.
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implemented in the 1986 Act (272)
An overseas divorce cannot be recognised unless the jurisdictional bases are satisfied' 
at the date of the commencement of the p r o c e e d i n g s ' . ( 2 7  3 )  However, the 1986 Act makes 
two exceptions to this general rule. The first is to be found in section 47 (1) in the case of 
c r o s s - p r o c e e d i n g s . ( 2 7  4 )  Under this section an overseas divorce obtained either in the 
original proceedings or in the cross-proceedings would be recognised if the jurisdictional 
bases in section 46 (1) (b) were satisfied at the date of the institution either of the original 
proceedings or of the cross-proceedings and therefore, it is immaterial which of them led to 
d i v o r c e . ( 2 7 S )  Thus, in the case where a husband petitioned an Iraqi court for divorce on 
the basis of nationality at the time when the proceedings were instituted, but before the 
petition was heard he left Iraq and acquired foreign nationality, and the wife who is a 
foreigner and who had no connection with Iraq raised cross-proceedings there and obtained 
a divorce, the divorce is entitled to recognition under section 47 ( 1) even if the requirements 
of jurisdictional bases were not satisfied at the time of the cross-proceedings. Similarly, if 
the requirements of section 46(1) (b) are satisfied at the time of the cross-proceedings, but 
not at the time of the original proceedings, the divorce obtained by either proceedings will 
be recognised.
The second exception is to be found in section 47 (2). This talks about the recognition 
of divorce by conversion after a legal separation. In some countries a legal separation can 
be converted into a divorce after a certain time. Such a divorce is entitled to recognition
2 7  1- Anton, 1971 S.L .T.89 at 90; Clive & W ilson, 2nd-ed p. 606; Art. 14 o f the Hague Convention.
2 7 2  S 49; Cheshire & North, llth -ed  p. 656; Jaffey, op.cit.p.64; D icey & Morris, 1 Ith-ed , p. 688, 12th- 
ed.p.736.
2 7 3  -S .46 (3) (a); See also, S.3 (1) o f the 1970 Act; Art.2 and 5 o f  the 1970 Hague Convention, but see 
A rts.7,19, 20, 21 is that o f  the time where the divorce obtained; Anton, (1968) 18 I.C.L.Q .642; 
Mansell v. Mansell [1967] P .306 cf, Blair v. Blair (1968) 3 AII.E.R. 639.
2 7 4  -See, in relation to the 1971 Act, S 4 (1); Art.4  of the Hague Convention.
2 7 5 -  S .47 (1) (a); Cheshire & N orth ,llth -ed  p .654; D icey & Morris, llth -e d  p, 697, 12th-ed.p. 732; 
Anton, 2nd-ed ,.p. 478; Clive,3rd-ed.p. 624.
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even if the jurisdictional bases at the time of the conversion were not s a t i s f i e d / 2 7  6)
In order to recognise such a divorce several conditions must be satisfied:
( 1 ) the legal separation itself must be entitled to recognition by virtue of sections 46 (1 ) 
and 47 (1), This means that it must be obtained in a country outside the British Islands by 
proceedings and at the date of the proceedings the jurisdictional bases are satisfied, or it 
was obtained by cross-proceedings and the jurisdictional bases are satisfied at the date of 
the institution either of the original proceedings or of the c r o s s - p r o c e e d i n g s / 2 7  7 )
(2 ) the conversion must take place in the country in which the legal separation was 
obtained and the divorce must be effective under the law of that country/27 8)
B- Recognition of Extra-Judicial Divorces
In the earlier cases concerning recognition of extra-judicial divorces, the courts departed 
from the principle that personal status and the validity of divorce are governed by the law of 
domicile. Accordingly, recognition was denied to such divorces either on the ground that 
the divorce was not granted by a court or that a marriage in the Christian sense could not be 
dissolved by a method of divorce which is unknown to the English or Scots concept. Later 
the position changed completely and the courts showed their willingness to recognise such 
divorces even if they were obtained in the British Isles so long as they were valid according 
to the law of the parties' d o m i c i l e . ( 2 7 9 )
After the enactment of the 1971 Act, the recognition of extra-judicial divorces was 
greatly complicated. One complication arose from the fact that this Act drew a distinction 
between "overseas divorces" and "divorces obtained outside the British I s l e s " ( 2 8 0 )  and 
required that the former must have been obtained by "means of judicial or other 
proceedings”(281) Tliis phrase in its application to extra-judicial divorces was a source of
2 7 6 -  Anton, 2nd-ed p. 478; Clive, 3rd-ed.p. 624.
2 7 7  -S .4 7 (2 ).
2 7  8  8 .4 9 (2 )  (3) (b).
279 -T h is liberal position is represented by the decision in Qureshi v. Qureski [1971] 1 A li.E.R.325.
2 8 0 - 8 . 1 0 ( 4 ) .
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some difficulties and judicial disagreement. The Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings 
Act 1973 placed some limitations on the common law rules for recognition of extra-judicial 
divorces and made the law more complicated in introducing the word * ' p r o c e e d i n g " ( 2 8 2 )  
which also was a source of uncertainty.
In 1986, the Law C o m m i s s i o n s ( 2 8  3 )  recommended that an extra-judicial divorce which 
satisfies the requirement of being obtained by proceedings should be entitled to recognition. 
They also recommended that the phrase "judicial or other proceedings" contained in the 
1971 Act should include "acts which constitute the means by which a divorce may be 
obtained in that country and are done in compliance with the procedure required by the law 
of that c o u n t r y , " ( 2 8 4 )  Although in particular cases the courts still have discretion to refuse 
recognition on public p o l i c y  , ( 2 8  5 )  ^  seems likely that any divorce however informal might 
qualify for recognition. This liberal approach has not been implemented. Instead, the 
Family Law Act 1986 expressly draws a distinction between two types of extra-judicial 
divorces (those which are obtained by proceedings and those obtained 'otherwise than by 
means of proceedings') and apply different rules for the recognition of e a c h . ( 2 8 6 )
While it cannot be ignored that the 1986 Act has made significant changes in the law of 
recognition of extra-judicial divorces, it appears that it has failed to remove all the 
uncertainties created under the previous law. It seems also likely that it has failed to fulfil 
its aim of reducing 'limping marriages' because of its excessive formalism. The points 
which will be discussed are: 1- some types of extra-judicial divorces. 2 - common law 
recognition rules. 3 - statutory recognition rules.
2 8 1 -  S.2.
2 8 2 -  S. 16.
2 8 3  -Law Com NO. 137 Scots Law Com No.88.
2 8 4 -  Ibid, para.6, 11.
2 8 5 -  S.51 (3) (c).infia, ch.5.
2 8 6 -  Contrats S46 (1) with S46 (2).
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1- Some Types of Extra-Judicial Divorces
In some legal systems, a divorce may be obtained merely by the agreement of the 
parties or by administrative process or unilaterally by one party to the marriage in 
accordance with a religious law. These divorces obtained by means other than from a court 
of law are referred to as extra-judicial d i v o r c e s . ( 2 8 7 )  The examples of extra-judicial 
divorces which have come most commonly before the English and Scottish courts are 
Jewish and Muslim divorces.
Under Jewish l a w , ( 2 8 8 )  the husband may divorce his wife by delivering to her a bill of 
divorcement called a gett. The ceremony takes place before a Rabbinical court and two 
witnesses. The requirement of the Rabbinical court is to ensure that the grounds for 
divorce are available and that the parties consent to and understand the nature of the act. 
Such a divorce is effective under Israeli law whether obtained in Israel or elsewhere if the 
parties are domiciled in Israel.
Under Classical Islamic law, a valid marriage may be dissolved by extra-judicial 
divorce as well as by judicial p r o c e s s . ( 2 8 9 )  The most usual forms of extra-judicial 
divorces are divorce by taiaq and divorce by khula. It will be remembered that in the case 
of talaq the husband can divorce his wife by pronouncing the word talaq. The wife need 
not be present or aware of the proceedings and there is no formal necessity for witnesses. 
This form of Muslim divorce has come before the courts and is referred to by English 
judges as a 'bare talaq' .(2 9 0 )
In modem times however, the civil authorities in many Muslim countries have required 
further formality designed either to protect wives or to make the act of divorce more public. 
In Pakistan, for instance, the Muslim Family Law Ordinance 1961 requires that the
2 8 7 -  North, (1975) 91 L,Q.Rev.36; David Gordon, op.cit p. 12.
2 8 8  Susan Maidment, The L egal Effect o f  R elig iou s D ivorces, (1974) 37  M .L .R ev.611 ; B erkovils, 
Transnaiional D ivorces: The Fatima Decision, (1988) 104 L.Q.Rev.60; David Gordon, op.cit.36,
2 8 9 -  Supra, 17.
2 9 0 -  Chaudharyv. Chaudhary [1985] 3 AH.E.R.1017, See, infra, 195.
179
husband must deliver a notice of pronouncement of talaq to the chairman of the union 
council with a copy of the notice to his wife. The chairman must constitute an Arbitration 
Council for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation. The talaq cannot be effective until the 
expiration of 90 days from the date o f delivery of the notice to the chairman of the
c o u n c i l .  (2  9 1 )
In Iraq, although the 1959 Personal Status Code requires further formality than Islamic 
l a w , ( 2 9  2 )  i t  i g  submitted that this formality is enacted for procedural and statistical purpose 
and therefore, it does not change the fact that talaq shall be recognised in Iraq even if the 
husband does not follow the requirement of the 1959 Code, Such a talaq (i.e. "bare" in the 
Western view) is effective under Iraqi law whether obtained in Iraq or elsewhere if  the 
parties are Iraqi nationals and wherever they might b e . ( 2 9 3 )  the case of dissolution of 
marriage by khula, the Iraqi law requires further formality than the dissolution of marriage 
by talaq. Article 46 requires that the parties must commence proceedings before the court. 
The court shall grant a decree dissolving the marriage if it is satisfied that all the conditions 
in article 46 are present. The parties must register the divorce in the c o u r t . ( 2 9 4 )  
contrast with talaq, it seems that the dissolution of m arriage by khula involves 
proceedings which do not amount to judicial investigation,
2- Common Law Recognition Rules
The difficulty and uncertainty over the state of recognition of extra-judicial divorces in 
common law was initiated by the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v. Hammersmith 
Superintendent Registrar o f Marriage, ex p-M ir-Anw aruddinf^^^) in which a Muslim 
domiciled in India married a domiciled Englishwoman in England. Within 6 weeks of the
2 9 1  -David Pearl, A text book on M m lim  Law, London, 1979, p.96; Qureshi v. Qureshi [1971] 1 
A11.E.R.325; Quazi v. Qiiazi [1979] 3 A11.E.R.897.
2 9 2  Art.39 supra, 19.
2 9 3  -Art.2 (1) of the 1959 Personal Status Code.
2 9 4 -  Art.39 (1).
2 9  5  -[1917] 1 K.B.634; Maher v. Maher [1951] P.342; Carter, (1962) 38  B.Y.B.I.L.486.
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marriage, the wife left the husband. From an Indian court, he obtained a decree of 
restitution of conjugal rights with which his wife declined to comply. Subsequently, on his 
return to England he made a unilateral declaration of divorce by talaq. There was no doubt 
that the/«/aqf would be recognised as effective in India, i.e the lex domicilii, because there 
is no method of divorce open to Muslims other than talaq.
The question which the Court of Appeal had to consider was whether the talaq was 
effective in England to dissolve a marriage celebrated with an Englishwoman in England. 
The court unanimously held it was not. The court justified its decision by arguing that the 
divorce was not granted by a c o u r t , ( 2 9 6 )  g^d that a marriage in the Christian sense could 
not be dissolved by a method of divorce which is appropriate to a polygamous u n i o n . ( 2 9 7 )  
It is submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeal is inconsistent with the status theory 
and contrary to the common law rules. If it is accepted that the lex domicilii governs 
personal status, then it is necessary to follow that a divorce accepted as valid by the 
domiciliary law must also be recognised in English law. It is therefore immaterial whether 
the marriage is monogamous or polygamous. It is equally immaterial whether the foreign 
law required a judicial decree ornot.(298)
Since judicial proceedings are by no means a universal method of divorce, there 
appears to be no reason why the courts should refuse to recognise foreign non-judicial 
divorces in preference to the principle that personal status is governed by the lex 
6fc»mia7/7.(299) Moreover, if divorce under Muslim law may be relatively easy to obtain 
for a man, this does not confirm the superior efficacy of divorce obtained by judicial 
2 9 6  -Ibid, at 643, 653, 659.
2 9 7 -  Ibid, at 649, 659, Ç>6\ \ M aher v. M aher [1951] P.342. The third reason for refusing recognition was
that it was contrary to natural justice that a man should be judge in his own cause and be able to
dissolve his marriage unilaterally without notice to his w ife, will be discussed, infra, chapter Five.
2 9 8 -  Cheshire, 6th-ed , p. 403; M orris, (1953 ) 66  H ar.L .R ev.961 at 1003; Anton, Non-Judicial 
D ivorces,{\965)  S.L.T. 1; Swaminathan, R ecognition o f  Foreign U nilateral D ivo rces in English  
Conflict o f  Laws, (1965) 28  M.L.Rev. 540 at 542.
2 9 9 -  M aher V. Maher [1951] P.342-,Qureshi v. Qureshi [1971] 1 A11.E.R.325
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process over all other methods. But it does raise questions about fair treatment of wives. 
These doubts in modern days may not be well founded. Thus, social and economic 
circumstances produced pressure on the Iraqi legislature to place the wives to a talaq in a 
stronger position than wives to a judicial divorce in terms of financial relief.!^®**)
It is also submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeal confused ends and means, 
and resulted in a very narrow p r i n c i p l e . ! ^ 0 1 )  created more limping marriages when the 
court treated the couple as still married in England while they were recognised as divorced 
in I n d i a . ( ^ 0 2 )  To much should not be made of Hammersmith, because its ghost 
disappeared gradually. The courts came to treat it as not authority. Thus, in Yousef v. 
Yousefi^^^'l and El-Riyami v. E l-R iyam if^^^^  the English court without referring to the 
Hammersmith case recognised as valid a talaq pronounced by the husband to dissolve a 
marriage celebrated in England between an Englishwoman domiciled in England and a 
Muslim man. The key point for recognition of the talaq in these two cases was that the 
talaq took place before the court in the presence of both parties and two witnesses. It was 
registered in the court records and the expert evidence showed that it would be recognised 
as valid by the law of domicile.
It is submitted that these two decisions were those of a single judge, and they appeared
to be in direct conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Hammersmith case.
However, the decision of the Hammersmith case was expressly overruled by the Court of
Appeal in Russ v. RussS^^^"> in which a Muslim domiciled in Egypt, married an
Englishwoman domiciled in England in 1913. The maniage was celebrated in England but
3 0 0  -See, infra, 331,
3 0 1 -  Graveson, 7th-ed.p. 320.
3 0 2  Swaminathan ,(1965) 28 M .L.R ev.540 at 547.
3 0 3 -  [1957] The Tim es, 1 August 1957.
3 0 4 -  [1958] The Times, 1 April 1958.
3 0 5 -  [1963] P.87; [1964] P.315; discussed Webb, Further and Better Relegation o f the Hammersmith 
Marriage Case,(1963) 26  M .L.R ev.82; Swaminathan, (1965) 28 M .L .R ev.540 at 543; Carter, (1962) 
38 B.Y.LL.487.
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was followed by a Muslim ceremony in Egypt. In 1932, the husband divorced his wife 
according to Muslim law by talaq in her presence and two witnesses. The takiq was 
recorded in the official court records. In 1936 the wife went through another muslim 
ceremony of marriage in Egypt with a man domiciled in Egypt but this union was also 
dissolved by talaq in the Cairo court in the presence of the wife and two witnesses. In 
1942 the wife entered into a third marriage with R. at a church in Cairo in accordance with 
the rites and ceremonies of the church of Scotland. The question which the Court of 
Appeal had to decide in 1962 was whether the ialaq{s) valid according to the Egyptian law 
where the husband was domiciled would be recognised in England.
Although the members of the Court of Appeal all conceded that the Hammersmith case 
was binding upon them as a Court of Appeal decision, they held that the talaq(s) was valid 
and the Hamnwrsmith case must be distinguished.!^®**) Willmer L.J. pointed out that the 
real ratio in Hammersmith case was the absence of any judicial proceedings. The talaq 
pronouncement was made privately in a room in London, in the absence of the wife and 
there was no suggestion of any judicial proceedings of any kind, but in Russ v. Russ the 
talaq was pronounced before the Egyptian court in the presence of the wife and two 
witnesses and it was recorded in the official records of the court. The fact of judicial 
recognition by the court of domicile seems to constitute an important element in the present 
case which wholly is lacking in the Hammersmith case. The Learned judge concluded that 
the decree in the Hammersmith case cannot be regarded as of universal application. Its 
application must be confined to cases where the facts are the same or s i m i l a r . ! ^ ®  7 )
The result of the decision is certainly positively to be welcomed since it established that 
the requirement of judicial investigation was not necessary to give recognition to foreign 
divorces and that a monogamous marriage can be dissolved by a method appropriate to a 
polygamous marriage. It had the effect of regarding the Hammersmith case as a departure
3 0 6 -  Ib id , al pp .326 , 333 , 335,
3 0 7 -  Ib id , al 322-325.
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from the principle that personal status and the validity of divorces are governed by the law 
of domicile. On the other hand, the decision of the Court of Appeal might be criticised in 
so far as it drew a distinction between a talaq which involves some formality and a takiq 
which does not, suggesting that recognition would only be given to the first type: the 
second type was not entitled to recognition because was contrary to natural justice. If the 
talaq is valid by the law of domicile, why do the courts emphasise that it must involve 
some formalities?!^®^) Moreover, since the courts have always held that the cause for 
divorce is immaterial for its recognition, it is hard then to see how the methods by which a 
divorce can be obtained under the lexdomicilii should be material.!^®^)
In Qureshi v, Qureshif^^^>  which was the last case dealing with the recognition of 
Muslim talaq before the enactment of the 1971 Act, Sir Jocelyn Simon P. adopted a more 
liberal view in dealing with Muslim divorce when he held that the procedure and form of 
the divorce were irrelevant so long as the divorce was recognised by the law of domicile. In 
this case, the parties were married in England. They were both Muslim and domiciled in 
Pakistan. After the marriage in England they went through a Muslim ceremony. It was not 
a happy marriage and after a few months the couple separated. The husband then wrote a 
letter to the wife in the form of a talaq, a copy of which was sent to the office of the High 
Commissioner for Pakistan in London. The husband complied with the requirements of the 
law of Pakistan and the talaq then became absolute under that law. The wife claimed that 
the talac] was invalid.
Sir Jocelyn Simon P. found that he was confronted by two inconsistent decisions of the 
Court of Appeal in the Hammersmith case and Russ v. Russ, and he preferred the later 
one. Moreover, the Learned judge was satisfied that there is no general rule in English law 
that;
3 0 8 -  S w am ina than , (1965) 28  M .L .R ev .540  at 541 , 545.
3 0 9 -  Morris, (1953) 66 Har.L.Rcv.961 at 1003.
3 1 0 -  [1971] 1 A II.E .R .325 .
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"compels refusal of recognition to a divorce valid by the law of domicile, if it 
is not the creature of a judicial act or performed injudicial presence, either 
generally or if the marriage is celebrated in England, or if the purported 
divorce takes place in England, or both"/^ 11)
The judge went on to say that:
"the fact that there has been no  jud ic ia l intervention o r  even presence is irrelevant if  the 
purported  divorce is  effec tive by the law  of the dom icile to term inate the m arriage in 
q u es tio n " /^  ^
Although Qureshi v. Qureshi, was not dealing with informal divorces, it is submitted 
that the principle declared in this case clearly applied to all informal divorces which were 
effective as terminating marriage in the countries where the divorce occurred. 13)
The principle, that recognition should be given to informal divorces which are valid by 
the law of domicile of the parties, applied also to other forms of extra-judicial divorces. In 
Ratanachai V. Ratanachai^^^^) and Varanand v, VaranandS^^^) the English court 
recognised a divorce effective according to the law of Thailand by the mere agreement of 
the parties despite the fact the agreement had not been made in the presence of anybody.
In relation to Jewish divorces, the policy of the English law is in favour of recognition 
of Jewish divorce even if granted without judicial intervention so long as it is valid under 
the law of d o m i c i l e . ( 3 1 6 )  The first decision in this line was the decision of the Privy 
Council in Sasson v. Sasson,^^^'^^ in which a declaration was granted that the divorce 
before the Grand Rabbi in Alexandria was effective to dissolve the marriage of two British 
subjects domiciled in Egypt. The decision was followed in Har-Shefi v. Har- Shefi,i^^^)
3 1 1  A 1.344.
3 1 2 - Ibid, at 345.
3 1 3 -  Chaudharyv. Chaudhary [1985] 3 A H .E.R .1017 at 1029.
3 1 4 -  [1960] The Tim es, 4  June I960.
3 1 5  -[1964] 108 Sol. Jo. 693; Lee v. Lau [1967] P. 14 ; W ebb, (1965) 28  M .L.Rev. 109.
3 1 6 -  Cheshire, 6th-ed.p.403.
3 1 7  -[1924] A.C.1007.
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in which the marriage between two members of the Jewish faith was entered into in Israel, 
the wife being domiciled before marriage in England and the husband in Israel. After a 
short residence together in England, the husband was deported from England but the wife 
remained. Before his departure, he delivered a Gett which was receiyed by his wife at the 
Beth Din in London, the court of the chief Rabbi in London. The wife petitioned in 
England for a declaration that the gett had validly dissolved the marriage. Expert evidence 
was shown that the Gett would be recognised as valid by Israeli law. Pearce J., declaring 
that the divorce must be recognised as valid in England, said that:
"the marriage had been validly dissolved by the only form of divorce w hich is open to a 
Jew dom iciled in Israel. To hold that such a m arriage, which has been legally dissolved 
according to the law  o f  the dom icile , continues binding in this coun try  is to create 
confusion and hardship and is, in m y opinion, contrary to the principle laid dow n in La 
M esuner v. Le Mesurier and the principle o f international law".(3 1 9 )
In Scotland, there was considerable reluctance in the earlier cases to recognise extra­
j u d i c i a l  d i v o r c e s .  (320) ifj Warrenderv. W atrenderf^^^l Lord Brougham took the view 
that only a foreign divorce decree given by a court after judicial proceedings would be 
recognised. In Liiszczewska v. LuszczewskaS^^^^ it was suggested that divorce 
obtained by consent of the parties might be morally repugnant.
The attitude of the Scottish court was to change in favour of recognition of extra­
judicial divorces and the courts followed the English cases that an extra-judicial divorce 
would be recognised if it was valid by the law of dom icile. In M akouipour v. 
M akouipourf^^^l a woman domiciled in Scotland, married in Scotland, an Iranian 
domiciled in Iran. They resided together in Iran for about 11 months. They then went
3 1 8  -(No.2) [19531 p,220; G raveson, Judicial Interpretation o f  D ivorce Jurisdiction in Conflict o f  Laws, 
(1954) 17 M .L.Rev 501.
3 1 9  Al, 224.
320 -A n to ii, (1965) S.L.T. 1.
3 2 1 -  (1835) 2 C1& Fin.488.
3 2 2 -  1953 S .L.T.(N otes)73.
3 2 3 -  1967 S L .T .lO l: Radoyevith  v. Radoyevitk, 1930 S.C .619.
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through a procedure of divorce according to -he iaw of Iran and judicially recognised in that 
country. The wife returned to Scotland and subsequently brought an action of declaration 
that her marriage was validly dissolved by the Iranian divorce, and that by the law of 
Scotland she had the status of a divorced person.
Lord Thomson followed the English case of Russ v. Russ,{^^^^ holding that an act of 
dissolution of marriage in the country of the domicile and judicially recognised there should 
be recognised as valid in Scotland. Lord Thomson stressed that an extra-judicial divorce 
must involve some formality in order to be recognised in Scotland. In the case under 
discussion the parties went through a ceremony or procedure of divorce at the registry 
office following upon which a divorce deed was signed by the parties and witnesses and 
registered in the registry o f f i c e . (3 25)
It appears that at common law the court had begun to accept extra-judicial divorces and 
that judicial intervention has no inherent virtue, neither is it universal, for the courts to 
insist on such a procedure in the case of a foreign divorce. The place of marriage and 
divorce are immateral provided the divorce is valid by the law of domicile and the parties 
are not domiciled in England or Scotland. (3 2 6 )  However, when statute intervened, it 
became impossible for an extra-judicial divorce to be granted validly in U.X.(327)
3- Statutory Recognition Rules
The liberal approach of the Law Commissions to assimilate divorces obtained otherwise 
than by proceedings to those obtained by proceedings has not been implemented by the 
Family Law Act 1986. Instead, the Act expressly draws a distinction between these two
3 2 4 -  [1964] P.315.
3 2 5 -  A t ,  1 0 2 .
326-Joseph  r. Joseph  [1953] 1 W .L .R .l 182; Corbett v. Corheft[ 1957] i W .L .R .486; Preger v. P reger  
11926] 42 T .L .R .218; Har- Slieji Har-Shefi (N o.2) [1953] p. 220; Qureshi v. Qureshi [1971] 1 
A II.E .R .325.
3 2 7 - S.44 of the Familv Law Act 1986.
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types of extra-judicial divorces and provides a more restricted approach in relation to 
recognition of foreign divorces obtained otherwise than by judicial or other proceedings. 
This state of law is highly unsatisfactory because it would encourage the creation of 
limping marriages and produce confusion in the law. It attempts to impose British 
standards of justice on foreign spouses. The test of distinction depends upon whether or 
not the divorce was obtained by proceedings. Although 'proceedings' are defined as 
"judicial or other p r o c e e d i n g s " ( 3  2 8 )  ^  j g  submitted that the 1986 Act does not advance a 
clear criterion as to what constitute 'other proceedings'. Since the Act applies different 
rules for recognition of each, it becomes necessary to consider the m eaning of 
'proceedings' in order to classify whether or not the divorce in the question involves 
proceedings.
Since the 1986 Act provides that an extra-judicial divorce cannot be recognised unless it 
is effective in the country where it was obtained, it follows that a divorce obtained in the 
British Islands will be denied recognition because it does not form part of the British family 
law. This simple rule can give rise to difficulty in deciding where an extra-judicial divorce 
is obtained. The difficulty comes from the fact that it is sometimes not easy to identify the 
country in which an extra-judicial divorce is obtained because such a divorce may consist 
of a number of different elements each of which may occur in a different country. A 
further point to be discussed is the position of extra-judicial divorces obtained within the 
British Islands.
a- What are "Proceedings ' ?
At the Hague Conference the views of the delegates were conflicting on the scope of the 
application of the Convention to foreign divorces. Some states including the United 
Kingdom would have preferred the Convention to apply whatever the forms or method of 
divorce provided or permitted by the giving state on the view that the sole relevant question 
is whether the marriage has been effectively dissolved. This view was rejected by some 
3 2 8 -  S.54 (1) o f  the Fam ily Law A ct 1986.
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states which declared that the Convention must be limited to divorces emanating from 
official p r o c e d u r e s / 3 2 9 )  The result of these views is Article 1. Under this Article the
Convention was declared to apply to "divorces obtained in another contracting state
which follow judicial or other proceedings officially recognised in that state(the state of 
origin) and which are legally effective there."
The official report on the Convention defined the expression "other proceedings" in 
Article I as involving "a minimum of acts, steps or formalities lawfully prescribed and 
carried out by some authority, or at least with its approval or in its p r e s e n c e . "(330) The 
report indicated that the Convention intended to cover divorces resulting from legislative, 
administrative or religious acts. As to consensual divorces and repudiation, the report 
suggested that depending upon whether the particular divorce in question involved the 
intervention of the public or religious authorities such could be regarded as 
p r o c e e d i n g s . ! 331) Thus, the Convention in relation to extra-judicial divorces was not clear 
and d i d  not help definitively to ascertain the meaning of " p r o c e e d i n g s " . (33 2)
The 1971 Act was passed to enable the United Kingdom to ratify the Convention.
Section 2 (a) provided for recognition in the United Kingdom of divorces which have been
obtained by means of judicial or other proceedings in any country outside the British Isles.
The 1971 Act does not define the term "other proceedings". However, during the
Parliamentary debates, it was agreed that the term "other proceedings' was designed to
include within the Act at least some kinds of extra-judicial divorces, including divorces by
As to divorces by 'bare talaq' or by mutual consent, the Solicitor General
made clear that the Act is not intended to afford recognition to divorces which do not have
the nature or quality of an official a c t . (334) Nevertheless such divorces could be
3 2 9  -Anton, (1968) 18 I.C .L .Q .627; 2nd-ed.p. 472.
3 3  0- See, M c'lcan, op.ciL.p.75.
3 3  1 -See, Kursicn, Rerogniiion ofNon-JmUcial Divorces, (1980) 43 M .L.Rev. 202 al 204.
3 3 2  North, op.cil.(1977) p.227.
3 3 3  H .C .D cb.V ol, 821, Cols, 165-171.
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recognised under section 6 of the 1971
The meaning of "proceedings’ became more complicated when the original section 6 
was amended by the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings A ct 1 9 7 3 . The new 
section 6 in providing for recognition of a divorce which is effective in the country or 
countries where the spouses were domiciled, states in subsection 4  that the material time at 
which domicile must be considered is "the time o f the institution of the proceedings in the 
country in which the divorce was obtained". This raises the question whether 
"proceedings" in section 6 are the equivalent of "proceedings' in section Further
complication was introduced by section 16 of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings 
Act 1973. This section provided, with regard to divorces obtained after 1974, that no 
proceedings in the British Isles are to be recognised as validly dissolving a marriage unless 
instituted in a court of law. This also raises the question whether "proceeding" in this 
section is the equivalent of "proceedings' in sections 2 and
Although the 1986 Act defines "proceedings" in section 54 (1) as meaning "judicial or 
other proceedings", it does not contain direct guidance on the m eaning of this 
expressions^ 3^). It seems difficult to reach a conclusion from the statutory provisions as to 
the meaning of "proceedings". It might be helpful to rely on the decisions of the courts. 
Although the courts had earlier dealt with the phiase "judicial or other proceedings", it was 
not specifically discussed. In Broit v. the Scottish court recognised divorce
by gett obtained by the husband from the Rabbinical court in Haifa on the grounds that it 
was obtained in the country of the husband's residence, nationality and d o m i c i l e . f ^ ^ l )
3 3 4  -Ibid, Col, 169.
3 3 5 -  Ibid, Col, 170.
3 3 6 -  S.2.
3 3 7 -  David Gordon, (1986 )3 7 N .I.L .Q ,1 5 1 .
3 3 8 -  S tone, The R ecognition  in E ngland o f  Talaq D ivorces, (1985) 14 A .A .L .R .363 ; S m art, The 
Recognition o f  Extra-Judicial D ivorces, (1985) 3 4 1.C.L.Q.395-397.
3 3 9 “ D icey &  M orris, 12tli-ed. p. 743.
3 4 0 -  1972, S .L .T .(N otes) 32.
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Lord Fraser seems lo have assumed that the delivery of the gett before the Rabbinical court 
satisfied the requirement of "Judicial or other proceedings" in section 2. In Radwan v. 
RadwanS^'^^^ although the divorce was refused recognition, it was assum ed by 
Cumming-Bruce J. that a talaq pronounced before witnesses and involving a 90 days 
reconciliation period satisfied the requirement of "other proceedings" within the meaning of 
section 2.
The leading case to offer an analysis of the phrase "judicial or other proceedings" is 
Quazi V. in which the parties were Muslims and Pakistani nationals, married
in India in 1963. The marriage was not a happy one. In 1973 the husband left Pakistan and 
came to Lngland where he bought a house. In 1974 he went to Pakistan and there 
pronounced under the Pakistani Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 a tahq from his 
wife by formally repeating before witnesses the word talaq three times. He gave notice of 
talaq to a public authority and supplied a copy of the notice to the wife. The takiq was 
effective under the law of Pakistan. In 1974 the wife instituted divorce proceedings in 
England. The husband claimed that the marriage had been dissolved either by a khula 
agreed between the parties at the instance of the wife in Bangkok on March 22, 1968 in 
accordance with the law of Thai, and where the parties were then domiciled and habitually 
resident or by talaq pronounced by him in Karachi on 30 July, 1974, when he was 
habitually resident in England and his wife habitually resident in Pakistan, and taking effect 
under the law of Pakistan 90 days thereafter, i.e on 28 November 1974, and so before the 
wife's proceedings for divorce in England had been started.
At first instance,!'^ '*W ood J. held that the mamage had been dissolved by Khula in
3 4 1 -  vS.3 of the 1971 A c t
34 2- (19731 Fam .24; d iscussed  P o lonsky , ( 1973) 22  I.C .L .Q .343 .
343- 11979] 3 A11.E.R.897; K arslcn , (1980) 43 M .L .R cv.202; L ucy C arroll, (1 9 8 !) 97  L .Q .R cv .28; 
S tone, (1985) 14 A .A .L .R .363 at 364; NoU, "Jnclicial or other proceedings" 3 4  I.C .L .Q .838;
Kenneth Mck .Norric, 'lire Raven and the Wriling Table: Recent English D ecisions on Recogitition o f  
the Talaq, 0 9 m )  .J.L.S.S.31 ii4 158
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J968, but since the expert evidence of Thai law had been conflicting he also held that if, 
contrary to his view, the marriage was still subsisting in 1974, it was dissolved by the 
takiq not later than November 1974. The Court of A p p e a l ( ^ 4 5 )  reversed this judgment, 
holding that neither the khula  nor the talaq had dissolved the marriûge. The court took a 
very strict view of the interpretation of the phrase "judicial or other proceedings". Ormrod 
L.J. argued that the requirement of "proceedings" implied that;
"the stale or some official organization recognised by the state m ust play som e part in 
the di\'orce process at least to the extent, in proper cases, that it can prevent the w ishes 
ol the paiiies or one ol them, as the case may be, (rom dissolving the m arriage tics as o f
The learned Judge expressly refused the recognition of Û\q Khula or Ordinance talaq 
as neither of them qualified as proceedings under section 2, He submitted that talaq is a 
unilateral act of the husband over which there is no control. Therefore, on this approach 
for an extra-judicial divorce to be "proceeding" it must not only be obtained in accordance 
with rules laid down or carried out by a public or religious authority but that such authority 
must have a veto to be used in "proper cases" to prevent unilateral or consensual divorces 
being effective. It was the absence of such power of veto that led the Court of Appeal to 
hold that the procedure of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance 1961, does not make a 
divorce by talacj obtained in Pakistan, a divorce that has been obtained by means of judicial 
or other proceedings within the meaning of section 2.
It seems difficult to agree with such an attitude, it is submitted that section 2 is clearly 
designed to involve some types of extra-judicial divorces and the word "proceedings" is 
intended to cover some acts external to the parties such as registration, conciliation 
proceedings or other form of a p p r o v a l . ( ^ 4  7 )
3 4 4 -  [19781 8 Fam. Law 203.
3 4 5 -  f 1979] 3 AII.E.R 424; [ 1980] A .C .744; Graveson, "Olher proceedings" (1980) 96 L .Q .R cv .l69 .
3 4 6 -  [1980] A .C .744 at 789.
3 4 7 -  Polonsky. (1973) 22 Î.C .L .Q .345; M orris, 3rcl-ed.p. 204.
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The House of Lords rejected the view of the Court of Appeal and unanimously held that 
the pronouncement of talaq and the giving notice of it to the wife and to the Chairman of 
the local union council with the prospect of conciliation proceedings constituted"other 
proceedings" within the meaning of s e c t i o n  2 / ^ 4 8 )  since the parties were nationals of 
Pakistan and the proceedings had taken place in Pakistan and the talaq was effective under 
the Pakistani law, the House of Lords held that talaq was entitled to recognition under 
the 1971 Act.(^49) Lord Diplock interpreted the phrase "judicial or other proceedings" by 
reference to the 1971 Hague Convention.!^ He pointed out that the 1971 Act was 
passed to implement the Convention. It was a legitimate aid to the construction of any 
provisions of the Act that are ambiguous or vague, to have recourse to the terms of the 
Convention in order to see what was the obligation in international law that Parliament 
intended that this country should be enabled to assume.!^ ^  After explaining Article 1 his 
Lordship stated that the use of the phrase "obtained by means of judicial or other 
proceedings in any country outside the British Isles" was intended to provide for the 
recognition of all divorces to which the Convention applies, for to fail to do so would be a 
breach of that Convention by this country. Since the talaq had satisfied the requirement of 
the Pakistani law, he concluded that there were proceedings and the talaq was within this 
phrase.!^
Lord Salmon, after saying that the words "other proceedings" cover " a very wide field 
in their context" construed section 2: "as applying, amongst other things, to overseas 
divorces obtained by proceedings other than judicial proceedings, if such divorces are 
effective under the law of the country in which they are o b t a i n e d . T h i s  view might
3 4 8 -  Jaffy, op.cit.p .69; Stone, (1985) 14 A .A .L.R .363 at 365; Cheshire & N orth, l i th -e d  p.665.
3 4 9 -  T h e  case fell underS .3  o f  the 1971 A ct because the parties w ere P akistan i nationals, dom ic ile  
uncertain.
3 5 0 *  Q uazi v. Quazi [1979] 3 A11.E.R.897 a t 9 03 ; See, a lso  L ord  V iscount D ilhorne, a t 904; L ord 
Fraser, at 908; Lord Scannan, a t 915.
3 5 1 - A t, 903.
3 5 2 - A t 903.
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be criticised on the ground that it does nothing to explain the language of the 1971 Act and 
which, in its use of the phrase "amongst other things" adds a strong elem ent of
un certainty .(354)
Lord Fraser expressed the view that the only limitation on the scope of the " 
proceedings" was that they should be officially recognised and legally effective in the 
country where they have taken place and they must have some regular definite f o r m . ( 3 5 5 )  
It is submitted that the liberal view of the interpretation of "judicial or other proceedings" 
was given by Lord Scarman. His Lordship construed section 2;
"as applying lo any divorce which has been obtained by m eans of any proceedings, i.e. 
any aei o r acts, olTicially recognised as leading to a divorce in the country w here the 
di\'orcc was obtained, and which itself is recognised by the law o f the country  as an
effective div o r c e ' .(3 5 6)
On this basis. Lord Scarman held that the Khula, which had been signed and 
witnessed in accordance with Thai law, constituted proceedings within section 2.(3^ 7) ^  is 
clear that Lord Scarman's approach has the effect of applying to all types of extra-judicial 
divorces and it would probably help to reduce limping m a r r i a g e s . ( 3 5 S )  Lord Scarman was 
the only member of the House of Lords to consider the divorce by Khula, whereas other 
Lordships found it is unnecessary to consider it since the talaq was r e c o g n i s e d , (359) 
Moreover, the litigation was sufficiently lengthy and expensive without adding long 
consideration of a type of foreign divorce likely to be encountered less often than the 
talaq. (360)
3 5  3- At, 906.
3 5  4 -Sec, Me'I can, op.cii.p. 91.
3 5 5 -  At, 908-909.
3 5 6 -  At, 916.
3 5  7- At, 916.
3 5 8 -  D a\ i(i Gordon, op.c it.p.93.
3 5 9 -  Lucy Carroll, {1981) 97 L.Q.Rcv.28.
3 6 0  -f 19791 3 W.L.R..AI, 850, /v rL ord  Scarm an; at 841 jx r  Lx)rd Viscount Dilhomc.
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The decision of the House of Lords is welcomed so far as it established that some 
forms of extra-judicial divorces obtained in Pakistan or other countries, but by compliance 
with similar procedural rules to those of the Ordinance, are within the phrase "judicial or 
other proceedings". It is regrettable that the judges have only focused their analysis on the 
question whether the procedure required by the Pakistani Ordinance impressed the 
characteristic of proceedings on the means by which the divorce in that case was obtained, 
ignoring the other forms of extra-judicial divorces. In any event, the decision of the House 
of Loids indicated clearly that the phrase "judicial or other proceedings" cannot be 
construed so widely as to recognise all foreign divorces however obtained.(361)
b- Is A Bare Talaq  Proceedings?
Apart from the statement of Lord Scarman,(362) it is submitted that the decision of the 
House of Lords in Quazi v. Quazi did not definitively settle all questions relating to the 
recognition of extra-judicial divorces, particularly bare talacf However, since Quazi v. 
Quazi was decided there have been many cases on a bare talaq before English courts and 
alter conflicting decisions at the first instance the question of bare was settled by the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Chaudhary v. Chaudharv. (363)
In Sharif V. SharifS^^^) the wife was English and the husband was an Iraqi national. 
The parties lived together in Iraq and in England. In 1978 the husband divorced his wife 
by pronouncing talaq in Iraq, which is effective under Iraqi law. The wife sought a decree 
for the dissolution of the marriage on the fact of unreasonable behaviour under section 1 (2) 
(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The husband sought a declaration that the 
marriage was dissolved by talaq which should be recognised under the 1971 Act. Upon 
the fit St view of the expert evidence, Wood J. held that the talaq by the husband in 1978 
was a bare talaq which could not be described as proceedings within section 2 .(3 6 5 )
3 6  I -Except Lord Scraman, at 916.
3 6  2- Sec, Supra, 193.
3 6 3 -1 1 9 8 4 ] 3 AII.E.R. 10)7.
3 6 4 -  11980] 10 Fam.Law 216.
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In Zaal v. Zücr/,(366) gush J. came to the opposite conclusion in reliance on the words 
of Lord Scarman, holding that a bare talaq pronounced in Dubai, where it was recognised 
by the local law as effective to end the marriage, was a divorce obtained by "judicial or 
o t h e r  p r o c e e d i n g s " . ( 3 6 7 )  This view was endorsed by Taylor J.' in R v. Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal, exp. Secretary o f State for the Home Department
The Court of Appeal in Chaudhary v, Chaiidhary,(^^^l approved the judgment of 
Wood J at first instance(3?0) holding that a bare takiq did not qualify for recognition under 
Sections 2-5 as it did not constitute a divorce obtained by means of "judicial or other 
proceedings". In this case the facts were: The parties, Pakistani Muslims, had married in 
Kaslii.d* in 1954. The husband came to England in 1963 in pursuit of employment leaving 
the wife and the children in Kashmir. In 1965 he met another woman in England and 
thereafter they lived together as husband and wife. In 1976 he purported to divorce his 
wife by pronouncing takiq three times before two witnesses in London. In 1978 he went 
to Kashmir and again purported to divorce the wdfe by pronouncing talaq three times 
before two witnesses. Kashmir is a part of Pakistan but not subject to the Muslim Family 
Law Ordinance 1961, so that a talaq itself constitutes a valid divorce. In 1979 the wife 
petitioned for divorce in England, and the husband responded by seeking a declaration that 
the marriage had been dissolved by talacp
All judges agreed with the view expressed by Ormrod L.J. in Quazi v, gwaz/,(37l) 
that the inclusion of the words "judicial or other proceedings" in section 2 must have been
3 6  5- Ibid, at 217.
3 6 6  f 19831 4  F.L.R.284.
3 6  7- Ibid, at 287.
3 6 8 -  11984] 2 W .L.R.36: Keith Hod kin son, ( 1984) J.S .W .L .46
3 6 9 -1 1 9 8 4 ] 3 AII.E.R. 1017; Lucy Carrol I, A" hare" Talaq is not a divorce obtained by other proceedings, 
(1985) 101 L.Q.Rcv 170; C anton, (1985) 48  M .L .R ev.212; Sm art, (1985) 34  I.C .L .Q .392 ; N oll, 
(1985) 34 I.C .L.Q .844: K enneth Mck. N orric, (1986) J.L .S .S .31.n4.159.
3 7 0 -  11984] 3 AII.E.R. 1007 at 1023, 1024.
3 7  1 [ 1980] A .C .744 at 788.
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intended as a limitation on the scope of that section. If the words had been omitted the only 
question would be whether the divorce was effective under the law of the country where it 
was obtained, and section 2 (a) would be s u p e r f l u o u s / 37 2)
Oliver L..I, was not prepared to recognise a bare talaq since in his opinion it lacks any 
formality other than ritual performance, it lacks any necessary element of publicity, it lacks 
the invocation of the assistance or involvement of any organ of, or recognised by, the state 
in any capacity at all, even if merely that of registering or recording what has been done. 
The learned judge expressed the view that the word "proceedings" must
"at least bear in the slaUilc a m eaning which the word w ould have in norm al speech 
where, as it seem s to me, no one w ould ordinarily  refer to a private act e r r  J acted 
entirely by parties inter sc o r b\' one party alone even though the pm ty perform ing it 
may give It an additional solemnity or e \c n  an efficacy by perform ing it in the presence 
of other persons whose only inr o h  cm cnt is that they witness its p e r f o r m a n c e .  "(3 7  3)
The Learned judge later went on to say that proceedings: "must import a decree of 
formality and at least the involvement of some agency, whether lay or religious, of or 
recognised by the state having a function that is more than simply p r o b a t iv e " .(3 7  4)
Balcombe L.J., after supporting the argument put forward by Counsel for the wife that 
the phrase "judicial or other proceedings" requires some form of state machinery to be 
involved in the divorce process or religious machinery recognised by the state as sufficient, 
concluded that the unilateral act of one party to a marriage, however formal in its nature, 
and whether or not performed in the presence of witnesses is not characterised as
"proceedings".! 3 7 5)
Cumming-Bruce L.J.although he respected the religious and cultural tradition upon
3 7  2- a w u d h a ry  V.  Clmudhary \ \9 m \  3 A II.E.R . Î 0 17 at 1027, 1034; N ell, (1985) 34  I.C .L .Q .844  at 
845; Canton, (1985] 48 M L .R ov.212 .
3 7  3- Ibid, at 1030.
3 7 4 -  Ibid, at 1031.
37  5- Ibid, at 1034.
197
which the bare talaq was founded, stated that the talaq in Kashmir was not within section 
2 because "there is no formality, no requirement of notification to anybody. No institution 
of the state, legal or administrative, is involved. No religious institution plays any
part."(376)
It is regrettable that the Court o f Appeal limited "judicial or other proceedings" to a 
narrower category of divorces than all divorces obtained by any means whatsoever which 
are effective by the law of the country in which the divorce was obtained. It is submitted 
that the decision of the court created an unsatisfactory distinction between two types of 
Muslim divorce. This distinction cannot be justified by the limited nature of the Pakistani 
reform.(377) It is also submitted that such a distinction runs contrary to the policy of 
avoiding limping marriages. (378)
c- The Law Commissions' Proposais
The Law Commissions, following Lord Scarman's approach in Quazi v. Quazi, 
recommended that "judicial or other proceedings" in relation to a country outside the British 
Isles should "include acts which constitute the means by which a divorce may be obtained 
in that country and are done in compliance with the procedure required by the law of that 
c o u n t r y .  " ( 3  7  9 )  The Law Commissions further recommended that there should be one set 
of rules governing recognition of all foreign divorces whether obtained by proceedings or 
n o t . ( 3 8 0 )  This liberal approach was not implemented in the Family Law Act 1986. The 
Act maintains the law in Quazi and Chaudhary and draws a distinction between overseas 
divorces which are obtained by means of proceedings and those which are not.(381)
3 7 6 -Ibid, at 1026, 1029.
3 7 7 -  Peral, V>.Family Law Act 2986, part IÎI, (1987) C.L.J.35v at 38.
3 7 8 -  David Gordon, (1986) 37  N.I.L.Q.151.
3 7 9 -  Law Com No. 137 & Scots Law Com N o.88.para.6,l 1.
3 8 0 - Ibid, 6,11.
3 8 1 -  Contrast S .46 (1) with S .46 (2); See, infra, 207.
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The proposal of the Law Commissions was rejected for many reasons, explained by 
Lord Hailsham in the debates on the Family Law Bill. Lord Hailsham stated that
"the Law Com m ission recom m ended that such infonnal divorces should be recognised 
cm I he sam e basis as those d ivorces obtained by jud ic ia l o r o ther proceedings. W e 
cannot accept this w ide 1 ecommendalion. There are public policy elem ents here. Such 
d i\o rces arc inform al, arbitrary and usually unilateral. More im portantly, there is often 
no a \a ilab lc  proot that what is alleged to have taken place has taken place at a ll... these 
divot ces arc alm ost exclusively  obtained by men and therefore d iscrim inate against 
w om en...particularly  where the wife is resident abroad, such divorces provide little or 
no financial protection for the wife and f a m i ly ." (3 8  2)
It seems hard to accept those arguments. While it cannot be denied that the right of
lakiq under Muslim Lw belongs to the husband, it is difficult to say that such a method of
dissolution of marriage tends to discriminate against women. It is submitted that talaq is a
matter of religion derived from the Quran. All Muslims agree that such a concept of
dissolution of marriage does not carry with it any seeds of injustice against women because
the wife can at any time obtain judicial decree when reason for divorce is available or she
can terminate her marriage by klnila. Moreover, the wife can terminate the marriage by
pronouncing tahq  if the husband delegates his own right to the wife herself in the marriage 
contract or thereafter. (38 3)
However, if one admits the argument of Lord Hailsham that a bare talaq tends to 
discriminate against women, it is submitted with respect that the requirement of notice to 
the wife and to the Chairman of Council in Pakistani talaq does not end the discrimination 
because the right of talaqremmns in the hand of the Pakistani husband. The only effect of 
such further procedures is that they operate to delay the divorce coming into effect for some 
period and they prevent the wife from being divorced without her knowledge.
382- 475 H.C. dcbs,Col, 1082 (1986); See, Lilian Edwards, (1988) 18 Fam ily Law 422; David G ordon, 
op .cil.p ,76; ( 1986) 37 N .l.L .Q .296-297; Y oung, The Recognition o f  Extra fn d ic ia t D ivorces in the 
United Kingdom, (1987) 7 LS 81-83; Cheshire & North, 1 Uh-ed.p.661 ; North, op.cit ( 1993) p.78.
38 3- Arls.40-43 ol' the Iraqi Personal Status Code.
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The argument that the informal divorces provide little or no financial protection for the 
wife and family is not always right. For instance, Iraqi law does not distinguish between 
women who are divorced by tcdaq and those who are divorced by judicial decree in relation 
to financial relief. Moreover, if  the husband divorces his wife by talaq without reasonable 
cause and she applies to the court for compensation, the court shall order from her ex- 
husband the compensation deemed by the court to be fair, provided that it shall not be in 
excess of the equivalent of the maintenance due to her for two years; however, this shall 
not affect the other marital rights due to the divorced w i f e . ( 3 8 4 )  j ^ e  Matrimonial and 
Family Proceedings Act 1984 allows the courts in England and Scotland to grant financial 
relief in respect of foreign d i v o r c e s - ( 3 8 5 )  Thus, the major practical reason fo r a 
discriminatory treatment of informal overseas divorces was removed.
It should be noted that much public money was spent in the case of Quazi upon 
litigation the mainspring of which might be said to be the wife's desire to repudiate the 
tdaq  divorce in order that she might profit financially from an English divorce. The case 
(and all that it has provided in the way of discussion) might not have come about had the 
1984 Act been in existence. In any event, the Family Law A ct 1986 has lost the 
opportunity given by the Law Commissions to avoid the difficulties which might arise from 
the interpretation of the word "proceedings" and has maintained the law as stated in Quazi 
and Chaudhary which is highly unsatisfactory because it will encourage the creation of 
limping marriages and will produce confusion in the law. Indeed, although "proceedings" 
are defined as "judicial or other p r o c e e d i n g s " ( 3 8  6 )  j g  submitted that the 1986 Act does
not advance a clear criterion as to what constitute"other proceedings". Reference to the case 
law in this point is not conclusive because the court dealt only with some types of extra­
judicial divorces and they have given no clear answer whether or not some other extra­
judicial divorces are within the meaning of other "proceedings".
3 8 4 -  Arl.39 (2); See. infra, 331.
3 8 5 -  Infra ch.7.
3 8 6  8 .5 4 (1 ) .
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In the light of Quazi and Chaudhary, it seems not only 'bare talaq' but purely
infonnal and consensual divorces will be treated as having been obtained " otherwise than
by means of proceedings" within section 46 (2 ),(387) for example, a khula under
Islamic law by consent based simply on agreement signed by the parties or a divorce by 
consent under Chinese law. (3 8 8 )
cl- Where is an Extra-Judicial Divorce Obtained?
The Family Law Act 1986 contains two general rules in relation to extra-judicial 
divorces. The first is that an extra-judicial divorce obtained overseas will be recognised if 
the requirements of recognition are satisfied.(389) The second is that such a divorce will 
be denied recognition if obtained in the British islands.(390) This lead us to consider
where an extra-judicial divorce is obtained in order to classify it as one obtained overseas or 
one obtained in the British Islands.
It is sometime not easy to identify the country in which an extra-judicial divorce is 
obtained because such a divorce may consist of a number of different elements each of 
which may occur in a different country. The difficulty arises typically in relation to 
Pakistani lalaq when e.g a husband pronounced talaq in say England and has sent notice 
to a public authority and his wife in Pakistan. Clearly, in this example the proceedings took 
place neither wholly overseas nor wholly within the British Islands. Such an extra-judicial 
divorce is referred to as 'transnational divorce '.^» •) Is such a divorce 'overseas' or one
3 8  7- See. David Gordon, op.cit.pp. 106-120.
3 8 8 -  I.ee r. Lan fl964} 2 AII.E.R. 248.
3 8  9- SS.45 and 46.
3 9 0 - S.44.
3 9 1 -  R V . Secnuary o j Siaie Jor Uie H ow e D epanw ent. exp, Fatima [1984] 2 AI1.E.R .458 a t 463 ,464; 
P ilk inglon, M .P.I'ransnattonatDivorces under the Fam ilv Law Act 1986, (1988) 37 I.C .L .Q  131 • 
Bcrkovits, (1988) 104 L .Q .Rcv.60; Da\ id Gordon, (1986] 37  N.I.L.Q. 151, 293; op.cii.p . 100; Carroll, 
Talaq pronounced in Lngiaud and perfected by post not recognised : Fatim a in the House o f  Lords, 
(198.5) 10! L.Q. R ev .175; (1986) 49 M .L.Rev.776; C anton, ( 1985) 48 M .L.Rcv. 212; S tone, (1984)
14 A .A .L.Q .363; David Pearl, (1987) C .L .J.35; Forsyth, Recognition o f  Extra-judicial D ivorces: The 
Transnational Divorce, (1985) 34 Ï.C .L .Q .398: Kenneth Mck. Norric, (1986) J.L .S .S .31.n5 209
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obtained within the British Island?
In R 1'. Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriage, ex Parte M i n h a s , 0 9 2 )  t ( ,e  
husband pronounced tahq in England and sent a notice of the talqq to the Chairman of 
Council and a copy of that notice to his wife in Pakistan. Park J. held that the divorce was 
not an overseas divorce within the meaning of section 2 but one obtained in the British Isles
and could not be recognised under the 1971 Act. The Learned judge justified his decision
by arguing that the divorce was obtained by means of the pronouncement of the tahq only. 
The service of the copy of the notice on the wife and the Chairman, and the reconciliation 
period of 90 days, which took place in Pakistan were unnecessary or, in any event not 
proceedings by means cf whieli divorce was obtained. Park J.'s decision was 
considered by Lord Fraser in Quazi v. Quaii,09i) ^  have been based on a 
misunderstanding of the effect of the Pakistani law.
However, when the question of transnational tahq arose in R v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, exp, FatimafMt*) Mmhas was ignored and the question was
considered afresh in the light of the decision of the House of Lords in Quazi v. Quazi.
The facts in the Fatima case were: The husband was a Pakistani national and had married in
Pakistan prior to coming to England in 1968. The marriage had been dissolved by tahq
pronounced in England by the husband in 1978. He sent notice of the tahq to the wife
and the appropriate public authority in Pakistan as required by the Pakistani law. The tahq
was not revoked and under the Pakistani law the marriage was declared dissolved 90 days
later. In 1982 he wished to marry Ghulam Fatima, but she was refused entry to the United
3 9 2 -  11976] 2 AI1.E.R.246; Canton. (1976) 25 I.C.L.Q .909; Gravel!.,, Heconnition o f Extra-judicial 
Dtmrcc.cTlworeticalprohlcunsKeati.sed, (1976) 92 L.Q.Rev.347; Lucy Carroll, ( 1981) 97  L.Q.Rev.
28.
3 9 3  -11979! 3 A II.E .R .897 at 910; Forsylh, (1985 ) 34  I.C .L .Q .398 at 399; S lone (1984) 14
A .A .L.Q .363 at 374.
3 9  4  -11984) I AI1.E.R.488; 11984] 2 AII.E.R.458; 1 1986] 2 AII.E.R.32; K  u..Secretary „JSlate fo r  the 
H ^ne Depart,,,eut. erp, « /  11984] 2 AII.E.R.458; Kashir v. Zahu Nisar. unreported, April 21, 1986
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Kingdom by the Immigration officer on the ground that the tdacj would not be recognised
under English law.
The Immigration officer's decision was approved by Taylor J., the Court of Appeal and 
the House of Lords. Taylor J. referred to the speeches of Lords Fraser and Scarman in 
Quazi V. Q u a z i , 0 9 S )  holding that "the pronouncement of tahq  in England was part of the
proceedings and indeed the institution of proceedings by means of which the divorce was
obtained.
Slade L.J. in the Court of Appeal, after rejecting the argument that the tahq
prnuouncement was not itself part of th: p.occ-dings involved in obtaining a Pakistani
talaq, stated that :
"Wc find itdifTlcull to sec how one can properly isolate the first essential step in the
chain ol events that has to take place before a talaq divorce is effective under Pakistani
hm' from the o ther steps and say that it does not itself form part o f the re levan t’ 
proceed i n g s  ^ ^  7)
All the judges agreed that the tahq in question was not an overseas divorce because the 
proceedings had taken place partly in Pakistan and partly in England.^»*) The judges 
then turned to consider whether the taUicj in these circumstances could be recognised as
one obtained within section 2.
Slade L.J. accepted that the words of section 2 (a), if read in isolation, were capable of 
more than one construction, but he said that they should be read in conjunction with the 
wording of section 3(1). When read together, sections 2 and 3(1) of the 1971 Act made it
clear that in using the phrase "judicial or other proceedings" in the course of its definition of
3 9 5  -[1979] 3 AII.E.R.897 at 911, 918.
3 9 6 -[1984] 1 A11.E.R.488 al 495.
3 9 7 -  [1984] 2 AII.E.R.458 at 463.
3 9  8- [1984] 2 AII.E.R.458 al 463 i?er S lade L .J; [19841 2 A ll.E .R .32 aG 5 / w  Lord A ckner in the Hose
of Lords.
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an overseas divorce, the legislature contemplated (a) one set of proceedings only, (b) a set 
ol proceedings which had been instituted in the same country as that in which the relevant 
divorce was ultimately obtained. On any other footing the phrase ' at the date of the 
institution of the proceedings in the country in which it was obtained' in section 3 ( 1 )  
would be inept.U»*) Since the country where the divorce was pronounced and the 
country where the divorce was obtained were not the same country, it followed that the 
divoice was not an overseas divorce and could not be recognised under sections 2-5.
It is submitted that the decision in Faiim  case is socially undesirable, and morally 
dubious. It creates a situation where there is one law for the poor and another law for the 
w e a l t h y ( 4 0 « )  because the rich husband can visit Pakistan and pronounce tahq there and 
his tahq will be recognised on the authority o f the QiurJ case. The emphasis that the 
whole procedings must be instituted in one country leads to the result that the tahq will 
always be denied recognition if  the proceedings take place in two countries even if  all the 
elements of the tahq take place outside the British Islands, and even if  the tahq is 
effective in each of the countries where some of the proceedings take place. There is no 
policy or principle requiring this result.!**®!)
It is submitted that the decision in the Fatima case is difficult to reconcile with the view  
ol the Court ol Appeal in Chaudhary. In Fatima the pronouncement o f tahq was 
considered part of the proceedings whereas in Chaudhary it was not considered as 
proceedings at all.C*02) This state of confusion reflects the fact that English courts attempt 
to impose their law, morals and culture on the law of foreign countries granting extra- 
jiidicial divorces. It is afso submitted that the decision in Fatima indicates that the policy of
.199-119841 2 AII.E.R.458 al 4 6 4  ;( 1984] 2 AII.E.R.32 al36 ,>er Lord Ackner in the Hose o f  Lords.
4 0 0 -  C an,on. (1985) 48 M .L .R cv .2 I2  ul 215; D avid Pearl. (1987) C .L .J.35 ; B crkov its. (1988) 104
L.Q.Rq\  60 al 92; Ci; Lucy Corral I, (1986) 49 M .L.Rcv. 778.
4 0 1 -  Forsyth, (1985) 34  I.C .L .Q .398 al 399 al 400; Slone, (1984) 14 A .A .L.Q .363 al 374; K cnnelh Mck. 
Norric, (1986) J.L .S .S .3 t.n5  209: Chc.shire & N orlh, 1 Uh-cti p. 663.
4 0 2 -  David Peart, Note on Talaq D ivorces  .(1984) L .A .Î4 7 ;(!9 8 4 ) C .L .J.249; Cf, Lucy C orrall, (1985) 
lOI L.Q .Rev. 179.
204
avoiding limping marriages is less important than the policy factor of subordinating all 
residents of England to a uniform municipal j u r i s d i c t i o n / " * I n  any event, the decision 
is not satisfactory and caused social and religious damage to many Muslims. It attempts to 
impose English law on all residents of England even if this conflicts with parties’ personal 
or religious law.
e- Transnational Divorce in the 1986 Act
The Law Commissions recommended that no reform was required in the law relating to 
transnational divorce since the law had been clarified by the decision of the Court of Appeal 
in the Fatima case.!"***"*) The 1986 Act does not deal with this matter directly and it seems 
that the draftsmen had not intended to affect the law of transnational divorce.!"*® 
However, since the wording of the provisions of the 1986 Act was not drafted in identical 
terms with the wording of the conesponding sections of the 1971 Act, it is possible that the 
law relating to transnational divorce may have been affected.(4®6)
As has been mentioned earlier, a transnational divorce was denied recognition under the 
1971 Act because the wording of sections 2 and3 (1) required that the proceedings by 
means of which an overseas divorce was obtained must be a single set of proceedings 
which had to be instituted in the same country as that in which the relevant divorce was 
ultimately obtained. Since the pronouncement of the talaq was an essential part of the 
proceedings, if Maq was pronounced in England, then the requirements of sections 2 and3 
(1) were not satisfied. In other words, the 1971 Act focused upon the proceedings by 
means of which the divorce was obtained and looked to the place where these proceedings 
took place.!"*
4 0 3  'B erkovits, (1988) 104 L .Q .R ev 60 at 77; D avid G ordon, (1986) 37  N .I.L .Q . 162 and 294.
4 0 4 -  Law  Com  No. 137 & Scots Law  C om  No 88  para .6, 11.
4 0 5 -  Berkovits, (1988) 104 L .Q .R ev 6 0  at 79.
4 0 6  Pilkington, (1988) 37 I.C .L .Q .133; D icey& M orris, 12th-ed.p. 744; M orris, 4th-ed.p. 196.
4 0 7 -  Ibid, a t 133.
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Section 45 of the 1986 Act defines an overseas divorce as one "obtained in a country 
outside the British Islands . Section 46 ( 1) requires that an overseas divorce obtained by 
means of proceedings shall be recognised if it is effective under the country in which it was 
obtained/4®^) and at the relevant d a t e ! " * 0 9 ) date of the commencement of the 
proceedings I either party was habitually resident or domiciled in or a national of the country 
in which the divorce was obtained/410)
If one looks carefully at the provisions of the 1986 Act, one will find that the wording 
of this Act is different from that in the 1971 Act. The 1986 Act does not refer to a divorce 
"obtained by means of judicial or other proceedings in any country outside the British Isles 
as contained in section 2. The 1986 Act also does not refer to "the institution of the 
proceedings in a country in which [the divorce] was obtained" as contained in section 3(1) .  
The 1986 Act requires that the divorce be obtained in a country outside the British Islands 
and that it be obtained by means of proceedings and it must be effective in the country 
where it was obtained and at the relevant date one of the relevant Jurisdictional links with 
that country is satisfied. Thus, the 1986 Act emphasises the place where the divorce was 
actually obtained and not where the proceedings took place.(411) Thereupon, there is no 
limitation on the place in which the proceedings have to take place(412) ^^d then it is not 
necessary that the whole of the proceedings must take place in the same country.(413)
Section 46 (1) requires that the divorce must be effective in the country where it was 
obtained. The question, therefore is in w hich country is the transnational divorce obtained
in order to regard it as effective in that country? In the Minhas c a s e / 4 1 4 )  jt was decided
4 0 8 - 8 .4 6 ( 1 )  (a).
4 0 9 - 8 .4 6  (3) (a).
4 1 0 -  8 .4 6 (1 )  (b).
41  1-Pilkington,.( 1988) 37 I.C .L .Q .133; D a\’id Gordon, op.cit.p. 103.
4 1 2 -  Berkovits, (1988) 104 L .Q .Rev 60 at 79.
4 I 3-.îafl‘cy, op .cit.p .7 l.
4 1 4 -  119761 2 A11.E.R.246.
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that the divorce was obtained by the pronouncement of the word talaq and not by the 
conciliation proceedings. However, this view was considered by Lord Fraser as one based 
on a misunderstanding of the Pakistani l a w , ( 4 l  5 )
It is submitted that the correct position was established by the House of Lords in Quazi 
V. Quazi, in which it was held that the divorce is not effective until the notices have been 
given to the wife and to the Chairman of the relevant union and until the expiry of 90 days 
from the day on which notice of it is delivered to the Chairman. This indicates clearly that 
the divorce is obtained in the place where the process is completed. ("* I Accordingly, it 
is hoped that the interpretation of the wording of the 1986 Act in this way is correct and if 
so it leads to the result that the transnational divorce is entitled to recognition under the 
1986 Act even if the proceedings take place in more than one country so long as the divorce 
is effective where it was obtained. Moreover, such a divorce, in principle is entitled to 
recognition even if the pronouncement of talaq takes place in the British Islands and the 
other proceedings take place abroad so long as it is effective where it was obtained
One may wonder whether transnational divorce pronounced in the British Islands and
completed abroad can be denied recognition by virtue of section 44(1) This section, which
replaces section 61(1) of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, states that
"no divorce... obtained in any part of the British Islands shall be regarded as effective in
any part of the United Kingdom unless granted by a court of Civil Jurisdiction". Thus,
section 44(1) refers not to proceedings, as in section 16 (1), but to divorce obtained in the
British Islands. Since the transnational divorce in the above example is not one obtained in
the British Islands but one obtained abroad where the process is completed, it follows that
section 44(1) is not applicable.!"* * '^ ) In the converse situation, that the pronouncement of
talaq takes place abroad and the divorce completed in the British Islands, it is submitted
4 1 5  Qmizi v. Quazi [1979] 3A11.E R .897 at 910.
4 1 6 -  D avid G ordon, o p .c itp .l0 3 ; P ilkington, (1988) 37  I.C .L .Q .135.
4 1 7  Subject to public policy, infra ; D avid G ordon, o p .c it.p .l0 4 ; cf, C ollier, op .cit.p .291; David Pear,
(1087) C.L.J.35.
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that the divorce in these circumstances is not entitled to recognition because it is not 
effective where it is obtained and will be caught by section 44(1).
f- Jurisdictional Bases
As has been mentioned earlier, the Law Commissions' recommendation to have one set 
of rules governing recognition of all foreign divorces, coupled with a more liberal 
interpretation of the concept of 'proceedings' was not implemented by the 1986 Act. 
Section 46 draws clearly a distinction between divorces obtained by means of proceedings 
and those obtained otheiwise than by means of proceedings. The grounds for recognition 
of an extra-judicial divorce obtained by proceedings which are contained in section 46 (1) 
are the same as those in relation to divorces obtained from a court. Hence, an extra-judicial 
divorce will be recognised if either party to the marriage at the date of the commencement of 
the proceedings was habitually resident or domiciled, either in the United Kingdom or 
foreign sense,(41®) in or a national of, the country in which the divorce was obtained, 
provided it is effective under the law of that country. On the authority of Quazi, it seems 
that not only divorce under Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 of Pakistan but also 
administrative divorces,!"* 19) khula under Iraqi law and Jewish will be
considered as being obtained by proceedings within section 46(1).
If the House of Lords in Quazi has failed to settle the question of informal divorces, it 
is now clear that such divorces are recognised under section 46 (2). This section runs 
contrary to the policy considerations which supported the Law Commissions’ proposals. It 
adopts a more restrictive approach than section 46 (1). Lord Hailsham in the debates of the 
Family Law Bill justified the inclusion of section 46 (2) on the grounds that it is designed 
"to give greater protection to wives resident in the United Kingdom whose husbands have 
obtained an informal divorce abroad. It would be wrong to deny a wife living here the 
4 1 8 - 8 .4 6 ( 5 ) .
419~  M akouipour v. M akouipour,1967  S L .T .lO l.
4 2 0 -  B roit v. Broit ,1972 S .L .T .( N otes) 32; M aples v. M aples [1987] 2 W .L.R .487.
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protection of our own c o u r t . "(421)
It is regrettable that the policy of protecting the British wife is to be considered a more 
important aim than avoiding "limping marriages",(4 22) xhere is a clear lack of sympathy 
between these views. On the one hand. Western lawyers tend to misunderstand the nature 
and consequences of the Muslim religious divorce, in the author’s view. On the other 
hand, the "limping marriage", though undesirable in general, may be the lesser evil in the 
particular case. Moreover, one could postulate the situation of a divorce of two Iraqis, 
denied recognition in the U.K because the husband is resident in England or Scotland. It 
seems clearly that a bare talaq, M uslim khula, certain Hindu practices and divorce in 
T h a i l a n d ( 4 2 3 )  are within section 46 (2).
Section 46 (2) provides that "the validity of an overseas divorce... obtained otherwise 
than by means of proceedings shall be recognised if -(a) the divorce.. .is effective under the 
law of the country in which it was obtained; (b) at the relevant date-[the date on which it 
was obtained] (i) each party to the marriage was domiciled in that country; or (ii) either 
party to the marriage was domiciled in that country and the other party was domiciled in a 
country under whose law the divorce...is recognised as valid; and (c) neither party to the 
marriage was habitually resident in the United Kingdom throughout the period of one year 
immediately preceding that date".
Prior to the enactment of the 1986 Act there was controversy upon whether or not an
extra-judicial divorce not obtained by proceedings should be recognised under section 6,
One view suggested that section 6 should be read 'on its face' as requiring proceedings for
recognition of extra-judicial di v o r c e s . ( 4  2  4 )  Clearly this view runs contrary to the policy of
4 2 1 -  475  H .C .debs, Col, 1082 .
4 2 3  -David G ordon, o p .c itp . 77,
4 2 3 -  Ratanachaiv. Ratanachai [1960] T he T im es, 4  June 1960; Varammd v. Varammd [1964] 108 Sol.
Jo. 693.
4 2 4 “ Viswalingham v. Viswaliugham [1980] F .L .R .15  a t 19; Chaudhary v. Chaudhary 3
A11.E.R. 1017; David G ordon, (1986) 37 N .I.L .Q . 151.
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avoiding limping marriages, since it would exclude informal divorces. It is submitted that 
section 6 did not require that an extra-judicial divorce m ust be obtained by 
p r o c e e d i n g s / 4 2  5) Such a divorce was entitled to recognition if the parties were domiciled 
in the United Kingdom sense in the country where it was obtained, or if it was recognised 
in the country or countries of their domicile. It is also submitted that section 6 did not 
require that such a divorce must be effective in the country where it was obtained, so a bare 
talaq, pronounced by an Iraqi national, in a country where it is not effective would be 
recognised under section 6 if recognised by the law of the domicile of the parties. 
However, the controversy over the state of extra-judicial divorces not obtained by 
proceedings has now been removed. Moreover, there is now no longer any scope for 
recognition if such a divorce is not effective in the country where it was obtained. To give 
effect to the requirement of effectiveness the 1986 Act states that the courts may refuse to 
recognise such a divorce if there is no official document certifying that the divorce is 
effective under the law of the country in which it was obtained. (426)
The requirement of effectiveness raises again the problem of deciding where an extra­
judicial divorce not obtained by proceedings is o b t a i n e d . ( 4 2 7 )  j g  submitted that there is 
no difficulty in identifying the country in which 'oral bare talaq' is obtained because such a 
divorce is regarded to be obtained in the country where the husband pronounced the word 
talaq. The difficulty seems to arise in the context of a 'written bare talaq' where the 
husband writes a letter, say, in Iraq and sends it to the wife who is at that moment in the 
United Kingdom. Is a divorce obtained in Iraq where the husband writes the letter or in the 
United Kingdom where the wife receives the letter?
Quazi and Fatima are authorities for the proposition that Ordinance talaq is obtained
4 2 5 -  M orris, 2nd-ed.p.205; N orth, op.cit.(1977) p. 233; Canton, (1985) 48  M .L.Rev. 212  a t 216; Sm art, 
(1985) 34 I.C .L.Q . 396 at 397; Palm er, (1980) J.S.W .L. 177; Lucy Carroll ,(1985) J.S .W .L . 151.
4 2 6  -S.51 (3) (b) (I) infra, 247..
4 2 7  -Cf, earlier com m ents about place of peifecting in ’proceedings'" transnational divorce", supra, 201.
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in the country in which the proceedings are completed, i.e. the country in which the 
Chairman receives the notice of talaq and not in the country from which it is sent, whereas 
under Iraqi law a written bare tcdaq takes effect as soon as it is written unless expressed to 
be conditional on receipt by the wife. If the talaq in the above example is considered to be 
obtained in the United Kingdom on the analogy oiQuazi and Fatima, recognition will be 
denied because it is not effective where it was o b t a i n e d . ! " *  2  8 )  however it is considered 
to be obtained in Iraq where it is effective, it seems this divorce will be recognised if the 
requirements of the 1986 Act are satisfied- Section 44 (1) is not applicable because this 
section talks about divorces obtained in the British I s l a n d s . ( " * 2 9 )  This highlights yet 
another, more specific, point of dispute between different legal systems. Iraq (being expert 
in these matters, and provided with many domestic cases) considers a written bare talaq to 
be effective where posted, thus affecting (their) view of where it has been "obtained". 
There are cases in Iraq upon where, when a delivered by telephone is, completed, but 
there is no clear view.
Section 46 (2) adopts more restrictive jurisdictional bases than the repealed earlier 
l e g i s l a t i o n . (430) There is now no longer any scope for recognition if the divorce was 
obtained in a country where neither spouse was domiciled even though recognised either in 
their common domicile or in the countries of their separate d o m i c i l e s .(431)
An extra-judicial divorce under section 46 (2) has to be obtained either in the country 
where both parties are domiciled or in the country where one of them is domiciled and 
recognised as valid under the law of domicile of the other paify. It follows from this rule 
that if one spouse was domiciled in the United Kingdom, recognition will be denied 
because of the circular p r o b l e m , ( 4 3  2 )  whereas an extra-judicial divorce obtained by 
4 2 8 -  S .4 4 ( l) .
4 2 9 “  It m ight, how ever, be denied recognition on the grounds of public policy. See, infra, 248,
4 3 0  “8 .6  (3) (b) o f the 1971 Act.
4 3 1 -  A n extra-judicial divorce obtained before part II o f the 1986 A ct cam e into force and w as recognised as 
valid under section 6  (3) (b) and was not affected by section 16 (2), will be continue to be recognised, S 
5 2 (5 )(b ) (e ) .
4 3 2 “ .Taffey, op.cit.p.67.
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proceedings within section 46 (1) can be recognised on the basis of domicile of either 
spouse even if the other was domiciled in the United K i n g d o m / 4 3  3 )  Moreover, a divorce 
within section 46 (2) cannot be recognised on the grounds that either spouse was habitually 
resident in, or a national of, the country in which it was obtained. The adoption of more 
restrictive recognition rules in relation to divorces not obtained by proceedings indicates 
clearly that the 1986 Act does not accept the modern tendency towards universal 
recognition of foreign divorces. The proposal of the Law Commissions to have one set of 
rules governing recognition of all foreign divorces is highly to be recommended and a good 
movement towards respecting foreign religious or personal laws.
Domicile as a ground for recognition of extra-judicial divorces under section 46 is 
broader than that in section 6. Section 46 (5) states that domicile for the purpose of 
recognition of extra-judicial divorces means domicile in the United Kingdom sense or in the 
foreign law sense in family matters. It seems that domicile in family matters is unlikely to 
be of much significance in the case of recognition of extra-judicial divorces because most 
countries permitting such a divorce do not have this concept: they usually use the national 
law or religious principles.
I t  is also necessary for recognition under section 46 (2) that neither party to the 
marriage must have been habitually resident in the United Kingdom throughout the period 
of one year immediately preceding the date on which the divorce was o b t a i n e d . ( 4 3  4) This 
residence limitation is more restrictive (or protective to the British wife, according to one's 
point of view) (435) than was section 16 (2) of the earlier legislation.(436) Under the 
previous section the divorce would only be denied recognition if both parties had been 
habitually resident for one year.
4 3 3 - S .4 6 ( l ) ( b ) ( i i ) .
4 3 4 -S .4 6  (2) (c).
4 3 5 -  A nton, 2nd-ed,, p. 477.
4 3 6 -  Lilian Edw ards, (1988) 18 Fam ily Law  424; D avid Pearl, (1987) C .L .J.36: Jam es.Y oung (1987) 7
L .S .84 .
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The policy behind this residence limitation is to prevent a person habitually resident in 
the United Kingdom from evading of section 44 (1) by simply leaving temporarily the 
United Kingdom to obtain an extra-judicial divorce. It seems that such a limitation is in 
conflict with the 1986 A ct’s major purpose, namely to cure the mischief of limping 
marriage. It attempts to impose on the persons the British system even though alien to their 
culture and religion. There is no reason why an Iraqi husband, who has no connection 
with the United Kingdom should be forced to raise an action before the U.K.court to 
divorce his wife. This limitation might cause hardship for many Muslims because talaq is 
seen as concerning religious rather than social matters.
It should be noted that the anti-evasion provision provided by the 1986 Act does not 
apply to an extra-judicial divorce obtained by proceedings under section 46 (1). Thus, 
recognition will be given to a divorce obtained in Pakistan by proceedings under the 1961 
Ordinance even if the parties have both habitually resided in the United Kingdom for years 
and even if they are both domiciled h e r e . ( 4 3 7 )  There is no point in denying an Iraqi 
national the right to divorce under his personal law, while the Pakistani can rely on his 
personal law merely because his talaq involves some empty formalism. One might say 
that Pakistani talaqs should be re-classified so as to fall under section 46 (2), but the 
author's defence (general conclusion) is to have section 46 (2) removed from the Act, and 
permit safeguards in religious divorces to be provided by public policy.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the effect of the residence limitation under the 
present law is less important than it was under section 16. It will be remembered that an 
extra-judicial divorce obtained in a country where neither party was domiciled would be 
recognised under section 6 if it was recognised as valid by the law of the parties’ domicile. 
Thus, in the case of a husband and wife, both Iraqi nationals domiciled in Iraq, but 
habitually resident in Scotland, who go to France where talaq is pronounced by the
4 3 7 -  S .46 (1); .James.Young, (1987) 7  L.S.84.
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husband, the divorce is recognised under the above rule, because it is valid under the Iraqi 
law despite the fact that it is not effective in France. Hence, section 16 (2) might be said to 
have been necessary to prevent the parties from obtaining divorce in such circumstances. 
The above rule in section 6 has now been abolished. The new rule requires that an extra­
judicial divorce not obtained by proceedings has to be obtained in the country o f the 
domicile at least of one party and be effective under the law in which it was obtained. 
Thus, the divorce in the above example cannot be recognised under the 1986 Act since it 
was not effective in the country where it was obtained. This fact makes the residence 
limitation under the present law less important and its purpose is less obvious.
4- Extra-Judicial Divorces Obtained in the British Islands
At common law an extra-judicial divorce obtained in the British Islands was entitled to 
recognition if recognised in the law of the domicile of the p a r t ie s , ( 4 3 8 )  When the 1971 Act 
came into force, it contained no express provision regulating the position of extra-judicial 
divorces obtained in the British Islands by parties domiciled elsewhere.
It was argued that the recognition of such divorces obtained after 1971 is outside the 
scope of the 1971 Act and could only be recognised under the common law rule in 
A rm itage v. A . G , ( " * 3 9 )  jf  j j -  was recognised as valid under the law of the parties' 
domicile.(44®) This view was based on the analysis of the provisions of the 1971 A ct as 
follows: Section 1 cannot apply to such divorces because this section talks about the 
recognition in the United Kingdom of divorces " granted under the law of any part of the 
British Isles", An extra-judicial divorce is not one granted by a court under the law of any 
part of the British Isles. Sections 2-5 also cannot apply because those sections talk about 
the recognition in the United Kingdom of divorces "obtained outside the British Isles". An 
extra-judicial divorce in the question is not one obtained outside the British Isles.
4 3 8 -  Q ureshiv. Qureshi [1971] 1 A11.E.R.325.
4 3 9 -  [1906] P. 135.
4 4 0 -  M orris, 2nd -ed .p .l53 ; N orth, op .cit.p .223; Cf, Polonsky, (1973) 22 I.C .L .Q .348-349.
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The state of extra-judicial divorces obtained in the British Islands was regulated by 
Section 16(1) of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973. This provided that 
"no proceedings in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man shall be 
regarded as validly dissolving a marriage unless instituted in a court of law of one of those 
countries". It is clear that the purpose of this section was to reverse the law as enunciated 
in Qureshi and to prevent recognition of extra-judicial divorces obtained in the British 
Islands after 1973. Nevertheless, there was doubt whether section 16 (1) would apply 
equally to all extra-judicial divorces obtained in the British Islands or if its application was 
confined only to those obtained where there are proceedings. This state of uncertainty came 
from the word "proceeding" in the section.
One view suggested that the word "proceeding "in section 16(1) has the same meaning 
as "proceedings" in section 2.M41) This view renders the section easy to apply but it runs 
contrary to the policy consideration which section 16(1) aims to reach since it would 
exclude extra-judicial divorces not obtained by proceedings from being caught by this 
section. Thus, since a bare tcdaq is not within "proceedings" in section 2, then it is not 
"proceeding" within section 16 (1) and therefore, it would be recognised if recognised by 
the law of the domicile of the parties. The other view suggested that it is not a requirement 
that a divorce must be obtained by proceedings to fall within section 16(1). It applies 
equally to all extra-judicial divorces obtained in the British I s l a n d s . ( ' * ' * 2 )
This state of confusion has now been removed. Section 44 (1) states that "no 
divorce...obtained in any part of the British Islands shall be regarded as effective in any 
part of the United Kingdom unless granted by a court of Civil J u r i s d i c t i o n " ( 4 4 3 )  
section does not affect the validity of an extra-judicial divorce obtained before 1974, which
4 4 1 -  K arsten, (1980) 43 M .L .R ev.202 at 207; S tone, (1985) 14 A .A .L .Q .366; L ucy  Carroll, (1985) 101 
L .Q .R ev. 178.
4 4 2 -  Chaudhary v. Chaiidhary [1984] 3 A ll.E .R . 1017 at 1029  per C um m ing-B ruce L .J; K enneth  
M ck.N orrie, (1986) J.L .S .S .31 .n5  210: K eith .H odkinson, (1984) J.S .W .L .47-50.
4 4 3 -  M aples  v M aples\l9^ 7 \ 2  W .L .R .487.
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would be recognised as valid under the common law rules then a p p l i c a b l e . ( 4 4 4 )  Finally, it 
is interesting to note that section 44 (1) seems to be unnecessary in the context of the 1986 
Act. For the purpose of recognition under this Act all divorces whether or not obtained by 
proceedings must be effective in the country where obtained. Since an extra-judicial divorce 
does not form  part of the United Kingdom fam ily law then this section appears
redundant. (4 4 5)
II- Iraqi Rules Relating to the Recognition of Foreign Divorces
The law of Iraq contains no specific statutory provisions regulating recognition of 
foreign divorces. On the other hand, enforcement of civil and commercial judgments are 
subject to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Code 1928 and the Enforcement of Arab 
Judgments Treaty 1952. Academ ic authorities, however, have expressed different 
speculative views as to whether the 1928 Code and the 1952 Arab Treaty should be applied 
to the recognition of divorces. To understand whether a foreign divorce can be recognised 
by virtue of the 1928 Code and 1952 Treaty reference must be made to the relevant 
provisions.
A- Enforcement o f Foreign Judgments Code 1928
A foreign judgment may, in accordance with the provisions of this Code, be executed 
in Iraq by the order of an Iraqi court, i.e. an order of execution. Article 3 provides that 
"any person desiring to execute a foreign judgm ent shall bring action in the court of first 
instance claiming the issue of an order for execution. The action shall be brought in the 
court having jurisdiction in the place in which the judgment debtor resides or, if  he shall 
have no fixed residence in Iraq, in the place in which any property which it is proposed to 
attach is situated. The application shall be accompanied by a copy authenticated in the usual 
manner, of the foreign judgment and the reasons therefor." Article 6 provides that "every
4 4 4 -  S.52 (4) (5) (a); M orris,4th-ed.p 188.
445- L ilian Edw ards, (1988) 18 Fam ily Law  424: Jam es.Y oung (1987) 7  L.S.84.
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judgment in respect of which an order for execution is claimed must fulfil all the following 
conditions. The court shall examine the fulfilment of these conditions on its own motion 
whether the judgment debtor has in this respect raised the question in his defence or not: (a) 
That the judgment debtor has reasonable and sufficient notice of the action of the foreign 
court; (b) That the foreign court was competent within the meaning of article 7 hereof; (c) 
That the object of judgment is for debt or definite sum of money and, if pronounced in 
action, is by way of civil compensation only; (d) That the cause of action was not such as 
would be considered under Iraqi law as contrary to public policy; (e) That the judgment is 
executoiy in the foreign country,"
Article 7 provides that the foreign court shall be deemed to be competent if one of the 
following conditions can be fulfilled: (a) That the action related to property movable or 
immovable in the foreign country; (b) That the cause of action arose from a contract 
entered into in the foreign country or intended to be there executed wholly or in part, to 
which the judgment related; (c) That the cause of action arose from acts which wholly or in 
part were done in the foreign court; (d) That the judgment debtor is ordinarily resident in 
the foreign country or was canying on commercial business in that country at the date on 
which the action was instituted; (e) That the judgment debtor voluntarily appeared in the 
action; (f) That the judgment debtor agreed to submit to tlie jurisdiction of the foreign court 
in the c a s e . "(446)
One view has suggested that practical considerations such as avoiding limping 
marriages, require the application of the 1928 Code to cover Matrimonial judgm ents 
including judgments on recognition of foreign divorces. Two points may be made: the first 
is that tlie civil and commercial judgments cannot be executed according to the 1928 Code 
without an order of execution granted by Iraqi courts. This is because the object of those 
judgments is for debt or definite sum of money. Since the object of the decree of divorce is 
not for debt or a definite sum of money but affecting status, it follows that the foreign 
446 -See, A m en, The Legal System o f  Iraq, (1989), p.337.
217
divorces are effective without an order of execution by the Iraqi c o u r t / 4 4 7 )  The second 
alternative ground is that article 17 o f the 1931 Personal Status Code for Foreigners gives 
the courts the right to recognise foreign judgments relating to succession and testaments 
without an order of execution. Since succession and testaments are treated as matters of 
personal status, it follows that there is no reason which prevents the courts from extending 
article 17 to cover all matters of personal status including foreign divorces. Accordingly, if 
the provisions of the 1928 Code are read together with article 17, the result should be that 
foreign divorces are recognised in Iraq without an order of e x e c u t i o n . ! 4 4  8 )  The other view 
defends the idea that foreign divorces must be treated in the same way as civil and 
commercial judgments in that an order of execution must be obtained according to the 1928 
Code in order to recognise them as effective in I r a q , ( 4 4 9 )
It is submitted that the existing views speculating upon the application of the 1928 Code 
are extremely doubtful and irreconcilable with any sound reasoning, for they assimilate 
divorce to a mere commercial judgm ent. It is also submitted that those views are 
inconsistent with the well established principle in Iraq that a statutory provision must be 
interpreted in every case in accordance with the object and intent of the Code in which it 
occuis. Looking at the relevant provisions as a whole, the 1928 Code deals only with civil 
and commercial judgments, and article 17 refers clearly to specific matters of succession 
and testaments. Since the nature of civil and commercial judgm ents is different from 
judgments affecting status, it is therefore, difficult to follow the view that the provisions of 
the 1928 Code and article 17 must be read together to cover foreign divorces.
It is also submitted that determ ination of the recognition of foreign divorces by 
reference to the 1928 Code runs contrary to the function of jurisdiction in matters affecting 
status. Under the 1928 Code a foreign judgm ent cannot be enforced in Iraq unless the
447-JaberJudR ahum an , Ara&îc Private/HterwaliOH«/Law,Vol.4 Egypt. v .4 (1 9 6 4 ) p .2 H  (In  A rabic)
4 4 8 -  bid at 110, 111; Cf, A II-H adw ay,op.dt.p .268.
4 4  9-Abdiil-Ham id W ashy, Private International Law in Iraq, Baghdad (1940), p .510.(In Arabic).
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foreign court assumed jurisdiction on one of the bases under article 7. The bases of 
jurisdiction under this article have nothing to do with judgments affecting status and they 
are completely different from those in articles 14 and 15 (1) of the 1951 Civil Code by 
virtue of which the Iraqi court can assume jurisdiction over divorce proceedings. The 
wording of article 7 indicates clearly that the government did not intend to afford 
recognition to foreign divorces by virtue of the 1928 Code. It is thought, therefore, that this 
is the less likely (and less desirable) interpretation.
However, if  it is considered that the 1928 Code is applicable to foreign divorces, then it 
is necessary for recognition that the foreign divorce be obtained by judicial proceedings and 
presumably that the proceeding be effective under the law of the country in which it was 
obtained. A foreign divorce obtained otherwise than by means of judicial proceedings 
should be considered outside the scope of the 1928 Code because article 1 states clearly that 
"foreign judgment" means "a judgment granted by a court constituted outside Iraq".
It is also necessary for recognition that the foreign court must have jurisdiction to grant 
a decree of divorce according to Iraqi law. This appears from the wording of article 7 
which states that the foreign court shall be deemed to be competent to grant a foreign 
judgment if one of the bases under this article is satisfied. Since the jurisdiction of the Iraqi 
courts to grant a decree of divorce is based on nationality and residence, one might have 
speculated that a foreign court shall be deemed to be competent to grant a decree of divorce, 
if at least one of the parties is a national of the foreign state, or if neither party is national of 
the foreign state but the respondent has his residence there.
B- Enforcement of Arab Judgments Treaty 1952
In 1953 Iraq signed a treaty of recognition and enforcement of Arab judgments with the
Arab League States and ratified it by the Act No.35 of 1 9 5 6 .(4  5 0 ) jt is interesting to note
4 5 0 -  T he system  in  Iraq does no t require that the goverem ent should pass leg isla tion  to  im p lem en t the 
treaties. A treaty becom es part o f Iraq law as soon cis it has been ratified and the courts apply it as a  part 
o f Iraqi internal law.
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that the treaty consists of 12 articles most of them designed for procedure purpose and 
having nothing to do with the recognition and enforcement of Arab judgments.
However, article 1 provides that every final judgment which is granted by a Judicial 
Committee of one of the Arab League States, which determines civil or commercial rights, 
or has granted compensation by the criminal courts, or is related to personal status, is 
enforceable in all States of the Arab League according to the provisions of this treaty. It is 
argued that, although this article does not deal specifically with divorce cases, it certainly 
includes the question of recognition of personal status. This could be understood to mean 
that the treaty was designed to include within its scope the question of recognition of 
divorces within the contracting States. As a matter of policy the interpretation of "personal 
status" to include divorce recognition within the scope of the treaty is welcome and it would 
certainly have a positive effect on limping marriages. Nevertheless, since it is a general 
treaty it is difficult for a lawyer to find out in which circumstances a divorce is entitled to 
recognition and it remains doubtful whether its provisions are capable of solving the whole 
problem of recognition of divorces.
It is necessary for recognition under the Arab treaty that the divorce be obtained by
judicial proceedings. However, it is interesting to note tliat the personal status law in the
Arab States generally is derived from Islamic law, under which a marriage may be
dissolved either by judicial process {tafriq) o r talaq o r khula. This approach to
dissolution of marriage has been followed by the Arab States Codes with the exception of
Tunisian Personal Status Code 1956 which provides " no divorce shall take place except
before a c o u r t " . (4 5 1) in  some Arab States the classical method of talaq has been altered
and statutory reforms were introduced requiring further formalities. Although such
foimalities do not amount to judicial investigation and, having regard to the fact that talaq
is effective under Iraqi law, the present writer suggests that such divorces should also be
governed by the Arab treaty.
    {
4 5 1 -  A rt.30; m ore details See, Nasir, The Islamic Law o f  Personal Status, London, (1986), p. 102.
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ït is also necessary for recognition that the forum court must have jurisdiction in the 
international sense to grant a decree of divorce. It should be noted that the treaty is not clear 
in the matter of whether the jurisdiction of the forum court must be satisfied according to its 
own law or according to the law of the state where recognition is sought This ambiguity 
comes from the wording of article 2 (a) which states merely that recognition will be denied 
if the forum court has no jurisdiction in the international sense.
Although this article has received criticism on the ground that it leads to different 
interpretations and it makes the law of recognition uncertain,(452) n  jg submitted that this 
criticism is less important in practice because there are no considerable differences in 
relation to jurisdiction over divorce proceedings between the Arab League States. 
However, if the treaty intended to leave the question of jurisdiction to be decided by the 
internal laws of the contracting States when considering a question of recognition, then the 
Iraqi law alone will determine whether or not the forum court has jurisdiction to grant a 
decree of divorce. This might be justified by the analogy to the general rule in article 7 of 
the 1928 Code which states that the foreign court shall be deemed to be competent to grant 
a foreign judgment if one of the jurisdictional bases under this article is met. In any event, 
the forum court shall be deemed to be competent to pronounce a decree of divorce if at least 
one of the parties is a national of the foreign State, or neither party is a national of the 
foreign State but the respondent has his residence there.(453) w hen the jurisdiction of the 
foreign court is established to the satisfaction of the Iraqi court, Iraqi courts need not 
consider the grounds upon which the divorce was granted because the general rule in Iraq 
is that the permissibility and the grounds for divorce are determined not by the Iraqi law but 
by the national law of the husband.(454)
It is also necessary for recognition that the divorce must be final and effective in the
4 5  2-JaberJud Rahum an, op.cit.p.201 ; A zzedeen A bdallah, op.cit.p.955.
4 5 3  Arts. 14 and 15 (1) o f  the 1951 Civil Code.
4 5 4  -Subject to  the possibility o f  public po licy  challenge, rarely encountered; See, Ch.3 and 5.
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State where it was obtained. The finality and validity of the decree must be proved by a 
document or note which is authenticated by the granting c o u r t . ( 4 5 5 )  xhe requirements of 
finality mean generally that the decree must be regarded as Res Judicata. A rticle 2 
provides that a contracting State is not permitted to refuse enforcement of the judgment 
except in the following circumstances; (d) when a final judgment has been pronounced by 
one of the courts of the State which is required to enforce the judgment concerning the 
same case and the same subject-matter.
If a decree of divorce is subject to appeal, it is submitted that it will not be regarded as 
final and effective and will not receive recognition in Iraq. Article 2 goes further when it 
provides that the decree will not be final and effective and recognition must be refused if at 
the time when the decree is obtained there are proceedings between the same parties before 
the court of recognition, providing that those proceedings had been brought to this court 
before the same proceedings w ere raised in  the court in which the divorce was 
g r a n t e d . ( 4 5 6 )  for example, the court in Jordan granted a decree of divorce to the wife 
and the husband had commenced proceedings to dissolve the same marriage in Iraq, the 
Jordanian decree will not be effective in the eyes of Iraqi law and the courts will continue to 
hear the husband's action. In the absence of rules of staying p r o c e e d i n g s ( 4 5 7 )  both in the 
Arab treaty and Iraqi law article 2 (d) would prolong proceedings and substantially increase 
expenses. Clearly this double process is wrong, inconsistent and unnecessary if the 
Jordanian divorce is worth o f r e c o g n i t i o n . ( 4 5 8 )
It has been seen that divorce by a court is not universally the rule, and the 1928 Code 
and Arab treaty are not applicable to non judicial divorces since they expressly provide that
only judgments granted by a court are entitled to recognition and enforcement. However,
4 5 5 -  Art.5.
4 5 6 -  A li-H adw ay, op .cit.p . 265; JaberJud  R ahum an, op .cit.p . 201; A zzedeen A bdallah , op .cit.pp . 955, 
956.
4 5 7 -  See, English  and Scottish in les, Supra, 83.
4 5 8 -  See, Infra, C hapter 5.
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the recognition of divorces not obtained by a court is subject to the choice of law r u l e / 4 5  9 )  
Hence, the basic principle of recognition is that the validity of such a divorce shall be 
recognised in Iraq if it is valid by the national law of the husband. Residence, domicile of 
the parties and the place where divorce is obtained are irrelevant. Moreover, such a divorce 
is entitled to recognition even if it is not effective where it was obtained and even if  it is not 
recognised as valid by the law of the other party so long as it is effective under the law of 
the husband's nationality/4^®) Applying this rule to the case of an Iraqi husband whose 
wife is Scottish, the talaq pronounced in Scotland will be recognised in Iraq even if it is 
not recognised as valid by the Scots law.(4® 1)
Finally, the validity of a talaq pronounced by a foreign national will be decided by 
Iraqi law qua forum  if at the time of the marriage the wife was an Iraqi national even if she 
has acquired her husband's nationality.
4 5 9 -  Art. 19 (3) o f the 1951 Civil Code.
4 6 0 -  Contrast w ith the position in the Fam ily  Law A ct 1986, S .46 (2).
4 6 1 -  C ontrast w ith the position in  the Fam ily Law  A ct 1986, S.44.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Grounds for Non-Recognition o f Foreign Divorces
Every legal system reserves to itself the power to limit the application of foreign law. 
Although this power is not the same in all legal systems, it is submitted that there is a 
degree of similarity, namely that a foreign law will not be applied if it would offend against 
the concept of justice and public policy of the state in which the foreign law is sought to be 
recognised or enforced. The application of this general rule to the field of divorce may lead 
to a refusal to recognise a foreign divorce if its recognition offends the ideas of justice and 
public policy of the state of recognition.
The rules of recognition in English, Scots and Iraqi laws contain within themselves all 
the conditions on which a foreign divorce will be recognised. These rules have already 
been discussed, and it has been seen that a foreign divorce will not be recognised if the 
requirements of recognition are not satisfied. Apart from these limitations (which pertain to 
jurisdiction) there are a number of grounds on which recognition to foreign divorces may 
be denied. So far as England and Scotland are concerned, the (public policy) grounds for 
non-recognition are now contained in section 51 of the Family Law Act 1986. In Iraq, 
there are no specific rules regulating this subject. The courts are bound to follow the 
general rules contained in the 1951 Civil Code and the 1969 Civil Procedure Code.
This chapter will consider the grounds of non-recognition of foreign divorces as 
follows:
I- Grounds for Non-Recognition of Foreign Divorces in England and Scotland.
II- Grounds for Non-Recognition of Foreign Divorces in Iraq.
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I- Grounds for Non-Recognition o f Foreign Divorces in England and 
Scotland.
At common law the English and Scottish judges had claimed a residual discretion to 
refuse recognition of foreign divorces which offended their sense of justice, and in a 
number of cases this discretion was used to refuse recognition to divorces obtained by 
fraud(U or duress.(^) There were also a number of dicta suggesting that the courts 
would refuse to recognise a foreign divorce where the foreign proceedings were contrary to 
natural justice(^) or where the grounds of divorce were repugnant to morality.(4)
Since 1971 the grounds for non-recognition of foreign divorces have been codified in 
statutory provisions. Section 8 (1) of the 1971 Act provided that a divorce whether 
obtained within or outside the British Isles must be refused recognition if by the law of the 
part of the United Kingdom in which recognition is sought (including its rules of the 
conflict of laws) there was no subsisting marriage between the parties. Section 8 (2), 
which applied only to divorces obtained outside the British Isles, provided that such 
divorces may be refused recognition in three situations, namely where such a divorce was 
obtained by one spouse without such steps having been taken for giving notice of the 
proceedings to the other spouse as, having regard to the nature of the proceedings and all 
the circumstances, should reasonably have been taken,(^) or without the other spouse 
having been given, for any other reason other than lack of notice, such opportunity to take 
part in the proceedings as, having regard to the nature of the proceedings and all the 
circumstances, he should reasonably have been g i v e n , o r  if its recognition would
1- Bonaparte V. Bonaparte {1892) PA 02; M iddleton v. M iddleton[ 1967] P .62.
2 - Re M eyer  [1971] P .298.
3- Shaw  V. A. G (1870) L .R .2  P  & D .1 5 6 ; R u dd  v. R u dd  [1924] P .7 2 ; S cott v. S co tt, 1973 
S .L .T .632 .
4 -  H um phrey  v. H um phrey Trustee's, 1895  33  S .L .R .9 9 ; W estergaard  v. W estergaard, 1914 
S .C .977 .
5 - S .8  (2) (a )( i) .
6 -  S .8 (2 ) (a) ii).
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manifestly be contrary to public policy.U)
In 1984, the Law Commissions(^) re-examined the grounds for non-recognition of 
foreign divorce contained in the 1971 Act. They recommended the continuation, in 
proposed legislation to replace the 1971 Act, of the grounds for non-recognition stated in 
section 8, but with some changes, namely they recommended that the ground for refusal of 
recognition contained in section 8 (1 ) should become discretionary rather than mandatory. 
They also recommended that the principle of Res judicata  should become a ground for 
refusal of recognition in the new legislation to all divorces whether obtained within or 
outside the British I s l e s . F u r t h e r  recom m endation was made by the Law 
Commissions that the grounds of want o f notice and want of participation in the 
proceedings contained in section 8  should be extended also to the petitioner rather than only 
to respondent.(1®) These recommendations have been adopted by the Family Law Act 
1986. Section 51 now contains an exclusive list of the grounds on which recognition may 
be denied both to other British and overseas divorces. This section also contains a special 
ground, not recommended by the Law Commissions, on which an extra-judicial divorce 
not obtained by means of proceedings may be refused recognition viz, if there is no official 
document certifying that the divorce is effective in the country of the domicile where it was 
obtained or is recognised in the country of the other spouse’s domicile. (* l) It should be 
noted that the grounds for non-recognition laid down in section 51 of the 1986 Act are 
subject to section 52 of this Act. This has been considered above.
A- Common Law Grounds for Non-Recognition of Foreign Divorces
The common law position reveals there are few cases in which a foreign divorce was 
denied recognition. This is because the courts limited the scope of the grounds on which a
7 - S.8 (2) (b).
8 -  Law Com  No, 137 & Scots Law  Com  No, 88 paras. 6,62-6. 68.
9 -  Ibid, 6. 66.
1 0 -  kandall v. Kandall [1977] Fam .Law .208.
1 1 - S.51 (3) (c) and (4).
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foreign divorce could be challenged. "There can be no doubt that this attitude is a wise 
one. To multiply the grounds of attack (many of which might be open to third 
paities)(* would introduce the gravest uncertainty into family relationships, because the 
parties might have remarried and have children after the foreign divorce".(*
1- Natural Justice
Various dicta indicated that an English or Scottish court might refuse recognition of 
divorces which were obtained in a manner contrary to English or Scottish ideas of natural 
justice. The usual ground of challenge of foreign divorce in this area is that the respondent 
did not receive adequate notice to enable him to defend the proceedings or if he was not 
given a fair opportunity to present his case to the c o u r t . 4) ijj Crabtree v. 
CrabtreeS^^^ the Scottish court refused to recognise a Latvian divorce granted in 
proceedings in which the defender had no notice and in which she had no opportunity to be 
heard or to be represented.
In a number of English cases, it was held that the divorce was not entitled to 
recognition because the respondent had not received notice of the proceedings. It should be 
mentioned that in these cases the main reason for denial of recognition was not that the 
respondent had not received notice of the proceedings but that the divorce was not granted 
by the court of the husband’s d o m i c i l e . ! F o r  instance, in Show  v. Alt.
Lord Penzance, in giving judgment, said that the decree of the court "has, in addition to the 
want of jurisdiction, the incurable vice of being contrary to natural justice, because the 
proceedings are ex parte and take place in the absence of the party affected by them".
12- Pem berton  v. Hughes [899] 1 Ch 781 (A.C.).
1 3 -  Dicey & Morris, 8th ed , p, 371; Morris, 3rd ed , p. 201; 4th ed., p. 198.
14- Morris, The R ecognition  o f  Am erican D ivorces in England, (1952) 29 B.Y.I.L.283, 286-287; 
Anton, 1st ed., pp .330-331; Mc’lean, op.cit.p. 51.
15- 1929, S.L.T.675.
16- Maher v. Maher [1951] P. 342 at 344-345.
17- (1870) L.R.2 p & D.156 at 162; R udd  v. R udd  [1924] P.72; S cott v. S cott, 1937 S.L.T.632 at 
633.
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Apart irom these cases, it was well settled that the mere fact that the respondent did not 
receive notice of the proceedings was not by itself a ground for refusal of recognition, 
pfovided that the loreign courts had acted in accordance with their own rules relating to 
substituted service or to the dispensing with service, hi Boettcher v. Boettcher it 
was decided that a decree of divorce in the state of Indiana was valid in the English conflict 
view, although the wife never received notice of the proceedings and did not learn of them 
until after the decree had been made. In giving this judgment, Wallington J. said "the 
requirements of the Indiana court as to service were so similar to certain provisions for 
constructive service in English practice that they could not be said to contrary to natural 
justice."! * 9) In this case the Indiana court had applied its own rules for service in that the 
notice of divorce was published in a local newspaper and a copy was sent by the court to 
the wife's correct address in England.!^®) On the other hand, the authorities established 
that if a failure to give respondent notice of the proceedings was due to the deliberately 
misleading conduct of the petitioner, the foreign divorce would not be re c o g n is e d .(2 •)
The alleged defect in the procedure in the foreign proceedings falling short in the matter 
ol want of notice would not justify denial of recognition of foreign divorce. In Pemberton
w Mughes(^-) the question was whether a decree of divorce granted by the Florida court 
1 8- jl9 4 9 ] W.N. 83: Maher v. Maher [1951] P.342.
1 9- A l83 ,bn (Jc [ ihc Fam ily Proceedings Rules 1991 any pctilion may be served out o f the ju risd ic tion
wilhoul the leave ol Ihc court, personally, or by post, o r by substituted service, rr. 10 (3) (6 ); For 
Scotland Sec. the Act ol Sederunt (Rules ol' Court A m endm ent No.4) (M iscellaneous) 1987 (S. 1.1987) 
No. 120b) rr. 195. 197. The court has a discretionary power lo dispense with .sei-vice, but it used only in 
\ c \ - \  special circum siances, Fam ily Proceedings Rules 1991, rr.2 .9  (9) (1 1), 10.(3). The court has 
made such an oidoi where the respondent had already (.obtained a decree of foreign court purporline to 
diss(^i\e the m arriage or, w here there was clear cxidencc that the spou.se had know ledge, o r m ust 
leasonabN assume, that the proceedings h a \c  been instituted; Paolanlonio v. Paolanionio [19501 2 
A ll.E .R .404.
2 0" cc. Igia V. Igra 119511 P .40 4  at 41 1; Wood e. Wood [1957] P .254; Arnold v\ Arnold (1957|
P .237; Hornelt i>. Hornell [19711 P.255.
2 1- Macalpine v. Macalpine 119501 P .35;3 'ro;/ v. SrofC 1937S .L .T .632; Crabtree v. Crabtree, 1929 
S .L .T .675.
2 2- 118991 I Ch.781.
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was to be regarded as invalid in England because the wife had not had the ten days’ notice 
to appear as required by the Florida procedural rules, but only nine. Lindley M.R.was not 
satisfied that this defect rendered the divorce invalid in Florida. His Lordship said:
"assuming lhal the dclcndanls arc right, and that the decree o('d i\ orce is void by the law 
til’ Florida, it by no means Idllows that it ought to be so regarded in this country. I t  a 
judgm ent is pronounced by a foreign court over persons within its jurisd iction  and in a 
m atter w ith which it is com peten t to deal, English courts never investigate the 
propriety of the proceedings in the foreign court, unless they offend against English 
views o f substantial j u s t i c e .  "(2 3)
Moreover, it is felt that it is unreasonable to expel British rules on service and notice to 
be mirrored in other systems. In addition, on occasion, it may be the case that the party to 
whom little notice was given may yet acquiesce in the outcome, and wish to act on the 
decree.
2- Fraud
It is worth noting first that fraud in the foreign court as to the merits of the case upon 
which the decree of divorce had been granted need not bar recognition, as in the case where 
a loreign divorce had been obtained in a foreign court by false evidence about the 
matrimonial offence relied o n . 125) r. F c n h , ( 2  6) Lhrd Som held that:
"the trend of nvxlcrn decisions has been more and more towards recognising the finality 
o f the court of the dom icile- if that decree has been obtained by fraud, o ther, that is, 
than fraud misleading the court w ith regard to its juri.sdiction, the rem edy o f  the parly 
aggriev ed must be to have it set aside in the country where it was pronounced."
On the other hand, the authorities established that fraud as to the jurisdiction of the
2 3 -Ibid, at 790, 791.
2 4- l^ra v, l^ra [ 1951 ] P.404.
2 5 -Dicey & M orris, 11th cd , p. 318, 12th cd., p. 755; Chc.shirc & North, 11th cd ., p. 675; Grave.son, 
6ih cd , p .674; M c'lcan. op.cit.p. 51; Jaffcy, op. cit.pp. 73-74; A nton, 1st cd., p. 331. T hough Sec, 
later under the Acts S.8, 1971 ; S .51, 1986.
2 6 -  1950 S .L .T .5 I at 53; B aler  v. Baler  (1906] P .209, at 218, 239; Varcly v. Sm ith , 1932 48  
T .L .R .66] at 663; Crowe v. Crowe (]9 3 7 | 2 AII.E.R .723; Middleton  v. M iddleton  [1967] P.62.
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fo re ig n  p ro ceed in g s  w o u ld  resu lt in reco g n itio n  b e in g  r e f u s e d . (2 7) H ere fraud m ay  take  
on e of tw o  form s; E ither it rendered the fo re ig n  p ro ceed in g s contrary to  natural ju s t ic e , or it 
vitiated  the ju r isd ic tio n  o f  the fo re ig n  court by in d u c in g  it to  a ssu m e  ju r isd ic tio n  w h ic h  
o th erw ise  it w^ould not have d o n e . (28)
An example of the first form is Mcicalpine v, MacalpineS'^^) It must be remembered 
that the mere fact that the respondent did not receive notice of the proceedings was not by 
itself a ground for challenging the foreign d i v o r c e , b u t  where the absence of notice 
was procured by the fraud, it was held that a foreign divorce obtained in such 
citcumstances wmuld be treated as invalid. The parties in \4acalpine v. Mciccilpine, were 
domiciled in England. The husband acnuired a domicile of choice in Wyoming, U.S.A. 
leaving his wife in England, and in 1948 obtained a divorce from a court in Wyoming. He 
falsely told the court that he did not know his wife’s address and as a result the wife 
received no notice of the divorce proceedings until after the decree was pronounced. Sachs 
J. held:
when :i decree as lo status ol a foreign court, which has proper jurisd ic tion  o ver the 
subject m atter ol the suit, is shown to fnn e been procured by a I'raud which prevented 
the respondent spouse having notice o f the proceedings, that decree will be treated in 
this country as a nullity ,' B
The second form of the traud as to the jurisdiction of the foreign court may be
illustrated by Bonaparte v. B o n a p a r t e and Middleton v. MlddletonA^^) In the
former case, Ihe husband obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of Session following
averments that he was domiciled in Scotland. These averments were untrue and had been
ll-H om tpane v. Ponapane P. 4 0 2 ; Macatpine v. Macatpine [1950] P .3 5 ; Middleton v.
Middleton \ \9 a i \  P .62; Perin Perin, 1950 S .L .T .51.
2 8- Gra\ cson. 6th cd , p. 674.
2 9- 11950] P. 35.
.Î 0- l^ra V. t o r n  11951 ] P. 404; Wood v. Wood ( 1957] P. 254; Hornctt v. Honietl 11971 ] P. 255.
3 1- At, 41.
3 2- {1892] P. 402; Show v. Gontd {mCd.) L.R. 3 H .L.55.
3 3- 11967] P. 62.
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made by arrangement with the co-respondent. The truth was that the husband was only in 
Scotland for a few days. Corel! Barnes J. held;
il is clear lhal in the prcscnl case a fraud was perpétra led on thc^Scottish court by 
allow ing ii act on the assum ption that the pursuer was dom iciled in Scotland. It 
(oilov\s, the)cl0)0 , that the Scottish court had no jurisdiction to pronounce a decree i 
this coliusjvc suit, and the decree which it has pronounced is null and v o id 'd ^  4)
in
In Middleton v. MiddleUmS^^) the husband was an American citizen domiciled in 
the State of Indiana and the wife was English. He petitioned for divorce in the state of 
Illinois, alleging both that he had been resident in Illinois and that his wife had deserted 
him. In taking the jurisdiction and granting the divorce the Illinois court had relied on the 
allegations of the husband which were untrue. Evidence was given that the divorce was 
granted in Illinois, and although obtained by fraud would be recognised in the State of 
Indiana where the parties were domiciled. The wife petitioned the English court for a 
declaration as to the validity of the Illinois divorce.
The validity of the Illinois divorce appeared to fall within the rule of ArmUage v. A 
G ,(3 « >  and might have had to be recognised in E n g l a n d . ( 3 7 )  Cairns J. did not reach 
this conclusion. He made an exception to the rule in Annitage v . A. G, since the decree
of Illinois had been vitiated by fraud. The .ludge said:
the ru le  in A rm ifage  r. A. G  is n e t an o v e n id in g  pi'inciplc but is sub ject to 
c.xception. One exception is that the decree was obtained by fraud going to the point o f 
jurisdiction. If the rule is, as staled in som e o f the authorities, that the only exception 
is that the dcciee was made in circum stances which offend natural justice  o r substantial 
justice, the dctinition ol what is contrary to natural justice or substantial justice is wide 
enough to cover such a fraud as was perpetrated by the husband in this case. I am ,
  ^It^relorc, ol the opinion that the Illinois decree m ust be regarded by this court as
3 4- Bonaparte u. Potiaparle { \m 2 )  P. 402 at 409, 410.
3 S - 119671 P .6 2 : Discus.,cd Lip.stcin, ( 1966) C .L ..1 .I8I; Unger, Kccognirm, o f  Poreign Divorces m d
Sifhslantiai Justice, (1966) 29 M..L.Rev.327.
3 6- 11906} P. 135.
3 7-Lip.stcin. (1966) C.L..I.181 at 182.
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invalid. A lternatively, if this court ha.s a discretion, I consider that the justice o f  the 
case dem ands that the d iscretion should  be c.xcrcised by refusing to recognise the
d ivorce .  8 )
The reason for the distinction between fraud going to the m erit of the case and fraud 
going to the jurisdiction was that to allow reduction on the ground that false evidence had 
been given would be, in effect to reopen an issue which had already been before the 
previous court, namely the credibility of the evidence, whereas in the other cases, the issue 
is something that is extrinsic to the previous decision and which did not enter the 
proceedings at all.l^^) It may be suggested further that averments as to jurisdiction may 
be presented in writing and therefore there may be no opportunity to examine the party. 
However, academic authoriiies pointed out that there is no substantive point in this 
distinction.(4^) They agree that fraud is fraud whether going to the jurisdiction or to the 
merits ol the case. I he court should not allow the fraudulent person to reap the fruit of his 
fraud. It should be noted that now, under statute, fraudulent behavior in general (as 
opposed to the narrower fraud as to the jurisdiction) may give rise to non-recognition.C* B
3" Duress
It is submitted that the free consent of the parties themselves is essential to the validity 
of any contract, including that of marriage. If the parties entered into the marriage without 
such consent, that marriage will be regarded as invalid. Under English domestic law, a 
marriage shall be voidable if either party did not consent to it, whether in consequence of 
duress, mistake or o t h e r w i s e . 2) Can this general principle apply to a refusal to 
3  8 -  A t ,  7 6 .
3 9- Perin v. Perin, 1950 S.L.T. 51 m 52.
4 0- D iccy & Moni.s, 8 ih cJ , p. 318: Unger. (1966) 29 M .L.Rcv.327 at 329; JalTey, op.cit.p. 74.
4 1-S.5I of the Family Law A ct and See also, under the superseded 197] Act, S .8; kendall v. K endaii 
11977] Fam .Law .208; Sec, infra, 249.
4 2- S. 12 (c) ol the M atrim onial C auses A ct 1973; W hile in Scotland the lack, o f consent one o f the 
parties would be a ground for declaring  the m arriage void ab inilio. Sec, A nton, 2nd cd , p. 440; 
riiom son, baniily Law in Scof/and, 2nd cd (1991), pp. 30-36; In Iraq the general rule is that the lack 
of consent renders a m arriage void, A rt.9 o f the 1959 Personal Status Code.
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recognise foreign divorces if the institution of the proceedings was against the will of the 
parties?
in Re M eyer,03) ,he parties were married in 1932, in Germany, both being German 
nationals, the husband, but not the wife, being Jewish. In 1938 the husband escaped from 
Germany asaretugee trom antisemitic persecution and went to England. The wife found 
herself subject to discrimination by virtue of the fact that she was married to a Jew. Fearing 
that her position would become intolerable she agreed with her husband before he left to 
dissolve the marriage. The marriage was dissolved by a German court at the suit of the 
wife in 1939. In 1949 the wife arrived in England and the parties lived together until the
husband died in 1955. In 1971 the wife applied to the English court for a declaration that
the German decree was void for duress.
Bagnall J. granted a declaration that the divorce was not recognised in England, 
because it had been obtained by duress since "the will of the party seeking the decree was 
overborne by a genuine and reasonably held fear caused by present and continuing danger 
to life, limb or liberty arising from external circumstances for which that party was not 
r e s p o n s i b l e . " ( 4 4 )  'Danger' to 'limb' included serious danger to physical or mental health, 
and 'danger' included, at least danger to a parent or child of the party.(4 SI
The degree of duress i e.whether it is sufficient to avoid the decree of divorce is 
dependent on the discretion of the court. In exercising its discretion the court should have 
regard lo all the facts of the case. In general, the duress must be such as to cause the 
person seeking the divorce to fear for his life or liberty in the event of his doing so,(4«) 
the degree offcar must be sufficient to vitiate consent, the fear must have been reasonably
4.1- 119 7 1 1 p. 298; d iscussed  H artley . Foreign D ivorces and E sw p p e l hy Con,Inc, in F nglhl,
Confli,-, u f (1971) 34  M.I..RCV.45; G n n  cson, 7th-ed , p. 3 0 4 ; norland v. norland 1947
S .C .432 .
4 4- At, 307.
4 5 -  Hartley, (197!) 34  M .L .R c\'.455 at 456.
4 6- Burke v. Burke, The T im es, M arch 17. 1955.
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entertained and have arisen from some external circumstances for which the petitioner 
himself is not r e s p o n s i b l e / ' ^  7) case under discussion the wife obtained the divorce
under pressurerher employers told her that she would be dismissed if she did not divorce 
her husband. She also feared that she might lose her flat and that she and her daughter 
would not survive. Bagnall J. held that this constituted sufficient evidence of duress and 
the wife would not have sought to obtain the divorce if her will had not been overborne by 
those fears.('*^ 1
In Igra v.lgrad^^) the facts were very similar to those in Re Meyen The wife 
obtained a divorce from the German court without her being willing. The court found that 
the degree of duress was not sufficient to invalidate the German decree because the parties 
accepted the divorce as valid after the war was over and lived together until the husband 
remarried. The situation in Re Meyer was different.
4- Grounds of Divorce are Repugnant to M orality
It is well settled at common law that the main principle in the recognition of divorces is 
essentially one of examining the jurisdiction of the court which granted the decree. The 
grounds on which the foreign divorce was granted are largely irrelevant.!^0) In many 
cases the courts in England!^ D and S c o t l a n d ! ^ 2) recognised a foreign divorce despite 
thelact that the grounds for which the decree had been granted were unknown to English 
and Scottish law. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that a foreign divorce will be denied 
recognition if the grounds of divorce are repugnant to morality. In a Scottish case
Humphrey v, Humphrey's îrusîeesS^^) Lord Moncrieff suggested that the Scottish court
4 1 - H V.  H \  19541 P. 258.
4 8- AV M eyer [1971] P .298 ul 307.
4 9  11951] P.404.
5 0 -  Wastlakc, op.cit.p. 97; A nton, 1st ed , pp. 329-330; N orth, op.cit.p. (1977) 158; W ebb, (1967) 16 
I .e .L .Q . 1004.
^ 1- Baler v. Baler 11906] P .209; H arvey v. Faniie (1882) 8 A PP Cas 43 ; M etzger v. M erzger[ 1936]
3 A11.P:.R,130.
5 2- Humphrey r. Humphrey's T R  (1895) 33 S .L .R .99; Perin v. Perin, 1950 S .L .T .51.
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would refuse to recognise a foreign divorce when its ground is ’’repugnant to the standard 
of morality recognised by a civilised and Christian state". Similarly in Weslergaard v. 
WesteigaatdS^ i t  was suggested that the Scottish court would refuse to recognise 
foreign divorces which are a violation of "the moral code that obtains in this c o u n t r y " ( 5  5 )
In England, there is no reported case in which the English courts refused to recognise a
foreign divorce on the ground that its recognition was repugnant to English morality. In
Igtxi V Igra, (5 6) a German divorce obtained at the instance of the Gestapo on what were
suspected to be racial grounds was recognised. Nevertheless in this case Pearce.J. said:
"The fact that the proceedings were suggested by the Gestapo and that the decree may well
have been granted on predominantly racial grounds cannot be disregarded in determining
whether the decree was contrary to natural j u s t i c e . " ! ^  7) qphe concept of morality is very
wide and "there is a danger from its uncertainty of its being too widely a p p U e d .'h ^ S )  "it
is diflicult to envisage what grounds of divorce would be contrary to m o r a l i t y . " ! ^ I n
Middleton v MiddletonS^^) Pearce J. recognised that some difficulty arises over the
expression ’substantial justice' and he defined it by saying "what strikes an English judge
as being fundamentally unfair is contrary to substantial justice". Reference may be made
here by analogy to the non-recognition by English courts of Maltese nullities granted on the
ground of failure of English civil marriage ceremonies to comply with Roman Catholic 
forms.(^ B
5 3- (1895) 33 S .L .R .99 at 101.
5 4- 1914, S .C.977.
5 5 Ibid at 980.
5 6 -[19511 P.404.
5 7- Ibid at 412.
5 8- North, op .cit.(I977) p. 187. '
5 9- Anton,. 1st cd., p. 330.
6 0 - [J 967] P.62 at 70.
6 1- Cfiappelle v. Chappelle [ 1950j P. 134; G ray  v. Form osa  11963] P .259; I^ p re  v. Lepre [1965]
P.52.
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5- Evasion of Law
It will be remembered that before the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, a judical divorce 
was not permitted to English subjects. The parties crossed the border to Scotland in order 
to obtain a divorce.!^ On the question of the validity of these divorces, the English 
courts had never refused recognition of such divorces on the ground that the parties evaded 
English law. In cases of this period, divorce was refused recognition on the ground that 
the husband had not established domicile in Scotland.!** The approach of the courts to 
the recognition of foreign divorce was essentially one of examining the jurisdiction of the 
foreign court which granted the divorce. If the jurisdictional requirements were satisfied 
the courts would recognise the divorce even if the motive of the acquisition of a domicile 
was for the purpose of instituting divorce proceedings.!** 4)
Against this background there was, however, considerable judicial concern that 
divorces obtained abroad after a short period of residence should not be recognised.!**^) 
In Shaw  v GouldS^^) Lord Westbury said:
"no nation can be required  to  adm it that its dom iciled subjects m ay law fully resort to 
another counti-y for the purpose o f evading the laws under w hich they live. W hen they 
return to the country o f their dom icile, bringing back w ith them  a  foreign judgem ent so 
obtained, the tribuna ls o f  the d o m ic ile  are en titled  o r even bound  to  re ject such 
judgem ent, as having no extra-territorial force or validity."
When the basis of recognition of foreign divorces extended beyond the principle of 
domicile, the doctrine of evasion was given more consideration. Thus, in Indyka v 
IndykaS^^) this doctrine was mentioned by Lord Pearce. His Lordship said:
"I think, how ever, that our courts should reserve to  them selves the rig h t to  refuse a 
recognition o f those decrees w hich offend our notions o f genuine divorce. T hey have
6 2- Com pare, Ch 2, supra 
6 3- Shaw  V. Gould {V&G&) L .R .3 H .L .55 
6 4 -See, cases in chapter 2 
6 5- Faw cett, (1990) C .L .J.44 a t 46, 47. 
6 6 -  (1868) L.R .3 H .L .55 a t 82.
6 7 -[1 9 6 7 j 3W .L.R .510.
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done so w hen decrees offend  against substantial justice, and  this o f  course, includes a 
decree obtained by Fraud. B ut Î think it  also includes o r should include decrees w here a  
w ife has gone abroad in  o rder to  obtain a  divorce and where a  divorce can be said  no t to 
be genuine according to  our notions o f divorce",!^
Lord Pearce’s proposition might be justified on the ground that Indyka v Indyka, 
established "a real and substantial connection" as a basis for the recognition of foreign 
divorces/^ This test of recognition required that the connection between the parties 
and the foreign court must be a genuine connection not a spurious one designed for the 
purpose of easy d i v o r c e / 7  0)
The doctrine of evasion of the law has now found a place in tlie Family Law Act 1986, 
albeit in a minority area. In this Act there is specific anti- evasion provision in the context 
o f extra- judicial divorce not obtained by means of proceedings. Section 46 (2) (c) 
provides that an extra-judicial divorce not obtained by means of proceedings cannot be 
recognised if either party had been habitually resident in the United Kingdom for one year 
before the divorce was obtained. However, in general, given that motive is no bar to 
acquisition of domicile and that, in any event, habitual residence of either party for one year 
will suffice to found jurisdiction in the Scottish or English court, and that recognition rules 
are broadly consistent with this, it is hard to make out a strong case in the presence of an 
anti-evasion factor in the Scots and English rules.
B- Statutory Grounds for Non-Recognition of Foreign Divorces.
The Family Law A ct 1986 contains an exclusive list of the grounds on which 
recognition may be denied to d iv o r c e s .(71) These depend upon whether the divorce was 
obtained within the British Islands or overseas, and upon whether the overseas divorce was 
obtained by means of proceeding or otherwise than by means of proceedings. An overseas
6 8 - Ibid at 544.
6 9 See, Supra, 143.
7 0 -See, M c'lean, o p .c itp . 52.
7 1 -  S.51.
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divorce obtained by means of proceedings may be denied recognition on the grounds of 
Res judicata, no subsisting m arriage between the parties, want of notice of, or 
opportunity to take part in, the proceedings and when its recognition would be manifestly 
contrary to public policy. A divorce obtained within the British Islands may only be denied 
recognition on the grounds of Res judicata and no subsisting marriage between the parties. 
The last three grounds above are inapplicable to British divorces. It has been said to justify 
this approach that it is not appropriate to refuse recognition in one part of the United 
Kingdom to a divorce obtained elsewhere in the British Islands on these grounds, because 
the public policy is generally the same throughout the British Islands and if there is any 
breach of natural justice, that should be best dealt with by the court in which the original 
proceedings are b r o u g h t . (7 2) The grounds of want of notice and want of opportunity to 
take part in the proceedings are also inapplicable to overseas divorces obtained otherwise 
than by means of proceedings. Instead, the 1986 Act provides that such divorces may be 
denied recognition on the ground of want of documentation.
These are the only grounds on which the court has now discretionary power to refuse 
recognition to divorces. Although the 1986 Act does not define the factors which a court 
may consider when deciding whether or not to exercise its discretion under section 51, it is 
submitted that the court should have regard to all the surrounding circumstances which 
would include a full investigation of the facts.(7 3)
1- Res Judicata
Article 9 of the 1970 Hague Convention provided that "contracting states may refuse to 
recognise a divorce or legal separation if it is incompatible with a previous decision 
determining the matrimonial status of the spouses and that decision either was rendered in 
the state in which recognition is sought, or is recognised, or fulfils the conditions required
7 2- Law  Com No. 137 &  S cots Law  Com  No. 88  para. 6. 67; See also, the d iscussion in chapter 4  and
contrast earlier position, as seen in  Shaw  v. Gould  (1868) L .R  3 H .L  55.
7 3- Newmarch  v. Newmarch  [1978] Fam .Law  79  at 95.
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for recognition, in that state."
Section 8 (1) of the 1971 Act, which was intended to give effect to article 9, was 
enacted in narrower terms than article 9 and there was nothing in this section which enabled 
the courts to refuse recognition of divorces on the ground of Res Judicata. In 1984 the 
Law Commissions recommended that specific statutory provisions should be made to 
govern the recognition of nullity decrees and to extend refusal of recognition to divorce 
decrees on the ground of Res Judicata. There are two main reasons behind the 
introduction of Res judicata. The first reason is that section 8 (1) is not appropriate to 
annulments whose purpose is to declare that the marriage is invalid. The second reason is 
that there is common law authority that a foreign nullity may be denied recognition on Res 
judicata.^’^  In Vervaelce v StnithS'^^^ the wife brought proceedings in the English 
court for annulment of her marriage. The court however dismissed the petition, holding the 
marriage valid. The wife then obtained a nullity decree from a Belgian court on a variant of 
the ground which in the earlier English proceedings had been insufficient to annul the 
marriage. When the wife sought a declaration in the English court that the Belgian decree 
should be recognised, recognition was refused. Among the various reasons for refusing 
recognition that of Res Judicata because the Belgian decree would be uncompatible with 
the prior English decision. This case is a clear application of the principle of article 9. 
Thereupon section 51(1) of the 1986 Act was enacted to give effect to it, according to 
which recognition may be refused to a divorce or annulment whether granted elsewhere in 
the British Islands or obtained overseas if, at the time when it was obtained, it was 
ineconciiable with a previous decision of a court in the part of the United Kingdom in 
which recognition is sought, as to the subsistence or validity of the marriage.
This ground for non recognition extended also to cover the situation when the previous
7 4 -Law Com No. 137 & Scots Law Com  No. 88  para. 6. 64-6. 66.
7 5- Cheshire &  N orth, 12 th ed  , p. 677; D icey & M orris, 12th ed., p. 751.
7 6- [1983] I A .C .145; C arter, (1982) 53 B .Y .B .I.L .302; Jaffey, M atrim om al Judgments as Defences in 
Conflict o f  Laws, (1986) 5 C.J.Q. 35.
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decision was obtained in a country other than that in which recognition is sought, but 
which is recognised or entitled to be recognised in that country. This means that a Scottish 
court has now a discretion to refuse to recognise a divorce granted in England or overseas, 
if its recognition would be irreconcilable with a decision relating to the subsistence or 
validity of the marriage which has been previously made or recognised by the Scottish 
courts provided that the previous decision is one obtained by a court of law. If, however, 
the previous decision is not one obtained by a court, the Act states clearly that the principle 
of Res judicata will not apply/7 7)
It has been argued that when the conflict rules of status are in question, the policy of 
avoiding 'limping marriages' should prevail, A decision of the United Kingdom court 
dismissing a divorce petition, or deciding an issue in a particular way, should not preclude 
the recognition of a subsequent decree in a different court.(7 8) Although this argument is 
welcome since it would have a positive effect on 'limping marriages', it is submitted that 
one must also have regard to the interest of the state which required that there should be an 
end of litigation and that the individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause.(7 9) 
However, it seems unlikely that this ground will be of much practical importance in the 
matter of recognition of foreign divorces since its application is limited to cases in which 
the previous decision must be obtained by a court and must be one relating to the 
"subsistence or validity" of marriage.
2- No Subsisting Marriage
Although much of the substance of this ground is covered by the Res Judicata, it is
thought that there are other cases for which this ground is required, as in the case where the
marriage is treated by English or Scots law, including its rule of private international law,
as void ab initio, but no nullity decree has ever been pronounced; or in the case where the
7 7- S.51 (1); Cheshire & North, 12th ed., p. 678; Anton, 2nd ed., p. 480; Morris, 4th ed., p. 198.
7 8- Jaffey, (1986) 5 C.J.Q 35 at 49.
7 9- Lockyer v. Ferryman (1877) 2 App.Cas 519 at 530.
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previous decree was not one granted by a court, because the principle of Res Judicata does 
not apply where the previous decision is extra-judicial/*®) Section 51 (2) of the 1986 
Act gives the court a discretionary power to refuse to recognise a divorce, whether granted 
elsewhere in the British Islands or obtained overseas, if it was obtained at a time when, 
according to its law, there was no subsisting marriage.
This ground was also to be found in the 1971 Act, but it was a mandatory one. 
Because of the clear overlap with the Res Judicata, the Law Commissions thought it 
would be more appropriate for it to be discretionary.!* B This discretionary power has 
been criticised on the ground that a divorce cannot effectively dissolve a marriage which is 
void or has already been annulled or dissolved and therefore, to give the courts the power 
to recognise the foreign divorce in such a case would contradict the fact that under English 
or Scottish conflict rules there was or remains no subsisting marriage to be dissolved.!* )^ 
This argument seems to be consistent with the concept o f divorce as a m ethod of 
dissolution of valid marriage and with the domestic rule that if the court considered a 
marriage had already been dissolved or had never existed, it would not have granted a 
divorce. However, it also seems unlikely that this ground will be of much practical 
importance in the matter of recognition of foreign divorces. This view might be justified by 
the fact that there are no reported cases in which the non-recognition of a divorce was 
considered under this ground.!*^) M oreover, there is a com m on law authority 
supporting the view that a foreign divorce would be recognised without deciding whether 
the marriage dissolved was valid or not. !*4)
8  0 -  Law Com No. 137 & Scots Law Com No. 88 para. 6. 66; Cheshire & North, 12th -ed , p. 678; 
Dicey & Morris, 12th ed., p. 751; Anton, 2nd ed., p. 480; Parry, Denying Recognition to Foreign 
Divorces, (1978) 8 Family Law 29.
8  1 -  Law Com No ,137 & Scots Law Com No.88 para. 6. 66,
8 2 -Jaffey, (1986) 5 C.J.Q 35 at 47.
S3 -David Gordon, op.cit.p. 121.
8 4-Lee v. Lan [1967] P. 14 at 22, 23.
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3- Want of Notice o f the Proceedings
This ground for non-recognition applies only to overseas divorces obtained by means 
of proceedings, i.e.divorces whose recognition is within Section 46(1). By virtue of 
Section 51 (3) (a) (i) such a divorce may be refused recognition if it was obtained without 
such steps having been taken for giving notice of the proceedings to a party to the marriage 
as, having regard to the nature of the proceedings and all the circumstances, should 
reasonably have been taken.!*
Since the nature of the proceedings in extra-judicial divorces obtained by means of 
proceedings is different from those in an ordinary court of law, the court then must have 
regard to this nature in deciding whether the steps taken to give notice of the proceedings 
were reasonable. Hence, it is submitted that further information and perhaps a different 
standard may be required where the court of recognition is dealing with a religious 
proceedings divorce than when it is dealing with a judicial decree. It is interesting to note 
that in most cases of religious proceedings divorces, such as Ordinance talaq and Jewish 
gett there is no need to rely on this ground to refuse recognition, simply because a valid 
Ordinance talaq or Jewish gett cannot be obtained without the knowledge of the party 
pronouncing divorce and the notification of the other spouse. This means that an 
Ordinance tcdaq obtained without giving notice to the wife will not be effective and 
therefore, will not be within section 46(1).!*
However, in exercising its discretion the court will also have regard to all the 
circumstances of the case, including whether a failure to give notice resulted from external 
events!* 7) or whether one spouse had already decided not to participate in the
8 5- Collier, op.cit.p .295; Jaffey, op.cit.pp. 72-73; Cheshire & North, 12th ed , pp. 678-679; Dicey &
Morris, 12th ed., p. 752; Moms, 4th ed., p. 199; Anton, 2nd ed., pp. 480-481; S.8 (2) (a) (i) of the
1971 Act; Graveson, 7th ed., pp. 300-301; Mc'lean, op.cit.p. 87; Parry, (1978) 8 Family Law 29;
David Gordon, op.cit. p. 121.
8 6-David Gordon, op.citp. 123,
8 7- Igra v. Igra [1951] P.404.
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proceedings/**) The court may refuse recognition if in its view such steps for giving 
notice have not been taken as reasonably should have been. Since this ground is similar to 
the common law ground based on natural justice, the court may take into account the 
common law decisions as a guidance in its discretion. As has been seen, the mere fact that 
the respondent did not receive notice is not enough to challenge a foreign divorce/* ^) but 
recognition is likely to be refused when want of notice resulted from fraud.!^®)
As regards the extra-Judicial divorces obtained otherwise than by means o f 
proceedings, i.e. divorces whose recognition is within section 46 (2), it will be 
remembered that in R.v. Hammer smith Superintendent Registrar o f Marriage, exp-Mir- 
Anwc., add ln ,d> \) the Court of Appeal refused to recognise the talaq obtained in India. 
Among the various rea.sons for refusing recognition was that the takiq involved a denial of 
natui al justice. Lawrence.J, in giving judgement, said "it is contrary to natural justice that a 
man should be judge in his own cause and determine his marriage at his own will and 
pleasure without his wife’s consent and without any notice to her."!®B
In Xcial ,v. 7xiaid^^^ Bush J. followed this view when he refused to recognise a 
talaq obtained in Dubai. The judge said that he came to the conclusion that what had been 
done was done in secrecy. The first time the wife knew about the talaq was when she was 
irrevocably divorced. Some notice more than informal notice should have been given. 
There had been no notice for reconciliation or notice to enable her to enlist the aid of her 
husband’s relative. The lack of justice offended one's sense of justice and jarred one's
8 8- Sahhayji v. Sahbagh 11985] F .L.R .29,
8 9 -  fg ra v .Ig ra  | i9 5 ] )  P.404-,Wood v. W ood  | I957j P .254: Arnold  v. Arnold \\9 5 7 ]  P .237; Hornelt 
V. Honieif 1J97I | P.255.
9 0- Macatpine v. Macalpinc [1958J P.35; /V rm  i'. Perin , 1950 S.L .T . 51.
9 1- 119171 1 K .B .634 (i c at the tim e when Brili.sh courts first, w ere called upon to consider such 
di\orccs).
9 2- Ibid at 662.
.9 3 -1)9831 4 F. L.R. 284 a I 289 ; S h arif v. S h arif  | I 9 8 0 |  10 F am .L aw  216; V isw atingham  v. 
Viswatingham \ 19801 1 F .L .R .Ï 5.
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conscience.
It is submitted that the want of notice is an inadequate and unsatisfactory reason for 
refusing recognition to the bare taiaq because the nature of talaq makes such a notice 
unnecessary. Under Islam ic Law, the husband can divorce his wife m erely by 
pronouncing the word talaq. The wife need not be present and there is no formal necessity 
for witnesses. How can one imagine, therefore, that notice of the proceeding is necessary? 
Dr.Morris has rightly suggested that in the case of bare talaq and other divorces which are 
obtained where there are no proceeding, such a notice need not be given because "no 
amount of notice would enable the wife successfully to contest the husband’s unilateral 
declaration of divorce, and therefore it would be pointless to insist on an empty 
f o r m a l i t y . U n d e r  section 51 (3) (a) (i) an extra-judicial divorce obtained where there 
are no proceedings will not be refused recognition on the ground that no notice was given 
to the wife of the husband’s intention to divorce her. But, of course, the general 'public 
policy' challenge remains.
4- Want of Opportunity to Take Part
Even if the parties to the marriage received sufficient notice to take part in the 
proceedings, the court still has a discretion to refuse an overseas divorce obtained by means 
of proceedings if one of the parties was not given a fair opportunity to present his case 
before the court. Section 5 1 (3 ) (a) (ii) provides that an overseas divorce obtained by 
means of proceedings may be refused recognition if it was obtained without a party to the 
marriage having been given (for any reason other than lack of notice) such opportunity to 
take part in the proceedings as, having regard to those matters, he should reasonably have 
been given.l^
9 4- D icey & M orris, 11th ed , p. 713; M aher v. M aher [1951] P .342 at 3 4 5 ; Chaiidhery v, Chaiidhery 
[1984] 3 A11.E.R.1017 at 1035.
9 5- C heshire &  N orth, 12th ed ., p. 679; D icey & M orris, 12lh ed ., p .753; M orris, 4th ed ., p. 200; 
A nton, 2nd ed., p .481; Jaffey, op.cit.pp. 72-73; Collier, op.cit.p. 295; S .8 (2) (a) (ii) o f the 1971 A ct; 
Graveson, 7th-ed., pp. 300-301; M c'lean, o p .c itp p . 88-89; Parry, (1978) 8  Fam ily Law  29.
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The exercise of the discretion under this head of non-recognition was considered in a 
number ot cases in the context of the 1971 Act which provide a valuable guide to the likely 
application of section 51 (3) (a) (ii). In Joyce v. J o y c e the English court exercised 
its discretion to ret use recognition to the Quebec divorce because the wife had not been 
given reasonable opportunity to take part in the proceedings. Lane J.considered a variety 
of matters relating to the issue including the availability of legal aid, whether the wife had 
taken reasonable steps to put forward her case, what remedies were available to the wife in 
the foieign jurisdiction, the methods of enforcing any judgement that might be given by the 
ioreign court, particularly in relation to financial matters, and the public interest in ensuring 
that a wife and child)en were adequately maintained, so they did not become a charge on 
the United Kingdom community. Lane J.’s refusal of recognition to the Quebec divorce 
was based mainly on the ground that the result of recognition would to deprive the wife of 
the opportunity of obtaining financial relief from the English court.
in Mamdani v. M am daniS^’^ ) the English court found that the wife had not had the 
opportunity to take part in the Nevada proceedings because she did not have sufficient 
money to defend them and it granted a declaration that the Nevada decree was invalid. 
Curaming-Bruce L.J. in his judgment stated:
"Ihe question whether, in all the circum stances, the respondent to foreign proceedings 
u a s  given an opportunity  to take part in the proceedings m ust be answ ered in an 
appropriate case by icl'crence to the question w hether she had the m oney to go to the 
loicign com I and obtain legal representation. It is one o f the circum stances relevant to 
being given an opportunity to take part,"(9 8)
The wife's inability to attend foreign proceedings as a result of the lack of money was 
also considered by Wood J. in Sharif v. S h a r i f as a relevant reason for refusing 
recognition to the Iraqi divorce. On the other hand, in Sahhagh v. SahbaghM ^^) the
9 6 -f 1979| Fam.Law 93 at 111-113.
9 7- 11984] 3 F.L.R .699.
9 8 -Ibid. at 704. 705.
9 9  -119801 10  F am .L aw .216 at 317.
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English court rejected the w ife’s argument that she was prevented from taking part in the 
Brazilian proceedings by lack of money, because there was evidence that there was legal 
aid available in Brazil and she had not attempted to apply.
In Newmarch v, NewmarchS^^^^ although the English court was satisfied that the 
wife had not been given reasonable opportunity to take part in the proceedings because of 
the failure of the Australian solicitors to file an answer in the husband’s divorce suit in 
Australia, though she had given clear instructions through her English agents that she 
wished a robust defence to be made, so that it went undefended, it nevertheless exercised 
its discretion to recognise the divorce. Rees J. based his decision on the fact that the w ife’s 
main concern in these proceedings was to obtain maintenance and in all the circumstances 
she could obtain that maintenance despite the foreign divorce and therefore, no one's 
interests would be served by refusing r e c o g n i t i o n . H < > 2 )  Moreover, Australia was on the 
point of going over to a 'no fault' divorce system. A similar approach had been previously 
adopted in Hack v. in which the wife petitioned the English court for a
declaration that the Missouri decree was invalid on the ground that she was denied a 
reasonable opportunity to take part in the proceedings. Although, Arnold.J considered that 
all the circumstances and the facts of the case were relevant, he paid particular attention to 
the availability of financial relief, holding that the Missouri divorce should be recognised 
because its recognition would not prevent the wife obtaining ancillary relief from the 
English court.
Thus, the mere fact that the parties to the marriage had inadequate opportunity to take 
part in the foreign proceedings is not by itself sufficient a ground for denial of recognition. 
On the other hand, the mere ability to take part in the foreign proceedings did not constitute
1 0 0 -  [1985] F .L .R .29 a t 34; H ack  v. H ack  [1976] 6 Fam  Law 177.
1 0 1 -  [1978] F am .L aw  7 9 ; D ickson , The R ealistic  Approach to the R ecognition o f  Foreign D ivorces, 
(1 9 7 9 )2 8 I.C .L .Q .1 3 2 .
1 0 2 -Ibid at 90-95.
103-[1976 ] 6  Fam  Law 177.
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such an opportunity. The opportunity m r:t be adequate and effective to place views 
before the c o u r t . H 0 4 }  courts should have regard to all the surrounding circumstances 
which would include a full investigation of the facts relied upon to support a refusal of 
recogmtion.U^^l Since the problem of financial relief has now been removed by the 
Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, it seems unlikely that when considering the 
exercise of the discretion under this head of non-recognition the court will follow the 
decisions iwJoyoe and Sharif io refuse recognition to foreign divorces.
Again since the nature of the proceedings in extra-judicial divorces obtained by means 
of proceedings is different from those in an ordinary court of law, it is submitted that the 
court will have regard to this different nature in deciding whether the opportunity to take 
part in the proceedings was reasonable. If the courts consider that the procedures under the 
Pakistani law are satisfied, namely that the husband gives notice of the talacj to the 
Chairman of the Council and supplies a copy to the wife and the Chairman constitutes an 
arbitration Council for the purpose of bringing about a reconciliation between the parties, 
recognition should not be refused even if the wife does not take part in the conciliation 
proceedings, because under Pakistani law itself, there is no rule to compel either party to 
take part in the conciliation proceedings before the arbitration c o u n c i l . H  0 < > )
5- W ant of Documentation
This new ground of non-recognition, which applies only to extra-judicial divorces 
obtained where there are no proceedings, was not recommended by the Law Commissions 
because they did not consider specific provision for the recognition of such divorces. 
How^ever, section 51 (3) (b) gives the courts discretion to refuse recognition to such 
divorces where there is no official document certifying that the divorce is effective under 
1 0 4  -Joyce v. Joyce [19791 Fam.Law' 93.
1 0 5 - Newmarch v. Newmarch  11978] F am ,L aw  79; Joyce  v. Joyce  [1979 | Fam .L aw  93; Mamdani. v.
Mamdani 11984[3F.L.R 699.
1 0 6 - Quazi v. Qnazai 19791 3 A1I.E.R.897 at 902.
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the law of the country in which it was obtained;(l®'^) or where either party to the marriage 
was domiciled in another country at the relevant date/^®^) there is no official document 
certifying that the divorce is recognised as valid under the law of that other country.(109) 
"Official document" means one "issued by a person or body appointed or recognised for 
the purpose under" the law o f the country in which the divorce was obtained or recognised 
as v a lid .0 10)
Having regard to the fact that in some countries such a certificate may not be easily 
obtained, particularly in countries where the divorce was not obtained,(111) it seems that 
this new ground is intended to provide more discretion to the court to refuse recognition to 
informal divorces qualifying for recognition under section 46 (2). If it is so, it would be 
contrary to the whole purpose which the 1986 Act aims to reach, namely to cure the 
mischief of 'limping m a r r ia g e s '.1 The provision may, on the other hand, simply be a 
cross-cultural misunderstanding. The British court reasonably desires the information but 
the West does not fully appreciate the difficulties in obtaining such documentation. The 
area of law is complex, and the recognition by certificate may be hard to obtain and 
expensive. If one looks at what is required under section 51 (3) (b) one will find that is not 
a document saying that a person is divorced; it is a document certifying that the divorce in 
question is recognised as valid under the law of that c o u n t r y . ^  If this is correct, then 
the purpose of official documents is not clear and confuses, because official documents are 
notnecessary for the recognition of divorces in an English or Scottish court, since section 
51 (3) (b) only comes into play when the court is satisfied that there is an informal divorce
107- S .5 1 (3 )  (b) (i).
1 0 8 -  T he "relevant date" m eans the date on  w hich the divorce w as obtained; S.51 (4) and 4 6  (3) (b).
109- S.51 (3) (b) (ii); C heshire & N orth, 12th ed., p. 685; D icey & M om s, 12th ed., p. 754; A nton, 2nd- 
ed., p. 481; D avid G ordon, op.cit.p. 132.
1 1 0 -S.51 (4).
1 1 1 -  Zaal V . 2aa l [19831 4  F .L .R .284  a t 289.
112 -D avid Pearl, (1987) C .L .J.36; Sebastian Poulter, Recognition o f  Foreign D ivorces-The N ew Ij x w , 
(1987) V ol.84 L .S .G az 253 at 256; 47 5  H .L .D ebs, Col, 1093 (22 A pril, 1986) per Lord M eston.
1 1 3 -  475 H .L.D ebs, Col, 1094 (22 A pril, 1986) pet' Lord Meston.
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which qualifies for recognition under section 46 (2).(^ Surely one of the qualifications 
under section 46 (2) is (the pre-requisite) that the divorce is valid where obtained. The 
further requirement [S.51 (3) (b)] is evidential. However, so far as Iraqi law is concerned, 
the court will issue such a certificate to Iraqis if the talaqxs obtained in Iraq.(l 1 The law 
also authorises the Iraqi Consul in foreign countries to issue such a certificate where the 
talaq is obtained a b r o a d .H 1 6)
6- Public Policy
This ground probably embodies the substance of what, at common law, fell within 
denial of recognition if the divorce was contrary to substantial justice or was regarded as 
contrary to morality. Under section 51 the court has a discretion to refuse recognition to an 
overseas divorce whether or not obtained by means of proceedings if "its recognition 
would manifestly be contrary to public policy"H 1 xhe 1986 Act does not define this 
term. The court will seek guidance from the common law decisions and from those which 
were decided in the context of the 1971 Act in defining its extent and in deciding whether 
recognition would be contrary to public policy. The 1986 Act requires that only overseas 
divorces which are 'manifestly' contrary to public policy be denied recognition. The word 
“manifestly” was inserted to conform with article 10 of the 1970 Hague Convention which 
provided that "contracting States may refuse to recognise a divorce... if such recognition is 
manifestly incompatible with their public policy ('ordre public’).
Some contracting States use ‘ordre public’, which is much wider than that of public 
policy in England and Scotland, to refuse recognition to divorces granted upon grounds 
unknown to their own law. This would have damaged the Convention. To avoid this 
result, the word ‘manifestly’ was inserted in article 10 to restrict the discretion of the courts 
in this respect.! 11 *) Since the position at common law revealed that the discretion is one
1 1 4 -  Y oung ,(1987) L .S .78 a t 89.
1 1 5 -  A rt.39 o f the 1959 Personal S tatus Code.
1 1 6  -A rt.20 o f the Law  No. 15 o f  1936.
1 1 7 -  S.51 (3) (c); See also. S .8  (2) (b) o f the 1971 Act.
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to be exercised sparingly,!^ it seems, therefore, the word ’manifestly’ in section 51 (3)
(b) is redundant because it is no more than confirmation of the attitude of the courts at 
common l a w .(120) Wood J. in Chaudhary v. ChaudharyS^'^^) has this to say: "I do not 
believe that the word' manifestly' adds anything to sub-section,[S.8 (2) (b)] for I do not 
believe that any judge would invoke the doctrine of public policy unless he felt that it was 
clearly right and just so to do".
There is no requirement that recognition may be refused on public policy. The courts 
should have regard to all the circumstances which would include a full investigation of the 
facts relied upon to support a refusal of recognition. The mere fact that the husband was 
evading his responsibilities so that the wife had to turn to social security b e n e f i t s , !  1 2  2 )  q j . 
that the foreign decree has a different effect from an English decree is not sufficient to 
support the application of public policy.!! 23)
A clear case for the application of this ground is Kendall v. K e n d a l l in which 
Holling J.declined to recognise a divorce granted to the wife by the Bolivian court because 
its recognition would be manifestly contrary to public policy. In this case, the parties were 
domiciled in England. In 1972 the husband was posted by his employers to Bolivia. The 
wife joined him there in 1973. In 1974 the wife decided to leave Bolivia with the children. 
Before she left she was induced by the husband to sign documents in Spanish, which she 
did not understand, asking for a divorce which she did not want. The husband told her that 
the documents were to enable her to take the children out of Bolivia. In 1975 the Bolivian
1 1 8 -  A nton, (1972) S .L .T .90.
1 1 9 -  Varanandv. Varamml[\96^] 108 Sol Jo  693; Qureshi v. Qureshi [1971] 1 A il.E .R .325.
1 2 0  -C heshire & North, 12th ed , p. 683; D icey &  M orris, 12th ed ,, p. 7 54 ; M orris, 4 th  ed., p .201; 
Sharif V. Sharif [1980] 10 Fam  Law  216 at 217; Chaiidhery v. Chaiidhery [1984] 3 A I1.E.R.1017 at 
1024.
1 2 1 -  [1985] 2 W .L .R .359 at 359.
1 2 2  -Joyce v. Joyce [1979] Fam .Law  93 a t 96.
1 2 3 -  Social Security D ecision, N o.R  (G) 1, 85.
1 2 4  [1977] Fam .Law  208; Parry, (1978)8 Fam ily Law  29; M orris &  N orth, op.cit.p  .307.
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court granted a decree of divorce. The decree stated several things which were not true, 
namely that there were no children, that the wife worked and that neither party owned any 
property. The wife then petitioned the English court for a declaration that the decree of 
divorce granted to her by the court in Bolivia was invalid.
Hollings J .  referred to the common law d e c i s i o n s . !  1 2 5 )  Although he pointed out that 
fraud as to the merits of the case was not a ground for denial of recognition, he found here 
that the fraud is more fundamental even than fraud as to the merits or the jurisdiction. The 
Bolivian court was deceived not just as to the facts alleged in the petition when the husband 
falsely told the court that there were no children of the marriage, that the wife worked and 
that neither party owned any property, but as to the fundamental issue of whether the wife 
was petitioning at all. Hollings J.was satisfied that if the Bolivian court was apprised of the 
full circumstances, it would without hesitation take steps effectually to invalidate the 
decree. Accordingly, the recognition of the Bolivian decree in those circumstances would 
be manifestly contrary to public policy.
It is interesting to note that in a case before the enactment of the 1986 Act, it was
suggested that the mere fact that a divorce is informal and without proceedings is contrary
to public p o l i c y . !  1 2 6 )  This suggestion is unsound because there is no general lule either in
English or in Scottish law requiring the refusal of recognition to informal divorce because it
was not the creature of p r o c e e d i n g s . ! l 2 7 )  Moreover, this suggestion seems to be
inconsistent with the established view at common law where informality was not a bar to
r e c o g n i t i o n . ! ^  2 8 )  Although the judges at common law had residuary discretion to refuse
recognition to divorces which offended their sense o f  j u s t i c e , !  1 2 9 )  ^  had been held by
1 2 S- Baler Bater \\906] P.209;M<(caplim v. Macaplim  [1958] P .35 ; Middleton v. Middleton [1967] 
P. 62.
\16-Zaal V. Zaal [1983] 4  F.L.R. 284  a t 289; 445  H .L .C ol.76  (21.11.1983) per Lord Roskill.
1 2 7 -  Quazi v. Quazi [1980] A .C .744 at 782.
1 2 8 -  Qureshi V. Qureshi [1971] 1 A11.E.R.325..
1 2 9 -  Russ V. Russ [1963] P.S7; Makoitipour v. Makouipour 1967 S.L .T . 101.
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Scarman J.in \aranandv. Vanmandd^^^) that the residual discretion is one to be most 
sparingly exercised. The judges in fact did not establish general rules for the use of this 
fïovver. Instead, they preferred to use it in particular cases.! I )  event the judges
did not use this powei to create a general rule that recognition of informal divorces as such 
is contrary to public policy. Moreover, this kind of argument cannot be raised now 
because the 1986 Act provides specific provision tor the recognition of extra-judicial 
divorces obtained where there are no proceedings.! !  ^2)
One ot the facets of public policy on which recognition was refused to the talaq in 
Sherifv. SherifM ^^) was that "the wife has never taken the Muslim faith". This element 
of public policy seeks to establish the rule that a divorce is less likely to be recognised if the 
parties to the marriage are of different religions than is a divorce between parties of the 
same faith. If this is so, it would be contrary to the common law authorties .0^4) 
Moreover, if the marriage which is celebrated between parties of different religions is not of 
itself a bar and contrary to the English and Scottish public policy, why should the methods 
of dissolution of such marriages be considered as contrary to public policy? Such a ground 
certainly would harm relations between religious communities. The Western feeding surely 
must lie in the thought that the method is unknown in the culture of one party, and that may 
put (her) at a disadvantage. It is unlikely, however, that an English or Scottish court would 
rely on this factor of public policy without other supporting considerations to deny 
recognition to foreign divorces. This view is supported by the fact that the recognition of 
inlormal divorces is now governed by section 46 (2). Moreover, since the case oi Sharif 
has been decided there are no reported cases in which this ground of public policy was 
considered.
! 3 0  -{19641 108 Sol Jo 693.
1 3 1 -  Qureshi v. Qureshi {1971 | I A11.E.R.325 at 345; Makouipour v. Makouipour, 1967 S.L .T . 101 a t 
I 16.
132- S .46(2) (b).
1 3 3 [ ] 980j Î 0 Fain Law 216 at 217.
1 3 4 - Yousefv. [ 1957] T he Timc.s, 1 Agust, \951\Russ r. R//.v.v [ 1964] P .3 I5 .
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Another factor of public policy on which recognition was refused to foreign divorces 
was that the wife had begun divorce proceedings in England prior to the foreign 
divorce.! 1^^) Howevere, after the enactment of the principle of Res Judicata, it is 
unlikely that an English or Scottish court would refuse recognition to foreign divorces 
merely because proceedings had been instituted before the foreign proceedings. Under the 
principle of Res Judicata, the English or Scottish court may refuse to recognise a foreign 
divorce if at the time when it was granted it was irreconcilable with a decision previously 
given by its court. Moreover, if the proceedings are still continuing in both countries, the 
English or Scottish court may exercise its discretion to stay its proceedings.! I ^  6)
The main argument of public policy in favour of refusal of recognition of foreign 
divorces before the enactment of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 was 
that the result of recognition would often be to prevent a divorced spouse from obtaining 
the financial relief to which she or he would be entitled under English or Scots law. In 
Chaudhary V .  ChaudhatyM^'^^ W ood J. and the judges of the Court of Appeal decided 
that even if the bare taiaq fell within the meaning of proceedings in section 2 of the 1971 
A c t, it would be contrary to public policy to recognise it because the husband had obtained 
the divorce with the sole purpose of depriving the wife of the opportunity of obtaining 
financial relief from the English court. Similarly, m Joyce v. JoyceS^^^) Lane J. refused 
to recognise the divorce because the Canadian court had no jurisdiction over the jointly 
owned home in England.
The mere fact that the recognition of a foreign divorce would deprive the divorced 
spouse from obtaining financial relief was not by itself sufficient to refuse recognition on 
the ground of public p o l i c y . ! ' T h e  parties' connection with the forum of recognition
1 3 5 -  Sharif V. Sharif [1980] 10 Fam .L aw  216 at 217.
1 3 6 -  See, Supra, 83.
137 -[1984] 3 A Ii.E .R .1017 at 1025, 1029, 1033, 1035, 1036; S harif v. 5 t o / [ 1 9 8 0 ]  10 Fam .L aw  216; 
Zaat V. Zaal [1983] 4  F .L .R .284.
1 3 8  [1979] Fam .Law  93.
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was relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion in this context. This can be seen by a 
comparison iy[^  Chaudhary r. Chaudharf^^^^ with QucrJ v. the former
case recognition was refused because the parties were domiciled and habitually resident in 
England at the time of talaq. Ormrod L J .  stated:
II mu hi plain! \  be conirary lo ihc policy ol liic law in a case w here boUi pan ics to a 
m airiagc arc dom iciled in this country lo perm it one o f them , w hilst con tinu ing  his 
English d<miici!c, to a\'oid the incidents o t  his dom iciliary law and to depriv e the other 
parl\' to the m arriage o f her righ ts under that law by the sim ple process o f taking 
advajitagc ol his financial ability  to tra\'cl to a country whose laws appear tem porarily 
to be m ore fa\ c>urable to him"! 1 42)
Whei'eas m Quazi, recognition was given, although the h u s b a n d  was habitually
resident in England when he obtained the talaq, the wife having no connections with
England apart from a short stay. It should be noted that if the facts of the Chaudhary case
lecurred in a case considered under the 1986 Act, recognition still would be refused even
with the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act in force, because section 46 (2) (c)
provides clearly that no informal divorce will be recognised if at least one of the two parties
was habitually resident in the United Kingdom for at least one year before the divorce was 
obtained.
Ihe availability of financial relief in the foreign court was also relevant to the exercise
of the court's discretion. If the wife had already obtained financial benefits substantially
similar to those she would probably have obtained in an English or Scottish divorce,
recognition might not be r e f u s e d . !  * 4 3 )  i,j Qureshi v. Q u r e s h i Sir Jocelyn Simon
P. held that the recognition of lalaq would not cause injustice to the wife because she had
1 3 9  -Slone a 1985) 14 A .A .L.R.363 at 372, 373; Pi I kin g ton. (1988) 3 7  i.C .L.Q . 131 at 137,138.
1 4 0  -119841 3 A ll.E .R . 1017; S h arif v. S h arif \\< m )\ 10 Fam .Law  216; Z aal v. /xmi [1983] 4  
F .L .R .284; R v. Secretary fo r  the Home Department, exp. Fatima 11986] 2 A ll.E .R. 32.
1 4 1 -1 1 9 8 0 ] A .C.744.
1 4 2  -Chamlliery v. Chaudkery 11984| 3 A ll.E .R . 1017 at 1033.?
I 4 3  -Slone, ( 1985) 14 A .A.L.R. 363 al 373,
144-{19711 I A ll.E .R .3 2 5 a l3 7 3 .
254
already obtained a maintenance order from the magistrates court before the talaq and the 
deferred dower became payable to her. Another factor relevant to the court's discretion 
was that the wife should not consent to the divorce or accept it, e.g.by remarrying. This 
factor was mentioned by Oliver L.J. when he pointed out that the wife in Chaudhary 
learned of the talaq some months later and she had never sought or agreed to the divorce or 
accepted it as an effective divorce, whereas in Quazi the wife had required the earlier 
divorce.! * 45)
The problem of financial relief has been resolved by the Matrimonial and Family 
Proceedings Act 1984, which gives the English and Scottish courts power to make an order 
for financial relief after recognition of a foreign divorce. It follows that the rule that public 
policy can be invoked where the motive of the husband is to deprive the wife of her right, 
is no longer law and it is unlikely that the court will refuse recognition under section 51 (3)
(c) of the 1986 Act because the husband had obtained the divorce with the sole purpose of 
depriving the wife of her rights. In the recent Scottish case of Tahtr v. 7 « / n r , ( * 46 )  
wife argued that the talaq, which look place in Glasgow and was completed by formal 
proceedings in Pakistan,was contrary to public policy under section 51 (3) (c) of the 1986 
Act because the motive of the husband was to prevent her from obtaining her rights in 
financial claims. Lord Sutherland rejected this argument when he held that recognition is 
not contrary to public policy because section 28 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings 
Act 1984 allows the Scottish courts to order financial relief after recognition of foreign 
divorces.
It should be noted, although the matter will be discussed more later, that it is not clear 
whether English part III of the 1984 Act applies to all foreign divorces or only to those 
obtained by proceedings. This uncertainty comes from the wording of section 12(1) which 
provides "where -(a) a marriage has been dissolved., .by means of judicial or other
1 4 5 -  Chaiidhery v. Chaiidhery [1984] 3 A ll.E .R  1017 at 1033.
1 4 6 -  1993, S .L .T . 194.
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proceedings in an overseas country, and (b) the divorce...is entitled to be recognised as 
valid in England.,.either party to the marriage may apply to the court.,.for an order for 
financial r e l i e f  .('47)
Thus, if section 12(a) is limited in scope to divorces obtained by "means of judicial or 
other proceedings" then the argument of public policy on the ground of financial relief 
remains an important factor to the exercise of the court's discretion to refuse recognition to 
informal divorces. Since the 1986 Act makes specific provision for recognition of informal 
d iv o r c e s ,! '48) the logical result should be that the parties to such divorces have also 
sufficient financial protection by means of the 1984 Act equally with those divorced by 
proceedings, otherwise it might increase the problems of 'limping m a r r ia g e s '.! '49)
II- Grounds for Non-Recognition of Foreign Divorces in Iraq
It is generally agreed in Iraq that in the absence of specific rules upon which a foreign 
divorce may not be recognised, the courts are bound to follow the general rules contained 
in the Civil Code 1951 and the Civil Procedure Code 1969. The judges must bear in mind, 
in applying the general rules, that the function of decrees of divorce is different from 
decrees relating to commercial and civil judgments. The refusal of recognition of foreign 
divorces without reasonable reasons lead to limping marriages. This has a serious 
consequence not only for the parties themselves but also for the children.
The general rules reveal that the courts must decline recognition of foreign laws if they 
are against Iraqi public p o l i c y . ! ' 50) Where the recognition o f foreign divorce is 
concerned, this would be the case when the national law of the husband does not permit 
dissolution of a marriage during the lifetime of the spouses.!'5 ' )  If, for instance, a
1 4 7 -  C ontrast w ith Part IV o f  the 1984 A ct w hich gives the Scottish courts pow er lo  grant financial relief 
after recognition o f  all divorces w hether o r not obtained by proceedings, infra, chapter 7.
1 4 8 -  .46 (2).
1 4 9 -  Sebastian Poulter, (1987) V ol.84 L .S  G az 253 at 255; Jaffey, o p .c itp . 75.
1 5 0 -  A rt.32  o f the Civil Code o f 1951.
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Brazilian husband obtained a divorce from the English court, such a divorce cannot be 
recognised in Iraq, because the husband’s national law forbids it, whereas if a Brazilian 
wife was married to an English subject, divorce can be recognised, because the English law 
as the law of the husband permits divorce. It is hard to understand this discriminatory rule. 
Moreover, why does the Iraqi public policy intervene with respect to foreigners whose 
connection with Iraq is not close enough to warrant disregarding the foreign divorce? 
Public policy must be invoiced only when the foreign divorce is thought to be grossly 
offensive or repugnant to Iraqi standards of justice or morality. In the first example above, 
it might be thought that there is nothing in Iraqi public policy which should result in failure 
to recognise such a divorce. However, Iraqi law is seeking to be consistent with its own 
conflict rule, and is seeking to mspect the national law of the husband, the Iraqi choice of 
the personal law. This is an interesting area, and a difficult one.!' 5 2) There are two aims, 
or two evils. Unless the parties intend to remain in a legal system where their status is 
undisputed, it is probably more important to avoid limping marriages. It is understandable 
and meritorious that Iraqi law should seek to support the substantive law of its chosen lex 
causae {lex patriae, the personal law):the problem lies in the different treatment of the 
husband and wife.
The rule that the recognition of foreign divorce would be contrary to public policy if the 
marriage to which it related was indissoluble according to the personal law of the parties 
seeking a divorce is not to be found in England and Scotland.!' 5 3) The 1986 Act provides 
in section 51 an exclusive list of the grounds on which recognition may be denied and it 
makes no provision for excepting from recognition a divorce obtained by a party whose 
maniage, according to his or her personal law, was indissoluble. In addition, section 50
1 5 1 -An. 19 (3).
1 5 2 -Cf, difficulties in England and Scotland.e.g . Breen  v. Breen [1964] P. 144; Zanelli v. ZaneUi 1948]
P .381; See, S .50  o f the 1986 A ct and chap ter 6 (The effect o f recognition  o f  foreign d ivorces on
capacity to re-marry).
1 5 3 -  Though C f.generally S .50 of the 1986 A ct (and, earlier, S .7 o f the 1971 Act).
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places the recognition rules above the 'capacity to marry' r u l e . ! ' 5  4 )  Public policy can be 
invoked when a divorce is obtained as a result of fraud, as in a case when the parties 
change their personal law from one which does not permit divorce to one which does, and 
the only purpose of so doing is to obtain d i v o r c e . ! ' 5 5) g u t the conversion of religion to 
Islam even in order to obtain divorce does not make the recognition of such a divorce 
contrary to public policy. This is because Muslims always have the right to divorce 
irrespective of where they are domiciled, and depriving a Muslim of the right to divorce or 
to recognition of his divorce is contrary to public p o l i c y . ! '  56) It should be noted that, this 
rule does not mean that the Iraqi courts can recognise any divorce whatever obtained by 
Muslims. The divorce must satisfy the requirements of Iraqi law. If for instance, a 
Muslim pronounces a talaq in Scotland, such a talaq can be recognised in Iraq even if his 
personal law, Scots law, does not permit it, provided that he has the capacity to pronounce 
talaq according to Iraqi law (qua nationality: on our hypothesis, the husband is of Scots 
domicile, but Iraqi nationality). The Arab treaty states also that a divorce granted in one 
contracting State must be refused recognition if its recognition would be contrary to the 
public policy of the recognition c o u r t . ! '5  7) Since the law of divorce is generally the same 
throughout the Arab League States, it is thought that it is seldom that the courts will invoke 
public policy.
Neither the 1959 Civil Code nor the Arab treaty defines public policy. They left it to 
the discretion of the court to decide whether the recognition would be contrary to public 
policy in the circumstances of the particular case .! '5 8 )  I f  the court is satisfied that the 
recognition of foreign divorce in question is contrary to public policy, then it must refuse 
recognition, because this ground is mandatory not discretionary as under the 1986 Act,
1 5 4 -See, Ch.6
1 5 5  -AIl-Hadway, op.cit.p. 119; C ontrast 'B ritish ' position w hich does not regard a  change o f  dom icile for
such a  purpose as fraudulent. Sellars  v. Sellars [1942] S.C .206.
1 5 6 -Ibid, p.99.
1 5 7 -  Art. 19 (c).
1 5 8 -  Abdul W liahed.Karam , op.cit.p. 40.
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A foreign divorce must be denied recognition if it was obtained in a manner contrary to 
Iraqi ideas of natural justice. Article 19 (2) of the Arab treaty states that a divorce granted 
in one contracting State must be denied recognition if the parties had not been given notice 
of the proceedings. This means that a divorce against an Iraqi respondent who was not 
represented in court will not be recognised unless he was served either in the forum State or 
in Iraq by Iraqi judicial assistance. The requirements of the Arab treaty as to service are 
very similar to the Iraqi Civil Procedure Code 1969. This Code requires that adequate 
notice must be given to the parties concerned either personally, or by post, or by the 
publication in a newspaper in a case where the address is unknown.!' 59) The presence of 
the spouses during the divorce proceedings is not strictly necessary for r e c o g n it io n ,! '60) 
but it is submitted that recognition may be refused if in the court’s view the respondent had 
not been given a reasonable opportunity to take part in the proceedings, because for 
example, of the petitioner’s fraud.
Since the dissolution of marriage by tcdaq is part of Iraqi internal law, it seems unlikely 
that recognition would be refused because notice was not given to the wife of the 
husband’s intention to divorce her. This is consistent with the view of the nature of takiq 
as a purely unilateral act under Iraqi law. Unlike the 1986 Act, there is no ground under 
Iraqi law stating that such a divorce must not be recognised if there is no official document 
certifying that the divorce is effective under the law of the country where it was obtained.
According to the Arab treaty, a divorce must also be denied recognition if at the time 
when it is obtained there are proceedings between the same parties before an Iraqi court, 
providing that these proceedings had been brought to the Iraqi court before the same 
proceedings were raised in the court in which the divorce was granted even if the result of 
the foreign divorce is compatible with the Iraqi decree .!'6 ')  This is a very interesting
1 5 9 -  Arts. 14, 21; A Il-Hadway, op.cit.pp. 167-180.
1 6 0 -  Art. 56  o f the Civil Procedure Code 1969.
1 6 1 - A rt.2 (d ).
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situation results. Thus, if both decrees emanate from an Arab League country, neither will 
recognise the other (as a result of the Res Judicata), and yet the marriage is the same, the 
outcome the same, the substance of the divorce law and the consequence the same and, had 
there been no clash of proceedings, a divorce granted in either state would be recognised by 
the other. We see, though, to have intra-territorial effect of a consistorial decree (at least as 
far as the two legal systems involved are concerned); in practice, the potentialities of 
distress and uncertainty which usually attend 'limping marriages' seem to be small. Hence, 
there would be no true 'limping marriage' unless the Iraqi court should dismiss the action 
on the merits. Nevertheless, the situation cannot be regarded as entirely satisfactory.
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Effect of Recognition of Foreign Divorces on Capacity to Marry
The recognition of foreign divorces is governed by the law of the state in which 
recognition is sought, i.e.the lex fori, whereas capacity or essential validity of marriage is 
decided by the personal law of the parties, i,e the lex causae. Since the essential function 
of the divorce is to terminate the validity of marriage between the parties and leave each of 
them free to remarry, a conflict may arise if the laws concerned take different views as to 
whether the divorced person in question has capacity to remarry. This conflict arises where 
the previous marriage was dissolved according to one law but not according to another.
Prior to the Family Law Act 1986, the courts had adopted different views to solve the 
clash between the rules governing the recognition of foreign divorces, and those governing 
validity of marriage. Section 50 of the Family Law Act 1986 has resolved part of the 
problem and left the other part to be decided by the courts.
The Iraqi conflict rules have completely ignored this subject. The courts must find out 
the solution by reference to the general rules in the Civil Code 1951 and the Personal Status 
Code1959. Although the main aim of this chapter is to discuss the effect of recognition of 
foreign divorces on capacity to marry, it is interesting to discuss also the effect of non­
recognition of foreign divorces, and divorces granted in the court of the forum, on capacity 
to marry. A further point which will be considered, which relates to foreign divorces and 
capacity to many, is where foreign divorces impose prohibitions or restrictions on the right 
of one or both parties to marry. We shall find out whether they are to be accorded 
extraterritorial effect, or to be rejected on the ground of public policy. This chapter will 
divided as follows:
I- The Effect in English and Scots Law of Recognition of Foreign Divorces on 
Capacity to Marry,
II The Effect of Recognition in Iraqi Law of Foreign Divorces on Capacity to Marry,
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I- The Effect in English and Scots law of Recognition of Foreign 
Divorces on Capacity to Marry 
A- Capacity to Marry in General
The conflict rules governing the capacity or essential validity of marriage are based on 
two different principles reflecting the fundamental opposition between territoriality and 
extra-territoriality in the conflict of laws. According to one system, the matter is in 
principle subject to the lex loci celebrationis. According to another, the personal law of the 
parties applies. The adherence to the lex loci represents an early position, it is submitted, 
encapsulated in the maximum, locus regit actum. In early days, a marriage used to be 
judged in its entirety according to the lex loci celebrationis (i.e both as to essentials and 
form). Later, it was recognised that the tool of classification of elements of the problem 
offered an effective solution to the difficulty of ensuring that more fundamental matters 
were referred to the personal law. It may be that the rule in a particular legal system (as 
Scotland: Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977), requires capacity both by the personal law and 
the lex loci celebrationis. The Scots and English view of the importance of satisfying a 
foreign lex loci as to capacity is a matter of argument.!' )  However, the personal law 
system is divided into two tests, according as to whether domicile or nationality is adopted. 
While domicile is used as the most appropriate test to determine the personal law in 
common law countries, nationality is preferred in the civil law countries.
As regards English and Scots laws, the original view was that the choice of law rule 
relating to the validity of marriage in all its aspects was governed by the lex loci 
celebrationis.(2) However, about 1 8 ^  a distinction was drawn between two classes as 
to the validity of marriage: those concerned with formal validity and those concerned with
1- C i.R eed  v, R eed  (1969) 6  D .L .R  (3d) 617; See, Law  C om .W .P .N o.89; S cots Law  Com . N o .64 , 
para. 3 .44  (Recom m endation that capacity  by foreign lex loci be required). Contra, See, C hesh ire & 
N orth, 12th ed., p. 598. See, infra, 265.
2 - Scrirnshirev.Scrimshire (1752) 2 Hag. Con 395 , 161 E .R  7 82 ; D alrym ple v. D alrym ple  1811) 2 
H ag.C on 54, 161 E .R .665; Sim onin  v. M a lla c{l8 6 0 )  2  Sw &  Tr.67.
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capacity or essential validity. While the former remained subject to the lex loci, the latter 
was held to be decided by the parties' personal law.(3)
The leading casein this context is Brook v. Brookf^^') in which a man married his 
deceased wife's sister in Denmark, under whose law the marriage was valid. Both were 
domiciled in England. In applying English law. the House of Lords held that the marriage 
was void. Lord Campbell L.C. drew the following distinction:
"There can be no doubt ol the general rule, that 'a foreign m arriage valid according to 
the law of a country where it is celebrated is gtxxl everywhere'. But w hile the form s o f 
entciing into the contract ol m aiiiage arc to be regulated  by the lex loci coutrcictus, 
the law o f the country  in w hich it is celebrated, the essentials of the contract depend 
upon the (ex dom icilii, the law o f the country in which the parties are dom iciled at the 
time ot the marriage, and in which the matrimonial residence is contem plated."!^)
This decision is inconclusive, a matter which has caused some controversy over the 
years as to whether the lex domicilii in this context means the domicile of the parties at the 
time of marriage or the matrimonial domicile, f  wo theories have been advocated as to the 
law which should govern capacity to marry.
(1 ) The Dual or Ante-Nuptial Domicile Theory: According to this theory, 
capacity to marry is a matter to be governed by the parties' ante-nuptial domiciliary laws. 
For the mairiage to be valid, each party must have capacity to marry (in general and in 
particular) by the law of his or her domicile. Professor Dicey formulated this theory as 
follows;
"Capacity to m arry is governed by the law o f each parly 's ante-nuptial dom ic ile ... A 
mairiage is valid as rcgaids capacity when each o f  the parties has, according to the law 
ot his o r her anlc-nuplial dom icile , the capacity  to m arry  the o th e r...A  m arriage is 
(normally) invalid when either o f  the parties lacks, according to the law o f his o r her 
ante-nuptial dom icile, the capacity to m arry the other,"!®)
3 - Sec. Cheshire & North, 12th e d ,  p. 590; D icey & M orris, 11th ed ., p .623; 12th ed.,p. 664; A nton,
2nd ed., p. 419; Collier, op.c it.,p. 260; North, (1990) I Hague Recueil.49.
4 - (1861) 9 H.L. Cas 193; M elîe v. M ette (1859) î Sw & Tr.416.
5 - Hrook V. Brook  (1861 ) 9 H.L. C. 193 at 207.
6 - D icey & M orris, 12th éd .,pp . 663-664 ; l l t h  cd .,p . 622-623 ; Jaffey , op .c it, pp .24 -26 ; C ollier, 
op.cit, pp .260-262; Cheshire & N orth, I2lh-cd, p. 589.
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(2) The Intended Matrimonial Theory: According to this view, capacity to marry 
is a matter to be determined not by the parties' ante-nuptial domiciliary laws, but by the law 
of their intended matrimonial home. The theory was advocated by Dr. Cheshire. In his 
view
"The basic presum ption is that capacity  to m arry is governed by the law o f the 
husband's dom icile at the tim e of the m am  age, for norm ally it is in the country of that 
dom icile that the parties intend to establish their perm anent home. This presum ption, 
however, is rebutted if  it can be inferred that the parties at the tim e o f  the m arriage 
intended to establish their hom e in a  certain country and that they did in fact establish it 
there within a reasonable lime."C^l
The arguments for and against the two theories have been frequently rehearsed, 
and therefore, it is not proposed to repeat them here. Although the weight of authority, 
both judicial and academic, in England and Scotland, is in favour of the dual domicile 
t h e o r y t h e r e  is a certain stipport for the intended matrimonial home theory in some 
recent c a s e s . I n  the light of these conflicting authorities, the matter cannot be 
regarded as conclusively settled.
7 - Cheshire & North, 12th cd, p. 587; 7ih cd,,p. 279.
8 - D icey & M orris, 7lh cd, pp. 251-253 ; 9th cd, p. 261; 1 Uh ed, pp. 625-626; 12lh cd., pp. 664-668; 
Cheshire & North, 10th ed, p. 331; 12lh cd, p. 586; G ravcson, 7th cd, p .263; Anton, 2n ed, p. 428; 
M orris, 3th cd , pp. 159-160; 4lh ed,.pp. 664-668; North, (1990) 1 H ague Recueil, 53; Jaffey , op.cit, 
p. 24; W olff, op.cit., p. 335-336; Ixiwrence vAxmcence 11985) l.A L L .E .R . 505. A recent im portant 
di.scussion in this area is ''Private Intentalionaf Law, Choice o f  Law Ritls in M arriage"  Law .Com , 
W.P. N" 89 & Scots Law .Com . N" 64, (1984) See now Law Com . N ’^ 165 & Scots Law Com . N" 
105, Private International I m w , Choice o f  f jiw  Rales in Marriage, (1987).
9 “ R epaine,\\94i)\ CH. 46 ; Pugh v.Piigh  11951) P. 482: R v. Brentwood Superintendent Registrar  
o f marriage, exparte Arias [19681 P  .314; Padolecchia v, Padolecchia \\9 6 S ]  P. 3 1 4 ; Szecliter v, 
Szechter [ ] 97 \ ]  P. 286. In S co tlan d  S ec, Letidrnm v. Chakravarti, 1929, S .L .T . 96, 103; 
M acD ongall v. Cliitnavis, 1937 S .C  390-406 ; BUersbach v. MacEwen, 1959 S .C  4 3 -5 2 ; Rojas, 
Petr, 1967 S.L.T. 24 (sh .cl); Sec also. M arriage (Enobling Act) 1960, S .l  (3) and the M atrim onial 
Causes Act 1973. S .l 1(d); M arriage (Scotland Act) 1977, S S .l (1), 2 (1) and 5 (4) (f). T his theory is 
also favoured by Scottish academ ic, Anton, 2n cd,, p. 431 ; Clive, 3rd ed , p. 133.
1 0 “ De ReneviUe v. De ReneviUe [1948] P. 100-114 \per Lord G reene M .R .j 121-122 \per Lord  
Biicknill L .J,]; Kenw ardv, Kenward  [1951 ] P. 124 {fxr D enning L .J .]; Radwan  v. Radwan  IN'" 2] 
[1973] Fam 35; Lawrence v. [ 1985] 1 A LL.E .R  505, \per, A nthony Lincoln J.] at 506.
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In recent years, consideration has been given to other approaches to determining the 
l<m governing capacity to marry. Thus, it has been suggested that the law of the country 
"with which the marriage has the most real and substantial connection should govern the 
validity of marriage''/1 "  It has also been suggested that in cases other than those such 
as a minimum age or impotence, where the purpose of the rule is to protect the parties, the 
marriage should be regarded as valid if either the dual domicile or the intended matrimonial 
home theory is satisfied, i,e rule of alternative reference,d 2) Again, one might have an 
elective dual domicile test, but although prima facie attractive, Dr. North notesd 3) that 
limping marriages would result. However, the Law Commissions have reviewed the 
choice of law rules for marriage. They rejected all these approaches! 1-I) when they 
recommended that "All issues of legal capacity to marry should be governed by the law of 
each party's ante-nuptial domicile (the dual domicile test)"/*
There are a number of exceptions to the general rule that capacity to marry is a question
lor the parties' /ex domicilii. These are as follows:
B -T h e  Rule in Sottomayer v. De R «rm v(N o.2)
As a result of the decision of the English court in Sottomayer v. De Barros (N°
2),(1 in which it was decided that where one of the parties is domiciled in England and
the marriage takes place in England, the courts will not take account of any incapacity
imposed by the lex domidUi o f the other party which is not recognised by English law.
Professor Dicey made an exception to his general rule on capacity to marry which he
I I -  Vrrmeke S,niH, 11983) I.A .C . 145 a l 165.166, Lord S im on o f  G las .da l; W r n c c  v
tM..renn. |1 9 8 5 | I A L L.E .R , 501 al 512 A n.liony Lincoln J. T his approach liu., received som e 
academ ic .suppoir. Sykes, 7/ic /..w iin W  V alid ,y of Uterria,^r.ll9S5) 41 I. C .L .Q I5 9 -I6 8 ; Fcnlim an,
I'fie Validity o f  Marriage and (he Proper h m \(  ] 985) C.L, J 255.
1 2- Ja llcy , (1978) 41 .VI.L.Rev.38; See, lbid..pp. 26-32-39; Royal Conimi.ssion on M arriage and D ivorce
{195<:>) cmd, 9678, para. 891 ; Lawrence v. /.awrence 11985] 3 A LL.E .R .733 al 746.
I 3- Chc.shirc & North, !2th cd, p. 603.
I 4“ Law Coni.N '’ 89 and Scot Law Coni.N ” 64, paras. 3.20-.27.
15- Ib id , paia . 3 .36 ; See also , S co t L aw  Com . D iscussion  P aper .N o 85. Fattiily Law , P re-  
Consolidation Reforms ( 1990). p'ara.9.5.
I 6- (1879) 5 P.D 94,
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formuiated as follows:
I he \ alidiiv ol a maii'iagc celebrated in England belwccn persons of whom the one has 
an English, and I he olhet a loreign, dom icile is not allcclcd  by any incapacitv which, 
lliough existing under the law o f such foreign dom icile, docs not exist under the law of 
England."* *
The rationale behind this rule is to protect the English party. This decision found 
favour with the Court of Appeal in Ogden v. Ogden^^^^ and was followed in Chetti v. 
CheniM^) In Scotland, the precise nature of this exception is a matter of some 
doubt.12*» Professor C live suggested that the d ec ision  in M acDongall v. 
Chimavisf^^) supported this rule in Scots law. In this case Lord president Normand 
cited Chetti v. Chetti and said that "the law o f Scotland is in conformity with it".C2) 
However, Chetti and Macdougall [overruling Lendrum  v. Chakravarti]i^^) may be 
viewed as cases in a special category, where the issue was a consideration of foreign rules 
on restriction upon marriage, the restriction being based on religious grounds, e.g. a ban 
on "mixed marriages" and marriages out of caste. This exception has been strongly 
criticized as being nationalistic and u n p r i n c i p l e d * ^ ^ )  j  the view o f the Law  
Commissions is that the rule in Sttomayer v. De Barros should be a b o l i s h e d . ( 2  5 )
C- C apacity  and the L ex  L oci C elebrationis
There is some uncertainty as to whether the parties must have capacity to marry by the 
lex loci as well as by their domiciliary laws. So far as foreign marriages are concerned,
there is no direct authority in England and Scotland on the point. Nevertheless, it has been
t 7-D iccy & MniTis, 1 Uh cd .pp. 638-639; I2lh cd., pp. 679-680.
18- 119081 P. 46  ai 74-77.
1 9- 11909) P. 67 at 81-88.
2 0 -  See, Anloii , 2n ed. pp. 432-433; Clive, 3rd cd., pp. 153-154.
2 1- 1937 S.C.390.
2 2- Ibid, at 404
2 3- 1929 S.L .T . 96.
2 4 - Anton, 2n cd.,.pp. 431-432; Clive, 3rd cd.,p. 139; Cheshire & North, 2U b cd.,pp. 595-597.
2=»- Law Com No.89 and Scot Law com  N o.64 para. 3 .48; Scots Law Com Disciii.sion paper.N " 85 
(1990), para. 9.14,
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argued that Breen v, BreenO^^) is authority for this proposition when Karminski J was 
prepared to hold that incapacity by the lex loci was fatal to the validity of m arriage/^ 
However, since the learned judge did not examine the effect of a party's incapacity by the 
lex loci on the marriage's validity, the Breen case should be considered insufficient 
authority on this point/^*) So far as marriages celebrated in England and Scotland are 
concerned, it has been suggested that the parties must have capacity not only by their 
personal laws but also by the English or Scottish law on the ground that the court could 
hardly disregard its own law on such vital matters as the minimum age or prohibited 
degrees of marriages even if it was valid by the law of the parties' d o m i c i l e / ^  9)
The point under discussion has been considered by the Law Commissions. A 
recommendation has been made to the effect that
"a m arriage, whether celebrated in the United K ingdom  or abroad, should not be regarded 
as valid in the U nited K ingdom , if  e ither o f the parties is, according to  the law o f the 
country o f celebration (including its choice o f law rules), under incapacity  to  m arry the 
other. ®)
It is hard to see why validity by the lex loci should be required where neither the
parties nor the marriage have connection with that country. If there is policy justification
for applying this rule in the case of marriages celebrated locally, it is submitted that there is
no policy for applying this rule in the case of marriages celebrated abroad because this
would create an additional obstacle to the validity of marriage.*^ 1)
2 6- [1964] P. 144; See also, Berthiaume v. D astous [1930] A.C. 79  per V iscount D unedin, p. 83 
2 7 -  M om s, 3th ed, p. 168.
2  8 - Bradshaw, Capacity to M arry and the R elevance o f  the Lex Loci C elebration is in Com m onwealth  
Law, (1986) 15 A n g -A m er.L R . 112 a t 116-117; C heshire & N orth , 11th ed  , p. 586 ; See fu rthe r 
discussion o f Breen, infra. C onsider R eed  v. R e e d { \9 6 9  )6 D .L .R .(3d) 617.
2 9 -  M orris, 3rd ed , p. 164; G raveson, 7 th  ed, p. 238; Jaffey, op .cit., 39 ; D icey &  M orris, 11th ed ., p. 
637; 12th ed., p. 677; C heshire &  N orth, 12th ed., p. 597; See also, the M arriage (Scotland) A ct 1977, 
SS. 1 (2), 2 (1 )  (a) which provide that a  m arriage celebrated in Scotland is void if the requirem ents as to  
age o r consanguinity and affinity  are no t satisfied; See, Anton, 2nd ed, p. 434.
3 0 -  L aw  Com . No. 89  and Scot Law C om  No. 64, para, 3.44.
3 1 -  See, Hartley,77te P olicy  B asis o f  the English Conflict o f  M arriage  (1972) 35  M .L .R ev 571 ,576-
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D- Public Policy
Since the rule is accepted in England and Scotland that the courts will refuse to apply a 
foreign law if its application would be contrary to public policy, it follows that the court 
will not recognise a capacity or incapacity imposed by the parties' personal law or even by 
the law of the country of celebration if to do so would be contrary to public policy/^ 
Thus, the courts will not recognise a foreign incapacity of a penal or discriminatory 
nature/^ such as an incapacity which is based on grounds of religion/^ as under 
Iraqi law when a Muslim woman is prevented from marrying a non-Muslim m an/^ or 
caste 6) or race.
E- Capacity to M arry After Divorce
This point will be discussed fully to find out what is the effect of recognition of foreign 
divorces on the general rule of capacity to marry which has been summarized above. 
Although the main aim is to discuss the effect of recognition of foreign divorces on capacity 
to marry, it is interesting to consider also the effect of non-recognition of foreign divorces, 
and English or Scottish divorces, on capacity to marry. A further point to be considered, 
which relates to foreign divorces and capacity to marry, is where foreign divorces impose 
prohibitions or restrictions on the right of one or both parties to marry. We shall find out 
whether they are to be accorded extraterritorial effect, or to be rejected on the ground of 
public policy.
It is well settled in countries, which adopted the concept of monogamous marriage that
a married person lacks capacity to enter into a valid union with a third party whilst his or
577; Jaflcy , op.cit.p. 39; cï.R eed  v. R eed  [1969] 6 D .L .R  (3d) 617.
3 2 -  Cheni v. Chetti [1965].P .85; See, A nton, 2nd ed., p. 439; C heshire &  N orth, 12th ed ., pp. 599;
Collier, op .cit., p. 269.
3 3- Scott V. A.G, (1886) 11 P.D .128.infra.
3 4 -  Sottom ayer  v. D e B arros  (N .2) (1879) 5 P .D  94  a t 104; Padadopoulos v. padadopoidos  [1930] 
P .55; M acdougall v. Chitnavis, 1937 S.C  390.
3 5 -  Art. 17 of the 1959 Iraqi Personal Status Code, supra.
3 6- Chetti V. Chetti [1909] P.67.
3 7- Sttomayer v. De Barros (NO.2) (1879) 5 P .D .94  at 104,
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her first marriage is still subsisting under the parties' personal law or; probably, the lex 
loci celehfüîionis. Thus, under English and Scots law, a domiciled English or Scottish 
person who is bound by a prior, valid and subsisting marriage cannot contract another until 
the first marriage is ended by death or is annulled or dissolved. If such a marriage has been 
celebrated nevertheless, it is submitted that the courts must declare it void ah initio for 
bigamy.*^
It is submitted the the issue of a bigamy cannot give rise to difficulties in cases where
both questions (of the validity of the prior marriage and capacity to marry of the parties
concerned) are subject to the lex fori. But where the capacity to marry is subject to a
loreign law or laws, the issue can give rise to some difficulties, because the laws concerned
may take different views as to whether or not the prior marriage was dissolved validly,
with the result that the second marriage may be regarded as bigamy according to one law
but not according to the other. Here there is a conflict between the choice of law rules to
determine the validity of the second marriage, i.e lex causae, and those relating to divorce, 
i.e. lex fori.
The problem may be illustrated by the following example: H and W* are French
nationals domiciled in France. H obtained a divorce from W* in France and then came to
Scotland and acquired Scots domicile. H wished to marry in Scotland, There is no
doubt that the question as to the validity of the French divorce and H's capacity to marry
Vv^  is determined decisively by Scots law, with the result that the proposed marriage will
be permitted and held valid if the French divorce is recognised under the Scottish
recognition rules. Suppose now that H did not acquire Scots domicile but one in Spain,
according to which the French divorce is not recognised. Here the conflict will arise
because the Scottish law as the lex fori indicates that H is single with the result that he
3 8- Shaw  V. (lould(\m S>) L .R  3 H .L  55; B aindaii u. B a w d a ii f 19 4 6 ] .P. 122; Padolecchia v. 
Padolevchia\\96'i^\ P .314; S. I t  (b) o f ihe M atrim onial Causes A ct 1973; S .5 (4) (b) o f the M arriage 
(Scotland) Act 1977; Law. Com. N o.89 and.Scot.Law. Com. No. 64, paras. 3 .8 -3 .40-3 .42 ; Scot.Law  
Com. No. 85, para. 9.6; Clive, 3rd cd., p. 136.
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ought to be fiee to marry: the Spanish law as the l e x  c a u s a e  indicates that the prior 
marriage is still valid and subsisting with the result that H lacks capacity to marry. The 
converse situation has also occurred where the prior marriage has been validly dissolved 
according to the l e x c a u s a e  but not according to l e x  f o r i .  These situations can give rise to 
the general problem known in private international law as the "incidental question " .9)
The question thetefore, is whether the validity of divorce, as a preliminary question, 
should be decided by the l e x  f o r i ,  including its choice of law rules or, by the conflict rules 
of the country whose law governs the main question of capacity to marry. In other words, 
which rules should prevail to solve the problem, that is to say the rules relating to divorce 
or to capacity? Several views have been advanced to solve the problem of the incidental 
question. One view supports the l e x  f o r i  method,(4«) the second supports the l e x  
c a u s a e  method*^ I) and the third is that the solution should depend on the nature of the 
individual case and the policy of the forum thereon.*4 2)
The main argument lor the l e . c  f o r i  is that this method would achieve the internal 
harmony within the forum's legal system which would otherwise be lacking. Moreover, 
this method would avoid an anomalous result for the parties. For them a divorce 
automatically carries with it the right to remarry at least in that country and to deny this will 
del eat the reasonable expectations of the parties.*4 3)
3 9- The term is used by WolfT, 2nd ed , p. 206, and is considered the most suitable English expression.
For discussion o f this problem  See, Wcnglec, (1987) In.Enc.Com .L., Vot, iri.ch .7 ; GoUicb, (1977) 26 
I.C .L.Q . 334; ( 1955) 33 Can Bar.Rcv 523; D iccy & M orris, lU h  cd., p. 49; 12th ed., p. 48 ; M orris, 
4th-cd., p, 424; Cheshire & Nortli, 12th cd., p. 53; Ant(m, 2nd cd., p. 85; H arlely, (1967) 16.1.C.L.Q 
680, op.cit.. p. 264; Collier, op.cit., p. 29. The problem of the incidental question cannot arise
unless lirst, the main qucsinm  must by the I or urn conriict rules be governed by the law of the relevant 
loreign country and secondly, the conflict o f laws of that country lead to a d ifferen t rc.sult from the 
lorum conllict laws upon the incidental (or prelim inary) question.
4 0- Falcon bridge, "Renvoi" Cnrarierizaiion and Aqnired Rigfus (\939) 17 Can. Bar. Rev, 377-378.
4 1- W olff, 2nd ed, p .206; Lipslcin (1972) C .L .J.67 ,90-96; W cngler, (1987) Enc-C om .L ., Vol, III, ch.7,
pp. 16-18.
4 2- Diccy & M orris, 1 Uh ed., p. 50; 12th ed,.p. 49; C heshire & North, 12th cd., p. 55; A nton, 2nd ed., 
p. 88; G ouicb, / he Inrideniaf Question Revisiled-Theory and Prcuiice in Conflict of Ijiws, (1977) 26 
l.C .L .Q . 734.
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Against this argument, it has been suggested that the lex causae method should prevail. 
The reasons behind this argument are that the application of the lex causae to govern the 
incidental question would prevent limping marriages and achieve uniformity of decision 
between courts in different countries. The second is that this method is consistent with the 
choice of law rule that capacity to marry is governed by the law of the parties' domicile. 
The main purpose of this rule is to ensure that the marriage will be recognised in the 
country to which each party belongs by domicile or nationality. The purpose would be 
frustrated if the relevant foreign laws were to be disregarded on this vital point.(4 4)
The arguments in favour of the lex fori method seem stronger for some reasons. First, 
it is impossible to achieve international harmony of decision under the lexcausae in cases 
where the relevant laws of the foreign countries to which the parties belong give conflicting 
solutions. Let us take the following example to illustrate the point: H and W  are both 
Brazilian nationals and married in Brazil. H obtained a decree of divorce from the courts in 
France. Later H mairied a French woman domiciled in France. This marriage according to 
French law is valid but not according to Brazilian law where the divorce is not recognised. 
How can uniformity of view be achieved between Brazilian and French laws? It cannot. 
What should be the aim of a British forum, assuming it has a role to play (as lex loci 
celebarationis). There is no reason in such a case" why England should try to reach 
conformity with one rather than the other legal system".(45)
One might argue that the achievement of international harmony of decisions remains 
possible in this context by reference to the parties' matrimonial home at the time when the 
issue arises. This kind of argument does not always support the lex causae method, as in 
the case when the parties did not set up their matrimonial home at that t i m e . *46)
4 3 -  H artley , (1967) 16 I .C .L .Q .680 , 6 9 0 , 6 91 ; Ja ffey , The Incidental Question and Capacity to 
Remarry, (1985) 48 M .L.Rev. 465, 469, See also, op.cit., p. 266; Palsson, op.cit., p. 96.
4 4 -  W olff, 2nd ed., pp. 208, 209; H artley, (1967) 16 l.C .L.Q . at 690.
4 5 -  H artley, (1967) 16 l.C .L .Q . 680  at 690.
4 6 -  T his is often found to be a defect ol intended m atrim onial hom e reasoning. CÏJie v. Egerton's Will 
Trusts 11956] C .H .593.
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Secondly, the choice of law rule on capacity to marry has not been settled yet. Although the 
dual domicile theory has now been widely supported, it is submitted that some judges have 
apparently prefen ed the intended matrimonial home theory. This uncertainty of choice of 
law rule may lead to ditferent solutions according to which theory the courts apply to the 
cases of remarriage after divorce. Moreover, it has been recently suggested*^ 7) that the 
traditional approach of capacity to marry as a single category with a single connecting factor 
should be abandoned. Instead, there should be a separate connecting factor for each 
category designed to achieve policy. If this approach is right/48) ^ e^n the policy requires 
that capacity to marry after divorce is a matter which belongs to the l e x  f o r i  in order to 
achieve unity of decisions within the forum court and to avoid the anomalous result arising 
from the l e x  c a u s a e  method, as we shall see later.
Before the enactment of the Family Law Act 1986, which solves part of the problem, 
the courts were called upon to deal with this problem in some cases. These indicated that 
both methods had been adopted. Two situations must be examined separately.
1 - Divorce Granted or Recognised by English or Scots Law But not by 
Relevant Foreign Law: This case concerns a remarriage after a divorce validly granted 
oi recognised by English or Scots law but not so recognised in a country whose law 
governs capacity to marry of the parties as being the l e x  c a u s a e  according to English or 
Scots conflict law. Must the person concerned be taken to possess capacity to remarry in 
the eyes of English or Scots law even if he lacks such a capacity according to his law? It is 
interesting to note that the answer would differ according to which method is applied to 
detennine the validity of divorce. Applying the l e x  c a u s a e  method would lead to the 
result that a person who is single in the eyes of English or Scots law has no capacity to 
marry, whereas under the l e x  f o r i  method the proposed marriage would be valid although 
the divorce was not valid in the view of the personal law.
4 7- Downes, (1986) 35 l.C .L .Q . 170, 173-76; Radwan  v. Radwan  (1973j Fam 35.
4 8- This approach has been rejected; Law.Com . No. 89  and Scot.Law Com. No.64, para 3. 27.
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Until the enactment of the 1971 Act the prevailing view was that a divorce granted or 
recognised by the English or Scottish court was not sufficient ground for conferring 
capacity to marry on persons unless the divorce was recognised as valid by the relevant law 
which governs the capacity to m a r r y / 4 9 )  other words, the court took the view that the 
validity of divorce as a preliminary question should be determined by t h e  l e x c a u s a e .
B f e e n  v .  B t e c n C  0) although a case which does not involve an incidental question 
and cannot be considered a conclusive authority in favour of the application of the l e x  
c a u s a e ,  does lend weight to that view. In this case, the parties at all times domiciled in 
England, married in the Republic of Ireland. The wife petitioned the English court for 
annulment of the marriage on the ground that the divorce which had been granted by the 
English court in respect, of the husband s previous marriage, would not be recognised in 
Ireland and the marriage was therefore bigamous by Irish law. Karminski J. dismissed the 
petition on the ground that the English divorce would be recognised in Ireland (by general 
conflict of laws principles recognised in Ireland). However, the Learned judge was 
prepared to hold that a marriage is invalid under the English conflict laws if either party 
lacks capacity by the l e x  l o c i  c e l e b r a t i o n i s  despite the valid English divorce. Although the 
judge's approach in referring the question o f capacity to marry to the l e x  l o c i  was 
criticised,*^ 1) it was said that his judgment seems to imply that the parties' incapacity to 
maiTy by the l e x  l o c i  c e l e b r a t i o n i s  is fatal to the validity of their marriage. The judge 
therefore, was interested in the attitude of the Irish l e x  l o c i  to the English divorce. He 
dismissed the wile s petition because by the Irish conflict of laws the English divorce must 
be recognised.*^
The problem ol the incidental question arose clearly bel ore the English court in the case
4 9 -  D iccy & M orris, I l th  cd ., p. 51; 12th cd .,.p . 53; M orris, 4th cd .,.p . 161 ;.H arlJcy, (1967) 16 
l.C .L .Q . 687: Collier, op.cit.p. 31; N orth, (1990) I H ague Recueil, 91; Jaffey, op.cit., p. 34; C live, 
3rd cd.,.pp. 136-137; Halsputy'.s, Law s o f England, Vol. 8, p. 344.
5 0- [19641 R 144.
5 1- Cheshire & North, 12th cd., p. 598.
5 2- N arlh,.op.cit., (1977), p. 194; Hartley, (1967) 16 l.C .L.Q . 687.
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of R V. Brentwood Superintendent Registrae o f  Marriage, ex p  A r i a s , in which the 
problem was complicated by the introduction of renvoi. In this case the court adopted the 
lexcausae method and held that a marriage in England following a Swiss divorce is invalid 
if it is invalid under the law of the party's ante-nuptial domicile on the ground that the 
divorce was invalid by the Swiss personal law (i.e.in its conflict sense) even if such a 
divorce was entitled to recognition in England because the Swiss law referred the matter of 
capacity to the Italian law of the husband's nationality, and in so doing had to deny its own 
decree.
The facts in this case were: That the husband was an Italian national, domiciled in 
Switzerland, married a Swiss national in 1946. The marriage was dissolved by a Swiss 
court in 1967. His former wife remarried within a few months after the divorce. He 
wished to marry a Spanish national who was also domiciled in Switzerland but he could 
not do this in Switzerland because the law of his nationality, Italy, did not recognise the the 
Swiss divorce. He and his fiancee then came to England to get married but the registrar 
refused to marry them on the ground that the husband lacked capacity to marry by Swiss 
law as well as Italian law, being the lexpatrise referred to by Swiss conflict rules, under 
which the Swiss divorce was not recognised. The couple then applied for an order of 
mandamus to compel the issue of the licence enabling the marriage to be solemnised. The 
petition was rejected by the court on the ground that the Swiss divorce, although validly 
granted by a court of the husband's domicile, Switzerland, and recognised in England, was 
invalid by Italian law, the law governing capacity to marry. Thus, the English court 
concentrated on the issue of capacity to marry and decided that the incidental question 
(validity of divorce) should be determined by the conflict rules of the law governing the 
main question (capacity to marry).which itself referred the matter on to a third law, that of 
the nationality.
Although the English court by applying the lex causae achieved uniformity of decision
5 3 -  [1968] 3 A L L E R . 279.
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and status in England with countries of the husband's domicile and nationality, the decision 
on the other hand left the husband "in a state of matrimonial limbo: his first marriage was 
no longer subsisting under either English or Swiss conflict rules but it nevertheless 
prevented him from r e m a r r y i n g " / ^  4) Thus, a person single in the eyes of English law 
was not free to marry. This is an unfair result since his wife was able to remarry and had 
done so, simply, because she was a Swiss national. This decision is inconsistent with a 
fundamental human right and with the growing international trend towards the promotion 
of the validity of marriages.
In Scotland the problem arose in Rojas case*^ in which the Scottish court applied 
the lexcausae method and held that a remarriage after divorce in Scotland is invalid if the 
relevant personal law of the parties did not recognise that their previous marriage had been 
validly ended by divorce even if such a divorce was entitled to recognition in Scotland. In 
this case, the wife, who was an Italian national domiciled in Italy, had been divorced in 
Mexico. She wished to marry in Scotland a man domiciled in Venezuela. The couple then 
applied to the Sheriff court for a licence to enable the marriage to be solemnised. The court 
dismissed the petition on the ground that there was a legal impediment to her going through 
a form of marriage with another man because Italian law, as being her ante nuptial 
domiciliary law, did not recognise the Mexican divorce as valid.
The common law position as to the effect on capacity to remairy of the recognition of a
divorce was changed by section 7 of the 1971 Act,*^^) which gave effect to article 11 of
the 1970 Hague Convention.*^ 7) This section provided that "where the validity of a
divorce obtained in any country is entitled to recognition by virtue of sections 1 to 5 or
section 6 (2) of this Act or by virtue of any rule or enactment by section 6 (5) of this Act,
5 4 -  D icey & M orris, 11th ed., p. 54; 12th ed.,.p. 52; Collier, op.cit., p. 13; Jaffey , op.cit., p. 34.
5 5- 1967, S .L .T .24.
5 6- A s am ended by S. 15 (2) o f the D om icile and M atrim onial Proceedings A ct 1973.
5 7- This article provides that "a state which is obliged to recognise a divorce under this convention may
no t p reclude either spouse from  rem arry ing  on the  ground tha t the law  o f ano ther sta te  does no t
recognise that divorce"
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neither spouse shall be precluded I'rom remarrying in the United Kingdom on the ground 
that the validity of the divorce would not be recognised in any other country".
The effect of section 7 was to reverse the decision of the English court in R v .
B r e n t w o o d  i m d  the Scottish court in R o j a s  c a s e * ^ a n d  to abandon the l e x c a u s a e
method. Under this section the effect is that in this context the incidental question must be
decided by the English or Scottish conflict rules and not by those of the country of
domi ci l e . *' ^Thi s  means that, if the foreign divorce, is recognised in England or
Scotland, the parties are free to remarry here, notwithstanding any incapacity based on
non-recognition of the divorce in the country of the domicile.*^**) Thus section 7 makes
it clear that primacy is given to the divorce recognition rule of the forum to determine the
validity of the divorce before dealing with the issue of capacity to remarry governed by the
loreign law. Section 7 indicated that the recognition of foreign divorce automatically
earned with it the right to remarry at least in the United Kingdom. Moreover, it avoided the
serious consequence of the l e x  c a u s a e  method and achieved uniformity of internal
decision. On the other hand, section 7 in its context creates a state of uncertainty in this
area of law because its scope is limited only to remarriage in the United Kingdom after a
recognition of foreign divorce*^ *l and did not cover cases where remarriage had taken
place abroad or cases where remarriage followed an English or Scots divorce or a foreign
annulment. If, e.g a French domiciliary was divorced in Germany by a divorce which was
not recognised in France and remarried in Germany a second spouse, section 7 would not
cover this situation because the remarriage had taken place abroad; the rule in R  v .
B r e n t w o o d  would apply and the remarriage would be held to be invalid.
5 8- See, Liiw Com No. 137 and Scot. Law Com. N o.88, para. 6 .51; D iccy & M orris, 1 Uh cd., p. 54;
North, op,(.it., ( 1977), pp. ]92,19j>; Ja ltcy , op.cit., p. 35. Section 7 did not c.xtend to cover rem arriage 
in the United Kingdom after a foreign annulm ent entitled to recognition under the com m on law rules, 
but sec, P en in i v. Perrim  [ 1979} Fam 84: Sec now S. 50 of the Fam ily Law Act 1986.
5 9- Diccy & M orns, I l th  cd., p. 54.
6 0- Law Com .No. 137 and Scot. Law Com ., No. 88 ,.para .6.54.
6 1 -  The draft clause 7 proposed by the Law Com m issions was not lim ited to rem arriage in the United
Kingdom, it contained no reference to where the second marriage took place. Sec, Law Com.No. 34  and 
Scot. Law Com. No. 16, para. 40.
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This situation was considered in Lawrence v. Lawrence, i n  which the English 
court disregarded the geographical limitation of section 7 and held that if a divorce was 
recognised the parties must be regarded in English law as free to remarry anywhere/*» 3) 
The facts in this case were that the wife, a Brazilian national, was married in Brazil in 
1944. That marriage broke down and in Switzerland she met Mr. Lawrence who would 
marry her if she were free and they agreed that their future matrimonial home would be in 
England. By Brazilian law no divorce was possible in Brazil and any decree of divorce 
granted by another jurisdiction to a Brazilian national would be recognised only as a decree 
of separation. In 1970 the parties went to Nevada and there she obtained a divorce. The 
following day they married in Nevada and shortly afterwards returned to England to live 
according to their agreed plans. In 1972 the marriage broke down and the wife returned to 
Brazil. The husband petitioned for divorce and sought a declaration that the Nevada 
marriage following the wife's divorce in that state was valid. The wife sought a declaration 
that the marriage was null and void, contending that under English law capacity to contract 
a marriage was governed by the law of the parties’ ante-nuptial domicile. Since she was at 
all material times domiciled in Brazil and Brazilian law did not recognise the divorce, she 
lacked the legal capacity to enter into a second marriage.
The question before the court was whether the wife had capacity to marry in Nevada
even though she was still a married woman according to her domiciliary law, simply
because the Nevada divorce was entitled to recognition in England.*^ 4) first instance,
6 2- [1985] 1 A Il.E .R  506; [1985] 2 A il.E .R  733; discussed. C arter, Capacity to Remarry after a Foreign 
Divorce, (1985), 101 L .Q .R ev .496 ; C ollier, Foreign Divorces and Capacity to Marry: Judiciary and 
Jurists, (1985) C .L .J. 3 7 8 ; J a lle y , (1985) 48  M .L .R ev . 4 65 ; D ow nes, Recognition o f Foreign 
Divorces and Capacity to Remarry,{l9m) 3 5  l.C .L .Q . 170; L ipste in , Recognition o f Divorces and 
Capacity to RemarryX19S6) 35  l.C .L .Q . 178; N otl, Capacity to Marry Following Foreign Divorce 
or Nullity, (1985) 15 F am ily  law  199; H ill, Remarriage After an Overseas Divorce, (1985 ) 36  
N .I .L Q . 251.
6 3- C ollier, op .cit, p. 267.
6 4 -  The N evada divorce was recognised in E ngland under section 3  o f the 1971 A ct, either on the ground 
o f  the first husband's U nited State nationality, o r on the ground o f  the w ife's dom icile as defined by the 
law of N evada at the tim e o f  m arriage.
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Anthony Lincoln J. after reviewing the relevant authorities/*»^) concluded that while the 
dual domicile test had been frequently applied there had been no case relating to foreign 
divorce and subsequent marriage in which the courts had been confronted with a choice 
between the competing doctrines of dual domicile or intending matrimonial home, i.e the 
law oi the country with which the marriage had the most real and substantial 
connection.**'»6) On balance, the learned judge was in the view that the test of the 
intended matrimonial home should determine the question o f capacity to marry. 
Accordingly, since the parties intended matrimonial home was England and under English 
law both parties were free to marry, the judge held that the second marriage was valid.
Although the learned judge avoided the problem of the incidental question by holding
that the validity of marriage was governed by the intended matrimonial home, with the
result that the lex causae concided with the lex f o r i it is submitted that the judge’s
view was in tavour of the application ol the lex fori to the incidental question since he was
attracted by Ihe view that if a divorce was recognised under English law, the result must be
that the parties are free to marry/** One can conclude from Anthony Lincoln's decision
that he concentrated only on the facts of the case and did not attempt to find a solution to the
whole problem of remarriage after divorce. Thus, the use of the intended matrimonial
home to test the wife’s capacity will not help him in a case where such a matrimonial home
has not been settled yet. Again, the judge did not give a clear answer to the question where
the parties set up their matrimonial home in a country whose law does not recognise the 
divorce *^ )^
The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision that the marriage was valid, but not on the
6 5- R V. Brenlwood SuperiniendeiU Registrar o f marriage, exp Arias |1 9 6 8 ]  3 A L L .E .R  279;
Padoievrhia v. Padolecchia [ 1968] P .3 14 .
6 6- Lawrence v. Lawrence 11985] I A LL.E .R .505 al 511.
6 7- Downes, (1986) 35.I.C .L.Q . 170, 171; Carter, (1985) 101 L.Q.Rcv. 496, 499.
6 8 -  L ipstein, (1986) 35 l.C .L.Q . 178, 180; Jaffey, (1985) 48 .M .L.Rev.465, 466.
6 9 -  IrnvrencevdMwrenceWm^] 1 A LL.E .R . 505, 512; See, N oll, (1985) 15 Fam ily  Law , 199, 201; 
Carter, (1985) 101 L.Q.Rcv. 496,502.
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same reasoning. Ackiier L.J. rejected the view that the case involved the general question 
ot what law governed the capacity to marry, since the case was concerned  with one and 
only one species of alleged incapacity to remarry which arose out of  the continued existence 
of  the wife's first m arriage contracted in B r a z i l / 7 O j  i „  the recognition o f  the
divorce carried with it the right to marry. Therefore, the fact that the d ivorce was not 
recognised by the country in which one party was domiciled could not affect the validity o f  
the marriage. His Lordship then said:
"The cssenliai kincUon o f  a decree o f d ivorce is to d isso lve the m arriage h itherto  
existing between the parties. I consider that it i.s plainly inconsistent w ith recognising 
a divorce to say in the sam e breath that the m arriage which is purported to dissolve still 
conliniios m ex istence. S uch  a rec o g n itio n  w ould  be a ho llow  and em pty
gesture. "(7 1)
Thus, his Lordship managed to cope with difficulties arising from the use of the 
matrimonial home test by upholding the validity of the Nevada marriage on the ground that 
the inevitable consequence of the court recognising the Nevada divorce under the 1971 Act, 
was to recognise that it brought in its train the capacity to remarry and as a consequence of 
that, that it must be taken to dissolve the Brazilian maniage. Ackner L.J.'s jtidgm ent 
seems to suggest that the incidental question is to be decided by the lex fori X  2)
Purchas L.J. accepted that the issue raised an incidental question. His approach was 
that the validity of a divorce for the purjtose of a remarriage was to be determined by the 
law which governs the capacity to marry.(7 3) According to him, if a foreign divorce is 
recognised on the basis that it was obtained in the country of the domicile, determined in 
the foreign rather than the English sense, then this domiciliary law and not that o f the 
domicile determined by English law governed the issue of capacity to r e m a r r y .(7  4)
7 0- iMwrence v. Lawrence 11985] 2 A LL.E .R .733, 741.
7 1- Ibid, at 7 4 1.
7 2 -  .lattcy , (1985) 48 M .L.Rcw  465, 466; D<wucs, (1986) 35  l.C .L.Q , 170, 172. 
7 3- Ja llcy , (1985) 4  M .L.Rev. 465, 468; D ownes, (1986) 35 l.C .L.Q . 170, 173.
7 4- Cheshire & Nurth. 12th ed„ p .604; C arter ( 1985) 101 L.Q.Rcv. 496, 5(X.)-501.
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This means that his Lordship suggested that the question of capacity to remarry after 
divorce should be determined by the law of domicile as defined by the law of the place of 
divorce, where remarriage occurs in the same place.(7 5) in reaching this conclusion, the 
learned judge point out that the wife at the time of the proceedings in the Nevada court had 
acquired a domicile in Nevada (in the Nevada view) on the basis of six weeks' residence 
and could not have had any other domicile according to English common law. Then the 
wife, in the eyes of the English court, for the purpose of recognition of the Nevada 
divorce, had lost her Brazilian domicile and acquired a domicile of choice in Nevada under 
section 3(l)(a) of the 1971 Act. In these circumstances the Nevada concept of domicile 
should extend beyond the requirement of section 3 (2) and that it should be relevant as well 
for the purpose of determining capacity to remarry.
The use of the domicile in the foreign sense to test capacity to remarry is unsupported 
by previous authority and not required by the 1971 Act which uses this concept only for 
determining the validity of foreign divorce.(^ Moreover, the learned judge's approach 
seems to give primacy to recognition rules of domicile over nationality and habitual 
residence, as a result of which the remarriage will be valid if the foreign divorce is 
recognised on the ground of domicile but not on the ground of nationality or habitual 
residence.C^ *) Tliis appears to give a primacy which is not required by the 1971 Act, and 
is regarded as a retrograde step from the common law rule under which a divorce was to be 
recognised only if it was granted or recognised by the domicile of the parties, and which 
common law rule was to be widened by the Act.
Sir David Cairns, in upholding the validity of the second marriage based his decision
on two different grounds. The first seems to support Lincoln J's view that capacity to
marry is to be decided by the law of intended matrimonial home. The second supports
7 5- See, D ow nes, (1986) 35 I.C .L .Q . 170, 173.
7 6- Lawrence v. Lawrence [1985] 2 A LL.E .R . 733, 744-745.
7 7 -  C arter, (1985) 101 L .Q .R ev .4 9 6  ,501; D ow nes, (1986) 35 I .C .L .Q . 170, 173; H ill, (1985) 36
H .I.L .Q . 251, 253.
7 8- Jaffey, (1985) 48 M .L.Rev. 465, 468.
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Ackncr L.J.'a view that the recognition of divorce carries with it the right to m a r r y , ( 7 9 )
[ he actual rostilt in the Lawrence case is strongly criticised on the ground that it is not 
to be tound in the transposition of domestic policy attitudes into a transnational factual 
context. Nor is to be found in the inteipretation of section 7 of the 1971 Act, and not with 
choice of law rules governing capacity to marry.(«0) It is argued that the reason for 
upholding the validity of the second marriage was, in addition to the recognition of divorce, 
that the parties had established theirmatrimonial home in England and that England was the 
country with which the parties had most real and substantial connection.!* »
It is submitted that the reason for upholding the validity of the wife's marriage is to be 
tound in Ackner L.J.'s judgment. The learned judge states clearly that the validity of the 
second marriage was an inevitable consequence of the recognition of the Nevada divorce. It 
would be inconsistent with the essential function of the decree of divorce to deny the 
validity of the second marriage simply because the wife lacks capacity under her personal 
law. The tailure of the traditional choice of law rules to give a satisfactory solution as to 
the effect of recognition of foreign divorce on capacity to remarry leads the judge to extend 
section 7 to cover case where remarriage takes place abroad. It is submitted that this view 
is consistent with the policy of the lex fori method.
In 1984. the English and Scottish Law Commissions examined the issue under 
consideration and recommended that section 7 of the 1971 Act should be extended to cases 
where the remarriage is celebrated outside the United Kingdom.(*2) In effect this 
recommendation means that priority is given to the rules relating to divorce recognition over 
the traditional common law approach that status is e.xclusively to be determined by the law
£ d Q ^ c i l^C:(8 3) The Law Commissions make it clear that the policy behind it is to
7 9- Lawrence v. Lawrence J19851 2 ALL.E.R.  733 , 756.
8 0- Cuncr. (1985) 1 0 1  L .Q .R e \.5 0 1 .
8 1- Hill, ( l% 5 ) 35.N .I.L .Q . 2.51. 255; Carlcr, (1985) 10) L.Q.Rcv. 501, 502.
8 2- Law . C om . No. 137 & Sco t L aw  C om  N o .88, paras. 6 .4 9 - 6 ,5 9 .
8 3 -  A s in P M e rrM a  r. r a M e a h i a  119681 P. 314  and «  „. n re„ ,w „oü  Supenn,em ,em  R e ,is ,ra e  o f
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simplify the law.(^^)
A further issue has been considered by the Law Commissions, namely, the remarriage 
after an English or Scottish divorce,(*^ It has been seen that section 7 of the 1971 Act 
did not cover cases where remarriage following an English or Scottish divorce had taken 
place within the United Kingdom, and such a divorce would not be recognised by the law 
of the domicile of one or both of the parties. Applying the rules governing capacity to 
maiTy, the result would be that the second marriage would be invalid, whereas in the 
situation envisaged by section 7 it would be valid if  the English or Scottish court 
recognised the foreign divorce even if the personal law of the parties did not recognise it. 
This means that section 7 gives greater effect to foreign than to English or Scottish 
divorces.^* The Law Commissions recommended that the priority should be given to 
English and Scottish divorces over the rules governing choice of law relating to 
marriage.(8 7)
The proposal of the Law Commissions is criticised "as a retrograde step in English 
private international law, a step devoid of policy justification and a step likely to lead to 
unwarranted (and often pretentious) assertions of extra-territoriality abhorrent to 
international comity".(**) However, this argument has been rejected in favour o f  
simplicity of law and to ensure uniformity of decision within the forum court when section 
50 of the Family Law Act 1986 confirmed the proposal of the Law Commissions. This 
section provides that "where, in any part of the United Kingdom-(a) a divorce...has been 
granted by a court of civil jurisdiction, or (b) the validity of a divorce. ..is recognised by 
virtue of this part, the fact that the divorce would not be recognised elsewhere shall not 
preclude either party to the marriage from remarrying in that part of the United Kingdom or
marriage, exp Arias [1968] 3 A L L.E .R . 279.
8 4- Para. 6. 59.
8 5- Para. 6. 57,
8 6 -  D icey & M on is, 11th ed., pp. 55, 56; N orth , op. cit., (1977), p. 195.
8 7 -  Lcivv.Cora. No. 137 & Scot. Law  Com . N o.88, para. 6.57.
8 8- Carter, (1985) 101 L Q .R ev . 505, 505.
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cause the remarriage of either party ( where the remarriage takes place) to be treated as 
invalid in that part".
2- Divorce Recognised by the Relevant Foreign Law But not by English 
or Scots Law: The case envisaged here is that of a prior marriage which has been 
dissolved by a divorce valid according to the relevant foreign country whose law governs 
capacity to marry, but not according to English or Scots law. Do the persons concerned 
possess capacity to remarry in the eyes of English or Scots law, even if still bound by a 
previous marriage in the English and Scottish view? Applying the lex causae method 
would lead to the result that a person is validly and monogomously married to two persons 
at the same time. Under the lex fori method the proposed marriage would be invalid,!*
It will be remembered that under English and Scots law a domiciled English or Scottish 
person who is bound by a prior valid and subsisting marriage, cannot contract another until 
the first marriage is ended by death or is annulled or dissolved. The policy behind this rule 
is to avoid a case of bigamy. It follows that a married English or Scottish person who is 
divorced abroad has no capacity to remarry either in United Kingdom or abroad if the 
divorce is not recognised under the English or Scottish law.
In Shaw  v. G o u l d the House of Lords decided that the wife lacked capacity to
contract a new marriage because her first marriage was still subsisting as the Scottish
divorce was not recognised in England. In this case, since the wife was an English
domiciliary the problem of the incidental question did not arise,!** 1) and therefore, the
House of Lords did not find difficulty in deciding that the second marriage would only be
contracted validly, in the English view, if the divorce was entitled to recognition under
8 9 -  D icey & M orris, 11th ed., p. 51; C heshire & North, 12h ed., p. 603; H artly , (1967) 16 I.C X .Q .684 , 
685; Jaffey , op.cit., p. 34 ; Palsson,.op .cit., p. 99; C live, 3rd  ed., p. 137.
9 0- (1868) L .R 3  H .L 5 5 .
9 1 -  E xcept in so  far that there m ight be said to  be a  separate issue, legitim acy o f claim ants, w hich the 
House o f  Lords treated as inextricably  linked w ith the valid ity  o f the parents' m arriage, in tern linked 
inextricably w ith the anterior Scots divorce.
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English law. However, when the incidental question arises the problem can give rise to 
some difficulties.
There is no English or Scottish case in which the incidental question has arisen in this 
context, as there is for the converse situation. Nor does the case fall within section 50 of 
the Family Law Act 1986. Academic opinion is divided as to which law should decide the 
incidental question in this kind of case. According to one view,(^^> the law governing the 
main question (capacity to marry) should decide the incidental question of the validity of 
divorce. Applying this rule the result would be that the parties to the proposed marriage 
would be regarded as capable of remarriage despite the non-recognition of the divorce by 
the forum court. The Canadian case o f Schwehel v. Ungar^^^^ appears to support this 
view. In this case a Jewish couple had been divorced in Italy by a ghet while they were 
domiciled in Hungary. This divorce was not recognised by Hungarian law, nor by Italian 
law, but it was recognised by the law of Israel where both parties acquired a domicile after 
the divorce. Later, the wife, still domiciled in Israel, married in Ontario a second husband 
who was domiciled there. He petitioned the Ontario court for a declaration that his 
marriage was void because the wife was still married to her first husband since the Jewish 
ghet obtained in Italy was not entitled to recognition according to the Ontario conflict laws.
The court rejected the husband's plea and held the second marriage was valid because 
the wife's capacity to marry was governed by the law of her domicile, and by that law the 
divorce was valid, even though it was not valid by the Ontario law. Although the result of 
the decision has been welcomed on the ground that it promoted freedom to marry since the 
parties had married in good faith and had lived together for some time, or on the ground 
that it achieved uniformity of decision between the courts of the forum and the courts of the 
foreign c o u n t r y , ! * *  4) jt is submitted on the other hand, that this solution is in direct 
9 2- N orth, op.cit., (1977), p. 224; (1975) 91 L.Q .Rcv. 36  a t 45, 46, 53.
9 3 -  (1964) 48 D .L .R  (2d) 644, affirm ing (1963) 42 D .L .R  (2d), com m ents, H ooper, A N ew  Rule fo r
R ecognition o f  Foreign D ivorces?  (1964 ) 27  M .L .R ev  7 2 7 ; L ysyk , C onflict o f  L aw s-S tatu s-
Capacity to tnarry-Recognition o f  prior Foreign Divorces-The Incidental Question (1965) 43 Can. Bar.
Rev. 363; W ebb, (1965) 14 I.C .L .Q  .659.
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conflict with the concept of marriage as monogamous in English and Scottish 
This solution will imply the recognition of a kind of legal bigamy, the "divorced" party 
being lawfully married to two persons at the same time, and therefore, "intractable 
problems in relation to succession, matrimonial relief and other matters could thus arise. 
Suppose in such a case as Schwebel, the wife, after her second marriage had been held 
valid in England, became domiciled in England and died there intestate the first husband 
would be entitled to succeed as the surviving spouse, for the divorce would not be 
recognised in England. What about the second husband, whose marriage had been held 
v a l i d ? " ! * * 6) Accordingly, the lex fo ri method should be used to decide the incidental 
question of the validity of divorce to avoid such an absurd result, which would be the 
inevitable consequence if the 'lex causae method were to be applied.
The Law Commission in its consultation paper on the Recognition of Foreign Nullity, 
Divorces and Related Matters examined the situation under consideration and recommended 
that "in our view, it a loreign divorce or annulment is refused recognition in the United 
Kingdom, and the marriage is otherwise valid and subsisting, the spouses should not be 
regarded here as capable of remarrying, whatever the view taken by the law of their 
domicile."!** 7) el feet this means that a person whose foreign divorce is not recognised 
as valid should not be regarded as free to remarry, whether in England or Scotland or 
elsewhere, notwithstanding that the law of his domicile recognised the divorce. A 
suggestion which would mirror section 50, in that the (British) forum prefers its own 
recognition rule to that adopted by the law of domicile.
The English and Scots Law Commissions in the final report in 1984 suggested that 
legislation is unnecessary to deal with the effect of non-recognition of foreign divorce on 
9 4- Diccy & M orris. I Iih cd , p. 53; 12tK cd., p. 51; C ollicr.op.cit., p. 31.
9 5 -  Hooper, ( IU64) 27 M.L.R. 727. 730; Hartley, ( 1967) 16 I.C.L.Q. 680, 684; Clive, 3rd ed., p. 150.
9 6- dalfay, op.cil., p ,36; (1985) 48 M .L.Rev. 465 at 496.
9 7- Law Com & Scot.Law .C om , unpublished consultation paper circulated to a selected audience in may
1983.p. 97.
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capacity to marry/***) The main reason given by the Law Commissions was that the 
problem is not likely to arise in practice. In the case of remarriage in the United Kingdom, 
conflict between the recognition and capacity rules is not likely to arise because even if the 
parties have capacity under the relevant foreign law, capacity under the English and Scots 
law would also be required. In the case of remarriage abroad, the Law Commissions 
suggested that since the rules for recognition of foreign divorces are so broad, a conflict 
with the law governing capacity is unlikely. If recognition is denied on the ground of 
public policy, the Law Commissions took the view that such a non- recognition"ought not 
to be a bar to the recognition of the validity of a remarriage elsewhere".!** In the same 
line Dr. Noith! ) aigues that, in the case of a remarriage proposed or purported to have 
taken place abroad, difficulties for a United Kingdom court would be unlikely to arise 
because the United Kingdom divorce recognition rules based on section 46 of the Family 
Law Act 1986 are broad and generous. However, as against that, one might say that 
section 46 (2) is much more strict than section 46 (1) and it might well be the case that a 
United Kingdom court might differ from the view taken by the law of the husband's 
domicile in the matter of recognition of e.g. a bare takiq.
In the absence of legislation dealing with this issue, it rnight be argued that the desire to 
reduce limping marriages, the policy of achieving international uniformity of decision, and 
the policy of protecting the parties' reasonable expectations requires the application of the 
lex causae. It might also be argued that there is no policy justification for the forum to 
hold that the marriage is invalid if it is celebrated in accordance with the lex causae which 
would recognise the validity of that marriage, simply because the divorce is not recognised 
by the lorum's court, in the cases where neither the parties nor the marriage has a 
connection with that court.!
9 8- L a\v .C om .N o.t37  & Scot Law C om .N o.8 8 .para .6.6; C heshire & N orth, I2th ed ., p. 605; N ott,
( ] 985} 15 Fam ily law. 199 at 2 0 1, 202.
9 9- Para. 6.60.
1 0 0 - Cheshire & North, 12th cd., p. 605.
I 0 1- Diccy & M on is, I llh ed , pp 636-638; .Iarrcy..op.cil.p. 39; David G ordon, op.cil.p. 153.
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However, it is submitted that the tex fo r i method should be used to decide the 
lucidentai question. So taras remarriage in England or Scotland is concerned, this method 
is consistent with the accepted view that the parties must have capacity not only by their 
personal law but also by English or Scottish law.< 102) The Scottish Law Commission has 
recently recommended that "no matter what the domiciles of the parties may be, a marriage 
entered into in Scotland should be invalid if. according to Scottish internal law, ( b) either 
party is already married".<t0.3) To hold othenvise, would imply the recognition of a kind 
of legal bigamy, a concept which is offensive to English and Scottish standards of morality 
and public policy. In the case of remarriage abroad, it is also submitted that the lex fo ri 
method should be used in this context to avoid the consequences arising from the 
application of the feramvtte, nam-!y, t!-k a  person is validly and monogomously married
to two persons at the same time, and any complications arising from this fact in relation to
succession and matrimonial relief.
3- Prohibitions Against Remarriage After Divorce
The point to be considered here is the situation where a foreign divorce imposes 
prohibitions or restrictions on the right of one or both parties to marry. Does a divorced 
person possess capacity to marry within the prohibition period in the eyes of English or 
Scots law even if he lacks a capacity according to his law? It is well settled in England and 
Scotland that the answer depends on the kind of prohibition or restriction which is imposed 
by the foreign law. It is submitted that the prohibitions or restrictions under consideration 
might be divided into two c l a s s e s . ! I»-») First, those imposed against only one party. 
Secondly, those imposed on both parties,
1 0 2 - ,v/,„,r V . t ; „ „ W , |8 6 8 )  1,.R 3 H .L  5,5; M n d m l v. I M n M i  , I 9 4 6 |.P .  122; P a r io M .ia  v. 
l ’mlokvrluiilWX,H] P .3 I4 ;S .1 I  (b) o f the M alrim onial Ciiuse.s Act 1973; S .5 (4) (b) o f  the M arriage 
(Scollaml) Act 1977; Law com  N o.89  and Seul Law  Cum No.fi4, paras. 3 .8 -3 .40-3 .42 ; Scol Law
Q im ., N<l 85, para. 9.6; C li\ e, 3rd cd., 150.
I 0 3 - Tiic Scots Law Com. No.83, (1990), para. 9.6; Law Cum. No. 89  & the Scol.s Law  Com ., N o.64. 
para. 3.8.
1 0 4 - W olIL 2nd-cd., pp. 172, 173-339; D iccy & M orris. I llh  cd., pp. 631, 633; !2th cd, pp..672-674; 
Ciic,shlcr & Norlli. I2lli cd . pp. 605, 606; H anley, ( 1967) 16 I.C .L.Q .694, 699; Palssoii, o p .ic t .  pp.
64, 65, 93, 94; M aclean, op.cil., p. 57.
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a- Prohibitions Imposed on One Party
Various legal systems forbid one party to a divorce to remarry within a specified period 
of time or during the life of the other party. Such prohibitions or restrictions are designed 
to achieve different purposes. Under Iraqi law, for instance, if consummation of marriage 
has taken place and the marriage is dissolved by divorce, the woman is prohibited from 
marrying within a period o f  IddaS^^^^  This prohibition is designed either to prevent 
doubt arising concerning the paternity of any child bora to the divorced woman shortly 
after the divorce, or to give tlie husband opportunity to resume the relationship during that 
period.! Ub>) Some other legal systems forbid the guilty party to the divorce who has 
committed a matrimonial offence to marry so long as the injured party remained single or 
until after the death of the injured p a r t y . !U>7) The accepted view in England and Scotland 
is that a prohibition imposed by a foreign law on only one party will be disregarded if it is 
considered as being penal and discriminatory, irrespective of the domicile of the 
parties.! 10*) This might be justified on the ground that this kind of prohibition is
offensive to English and Scottish standards of morality and public policy.
In Scott V. A .G ,! 1 0 9 )  a husband domiciled in Natal obtained a divorce there on the 
ground of his wife's adultery. The law of Natal prohibited the remarriage of a guilty party 
as long as the innocent party remained unmarried. The wife, who was the guilty party 
married the co-respondent in Cape Colony, and later went through a second ceremony with 
him in England within the prohibition period. The judge held that the wife's remarriage 
was valid, on the ground that the prohibition in the law of Natal did not operate as a bar to 
marriage where the wife had acquired an English domicile, because after the divorce she 
was a single woman and therefore she is free to remove into any other jurisdiction to
10 5 -S ee , supra, 17.
1 0 6 -  E.g,.W arterv. W a r te r { \m y )  L .R .15 P.D .152.
1 0 7 -  Palsson, op.cit., p. 64; H artley, (1967) 16 I.C .L .Q . a t 694 .note (55).
1 0 8 - W illiam .E .H older, P ublic  P o licy  and N ational Preferences: The exclusion o f  Foreign L aw  in 
English Private International Im w ,  (1968) 17 I.C .L .Q . 926 ,948; W olff, op .cit., p. 339; C heshire & 
North, 12th ed., p. 606; D icey &  M orris, 11th ed., p. 632; 12th ed., p. 673
1 0 9 -  (1880) 11.P.D.128.
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contract a fresh marriage/^  ^ The decision in this case was explained by the same judge 
in Warter v.Warterf^^^)  on a different ground when he held that the incapacity to 
remarry imposed by the Natal law only attached to the guilty party and was therefore penal 
in its character and not to be enforced in England, whether or not there was a change in the 
domicile of the penalised party. This explanation would seem to provide a clear and 
explicit authority for the proposition that the prohibition on remarriage as penal will be 
disregarded and the proposed marriage in England or Scotland will be valid on the ground 
of public policy, whatever the domicile of the parties at the time of the remarriage.
Another kind of prohibition is that which forbids the remarriage of a divorced woman 
for a limited period. Although this prohibition attaches only to one party, it is submitted 
that it is far from being penal or discriminatory, because its purpose, as under Iraqi law, is 
either to avoid doubt about the paternity of any child that might be born after the divorce or 
to give the husband opportunity to resume the relationship. However, in the Australian 
case of Lundgren v. O' in which the prohibition was of the kind under
consideration, the court was of the view that the prohibition was penal, because it attached 
to one party only and upheld the validity of the wife's marriage within the prohibition 
period. Although the result of the decision is good policy for upholding the validity of the 
wife's marriage, it is hard to accept the reasoning of the court that such prohibitions are 
penal. It is submitted that the purpose of this kind of prohibition is not to punish the guilty, 
but to avoid the undesirable result of doubtful paternity of children born at this time.
Hartley has suggested that this prohibition should be applied if it forms part of the law 
governing the capacity of the parties to the new m a r r i a g e . ( H 3 )  follows that the 
remarriage of an Iraqi-domiciled divorced woman within the period o f the prohibition in 
England or Scotland should be held invalid. If, however, the wife acquired an English or
110- Ibid, at 131.
111- (1890) L.R.15 P.D.152.
1 1 2 - lNo.2] [1921] V.L.R.361; Dicey & Morris, 11th ed., p. 633; 12th ed., p. 674.
113 - Hartley, (1967) 16.I.C.L.Q. at 699; M oms, op.cit., p. 108,
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Scottish domicile, the prohibition should not be app lied /1  ^ There may be no need for 
such a distinction: the time limit in its nature is likely to be short, and causes no offence to 
the forum, it should be regarded as a reasonable exercise of judgment by the foreign forum 
in fixing the terms of divorce.
b- Prohibitions Imposed on Both Parties
This kind of prohibition which has been considered most frequently by English courts 
is based on the fact that in some comitries the decree of divorce, though absolute, does not 
permit the parties to remarry before the period of appeal has elapsed, and any maiTiage 
witliin that period is regarded as invalid. Its purpose is not to punish the guilty party but to 
avoid the undesirable result which might arise from a second marriage if the decree is 
reversed on appeal. This prohibition constitutes, as Dr. Cheshire points out, something 
analogous to the marriage disability imposed on domiciled English spouses in the period 
between the decree nisi and the decree absolute.!^ 1 Accordingly, the courts considered 
that this prohibition must be applied so long as it is not an everlasting prohibition if it is 
applicable under the lex divortii even if it does not form pai*t of the law governing the 
capacity of the divorced person to remarry.(11 ^
In Warter V, W arter/^  ^7) a husband obtained a divorce in India, on the ground of his 
wife’s adultery. Indian law imposed a prohibition on both parties, forbidding remarriage 
until the period of appeal had elapsed from the decree absolute. The wife remarried in 
England within this period. It was argued that since the second marriage was in England, 
the parties should be free from the prohibition imposed by the Indian law. Sir James
114- See, orignal explanation [ratio of Scott v. A.(7(1880) 11 RDI 28], supra, 287.
1 1 5 - Cheshire & North, 12th ed , pp. 605 ,606; Dicey & Morris, 11th ed., p .631; 12th-ed., p. 673; 
Graveson, 7th ed , pp. 261, 288. Moms, 3rd ed., p. 170; under English law the decree is made in two 
stages, the decree nisi, followed by the decree absolute. The marriage ceases as soon as the decree is 
made absolute and either spouse is then free to remarry. The decree ttisi does not have this effect, and 
if  either party remarries before it is made absolute, the second marriage will be void. See, section 1 (5) 
of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Such a two-step procedure is not part of Scots law.
1 1 6 - Wolff, 2nd ed., p. 379; William. E. Holder (1968) 17 I.C.L.Q. 920, 948; Collier, op. cit., p. 269.
1 17- (1890) 15 P.D.152.
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Hannen rejected this argument when he held that the second marriage was invalid on the 
ground that the prohibition in Indian law is an integral part of the proceedings, and a 
condition which must be fulfilled before the parties can contract a fresh marriage, and they 
cannot evade it by obtaining a domicile in other country or by purporting to marry in 
another country/I  ^ This decision was followed in Boettcher v. Boettcher,G^^^ in 
which W allington held that the prohibition had in English law the effect of making the 
marriage subsist until the time had expired.
It is quite clear that the learned judges justified the invalidity of the second marriage on 
the ground that the first marriage is not completely dissolved while the period of appeal 
lasts, so that any marriage within that period is void for bigamy, irrespective of the position 
of the lex loci and the lex domicilii of the parties. The justification given by the English 
judges for invalidating the second marriage was criticised!!^**) on the ground that it would 
lead to the strange result, namely, that the second marriage would always be held invalid 
even if the first marriage was no longer subsisting according to the lex divortii. This 
situation arises from the fact that in some countries which have such prohibition the decree 
absolute nevertheless dissolved the marriage from the moment it was pronounced. "The 
fact that neither spouse could remarry until the time for appealing had expired in no way 
affects the full operation of the decree. It is a judgment in rem, and unless and until a Court 
of Appeal reversed it the marriage was for all purpose at an end."!! ^ !) If the marriage is 
no longer subsisting by the lex divortti, there would be no policy to insist that it is still in
existence,!! 22)
In the Australian case of M iller v. Tealef^^^^  Kitto.J justified the invalidity of the 
second marriage not on the ground of bigamy but on the fact that the prohibition constituted
118- Ibid, at 155.
1 1 9 - [1949] 93 S.J.237. at 238; Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [1930] 46 T.L.R.203 at 204.
120- Miller v. Teale [1954] 92 C.I.R 406, [1955] 29 Aust. L.J, 91.(H.C.A); Hartley, T.C., (1967) 16 
L.C.L.Q. 697.
1 2 1 - Marsh r. Marsh [1945] A.C. 271 at 278.
1 2 2 - Hartley, (1967) 16 I.C.L.Q. 698.
123- [1955] 29 Aust. L.J. 91.
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an independent ground for invalidating the marriage which is governed by the lex divortti 
and operates independently of the rules concerning form and capacity. According to him, 
the decree absolute of divorce ends the incapacity arising from the first marriage but the 
prohibition creates a new one. A second marriage celebrated after the decree absolute is 
invalid" because of an applicable rule of the law which invalidates even monogamous 
marriages."! 124) The main defect of this view is that it makes the choice of law of validity 
of marriage more complex by adding a new aspect to the traditional approach. Under this 
view the validity of marriage is divided into three aspects, form, capacity and prohibitions 
against remarriage.
II- The Effect of Recognition in Iraqi Law of Foreign Divorces on 
Capacity to Marry
The choice of law rule relating to the capacity or essential validity of marriage is 
governed by the national law of the parties. According to article 19 (I) of the Iraqi Civil 
Code if both parties have capacity to marry each other by the laws of either nationalities at 
the time of the ceremony, the marriage is valid, but invalid if by either or both of those laws 
they have no such capacity. There are two exceptions to this general rule, the more 
significant is that where one of the parties is an Iraqi national at the time of the marriage, the 
court will not take account of any incapacity by the national law of the other party. The 
validity of a marriage celebrated in such circumstances will be governed by Iraqi law 
alone.!! 2^) The policy behind this exception is the desire to protect Iraqi nationals. This 
exception is sim ilar to that in Sottomayer v. De Barros (N o.2)!!^*») but with one 
difference that the Iraqi rule extends to include marriages celebrated abroad. The second 
exception is to be found in article 32 of the 1951 Civil Code. This provides that the courts 
must refuse to apply a foreign law if its application would be contrary to public policy. In 
general any capacities or incapacities imposed by the law of a foreign national must be
124- Ibid, at 96.
125- Art. 19 (5); All-Hadwy, op.ict., p. 166.
1 2 6 -  (1879) 5 RD. 9 4 , See, supra, 264.
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disregarded if they are considered as contrary to Iraqi public policy. As regards the 
question whether the parties must have capacity to marry by the lex loci as well as by their 
national laws, there is no clear answer, but it seems from the general rules that the 
requirements of the lex loci must be satisfied if the marriage is celebrated in Iraq. On the 
other hand, if the marriage is celebrated abroad, it is thought that the lex loci should be 
disregarded in order to facilitate the validity of marriage.
In dealing with the question of the effect of divorce on capacity to marry, the Iraqi 
conflict rules have completely ignored it. Neither the courts nor academic opinion have 
faced or discussed this question. However, we try to find out the appropriate solution by 
reference to the general rules governing capacity to marry which have been summarized 
above, and to the general rules in the Personal Status Code of 1959. It will be remembered 
that polygamy is a cornerstone of the Iraqi law. Here the law has drawn a distinction 
between polygyny (i.e. the system whereby the husband is allowed to have more than one 
wife at the same time), and polyandry (i.e.the system whereby the wife is allowed to have 
more than one husband at the same time). The only form of polygamy permitted by the 
Iraqi law is the f o r m e r . ( ! ^ 7 )  n  follows from this domestic rule that the husband has 
capacity to marry a second wife even if his prior marriage is still valid and subsisting, while 
the woman who is bound by a prior, valid and subsisting marriage, cannot contract another 
until the first marriage is ended by death or annulled or dissolved. If such a marriage has 
been celebrated nevertheless, the court must declare it void ah initio.
This rule cannot give rise to difficulties where the questions of the validity of divorce 
and capacity to marry are subject to Iraqi law. The difficulties arise where the capacity to 
marry is subject to foreign national laws, because these laws may take different views as to 
whether or not the prior marriage was dissolved validly. In the case where a divorce is 
granted or recognised by Iraqi law but not so recognised in a country whose law governing 
capacity to marry of the parties is regarded as being the lex causae according to Iraqi law,
127- Art.3 (4) (5) of the 1959 Personal Status Code.
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it is thought that primacy should be given to the divorce recognition mle for the same 
reasons which were considered above in the context of English and Scots law.
In the converse case where a prior marriage has been dissolved by a divorce according 
to the relevant foreign country whose law governs capacity to marry, but not according to 
Iraqi law, it has been suggested in the context of English and Scots law that a divorced 
person in these circumstances should not have capacity to marry, because the application of 
the lex causae would lead to the result that a person is validly married to two persons at the 
same time and this would be contrary to the concept of English and Scottish marriage as a 
monogamy. Since the Iraqi law has adopted the concept of polygamous marriage it is 
thought that the husband can marry a second wife even if his prior marriage is still valid 
and subsisting in the eyes of the Iraqi law. This solution would not be contrary to Iraqi 
public policy and would not produce difficulties in relation to succession and matrimonial 
relief since these matters have been regulated by certain provisions,!! On the other 
hand, a divorced woman whose prior marriage is still valid and subsisting in the eyes of 
Iraqi law should not have capacity to marry because to hold otherwise would imply the 
recognition of a kind of bigamy, the divorced woman being lawfully married to two 
husbands at the same tim e , and this would be contrary to the domestic rule that a woman is 
not allowed to have more than one husband at the same time. One might argue that this 
solution would imply the state of discrimination because it puts the female inferior to male. 
Whatever the power of this argument it must be admitted that this solution reflects the Iraqi 
domestic rule which is based on Islamic law. As regards the prohibitions or restrictions 
imposed by foreign laws on the right of one or both parties to marry, the public policy 
requires that such a prohibition or restriction must be disregarded if it is considered as 
being penal,!!^9) But where the purpose of the prohibition or restriction is not to punish 
the guilty party it is thought that such a prohibition should be applied because the Iraqi law 
itself contains such prohibitions.
128- Art.91 (1).
129- Art.32 of the 1951 Civil Code.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Effect of Recognition of Foreign Divorces on Financial Relief
Until 1984, a person whose overseas divorce was recognised in England and Scotland 
was unable to seek financial relief and property adjustment even if the marriage was closely 
connected with England or Scotland and even if both parties and property were'within the 
jurisdiction. The law led to unjustifiably harsh results in certain cases and encouraged the 
parties to challenge foreign d ivorces/!) The unsatisfactory nature of the situation 
existing before 1984 had long been recognised and criticised by judges and academic 
opinion. In 1984 the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act was enacted to give effect to 
the proposals of the two Law Commissions. The Act contains separate provisions for 
England and Scotland enabling the courts in those countries to make financial relief 
notwithstanding the existence of foreign divorce. In Iraq, there are no statutory provisions 
dealing with this subject, and the courts have no power to make financial relief to spouses 
where there has been a foreign divorce.
This chapter will consider in which circumstances the English and Scottish courts have 
powers to make financial relief after foreign divorce and to find out the differences between 
them. It will also consider the form of the relief which the Iraqi court may grant if it 
accepts jurisdiction. This chapter will be divided as follows:
I- The Effect of Recognition of Foreign Divorces on Financial Relief in England and 
Scotland.
II- The Effect of Recognition of Foreign Divorces on Financial Relief in Iraq.
1- See, per Ijord Scarman in Quazi v. Quazi [1979] 3 W.L.R.833 at 850, infra, 300; Torok v. 
Torok [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1066.
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I- The Effect of Recognition of Foreign Divorces on Financial Relief in 
England and Scotland 
A- The Position at Common Law
It is submitted that if a marriage is dissolved by an English or Scottish divorce the 
parties are no longer husband and wife, and accordingly no longer enjoy any rights which 
depend on that status. Their obligation to provide support for each other will cease.(^) 
Nevertheless, the courts have power to grant an ancillary order for financial relief whenever 
they have jurisdiction in the main suit for divorce,!^) provided the order would not be 
wholly ineffectual. (4) However, until 1984 the court's power to make an order for 
financial relief was limited to English and Scottish divorces and did not extend to cover 
cases where the marriage had been dissolved by a foreign divorce. This meant that a 
person who had been divorced abroad had no recourse to the courts for financial relief even 
if the marriage was more closely connected with England or Scotland than with any other 
country and even if both the property and the parties were within the jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, a person in a such situation was only able to claim financial relief in the 
country where the divorce was granted, and that might have been impossible or the 
financial provision made might have been inadequate.!^) Hence, a financial incentive
2- The wife and husband staute matrimonio are under obligation to maintain each other. See, S.27 of
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, as amended by Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Court Act 
1978, S.63; Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, S.4 and by Family Law Reform Act 
1987, Sched.2, para.52;See, for Scotland S .l (1) of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985,
3 - See, Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, SS.22, 23 [as amended by Administration of Justice Act 1982, 
S. 16] 24 and 24 A [added by the Matrimonial Homes and Property Act, 1981 S.7]; Matrimonial 
Homes Act 1983, S 7 and Sched.l;See, generally, Bromley, & Lowe, Bromley's Family Law, 
London, 7th ed (1987), Ch, 20. For Scotland, See, Family Law( Scotland) Act 1985, SS.8, 14; 
Matrimonial Home(Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981, S. 13; See, generally, Mclnnes, Divorce 
Law and Practice in Scotland, Edinburgh, (1990) Ch, 4; Thomson, Family Law in Scotland, 
Edinburgh, (1991).
4 -  Tallackv. Tallack [1927] P.211.
5" If a loreign order has been obtained, it will often be recognised and enforced; see in this respect. 
Maintenance Order Act 1950; Maintenance Order [Facilities for Enforcement] Act 1920; Maintenance 
Orders [Reciprocal Enforcement] Act 1927; Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982(in relation to
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existed to challenge the validity ol the foreign divorce, and to begin divorce litigation in 
England or Scotland. In most cases this was of no concern to the courts as the parties 
would have little or no connection with either England or Scotland. If, however, one or 
both parties was domiciled or had been habitually resident hère, the injustice, in 
comparison with the parties to English or Scots divorce, was considerable.
The liberality of the recognition rules of foreign divorces coupled with the restrictive 
appioach of some to ieign courts in considering financial relief provided cases of serious 
hardship to wives, 1 hus, a woman whose marriage had been dissolved by a foreign 
divorce recognised here was, e.g. unable to raise an action for maintenance for herself 
because siie had ceased to be a wife, so that the husband was no longer under a legal 
liability to maintain her.(^) She could not establish a claim to financial provision or 
property adjustment o rd e is , !^ )  She could not invoke the powers of the courts to prevent 
the husband carrying out a transaction which would leave her without any resources or to 
frustrate or impede the enforcement of any order.!*)
The unsatistactory nature of the law had long been recognised and the courts took 
different steps to minimise the difficulties.!**) In Torok v, Torok G the parties 
were Hungarian and came to live in England in 1956, getting married in Scotland in that 
year. In 1964 they became naturalised British Subjects. Later the husband left for Canada 
and the wife and the children remained in England in the house jo intly  owned by the 
parties. In 1972 the husband petitioned for divorce in Hungary. The Hungarian court 
pionounced a partial decree. The wile petitioned the English courts for divorce and to 
exercise their discretion to expedite the making of a decree absolute. Ormrod J. observed
o idc is  coming within the category oi ' m a i n t e n a n c e 'o r d e r s ; Q r t W  v. De Cavcl [I9 8 0 J  E.C.R. 7 3 ] '
M aintenance E nl'orccm ent A ct lt>9].
(ï- I'urczak v. Turczak ( 19701 P. 198.
7 -  lorok I', lorok 11973} 1 W .L .R . 1066; Quazi v. Quazi [1979) 3  W .L .R .833 .
8 - Joyce v. Joyce [\979\ F am .L aw .93 , 112.
9 -  C hesh ire  & N orth , 12 th ed , p. 709.
1 0- 119731 I W .L .R . 1066; Bryant v. Bryani j 19801 Î 1 Fam  L aw .85.
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that any final decree made by the Hungarian court would be entitled to recognition by virtue 
of section 3 (1 ) (b) of the 1971 Act(! !) and this recognition would prevent the court from 
making financial relief in favour of the wife, notwithstanding that the matrimonial home 
was within the jurisdiction. The learned judge, therefore, was able to avert such a situation 
when he held that the marriage was still subsisting and that the English court had 
jurisdiction to grant a decree, which would be expedited in order that the question of 
financial relief could be considered.
In certain cases, the courts decided to refuse recognition of foreign divorces in order to 
enable the wife to claim maintenance or bring an action for divorce in which she could 
claim financial relief.!! This step is highly unsatisfactory because it increases limping 
marriages, the practicalities of which cannot be ignored, and it would undermine the 
international Convention to which the United Kingdom is a party. The defect was not that 
the recognition rules of foreign divorces were vast but that the law did not provide for 
granting financial relief after recognition. Another step to minimise the difficulties faced by 
the parties to a foreign divorce was to grant relief in favour of a child. The recognition of 
foreign divorces did not prevent the court from making maintenance orders in respect of 
children.!! *) But the court's power, in comparison with the power exercisable in divorce 
proceedings, was narrow both in respect of the kinds of orders that would be made, and of 
the range of persons who would be ordered to make payments.
The final step was to keep alive an order for the maintenance of a wife made during the 
subsistence of the marriage by English courts, notwithstanding that the marriage was 
dissolved by a foreign divorce recognised in England.!! 4) The court also retained its
11- See, now 8.46 (1) (b) (iii) o f the Family Law Act 1986.
12-  Joyce v. Joyce [1979) Fam.Law. 93, 112; Sharif v, Sharif [1980] 10 Fam. Law 216; Chaitdhary
V. Chaitdhary [1984 ]3 A1I.E.R.1017.
1 3- P  (L.E) V. P  (JM )  [1971] P.318; Hack v. Hack [1976] 6 Fam.Law. 177.
14- Wood V. Wood [1957] R 254; Qureshi v. Qureshi [1971] 1 Ail.E.R.325; Macauley v. Macauley
[1991] W.L.R. 179.
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discretion to continue, vary or discharge the maintenance order/* The same principle 
was also applied to an interim order for maintenance made by the English court, 
notwithstanding a later foreign divorce recognised here/*<^) But the court's powers to 
make a financial provision order on the ground of wilful neglect to maintain are restricted, 
and in particular do not extend to the making oi property adjustment orders. Further, there 
lemains the problem posed by the need to deal with immovable property.
The Call for Reform
Undoubtedly, the law outlined above led to unjustifiably harsh results to those who had 
been divorced abroad and left with no claim for financial relief. It is hard to justify the 
denial to those people of any claim in the English or Scottish courts, particularly if they had 
been living here for a substantial period and possessed substantial assets in this 
country.t * 7) The law also encouraged the parties to challenge foreign divorce in order to 
claim maintenance or bring an action for divorce in this country in which they could claim 
financial rebel. Hence, the law led to unnecessary and expensive court cases. Quazi is 
notable here. 1 he main issue in this case was the wife's right under the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 to claim an interest in the small house in Wimbledon. The case involved 
long and complicated inquiries into the validity of Muslim divorces and their recognition in 
England. It occupied no less than 24 working days in the courts and involved 5 experts in 
foreign laws and a number of English lawyers. The cost of this case far exceeded the value 
of the house. The result was the court had no power to deal with the house since the 
parties had been validly divorced.
This unsatisfactory nature of the law led the judges and academic authorities to call for 
reform. In Torok \\ Torok,^^^) Ormrod J. commented on the effect of the Hungarian 
divorce upon the wife if it had been recognised:
1 5- Bragg v. Bragg [ 1925] P. 20.
1 6- Ncwmarrh v. Nemnarrli ( 1978J Fam .Law  79; C riticised by  .P a rry , Boreiga Decree and EnglDh 
provision, ( 1979) 9 Family Lxiw 12.
Ï 7- Torok v.Torok ( 1973] 1 W.L.R. 1066; Quazi v.QuazJ 11979] 3 W.L.R.833.
18- [1973] I W.L.R.1066 at 1070.
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"this, I think, must be an unforeseen situation, unforeseen that is at the time when the 
Act of 1971 was drafted; because the effect of the Act is to oust the jurisdiction of this 
court to deal with a family living in this country and with a property-a matrimonial 
home or a house in joint names- in this country. Now, that is a situation which 
plainly should be avoided at all cost."
In Quazi v Quazi Lord Scarman felt constrained to ask himself whether there
were better and cheaper ways of doing justice. His Lordship then called for reform when 
he said;
"I agree with the Court of Appea/^**) that the reform needed is one whereby a 
resident in the United Kingdom whose overseas divorce...is recognised by our law as 
valid, should be able, like one who obtained a divorce...in this country, to claim a 
property adjustment or other financial order under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973... I 
would comment that such a reform should achieve not only a greater measure of justice 
for first generation immigrant families but a considerable saving for the legal aid fund.
The incentive to challenge the foreign divorces would be gone, and the court could deal 
with the property and financial problems of the parties upon their merits."
The call for urgent legislative reform was also supported by academic authorities. 
Karsten wrote: "the loss of the power to award financial relief to a spouse can be an 
exceedingly heavy price to pay for the avoidance of limping marriages... Once this much 
needed reform materialises, our courts will be able to banish their present scruples about 
recognising foreign divorces".(31) During the debate on the Bill leading to the 1971 Act, 
Edward Lyons M.P.commented: "one hopes that there will be legislation soon to enable the 
courts in this country to ensure that wives living here who had been divorced abroad would 
have their rights to maintenance protected".(^
19- [1979] 3 W.L.R. 833 at 850; See also, per Lord Viscount Dilhorne at 841; Viswalingham  v. 
Viswalingham  [1980] 1 F.L.R.15.
2 0 - ]  1979] 3 W.L.R.402 at 405per  Ormrod.
21- Recognition o f  non-judicial divorces, (1980) 43 M.L.Rev.202, 208-209; and See also, (1970) 33 
M.L.R.ev. 205; The R ecogn ition  o f  D ivo rce s  an d  L eg a l S epara tion s A c t 1971, (1972 )35 
M.L.Rev.299; David Pearl, (1974) C.L.J.77; Wade, (1974) 23 I.C.L.Q. 461; Parry, (1979) 9 Family 
Law 12; Dickson, Foreign D ivorces Which Jar on Our Conscience,(19S0) 43 M.L.Rev.81; Notl, The 
Recognition o f  Foreign D ivorces: Some P roblem s Considered, (1980) 10 Family Law 13; Morris, 
2nd ed , p. 172,
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The whole problem was considered in 1980 by the two Law C o m m i s s i o n s / ^ ^ )  
Although they agreed that in some circumstances the court should have the power to make 
financial rebel after the recognition of foreign divorce, they expressed different opinions as 
to what those circumstances should be. In general, the English Law Commission adopted 
an approach in which there is widejiirisdiction and in which it is left to the courts, guided 
by a list of factors to be taken into account, to exclude inappropriate applications, while the 
Scottish Law Commission preferred restrictive jurisdictional rules combined with clear 
guidelines in advance to exclude inappropriate applications. Their recommendations were 
implemented by the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. Part III (SS.12-27)
confers such a power on the courts in England, while part IV(SS.28-31 ) makes provisions
lor applications to be made in Scotland.
B- Financial R elief in England
1- The Scope o f Part HI
Section 12( 1)  provides that "where-(a) a marriage has been d isso lv ed .. .b y  m eans o f  
judicial or other proceedings in an overseas country, and (b) the divorce. ..is entitled to be 
leco^nised as valid in E ng land .. . ,  e ither party to the marriage may apply to the court(2  4) 
in the m anner prescribed by rules o f  court for an order for financial re lie f . , .  ".(2 5)
1 here are a num ber of com m ents that must be m ade on this section. The first point is 
^ha tthe  power of the English court to make financial relief is limited to divorces granted in
2 2 -  Han.sarU. H.C.Dcb. 5 May 1971, Vol. 816.C olJ.S62.
Lau Com No. 117 PamUy La\\: /’hMlirhil llt-lic/A /k-r foreifin  Divnrcv' 1982; W.P. N o.77 19 8 0 ; 
Srol.s Law Com No. 77' / VumVy. Kc/mv ™ Provision Afier h o m n n  D ivorce’ 1982; Sec,
John W illiam s, /■imwaul Provision  iifier l-oreian D ivorces  (1983) 133 N .L..I.767; Canton, rhe 
M n lr im o n io l a n d  h a m llm ceed in ^ s A ct iVfid: Fanancia! R elie f a jier D ivorce ( 1985) 15 Familv Law 
13; Financial R elief ujler Talmi divorce  ( 1983) W .L.J.928:David Gordon, Par! HI o f  H,e MFPA-I9H4
A Panacea fo r  ForeP^n D ivorce?  (1986) J .S .W .L .3 2 9  and Foreii;n D ivorces: Fnalish h n v  an d
Frar//Vv,Ncucit.stic, ( 1988) ch, 11; M orris, 4th cd., p. 208.
2 4 - T im  C ourt' m eans the H igh Court, or C ounty Court if the latter is given juri.sdiction under p a n  V,
2 5- 'Order lor financial re lie f m eans an order under SS. 17 or 22 o f this Act, SS. 12 (4), 27.
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an "overseas country" which means a country or territory outside the British Islands/^ 
Hence, the party to Scottish divorce cannot seek financial relief in the English court under 
the provision of this part. The purpose of the 1984 Act is to prevent hardship for spouses 
who cannot obtain relief from the country in which the divorce was granted. Since the 
courts in Scotland have adequate power to make financial re lie f/^  it is therefore, 
unlikely that a person divorced in Scotland will face serious injustice. Such a person must 
seek financial relief in the divorce proceedings, and not in a subsequent application in 
England. Scottish orders will be recognised and enforced in England.(^
Secondly, the ability to make an application is not restricted to those who were 
respondents in the foreign divorce proceedings. Either party to the foreign divorce can 
apply f o r  r e l i e f . ( 2  9 )  n  may be argued that 'forum-shopping' and the protection of the 
respondent require that a person who chooses foreign proceedings should be prevented 
from coming back to England to claim financial relief. It is true that one of the objects of 
the reform in this area of law should be to discourage 'forum-shopping' and provide 
protection for respondents-but not in such a way as to defeat the main purpose of the 
reform. The proper way to discourage forum-shopping and provide protection for the 
respondents is by selecting appropriate jurisdiction and choice of law rules and not by 
excluding the petitioners in the foreign proceedings. Such an approach would limit the 
scope of the 1984 Act and would cause hardship in certain cases, and therefore, the 
mischief against which the Act was enacted would be defeated.
Thirdly, let us consider Chebaro v. Chebaro^^ in which the marriage was dissolved
2 6 “ 8.27; See, the difinition of 'British Islands', supra, Chapter Four, footenote 160.
27- See, SS.8, 14 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985; S. 13 of the Matrimonial Home (Family 
Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981.
2 8- See,.supra, this chapter, 295, footnote 5.
2 9- Contrast with Scots law S.28 (3) (b) infra; It should be noted that a party to a marriage shall not be 
entitled to apply for relief in relation to that marriage if he or she remarried even if the subsequent 
maniageis void or voidable; S. 12 (2) (3), such a restriction is similar to that where there have been 
proceedings in England, See, S.28 (3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.
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by a divorce obtained by the husband in the Lebanon prior to 16 September 1985, when 
part III came into force. The wife applied for leave to make an application for financial 
relief. The husband raised the question of jurisdiction, on the ground that part III does not 
apply where the divorce was granted before 16 September 1985. The court dismissed the 
husband's petition on the basis that, although the 1984 Act contains no express provision 
on retrospectivity, the language of that Act makes it clear that Section 12 is intended to 
apply to divorces whenever pronounced and whether before or after 16 September 1985. 
The court reached this conclusion by holding that the use of the past tense in Section 1(1)  
(a) "where a marriage has been dissolved", when contrasted with the present tense in 
Section 12 (1) (b)' " ...is  entitled to be recognised" clearly indicated that part III is 
retrospective.!^
There is no doubt that the interpretation of Section 12 retrospectively is sound in that it 
would cover as many foreign divorces as possible. What is in doubt is whether such an 
approach would protect respondents who might have relied on the law as it stood before 16 
September 1985. It is submitted that if the court's approach would cause hardship to 
respondents then the court's view would be inconsistent with the well established principle 
that a statute should not be interpreted respectively, if to do so would impair an existing 
right or o b l i g a t i o n . ! ^  2 )  However, the Court of Appeal makes i t  clear that any hardship 
which might arise from a retrospective construction of the provision would be reduced by 
the existence of the filter procedure which permits the court to exercise its discretion to 
refuse leave under Section 13.!^^)
Fourthly, Section 12 (a) requires not only that a divorce must be obtained in an 
overseas country but that it must be obtained by means of "judicial or other proceedings". 
The 1984 Act does not define the meaning of this phrase and this may lead to trouble over
30- [1987] 1 AU.E.R.999.
31- Ibid at 1001; See, David Gordon, op.cit p. 169.
3 2- Tew Bon Tewv. Kendreaan Basniara [1982] 3 AllE.R. 833 at 836.
33- Chebaro V. Chebaro [1987] 1 A11.E.R.999 at 1003.
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the scope of section 12 as to whether this section will cover all types of extra-judicial 
divorces or only those obtained by proceedings/^
In an explanatory note to the draft section 12 the Law Commission states that: "the 
reference to 'judicial or other proceedings' covers cases where the marriage has been 
terminated extra-judicially (for example, by talaq): cf. Recognition of Divorces and Legal 
Separation Act 1971, S,2 (a)"/^^) Although the view of the Law Commission is in line 
with the House of Lords interpretation in Quazi v. Quazi^^^) of the similarly worded 
section 2 (a) of the 1971 Act, it is far from clear whether other types of extra-judicial 
divorces are within the scope of section 12, This doubt arose as a result of the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in Chaudhary v. Chaudhaiy^^^) in which it was held that the phrase 
"judicial or other proceedings" in section 2 should be interpreted restrictively to exclude 
informal divorces/^
The recognition of extra-judicial divorces whether or not obtained by proceedings is 
now governed by the Family Law Act 1986. This made no reference to section 12 and 
therefore, the question is whether section 12 should be interpreted restrictively to apply 
only to divorces entitled to recognition under section46(1) or should be interpreted widely 
to apply also to divorces entitled to recognition under section 46 (2). It seems for the 
following reasons to be an error if the power of the English courts to grant financial relief is 
limited only to divorces obtained by proceedings/^
( 1 ) The Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 was enacted to end the injustice
for those who have been divorced and have suffered financially abroad. If section 12 is
3 4  -See, David Gordon, (1986) J.S.W.L.336-338; opxitpp. 170-173.
3 5- Law Com.No. 117.p .21.
3 6-[1979] 3 W.L.R.833.
37 -[1 9 8 4 ]3  A11.E.R.1017.
3 8- Contrast S.46 (1) with S.46 (2) of the Family Law Act 1986.
3 9  -David Pearl, Family Law and the Immigrant Communities, Bristol, 1986, p .79; David Gordon, 
(1986) J.S.W.L.338; op.cit.pp. 173.
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limited to divorces obtained by proceedings, then for those who have been divorced by 
means other than by proceedings, the Act will have changed nothing and merely raised 
false hopes amongst the immigrant community of financial relief following foreign divorce 
and parity with English divorces.
(2 ) The policy against 'limping m arriages' requires that section 12 should be 
interpreted widely because it will be remembered that the lack of financial relief in the 
foreign court was the main reason for denial of recognition of foreign divorces. If, 
therefore, section 12 is limited to divorces obtained by proceedings, then a party to a 
foreign divorce not obtained by proceedings will continue to challenge the recognition of 
such divorces and this would absorb a quite excessive amount of time and money .(40)
(3 ) Section 28 of part IV, which gives the Scottish courts the same power to grant 
financial provision after recognition of foreign divorces, made no reference to the phrase 
"judicial or other proceedings". This would imply that a party to foreign divorce whether 
or not obtained by proceedings can claim financial provision from the Scottish courts. It is 
unfortunate if the English and Scottish provisions on this point differ where their 
recognition rules are the same. Moreover, the provision is all the more needed in cases 
where the divorce has been obtained by means other than judicial, since it is less likely that 
financial matters have been adequately treated.
(4 ) The decision of the Court of Appeal in Chebaro v. Chebaroi^^) that section 12 is 
retrospective in operation should encourage the interpretation of this section widely to 
include as many divorces as possible.
(5 )  The distinction made in the Family Law Act 1986 between divorces obtained by 
proceedings and those obtained otherwise than by means of p r o c e e d i n g s ! 4  2) should not
40- Quazi v.Quazi [1979] 3 W.L.R.833; Torok v.Torok [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1066.
41 -[1987] 1 A11.E.R.999.
4  2 -  Contrast S.46 (1) with S.46 (2).
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encourage a strict interpretation of section 12 because that distinction was based on 
considerations of public policy, where public policy considerations under the Matrimonial 
and Family Proceedings Act 1984 require that section 12 should be interpreted widely.
2- The Scheme of Part HI
A person, whose divorce falls within section 12, seeking financial relief in England 
must firstly meet the jurisdictional requirement, secondly obtain leave from the court and 
thirdly satisfy the court that England is the appropriate jurisdiction,
a- Jurisdictional Requirements
In formulating the jurisdictional grounds the Law Commission was attempting to strike 
a balance between the need to establish a connection with England and the need to devise a 
scheme which does not exclude the meritorious case.(4 3) Accordingly section 15 reflects 
the recommendation of the Law Commissions, in which the jurisdictional grounds must be 
satisfied before an application can be made for leave under section 13. Subject to the 
provisions of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Acts 1982 and 1 9 9 1 ( 4 4 )  the English 
court has jurisdiction to grant financial relief if: (a) either party to the marriage was 
domiciled in England on the date of the application for leave or when the overseas divorce 
tookeffect;(45) or (b) either party was habitually resident throughout the period of one 
year ending on the date of the application for leave or when the overseas divorce took 
effect;(4 or (c) either or both parties had at the date of the application for leave a 
beneficial interest in possession in a dwelling-house in England which was at some time 
during the marriage a matrimonial home of the parties.(4 7)
The jurisdictional grounds of domicile and habitual residence at the time when the 
foreign divorce became effective reflect those contained in section 5 (2) of the Domicile and
4 3 -  Law  C om .N o.117 paras 2.7-2.S; W .P .N o.77 para. 31.
4 4- See, infra, 308.
4 5 -  S .1 5 ( l ) ( a ) .
4 6 -  S. 15 (1 ) (b).
4 7 - 8 .1 5 ( 1 )  (c).
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M atrimonial Proceedings A ct 1973. Under section 5 (2) the English courts have 
jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for divorce if either of the parties to the marriage is 
domiciled in England on the date when the proceedings begun, or was habitually resident 
throughout the period of one year ending with that date. The rationale behind introducing 
these jurisdictional grounds into the present context is that if the domicile or habitual 
residence were satisfied at the time of the foreign divorce, the applicant could have 
petitioned for divorce in England. Had the applicant done so, the court would have had 
jurisdiction to grant the financial relief sought. This head of jurisdiction may be criticised 
on the ground that it would open the English courts to applications by persons who at the 
time of the application have no connection with England.(4 8) Nevertheless, the opening 
of the doors of the English courts to those persons seems to be less dangerous than that of 
closing them and thereby excluding meritorious cases.
As has been mentioned above, the grounds of domicile and habitual residence must be 
satisfied not at the time when the foreign proceedings were started or when the divorce was 
granted but at the time when the foreign divorce "took effect" in the country where it was 
obtained.(4 9) in the case of an extra-judicial divorce, however, difficulty of proof can 
arise in respect of the question when it became effective, particularly in cases of the bare 
tahq, when the husband can divorce his wife without taking the matter to the court. In 
such cases the date when the divorce became effective may be in doubt.
The second alternative time in respect of which the jurisdictional bases of domicile and 
habitual residence must be satisfied is the time when the application for leave is made. The 
main criticism of this criterion is that it would permit applications in cases where the 
marriage had no connection at all with England, as in the case where, after the marriage has 
been dissolved abroad, one of the parties comes to England and subsequently establishes 
the requirements.f^ i) However, in the view of the Law Commission such a head of
4 8 -  Scots Law  Com  N o.77 para. 3,2-3.4.
4 9- Law  Com .No. 117 paras. 3 4 .Note. 155.
5 0 -  D avid Gordon, (1986) J.S .W .L .340.
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jurisdiction is necessary to cover cases in which a connection with England might arise 
after the marriage had been d is s o lv e d /3 2 )  Quazi v. Quazi is cited in this context when 
neither Mrs Quazi nor her husband had any connection with England at the time of divorce, 
but subsequently they established such a connection. Moreover, the Law Commission 
thought there might be cases in which the court must investigate which of several divorces 
actually dissolved a marriage: such an investigation could prove wide ranging and 
therefore, time consuming and expensive. Accordingly, the introduction of such a head of 
jurisdiction would avoid difficulties. It seems clear that these jurisdictional grounds are 
generous and they do not require a strong connection between the parties and England to 
justify exercise by the forum of its jurisdiction to give financial relief. It would be possible 
for a divorced person to come to England for the first time after divorce and claim for 
financial relief. The risk of injustice to respondents is obvious and the possibility of 
enforcement of orders abroad is weak.
The third head of jurisdiction, that there had been a matrimonial home, was rejected in 
the working Paper on the ground that it would allow parties with very little connection with 
England to invoke the court’s jurisdiction and it would cause difficulty in relation to the 
definition of the term 'matrimonial h o m e '.(33) The Law Commission subsequently 
decided that the court should not be prevented from dealing with the quite common 
situation"where both parties live abroad after the foreign divorce, but have in fact lived 
here, perhaps for a substantial period during the marriage and the only substantial asset is 
the matrimonial home in this country".(3 4)
While it seems to be wrong to prevent the courts from dealing with orders in relation to 
the matrimonial home, because the property here is not just any property, it is the property 
which was the parties' home at some time during their marriage and moreover, is, of
5 1 -  Canton, (1985) 15 Fam ily Law 13 a t 15.
5 2- Law  Com. W .P.N o.77 paras. 34-37.
5 3 -  Law C om .W .P.N o.77 para. 44.
5 4 -  Law Com .N o. 117 para. 2. 9.
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course, immovable, doubt must be expressed as to whether such a head of jurisdiction 
might not pose problems for the courts. The term 'matrimonial home’ is not defined in part 
III, but it is understood that a dwelling-house is not a matrimonial home if it has been 
occupied by one party alone/35) Equally, it is sometimes difficult to decide whether 
there had been a matrimonial home in cases where the parties had lived under the same 
roof. In the case of Quazi, the wife lived separately from the husband in the house for 
several weeks. In such circumstances could it be said that the house constituted a 
matrimonial home?(3 6) Where this head is the only basis of jurisdiction the power of the 
courts are limited to orders relating to the former matrimonial home.(3 7)
The jurisdictional grounds discussed above are subject to the Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Acts 1982 and 1991. Section 15 (2) provides a specific ground of jurisdiction 
for an application under part III in cases where the jurisdiction of the English court is based 
on the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Acts 1982 and 1991. These Acts were enacted to 
give effect to the Conventions on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (including the Protocol annexed to that Conventions) signed at 
Brussels on 27 September 1986 and amended by Accession Convention of 1978,(38) and 
at Lugano on 18th September 1989 respectively.
The main concern o f the Brussels and Lugano Conventions is with civil and 
commercial matters.(39) A lthough article 1 (I )  excludes from  the scope of the 
5 5- Cf, M atrim onial H om e A ct 1983; See, D avid G ordon, op.cit,p. 175.
5 6- C anton, (1985) 15 F am ily  L aw  13 a t 16; C onsider generally  S cottish  dom estic  S uccession  law , 
e .g .the "prior right" on in testacy o f the surviving spouse to the dw elling-house success. Succession 
(Scotland) A ct, 1964, 8 ( 1 )  and S .8  (4). "This section applies, in  the case o f  any in testa te , to any 
dw elling-house in w hich the surviving spouse o f  the intestate was ord inarily  resident at the date  o f  
death o f  the intestate."
5 7- 8 .20 ; infra, 320.
3 8 F or details See, L .A ., C o llin s, the C ivil Ju risd ic tion  and  Judgm ents A ct 1982; H artley , C ivil 
Jurisdiction and Judgm ents, 1984. T he R eports on the C onvention by P .Jenard  &  P .S chlosser, O J 
1979, C 59, m ay be refeired  to  as aids to  its interpretation (S.3 o f the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgm ents 
A ct 1982); Cheshire &  N orth, 12th ed., Ch, 14.
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Conventions "the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out 
of a matrimonial relationship, will and succession", article 5 (2) indicates clearly that 
"matters relating to maintenance" are within the Conventions. Since no definition of 
'maintenance' is to be found in the Conventions or the Acts, it follows that it is not clear 
whether some orders under part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 
are within the Conventions. If, however, an order under part III is considered within the 
Conventions, then the jurisdictional grounds in section 15 (1) (a) to (c) should be replaced 
by those imposed by virtue of the 1982 and 1991 Acts. Therefore, we must consider 
firstly whether or not an order under part III of the 1984 Act falls within the Conventions, 
and secondly the operation of the jurisdictional mles of the 1982 and 1991 Acts in the field 
of financial relief under part III.
The phrase" rights in property, arising out of a matrimonial relationship" contained in 
article 1(1) was interpreted by the European Court of Justice in De Cave I v. De Cavel 
(No.l),(**0) in which the husband instituted divorce proceedings in France. He alleged 
that his wife had removed from his flat in Cannes some valuable carpets which were his 
property, and had also removed a number of objects from the flat in Frankfurt. He 
requested protection measures and the court authorised the putting under seal of the 
furniture and other effects in the couple's flat and a seal in the wife's name in a bank in 
Frankfurt. The court also authorised the freezing of the wife’s bank account. The husband 
sought to enforce those orders in Germany under the Brussels Convention. The European 
Court of Justice held that provisional measures of the kind in question, granted during 
divorce proceedings, fall outside the Convention. Moreover, the court held that questions 
relating to status or proprietary relationships resulting directly from matrim onial 
relationships are also outside the Convention, whereas, proprietary relationships existing 
between the parties without connection with the marriage are within the scope of the 
Convention.
5 9- A rt.I .
6 0-  [1979] E .C .R .1055.
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Thus, an order under part III may not be within the Conventions, if it considered to be 
within the provisional protection measures, such as those ordered by the French court, or if 
it relates to rights arising directly from the matrimonial relationship or its dissolution, such 
as a former matrimonial home under section 20/** l) A possible area of debate is article 5 
(2) which states that matters relating to maintenance are within the Conventions. It can be 
argued that orders made by the courts under part III after the marriage has been dissolved 
by a foreign divorce are not 'maintenance' within article 5(2), because the marriage is 
already at an end before the proceedings in England begin. If this argument is 
correct, it follows that the jurisdictional rules in the 1982 and 1991 Acts will have no 
application in relation to financial relief on divorce under part III of the 1984 Act.
This, however, would not be a safe argument and some orders under part III may be
classed as maintenance under article 5 (2) even though they are granted sometime after the
divorce, because the European Court of Justice held in De Cavel v. De Cavel (No,2)(*»3)
that the "compensatory payments" provided for in the French Civil Code (Art.270),
concerned with financial obligations between spouses after divorce and fixed on the basis
of the parties' needs and resources were in the nature of maintenance under article 5 (2). It
is also stated by Schlosseri** 4) that the emphasis of the Conventions must be on the nature
of the payments between the parties rather than the timing of such payments. Thus, the
European Court of Justice may regard some orders under part III of the Matrimonial and
Family Proceedings Act 1984 as within the Conventions, as for example financial orders
for periodical payments or lump sum payments for a child or between spouses, if such
orders are considered to support a child or one spouse. If, however, a payment is not
considered to support a child or spouse, that payment would not be within the
Conventions. 3)
6 1- See, David G ordon, op.cit.p. 176.
6 2- Cheshire &  N orth, 12th ed., pp. 711-712.
6 3- [1980] E .C .R .731. Follow ing this case artic le  5  (2) was am ended to  include m atters "ancillary to
proceedings concerning the status o f a person".
6 4- Paras. 43-50 and 91-97.
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If an order under part III is considered to be within the Conventions, then section 15 
(2) must apply. This provides that where the jurisdiction of the court falls to be determined 
by reference to the jurisdictional requirements imposed by virtue of the 1982 and 1991 
Acts, the English court cannot take jurisdiction if the requirements of the 1982 and 1991 
Acts are not satisfied even if the jurisdictional requirements under section 15 (1) (a) to (c) 
are: and, conversely must take jurisdiction if the requirements of the 1982 and 1991 Acts 
are satisfied, even if the jurisdictional requirements under section 1 (1) (a) to (c) are 
not.(^
According to the 1982 and 1991 Acts, the English court will have jurisdiction to 
entertain proceedings under part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 if 
the respondent is domiciled in England/^ 7) he is domiciled in another contracting State 
and the court is a court for the place where the maintenance creditor is domiciled or 
h a b i t u a l l y  r e s i d e n t / ^  8 ) or; if the object of the proceedings relates to rights in rem in, or 
tenancies of, immovable property, if the property is in England;(^^) or if the parties have 
agreed to submit their dispute to the English court;(7 *>) or if the respondent enters an 
appearance other than solely to contest the jurisdiction.(71)
It must be noted that these Acts give domicile a special meaning for this purpose, 
different from its ordinary one in English law .(72) The main difference between the 
concept of domicile in these Acts and that under section 15 (1) of the 1984 Act is that under 
section 15 (1) the question where a person is domiciled depends on the lex fori, whereas 
under the 1982 and 1991 Acts the English court must apply the law of another contracting
6 5- David G ordon, op.cit. pp. 177-179.
6  6 Cheshire & North, 12th ed., p. 712.
6 7 -  S. 1, Sched 1, Art.2.
6 8 -  S. 2, Sched 1, Art. 5  (2).
6 9 -  S .5, Sched. 1, Art. 16.
7 0- S .6 .S ch ed .l, Art. 17.
7 1- S.6, Sched. 1, Art. 18.
7 2- See, supra, 27.
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State to determine where a person is domiciled in that State/7 3) under the 1982 and 1991 
Acts it will be possible for a person to have more than one domicile, whereas under 15 (1) 
only one domicile is possible. Moreover, the meaning of 'domicile' under the 1982 and 
1991 Acts is etiolated, as is now explained. Under the 1982 and 1991 A c t s , (74) ^n 
individual is domiciled in the United Kingdom (or a part of it) if he is resident in and has a 
substantial connection with the United Kingdom (or that part); if he is resident in the United 
Kingdom but has no substantial connection with any part of the United Kingdom he is 
domiciled in that part in which he is resident. Substantial connection is presumed from 
residence for three months or more unless the contrary is proved. In order to determine in 
what place an individual is domiciled, e.g for the purpose of article 5 (2), section 41 (4) 
provides that an individual is domiciled in a particular place in the United Kingdom if he is 
domiciled in the part of the United Kingdom in which that place is situated and is resident 
in that place. An individual is domiciled in a State other than a contracting State if he is 
resident in that State and the nature and circumstances of his residence indicate that he has a 
substantial connection with that State.
It is apparent from the above discussion that it is possible that the European Court of 
Justice might decide that an order made under part III of the 1984 Act is within the 
Conventions. For the avoidance of doubt and the possibility of clashes between the 
jurisdictional rules of the Conventions and the 1984Act, section 15 (2) was enacted to give 
the English court jurisdiction in cases where an order under part III might be thought to be 
under the Conventions despite the different and generally wider rules of jurisdiction 
provided under section 15 (1). Although it might be appear that the 1984 Act draws a 
distinction between applications which fall within the Conventions and those which fall 
outside the Conventions, it is submitted that this distinction has little significance if we 
admit that in practice it may be that few applications will be found to be governed by 
section 15 (2). In the majority of cases the jurisdictional rules in section 15(1) will govern
7 3- S .41, A rt.52.
7 4- S.41.
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the court's jurisdiction to make an order under part III, as where the respondent is 
domiciled in a country outside the Conventions.
b“ Obtaining Leave
The jurisdiction requirements discussed above are too wide and would allow parties 
with very little connection with England to invoke the court's jurisdiction. In order to 
ensure that the courts' powers are only exercised in appropriate cases and to provide 
protection for the respondents against attempts to exert improper pressure on them, section 
13 provides that no application for financial relief order can be made unless the leave of the 
court has been granted in accordance with rules of the courts,(7 3) Applications for leave 
under section 13 are made ex parte and should be accompanied by an affidavit stating the 
facts relied upon.(7 **) But it seems from the decided cases that the court has a discretion 
to allow the respondent to be heard.(7
Although the idea of obtaining leave is to protect the potential respondent and to save 
him time and money, doubt was expressed as to whether such a procedure would succeed 
in providing protection for potential respondents.(7 8) It was said that such a procedure is 
both suspect and dangerous. It is suspect because if the respondent were to be given an 
opportunity to be heard the object of such a procedure would be defeated as he would have 
the expense and worry of being involved in a court case On the other hand, the procedure 
is dangerous because it allows the court to hear only the applicant's evidence and proceed 
on the basis of that evidence and such evidence may be exaggerated or unfair to the 
respondent. Although this argument is attractive in theory, the fact remains that the 
obtaining of leave is necessary in the context of English law to protect the respondent
against an application which might be thought to be wholly inappropriate. It is true that the 
7 5- See, Fam ily Proceedings Rules 1991, r.3.
7 6- R ule 3 .1 7 ;ty  v .iy [1989] 1F .L .R .22 ; Rv. K ensington  IT C  [1917] 1 K .B 48 6  a t 5QA.per L ord
Cozens-H ardy MR.
7 7- Chebaro v. Chebaro [1987] 1 A ll.E .R  999; H olm es v. H olm es [1989] 3 A11.E.R.786.
7 8 -  Scots Law  Com  N o.77 para. 2 .13 ; C anton, (1985) 15 Fam ily  Law 13 a t 15; D avid G ordon, (1986)
J.S .W .L . 329 a t 334  and o p .c i t ,  p. 183.
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court will hear only the applicant's evidence but this does not necessarily mean that the 
court will proceed and grant leave on the basis of that evidence. The decided cases show 
that there is a duty on the applicant to make full disclosure of the material facts.(7 9) 
Moreover, the court will not grant leave unless it considers that there is substantial ground 
for the making of an application for an order.(8 O) Here it is submitted that the court must 
take into account the matters listed in section 16(* 1) in granting leave. If on the 
application for leave to apply the court was satisfied that if leave was given the application 
for relief would fail because it would not be appropriate for an order for such relief to be 
made by a court in England, then the court would dismiss the application.(8 2)
The court may grant leave notwithstanding the existence of a financial order made by a 
foreign court requiring the respondent to make any payment or transfer any property to the 
applicant or a child of the f a m i l y . (^3) This is because the foreign order may be 
inadequate or i n a p p r o p r i a t e . l ®  4) however, the foreign court has made adequate orders 
which are clearly enforceable, the application must be d i s m i s s e d . ( 8 5 )  Here it seems that 
the possibility that financial relief made in England would be better than that in a foreign 
country is an insufficient reason to give the English court jurisdiction under the 1984 
A c t . (8 6) It is open to the court to grant leave subject to such conditions as it sees 
fit.(87) For example, the applicant may be required to give an undertaking not to enforce 
any order made by a foreign court or to have any such order discharged.(8 8) Once leave 
has been granted, the court may make an interim order for maintenance in favour of the
7 9- W v.W [1989] 1F.L.R.22; H olm es v. H olm es[ 1989] 3 AU.E.R.786.
8 0 -  S.13 (1).
8 1- See, infra, 315.
8 2- H olm es v. H olm es [1989] 3 A11.E.R.786.
8 3- S.13 (2).
8 4- Cheshire & N orth, 12th ed., p. 712.
8 5 - H olm es v. H olm es [1989] 3 A11.E.R.786.
8 6- H olm es  v. H olm es  [1989] 3 A U .E .R .786  a t 7 9 5 ; D e D am pierre  v. D e D am pirre  [1987] 2 
AU.E.R.1 at 12.
8 7 -8 .1 3 ( 3 ) .
8 8- D icey & M orris, 12th ed., p. 772; M orris, 4 th  ed.,.p. 209.
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applicant or any child of the family where they are in immediate need of a s s i s t a n c e / 8  9 )  
Such order would cease to be effective no later than the date on which the full application 
for relief is finally deteimined: such an order cannot be made when the jurisdiction of the 
court is based on matrimonial home under section 1 5  ( 1 )  ( c ) / 9  9 )
c- Proving Appropriateness
Obtaining leave under section 13 does not necessarily mean that an order will be made. 
The 1984 Act requires, before an order will be made, the applicant to show that England is 
the appropriate venue for the application. These requirements are designed to enable the 
courts more readily to identify and exclude umneritorious cases which might be brought as 
a result of the width of the jurisdiction rules.(91) According to section 16, the court must 
consider a wide range of matters in determining the appropriateness of the venue. In 
particular/92) the connection that the parties to the marriage have with England, the 
country where the divorce was granted and any other country outside England; whether 
adequate relief has been or could be obtained in a country outside England; the likelihood of 
any order made under part III of the 1984 Act being enforceable and the length of time that 
has elapsed since the date of divorce.
What is notable in section 16 is that it gives the court a wide discretion to dismiss the 
application if the court is not satisfied that it would be appropriate to make an o r d e r . ( 9 3 )  
Thus, it is highly likely that the court would not grant an order if the parties have more 
connection with the foreign country than with England either residentially or financially; or 
if the order is unlikely to be enforceable in the foreign country; or if the applicant did not 
bring proceedings within a reasonable time. It appears that at the hearing of the substantive
8 9- S. 14 (1 ).
9 0 -  S. 14 (2).
9 1- Canton, (1985) 15 Fam ily Law  13 a t 16.
9 2- S. 16(2); D avid Gordon, op.cit.pp. 184-188; D icey &  M oitis, 12th ed., pp  .773-774; M orris, 4 th-ed .,
p. 210.
9 3- S. 16 (1); John.W illiam s, (1983) 133 N .L .J.767 at 768.
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application, section 16 imposes on the court the duty to consider whether England is the 
appropriate venue for the application. It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeal in 
Holmes v. Holmes rejected the idea that the 1984 Act drew a distinction between the 
criteria which the court should take into account in deciding whether to entertain the 
application and those which the court has to consider in the matter of application for leave. 
The court held that the matters in section 16 must be taken into account in the stage of 
application for leave, and if it is not satisfied that England is the appropriate venue, the 
application for leave must be dismissed.
The decision mises doubt as to whether the court needs to reconsider section 16 on the 
hearing of the substantive application- It is understood from the Law Commission that 
section 16 must be considered by the court before it can make an o r d e r . ( 9 5 )  Here, it 
seems that such an investigation would prolong proceedings and therefore, would be time 
consuming and substantially increase expenses. Moreover, it is odd to reconsider what has 
been considered if there have been no intervening changes in circumstances or if such 
changes are not relevant.(9 On the other hand, reconsideration is another safeguard 
against incautious venturing into an area where a careful tread is much to be desired.
d- Orders Which the Court Can Make
If the court is satisfied that it is appropriate for it to make an order for financial relief, 
the form of the relief which the court may grant is decided by English law. The English 
court always applies its own law when making an order for financial relief ancillary to 
divorce proceedings irrespective of the domicile of the parties. (9 7) Although the general 
argument of choice of law rule has been c o n s i d e r e d , ( 9  8 )  it is interesting to note that in the
9 4  [1989] 3 A11.E.R.786 a t 795.
9 5- Law  Com  No. 117, para 2. 5 and P. 29.
9 6- John. W illiam s, (1983) 133 N .L .J.767 at 768.
9 7 -  Sealey  v. Callcin  [1953] P. 135; Cam tnell v. Cam m ell[ 1965] P .4 6 5 ; in  cases to  w h ich  the 
M aintenance O rders {Facilities for Enforcem ent] A ct 1970 o r the  M aintenance O rders [Reciprocal 
Enforcem ent] A ct 1972 apply , there m ay be a  lim ited num ber o f circum stances w here foreign law is 
relevant by reason o f the reciprocal provision.
9 8- See, ch. 3.
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view of the Law Commission, the application of a choice of law rule other than English to 
grant relief under part III would produce difficulties in determining which other law would 
be appropriate or in obtaining expert evidence or it would frustrate the object of reform if 
the foreign law concerned contains no provision or provides inadequate r e l i e f / 9  9 )
The application of English law may lead to the result that an order made under part III 
may not be recognised and enforced abroad. This can be seen, e.g. in respect of Iraqi law. 
The question of financial relief after divorce is a matter to be decided by the national law of 
the husband/^*)**) The financial relief under Iraqi law takes the form of dower, 
maintenance during the Idda period and compensation.fi **1) however, the English 
court orders the Iraqi husband to make payment for the wife which falls outside the concept 
of Iraqi financial relief, such an order will not be recognised and enforceability would 
depend on the Iraqi husband and property being within the jurisdiction of the British court. 
The otlier side of this argument is that if, in a ’mixed' cultural marriage leaning to Britain in 
nature, the British wife is wealthy, it may be that the Iraqi husband should be able to claim 
maintenance from her after divorce though this is quite incompatible with the husband's 
Iraqi personal law. One of the benefits of the 1984 Act is that it reduces the need to 
challenge the substance of foreign decrees because something can be done about inadequate 
provision. Clearly there is a need here for a balance. The English court should proceed 
with sensitivity, and with a view to parties' expectations, and the nature of the marriage it is 
dealing with-i.e.in a mixed marriage of Iraqi husband and British wife, whether the 
marriage and all the circumstances lean to Iraq or to Britain, of course, if there is a 
matrimonial home in Britain, it should be dealt with surely in accordance with English law.
The result of the application of English law is that the court can make any of the orders 
which it could make on granting an English decree of divorce (102) g m  the court's powers
9  9 L aw  C om .W .P .N o.77 paras 52,56.
1 0 0 -  Art. 19 (3) o f the 1951 Civil Code.
1 0 1 -  See, Infra, 331.
1 0 2 -  SS.23, 24  o f the M atrim onial C auses A ct 1973.
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are restricted where the sole ground of jurisdiction is the presence of a matrimonial 
home.(103) Thus, where the jurisdiction is assumed on the domicile or habitual residence 
basis or is based on the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Acts 1982 and 1991 the court can 
make to the other party of the marriage or child of the family any of the orders which it 
could make under part II of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 if the divorce had been 
granted in E n g l a n d , ( 1 0 4 )  I t  can make periodical p a y m e n t s / 1 0 5 )  secured periodical 
p a y m e n t s / 106) o r d e r s / 1 o7) transfer or settlement of property o r d e r s / 108)
orders for sale of p r o p e r t y / 1 0 9 )  ^n order varying an ante nuptial or post-nuptial 
s e t t l e m e n t ( i  10) an order extinguishing or reducing the interest of either party under 
such settlement.(l 11)
In deciding whether to make any of the orders above, section 18 of the Matrimonial and 
Family Proceedings Act 1984 imposes on the court the duty to have regard to a range of 
matters which are essentially the same as if it itself was granting a decree.(l 12) Briefly, 
the court must have regard to the welfare of any child of the family,(H3) the financial 
position, the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage; any 
physical or mental disability of either of the parties or of the child; the standard of living; 
the conduct of each of the parties. In addition, the court must consider the extent to which 
any overseas order has been made or is likely to be complied with.(i 14) There is nothing
1 0 3 - S.20 of the M atrim onial and Fam ily Proceedings A ct 1984.
1 0 4 -  Ibid, S. 17. U nder S .22, the court can m ake an order for the transfer o f certain  tenancies. M atrim onial 
H om e A ct 1983, S .7 and Sched. 1.S .25 am ends the Inheritance (Provision fo r Fam ily and D ependants) 
A ct 1975 to  give persons divorced abroad the sam e rights to  app ly  fo r p rovison under th a t A ct as 
persons divorced in England.
1 0 5  -S .23 (1) (a) (d) o f  the M atrim onial Causes A ct 1973.
1 0 6 -Ibid, S.23 (1) (b) (e).
1 0 7 -Ibid, S .2 3 ( i ) ( c )  (f).
1 0 8 -Ibid, S .2 4 ( l )  ( a ) ( b ) .
1 09-  Ibid, S .24 A ( I )  inserted by M atrim onial H om e and Property A ct 1981, S.7.
1 10 -Ib id , S .2 4 ( l) (c ) .
1 1 1 - Ibid, 8 .2 4 (1 ) (d).
1 1 2 -  Ibid, 88 .25 , 25 A inserted by M atrim onial and Fam ily Proceedings A ct 1984, S.7.
1 1 3 -  8 .1 8 (2 ).
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in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to prevent the parties themselves from agreeing the 
financial provision to be made. The court will normally approve such an agreement 
provided that it is not contrary to public policy, and will incorporate it in an order.(I 
This principle has been enacted in section 19 of the 1984 Act which gives the court the 
power, unless it has reason to think that there are other circumstances in to which it ought 
to inquire, to approve a consent order if the parties make an application for a consent order 
for financial relief based on section 17 above, or if they agree to an order varying or 
discharging an order under that section.
Where jurisdiction is assumed on the matrimonial basis,(I I**) the court's powers are 
limited to making orders affecting an interest in the dwelling h o u s e , ( H 7 )  Le.an order for 
the transfer or settlement of the whole or part of one party's interest in the house; an order 
varying an ante-or post-nuptial settlement; an order extinguishing or reducing either party's 
interest in the house; an order for the sale of a party's interest in the house,(l 18) or as to 
lump s u m , ( I l 9 )  limited in amount to the value of that i n t e r e s t , ! 1 2 0 )  to a party to the 
marriage or for the benefit of a child of the family.
Finally, section 23 gives the court, provided leave has been granted, power to make 
such order as it thinks fit restraining any disposition about to be made with the intention of 
defeating the claim for financial relief or setting aside any such disposition already 
m a d e , ( I 2 1 )  but where the only ground of jurisdiction is the presence of a former
1 1 4 - 8 .1 8 ( 6 ) .
1 1 5 -  8.33 A inserted by M atrim onial and Fam ily Proceedings A ct 1984, 8.7.
1 1 6  8 .1 5 (1 )  (c).
1 1 7 -  8 .20; Section 27 states that " 'dwelling-house' includes any building or part thereof w hich is occupied 
as a  dwelling, and any yard, garden, garage or outhouse belonging to  the dw elling-house and occupied 
therewith."
1 1 8 - 8 .2 0  (i) (c )(e )  (0  (g).
1 1 9 -  8 .2 0 (1 ) (a) (b).
120 -  8.20 (2).
1 2 1 -  See, also  8 .37  o f the M atrim onial Causes A ct 1973;Fam ily Proceedings R ules 1991, r.2 .68 ; Ghath 
v.Gfiath  [1992] 2 A Il.E .R .920.
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matrimonial home the court's powers are confined to restraining or setting aside a 
disposition of the property in respect of that d w e l l i n g - h o u s e / 1 2 2 )  Under section 2 4  the 
court can exercise this power even where the jurisdiction requirements are not satisfied 
provided the court is satisfied that the marriage has been dissolved by means of judicial or 
other proceedings in an overseas country and that the applicant intends to apply for leave 
for financial relief as soon as he has been habitually resident in England for one year. It 
should be noted that the court's power under this section will not extend to making an order 
setting aside dispositions already made.
C- Financial Relief in Scotland
The approach of Scots law to dealing with applications for financial relief is different 
from English law. While the latter adopted wide jurisdictional rules combined with a filter 
system to exclude inappropriate cases, the former preferred restrictive jurisdictional rules 
with conditions identifying certain cases as inappropriate in advance. There are two main 
reasons behind the Scottish approach; (1) the Scots law was intended to protect the 
'Scottish wife' rather than people having more tentative links with Scotland; (2) the Scots 
law rejected the English idea of leave to make an application. Here, the Scottish Law 
Commission expressed doubt as to whether such a procedure would achieve the desired 
result of protecting defenders from the expense and inconvenience of involvement in 
dubious actions. M oreover, since the Scottish system is not fam iliar with such a 
procedure, the Scottish Law Commission thought that the introduction of a special set of 
procedural rules for limited cases could not be j u s t i f i e d . !  1 2 3 )  Accordingly, a person 
seeking financial relief in Scotland does not need to go through a filter mechanism. Such a 
person needs only to satisfy the court that he is within the scope of section 28 (1) and that 
the provisions of the jurisdictional requirements and the conditions contained in Section 28 
(2)-(4) are met.
1 2 2 -  S.23 (4).
1 2 3 -  Scots Law C om .N o,72. para. 2-13; Canton, (1985) 15 Fam ily Law 13 at 16.
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1- The Scope of Part iy(124)
Section 28 (1) provides that "where parties to a marriage have been divorced in an 
overseas country..., the Coiirt(^^^) may entertain an application by one of the parties for 
an order for financial provision".
Although section 28 (1) is similar to English section 12 (1) in that it applies only to 
divorces obtained in an " overseas c o u n t r y i t  is, on the other hand, wider than its 
English counterpart in that it applies not only to overseas divorces obtained by means of 
proceedings but also to divorces obtained otherwise than by means of proceedings. This 
can be seen from the fact that the Scottish section made no reference to the phrase "judicial 
or other proceedings" contained in section 12 (1). While it is not clear whether divorces 
whose recognition is governed by section 46 (2) of the Family Law Act 1986 are within 
English section 12, they are clearly within section 28 (1). Thus, the Scots law in this 
context is more clear and certain and would avoid for the Scottish court the confusion and 
the uncertainty over the phrase "other proceedings" in this area of law.
The ability to make an application in Scotland is limited to those who were not pursuers 
(or joint pursuers) in the foreign proceedings.! 127) n  seems the main reason behind this 
limitation is to discourage "forum-shopping". There is no doubt that "forum-shopping" 
should be discouraged in this area of law but not in such a way as to defeat the object of 
reform. It is thought that the Scottish provisions contain within themselves sufficient 
protection against "forum-shopping". In certain cases it is not clear which party is the 
pursuer and which is the defender. For instance, in cases of the dissolution of marriage by 
khula under Iraqi law, both parties must apply jointly to the court to confirm their
agreement to dissolve the marriage.!12 8) such cases the limitation applies and the result
1 2 4 -  This part cam e into force on 1, Septem ber 1986.
1 2 5 -  "The Court" m eans " the C ourt o f Session or the Sheriff Court' S .30.
1 2 6 -  "Overseas Country" m eans "a Country or territory outside the British Islands" S.30.
1 2 7 -  8 .28  (3) (b); contrast w ith English  section 12 (1).
1 2 8 -  Art. 48  o f the 1959 Personal S tatus Code.
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is that neither party can ask the Scottish court for financial relief since both were the 
pursuers ( or joint pursuers) in the foreign proceedings. There is no point in withdrawing 
the court's power to make an order for such persons merely because they followed their 
religion in obtaining the divorce. The situation may be thought to show insufficient 
understanding by Scots law of foreign rules. The English law in this point is more justified 
and it achieves the desired result of the reform, while the Scots law will have changed 
nothing and merely raised false hope for the pursuers in foreign proceedings.
2- The Scheme of Part IV
A person, whose divorce falls within section 28 (1), seeking financial relief in Scotland 
must firstly satisfy the jurisdictional requirements and secondly meet the strict conditions 
listed in section 28 (3).
a- Jurisdictional Requirements
Section 28 (2) sets out the jurisdictional requirements which must be met before an 
application can be made. Subject to the provisions of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments 
Acts 1982 and 1991, the Scottish court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for an 
order for financial relief if the applicant was domiciled or habitually resident in Scotland on 
the date when the application was made and the other party to the marriage either: (1) was 
domiciled or habitually resident in Scotland at that date; or (2) was domiciled or habitually 
resident there when the parties last lived together as husband and wife; or (3) when the 
application was made, was an owner or tenant of, or had a beneficial interest in, property in 
Scodand which had at sometime been a matrimonial home.
It is quite clear that these rules differ considerably from those in the English law. The 
requirement that the applicant be domiciled or habitually resident in Scotland on the date 
when the application is made reflects the stated policy of protection of the "Scottish wife" 
who is left financially unprotected after foreign divorce rather than a general invitation to 
all. The requirement that the defender must also have a close connection with Scotland at
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the time of the application reflects the desire to provide some protection for him.
In contrast with the English rules, the Scottish rules would eliminate the worst cases of 
"forum-shopping" and would provide greater opportunity to enforce an order in practice. 
However, against these advantages, the Scottish rules are too narrow and might exclude 
cases which would be found in England to be meritorious and appropriate, particularly in 
cases where the domicile or habitual residence of the applicant rule is not satisfied at the 
time of the application but was only satisfied at the earlier date when the foreign divorce 
became effective/129) Scots Law Commission had rejected this criteria when they
concluded that "there is no need to open our courts to applications by those who were 
divorced abroad and who, at the time of the application, are domiciled and habitually 
resident a b r o a d " . ! I T h e  opening of the doors of the Scottish courts to those persons 
seems to be less serious than that of closing them, particularly where there had been a 
matrimonial home. Suppose both parties married and lived in Scotland. Later, on a 
temporary visit to Iraq, the husband obtained a decree of divorce from the Iraqi court the 
validity of which would be recognised in Scotland. While the wife remained in Iraq, the 
husband returned to Scotland and occupied the former matrimonial home. Since the 
marriage had substantial connections with Scotland (the parties having been living in 
Scotland, and their matrimonial home being in this country and the husband retaining his 
Scottish domicile) it seems unfair to prevent such a wife of Iraqi origin from seeking 
financial relief at least in relation to the matrimonial home. The opening of the doors to 
such a wife neither would encourage "forum-shopping" nor would be unfair to the 
husband. Contrary, the closing of the doors would encourage the wife to challenge the 
divorce and this would absorb a quite excessive amount of time and money.
Unlike the English law, no period of time is required for the habitual residence when 
the jurisdiction of the Scottish court is assumed on this basis. The Scottish Law 
Commission justified such an approach on the ground that the conditions listed in section
1 2 9 -  Contrast w ith English section 12 (1) (a) (b).
1 3 0 -  Scots Law C om .N o.72.para. 3-4.
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28 (3) made any particular period of habitual residence in this context unnecessary/^^)) 
The conditions, as we shall see, show that an application for financial relief will not be 
competent unless there is a strong connection with Scotland. Nevertheless, since the term 
of habitual residence has not been settled yet it seems desirable to specify at least a one year 
period as in the case of divorce p r o c e e d i n g s . ! !  ^2) Where the jurisdiction of the Scottish 
court is based on a matrimonial hom e/!^^) the court’s powers are restricted in a manner 
similar to that in England. This means that the orders which the court can make will be 
limited to an order relating to the former matrimonial home in Scotland.
The jurisdictional grounds in section 28 (2) are subject to the provisions of the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Acts 1982 and 1 9 9 1 .! !^ 4) The whole question of the inter­
relation of these Acts with the field of financial relief in the Matrimonial and Family 
Proceedings Act 1984 has already been considered.!! ^  ^ ) However, if an order under part 
IV  is considered to be within the Conventions, then section 28(4) must apply. Thus, 
where the jurisdiction of the Scottish court falls to be determined by reference to the 
jurisdictional requirements imposed by virtue of the 1982 and 1991 Acts, the Scottish court 
cannot take jurisdiction if the requirements of the 1982 and 1991 Acts are not satisfied even 
if the jurisdictional requirements under section 28 (2) are; and, conversely must take 
jurisdiction if the requirements of the 1982 and 1991 Acts are satisfied even if the 
jurisdictional requirements under section 28 (2) are not.!! ^^)
According to the 1982 and 1991 Acts the Scottish court will have jurisdiction to 
entertain proceedings under part IV of the 1984 Act if the defender is domiciled in 
Scotland;!! 3 ^ ) or the defender is domiciled in another contracting state and the court is a
1 3 1 -  Ibid, para. 3-4.
13 2- John W illiam s, (1983) 133 N .L.J. 767 a t 768.
1 3  3- S .2 8 (2 )(b )  (iii).
1 3 4 -  S .2 8 (4 ).
1 3 5 -  See, supra, 308.
1 3 6 -  S .28 (4).
1 3 7 -  S .l ,  Sched 8, Art. 2.
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court for the place where the maintenance creditor is domiciled or habitually resident/!  ^
or if the object of proceedings relates to rights in rem in, or tenancies of, immovable 
property, if the property is in Scotland/!^^) or if the parties have agreed to submit their 
dispute to the Scottish c o u r t / !  40) or if the defender enters an appearance other than solely 
to contest the jurisdiction/! 4 !)
b- Strict Conditions
Even if the divorce falls within section 28 (1) and the jurisdictional rules are satisfied 
the Scottish court will not be competent to make an order unless the conditions listed in 
section 28 (3) are met: (a) the divorce is one which would be recognised in Scotland; (b) 
the other party initiated the divorce proceedings;(c) the application was made within five 
years after the date when the divorce took effect; (d) a court in Scotland would have had 
jurisdiction to entertain an action for divorce between the parties if such an action had been 
brought in Scotland immediately before the foreign divorce took effect; (e) the marriage had 
a substantial connection with Scotland, and finally (f) both parties are living at the time of 
the application. The basic idea of section 28 (3) is the same as that of English section 16 
(2) but the flexibility and the scope for discretion which characterize English law are 
notably absent in Scots la w /! 42)
The condition that the application must be made within a fixed time limit was rejected 
by the Law Commission in favour of the view that the time factor should be left to the 
discretion of the court.!! 4 3) They thought that a time limit might prejudice a wife who had 
no notice of the proceedings. Moreover, in cases where there is a multiplicity of divorces a 
time limit could confront the court with the problems of deciding which of several foreign
1 3 8  -S,2 (5), Sched 8, A rt.2  (5).
1 3 9 -  S .4, Sched 8, A rl.l6 .
1 4 0 -  S.5, Sched 8, Art. 17.
141- 8.6 , Sched 8, Art. 18.
142- Canton, (1985) 15 Fam ily Law 13 a t 16,17.
1 4 3 -  8 .1 6 (2 )  (i).
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divorces actually dissolved the marriage in order to identify the date from which the period 
should r u n / ! 4 4 )  is obvious that the main argument of the Law Commission was based 
on the facts of Quazi v. Although it is hard to ignore the power of this
argument, one may say on the other hand, that the Law Commission's approach would 
produce a state of uncertainty where certainty and finality are desirable in this field of law. 
It would also provide no protection for respondents against wholly stale claims. Further, 
the circumstances of Quazi v. Quazi are unlikely to arise frequently. Accordingly, the 
application for financial relief should not have been allowed to remain doubtful indefinitely. 
The reasonable rule is that the applicant should be required to seek financial relief within a 
reasonable time. The Scottish rule is reasonable because it is clear, certain, simple and it 
encourages the making of claims for financial relief quickly and it enables stale claims to be 
excluded.
As regards the condition (c),(! 46) it seems clear that the Scottish court is not prepared 
to grant financial relief to those who were divorced abroad if at the time of the foreign 
divorce neither party could have brought divorce proceedings in Scotland. This condition 
implies that at least one of the parties must have been domiciled or habitually resident in 
Scotland before the foreign divorce took effect. "It would", the Scottish Law Commission 
said," be going too far to allow our law to be applied in cases where, had a divorce action 
been brought in Scotland, our courts would have had to decline jurisdiction".!!47) 
Although this condition ensures a certain connection between the maniage and Scotland at 
the time of the foreign divorce, the Scottish Law Commission felt that it was not sufficient 
connection to justify applying Scots law to financial relief after foreign divorce. In 
addition, condition (e) must be met. This requires that the marriage must have a substantial 
connection with Scotland.!! 48) The term "substantial connection" is not defined but it
1 4 4 -  Law C om .W .P.N o.77 para, 55.
1 4 5  [1979] 3 W .L.R.833.
1 4 6  S .28 (3) (d).
1 4 7 -  Scots Law Com .N o.72.para. 3-14,
1 4 8 -  S.28 (3) (e).
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seems that the connection need not be more substantial than with any other country 
because, since the parties these days can travel easily from one country to another, it is 
difficult to determine whether a marriage had more substantial connection with Scotland. In 
other words, doubt attends the meaning of this requirement.
The final condition is that both parties are living at the time of the a p p l i c a t i o n . ! !  4 9 )  
Unlike the English law,!!^®) no financial relief is available under Scots law to persons 
who have been divorced overseas against the executors of a former spouse who had died 
since the date of the foreign divorce. Such a condition avoids the practical difficulties 
which might arise if the deceased party's estate had already been distributed. This is a 
difficulty which is rare to encounter. In any event, this further difference between the 
English and Scots approaches should be noted.
c- Orders Which the Court Can Make
The form of relief which the court can make after a foreign divorce is governed by 
Scots law .!!^!) The Scottish Law Commission rejected strongly any idea which might 
lead to the application of foreign law!!^^) for the same reasons given by the Law 
Commission in relation to English law.!! ^  3) The result of the application of Scots law in 
an action for financial relief after foreign divorce is that the Scottish court can make any of 
the orders which it could make on granting a Scottish decree of divorce. But where 
jurisdiction is based only on the defender's interest in a matrimonial home in Scotland, the 
court's powers will be l i m i t e d . ! !  ^ 4 )  Thus, where the jurisdiction is assumed on section 
28 (2) (b) (i), (ii) and (4) the court can make any of the orders which it could make if the 
divorce had been granted in Scotland viz, it can make an order for the payment of a capital
1 4 9 -  S .28 (3) (f).
1 5 0 -  S.25.
1 5 1 -  S.28 (1).
1 5 2  -Scots Law Com .N o.72.para. 3-19.
1 5 3  See, supra, 316.
1 5 4 -  S.29 (5).
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sum or the transfer of property; periodical allowance;!! any " incidental order"!! 
including, an order for the sale or valuation of property, an order regulating the occupation 
of the matrimonial home or the use o f furniture and plenishings in it; an order that security 
shall be given for any financial provision; an order setting aside or varying any term in an 
ante-nuptial or post-nuptial marriage settlement; an order as to the date from which any 
interest on any amount awarded shall ru n /l ^  7) addition to those orders, section 29 (4) 
of the 1984 Act gives the court power to make an interim order for the payment o f 
periodical allowance if it appears from the averments that an order for financial relief will be 
made and that it is necessary to make such an order to avoid hardship to the applicant.
In making an order for financial relief after foreign divorce, the court is required to 
exercise its power so far as it is reasonable and practicable to put the parties in the financial 
position in which they would have been if the application had been raised in Scotland and 
had been disposed o f on the date when the foreign divorce took effect.!!^*) The court 
must take into account the parties' resources, present and foreseeable, and any order made 
by a foreign court for financial relief or the transfer of property.! 159) The court must also 
have regard to the welfare of a child, the age of each party, the duration of marriage, any 
physical or mental disability of either of the parties or of the child.!! 60)
In a case where jurisdiction is based only on the defender's interest in a matrimonial 
home, the court may only make!!  ^!) orders relating to the former matrimonial home,! 162)
155- S,8 ( i)  (a) and (b) of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985.
1 5 6 - 8 .8 (1 ) (c). Ibid.
157- 8 .14 (1 ), Ibid.
1 5 8  -S.29 (2); See, John.C.Melnnes, op.cit.p, 155.
159- S.29 (3).
1 6 0 - S .l 1 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985.
161 S.29 (5).
162- "Matrimonial home" means "any house, caravan, houseboat, or other structure which has been 
provided or has been made available by one or both of the spouses, or has become a family residence 
and includes any garden or other ground or building attached to, and usually occupied with, or otherwise 
required for the amenity or convenience of, the house, caravan, houseboat or other structure". See, S.22 
of the Matrimonial Home [Family Protection] (Scotland) Act 1981; S.30 (1) of the Matrimonial and
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or its furniture or plenishings/) or that the other party pays a capital sum not exceeding 
that other party's interest in the matrimonial home. In addition to the above orders, the 
court can make an order setting aside or varying any transfer of, or transaction involving, 
property which was effected by the other party to the marriage if satisfied by the challenger 
that the transaction had, or was likely to have, the effect of defeating in whole or in part, 
the applicant's claim for financial provisions.!) 64)
II- The Effect of Recognition of Foreign Divorces on Financial Relief in 
Iraq
One of the legal consequences of a valid marriage in Muslim law is that a husband is 
under an obligation to maintain his wife. A wife is not under a corresponding obligation to 
maintain her h u s b a n d /165) This of course reflected the fact that in the traditional Muslim 
society it was very unlikely that a wife would have an income. In recent years, although in 
many Muslim countries the law governing maintenance has been reformed to put the wife 
under the obligation to maintain the family if she has m eans/) 66) the Iraqi law still retains 
the Classical Muslim rule.!) 67)
If a marriage is dissolved by divorce the parties are no longer husband and wife, and 
accordingly the legal liability of the husband to maintain his wife will cease. Nevertheless,
Family Proceedings Act 1984.
163- "Furniture and Plenishings "mean "any article situated in a matiimonial home which-(a) is owned or 
hired by either spouse or is being acquired by either spouse under a hire purchase agreement or 
conditional sale agreement; and (b) is reasonable necessary to enable the home to be used as a family 
residence, but does not include any vehicle, caravan or houseboat, or such other structure as is 
mentioned in the definition of matrimonial home" S, 22 of the Matrimonial Home [Family Protection] 
(Scotland) Act 1981; S.30 (1) o f the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984.
164- SS.18 and 19 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985.
165- Abbas, M. op.cit.p. 109; Nasir, op.cit.p. 93; contrast with the position in England and Scotland, 
See, supra, 295.
166 See, Art.23 of the Timision Personal Status Code 1956; Art. 52 of the Unified Arab Draft Code for 
Personal Status 1985.
1 6 7 - Art.23 (1) of the 1959 Personal Status Code.
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the Iraqi courts have powers on granting divorce or at any time thereafter to make financial 
relief to the wife and children but not to the husband. In cases where the marriage has been 
dissolved by tcdaq the Iraqi law enables the court to make an order for compensation to the 
wife if it thinks that the husband divorced his wife in an arbitrary m a n n e r . !  16 8)
The question of financial relief after recognition of divorces granted in the Arab states 
has not been regulated either by the Arab treaty or by Iraqi law. It is thought that the 
absence of rules concerning this matter would not produce hardship to parties divorced in 
Arab states because, although these states all have their own legal systems, the grounds for 
divorce and the financial relief in those states are substantially similar to that in Iraq. As 
regards the question of financial relief after the recognition of non-Arab foreign divorces 
the Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments Code 1928, to which the court may 
refer in giving recognition, contains no provisions regarding this matter. The courts at 
present have no power to make an order for financial relief after a foreign divorce. The 
wife will face the same hardship existing in England and Scotland before the enactment of 
the 1984Act if the foreign law contains no provision, or provides inadequate relief.
If, however, the court accepts jurisdiction, then the form of the relief which the Iraqi 
court may grant is decided not by Iraqi law but by the national law of the h u s b a n d . ! )  6 9 )  
This is justified on the ground that the law which governs the dissolution of marriage 
should also govern the consequences of that dissolution. Since the rule in Iraqi law is that 
the dissolution of marriage by divorce is a matter to be decided by the national law of the 
h u s b a n d , ! )  70) follows that this law should also govern the form of financial relief.
It seems clear that the main defect of the application of the national law of the husband, 
besides the need to ascertain and in full understanding to give effect to it, is that it would 
cause hardship to the wife if this law was less generous than her personal law. If the
168- Ibid, Art.39 (3).
1 6 9  Art. 19(3) of the 1951 Civil Code.
1 7 0 - Supra, Chapter Three.
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national law of the husband is considered as the law of Iraq, then the courts can make the 
following orders.
A- Dower (Makr)
The Iraqi law does not define this term but it is generally accepted that it means a sum 
of money or other property promised by the husband to be paid or delivered to the wife in 
consideration of the marriage.!) 71) Contrary to a widely held misconception in the west, 
dower is not a bride-price. In fact dower is a marriage gift from the bridegroom to his 
bride and becomes her exclusive property. Islam has elevated the status of women as 
dower is given as a mark of respect for her and this is the reason why dower is neither an 
essential nor a condition for the validity of the marriage. A marriage is deemed valid 
without any mention of dower. () 7 2)
The dower may consist of anything that can be valued in money and it is the sole 
property of the woman which she can dispose of the way she likes. Any condition to the 
contrary shall be void. The dower can be either specified or u n s p e c i f i e d . ! ) 73) The 
specified dower is the amount settled by the parties at the time of the marriage or after the 
marriage is solemnized. It may be increased or reduced under certain conditions. The 
husband may increase the dower after the maniage and the wife may reduce it provided that 
they possess full legal capacity of disposition. This shall be attached to the original contract 
if it is accepted by the other at the sitting where the increase or reduction has been afforded. 
The specified dower can be either prompt or d e f e r r e d . ! )  74) When the dower is prompt it 
is payable on demand. If it is the deferred dower it is payable at the dissolution of marriage 
either by death of the husband or when the wife is divorced.!) 75)
The unspecified dower is the dower which is not settled at the time of the marriage or
171- Mhanimed Abbas, op.dLp. 102; Nasir, op.cit.p. 78.
172- Nasir, op.cit.p. 78.
173- Art. 19 (1) o f the 1959 Personal Status Code.
1 7 4 -Ibid, Art.20(l).
1 7 5 - Ibid, Art.20 {2);Shahnaz v Rizwmt [1965] 1Q.B.390.
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immediately after the marriage and is fixed according to the social position of the wife's 
family. The social position of the husband is of little account. In fixing the amount of 
unspecified dower the judge must take into account the age, beauty, wealth, education and 
virginity of the w o m a n . ! )  7 6) The wife shall be entitled to the whole specified dower if the 
divorce occurs after the actual consummation of marriage, if  the divorce occurs before 
consummation, the wife shall be entitled to half of the specified dower,!) 7 7) in the case of 
unspecified dower, the wife shall not be entitled to the half dower but the Mutaî or present. 
In other words, the husband is required to give a suitable amount to her according to his 
own capacity.!) 7*)
B- Maintenance ( Nafaqah)
Maintenance is the lawful right of the wife and children under a valid marriage contract
on certain conditions. The responsibility of maintenance by the husband is not only when
she lives as a legal wife and towards his children by that wife, but it is important to
maintain her even in the event of d i v o r c e . ! )  7 9 )  Maintenance consists of food, clothing,
housing, medicine, the necessary servants where the wife is of a social position which does
not permit her to dispense with such services, or when she is sick.!)**)) The
responsibility of the husband to maintain his wife will be continued on the same scale after
the dissolution of marriage by divorce and until the expiry of the period of Idda.
However, that is not a long period (3 months) and thereafter the divorced woman whose
social status is not high must look to her own family for support. Maintenance may be
increased or decreased in accordance with the change of the husband's condition and
market prices, and in fixing the sum by way of maintenance the judge will consider the
rank and circumstances of both spouses.!)* ))
1 7 6 — Nasir, op.cit.p. 82.
1 7 7 “ Art. 21 of the 1959 Personal Status Code.
1 7 8 - Ibid, Art.22.
1 79- Nasir, op.cit.p. 93.
1 8 0  Art.24 (2) o f the 1959 Personal Status Code.
1 8 1  Ibid, Art.28.
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If the divorce occurs after the actual consummation of marriage the court can make 
maintenance order to the wife for the period of Idda. This order will be ceased either on 
the death of the husband or the expiry of the period of In the case where the
divorce occurs before consummation the courts have no power to make an order for 
maintenance because the wife needs not to observe the Idda in this case. When the courts 
make a maintenance order this will include the right of the wife to stay during her Idda at 
the home in which the parties have lived together before divorce.!)*^) In certain 
conditions the Iraqi law extends the Islamic rule to allow the wife to stay in the matrimonial 
home for the period of three years commencing from the date when the order was made. 
The wife will lose this right if she accepts the divorce or the cause for divorce was her 
adultery or the dissolution of marriage was by The court can make a
maintenance order to a child( for this is the father's obligation, whether the marriage still is 
in existence or not). This order will continue until the girl marries, and the boy reaches the 
age at which he can earn a living, unless he is a student.!)
C- Compensation
In 1985, the Personal Status Code was amended to give the courts power to make an 
order for compensation in the case where the husband divorced his wife by taiaq in an 
arbitrary manner, e.g.without a reasonable cause, and the wife would suffer misery and 
hardship therefrom.!) *6) The compensation shall not be in excess of the equivalent of the 
maintenance due to her for two years. In deciding the amount of compensation the courts 
must take into account the conditions of the husband in respect of affluence or poverty.
182- Ibid, Art.50 and order No. 1000 of 1983.
1 83- Art.24 (2) of the 1959 Personal Status Code.
18 4- Order, No. 77 of 1983; Order, No. 145 of 1988.
185 - Art.59 of the 1959 Personal Status Code and order No. 1000 of 1983,
1 8 6 - Ibid, Art. 39 (3).
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CONCLUSION
Approaches to the solution of conflict rules in matters of divorce are fundamentally 
different within the legal systems treated here. What they have in common is that they give 
greater weight to the achievement of internal harmony and less to the achievement of 
international harmony and uniformity of status. However, the English and Scots rules are 
more developed than the Iraqi rules, reflecting to some extent the developm ent in 
contemporary conflict of laws rules. The Iraqi rules are rather rudimentary leaving many 
gaps and suffering from lack of clarity. This is not surprising for the choice of principles in 
divorce is ultimately a policy issue and is therefore, inevitably influenced by the religion 
and social conditions as well as the traditions prevailing in each country.
Jurisdiction
It is fair to say that if the relations of husband and wife are regulated with reference to a 
legal system with which they are connected, there will be greater reason to hope that the 
worst cases of 'forum-shopping' and 'limping marriages' would vanish and that justice 
would be done between the parties.
Domicile or nationality are proper grounds of jurisdiction in divorce actions. They are 
capable of ensuring that only those persons whose case has a sufficient connection with the 
country are entitled to invoke its jurisdiction. Clearly, the country of domicile or nationality 
to which the parties or one of them belonged has an interest in their marital status strong 
enough to warrant the assumption of jurisdiction. It is equally clear that this exercise o f 
jurisdiction normally meets the needs of the parties themselves, since the alternative is that 
of having to go to some other country with all the hardship, inconvenience and costs that 
may be involved therein.
Certainly there are cases in which domicile and nationality may not necessarily indicate 
a sufficient connection between the parties and the country concerned to justify invoking its
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jurisdiction. Most notably, under the present rules both of domicile and nationality, a 
person may be regarded as a domiciled in or a national of a country which he has never 
visited, and one of the difficulties about nationality is that it may result in stateless persons 
and persons with dual nationalities. Nevertheless, there is a powerful policy of 
convenience in the continued use of domicile in English and Scots law and nationality in 
Iraqi law as bases of divorce jurisdiction. The decrees emanating from such jurisdiction are 
worthy of recognition.
The present reform of domicile as far as this discussion is concerned (if it is 
implemented by legislation) would have a positive effect on the law of jurisdiction. It 
would remove the anomalies of the current domicile rules and would ensure that only those 
persons who have a genuine connection by domicile can raise divorce actions in England 
and Scotland. The present English and Scottish jurisdiction of domicile ended a long 
period of hardship facing the parties in the past. The domicile of the husband or that of the 
wife at the time of the proceedings founds one ground of jurisdiction in a divorce action 
brought by either party. The current Iraqi jurisdiction on the ground of nationality is 
somewhat defective. In its present text article 14 of the 1951 Civil Code reveals that only 
the Iraqi nationality of the respondent at the time of the proceedings is sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction on the Iraqi courts. This formulation of words may lead to unacceptable and 
illogical results in that the Iraqi nationality of the petitioner is never a ground of jurisdiction. 
A change in this article is required to the effect that the nationality of either party should be 
sufficient. The automatic preference for Iraqi nationality as a basis of jurisdiction in cases 
where a person has several nationalities is difficult to justify. The Iraqi nationality in such 
cases should not be sufficient unless it is considered to be the effective nationality.
Domicile or nationality as a sole basis of jurisdiction would provide too narrow a rule 
and would exclude too many cases in which there might be a sufficient connection between 
the parties and the country to justify conferring jurisdiction on its court. Accordingly, one
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year’s habitual residence of either party in English and Scots law and unqualified residence 
in the context of Iraqi law were introduced to meet such cases. What is notable about the 
cuiTent rules of 'residence' is that they give greater weight to the interest of the parties over 
the international concerns of the state.
The requirement of residence previous to actions of divorce should indicate stability of 
ties within the jurisdiction and should be sufficiently stringent to discourage 'forum- 
shopping' and secure so far as reasonably possible that the divorce will be recognised 
abroad. The lapse of time guarantees that the individual has become a participant in the life 
of that state and serves as evidence of establishing strong ties with that state. Could the 
present jurisdictional rules of 'residence' be said to be sufficiently stringent to meet that aim 
and standard? Is it reasonable to suggest that they be harder to satisfy? The term 'habitual 
residence' has not yet been settled beyond all doubt. There is no broad agreement as to the 
degree of importance which is to be given to intention in determining whether residence is 
habitual; nor is it clear how long residence must persist to become habitual. Another 
difficulty about 'habitual residence' is that it may result in circumstances in which a person 
may have no habitual residence or possibly have more than one. Hence, habitual residence 
would share the disadvantage of nationality in that it may lead to more than one court 
having jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage or could conceivably lead to absence of 
remedies although admittedly a person must have some type of residence and the courts do 
not seem hard to satisfy on the matter of the requirement of 'habitual'. The problems 
arising from the existence of more than one competent court may be solved by the use of a 
system of mandatory and discretionary sists, as used in the United Kingdom but unknown 
in Iraq. Of course, in principle, there is no necessary problem. A pursuer may have a 
choice of forum, but if there is no clash, there is no problem. However, in the light of the 
recent decisions, in which habitual residence was equated with ordinary residence, there is 
now much force in the fear that one year qualification is not a long period of time and does 
not denote a substantial connection and this is significant, when to this is added the fact that
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English and Scottish courts always apply their own laws in matters of divorce.
The Iraqi jurisdictional rule, based on a few days residence of the respondent, is 
irrational. It runs contrary to the basic function of the assumption of jurisdiction, viz, that 
divorce should not be granted to persons without real and substantial ties with a forum. It 
provides no solution in cases where only the petitioner is residing in Iraq even if for a long 
period of time. It could be said that the current United Kingdom and Iraqi jurisdictional 
rules of 'residence' are not difficult to satisfy with the result that a divorce petition may be 
brought by a person with very limited connection, a matter which may lead to denial of 
recognition of decrees in the country of domicile or nationality. Since most petitioners will 
rely on 'residence' as a basis of divorce jurisdiction because it is easier to establish more 
clarification over the meaning of 'habitual' is required. A lternatively, two years 
qualification is reasonable. The Iraqi rule of 'residence' should be read to mean 'habitual' 
(domicile) and should be extended to cover cases brought by the petitioners as well.
Obviously, one consequence of the widening of the jurisdictional bases is the likelihood 
of concurrent proceedings in different jurisdictions in relation to the same marriage. This 
new problem has led to the introduction of statutory grounds requiring or enabling the 
English and Scottish courts to stay or sist proceedings. The conclusion to be drawn from 
the decided cases is that the courts have adopted different ways in determining the balance 
of fairness and convenience, a fact which led to different decisions and made the law 
unpredictable. This attitude, however, was later changed in favour of extension of the 
principle of forum  non conveniens to statutory power to stay divorce proceedings. 
Although/orww non conveniens does not require the courts to assess the balance of 
fairness as between the parties but to identify the forum with which the dispute is most 
closely connected, and one might have thought that there is a conflict between the tests, the 
difference is in form rather than real because both tests clearly involve the same purpose of 
determining where the case can appropriately be tried for the ends of justice. Nevertheless,
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Ûit forum  non conveniens' approach seems to be more flexible since it enables the courts 
to look at a whole range of relevant factors to determine the most appropriate court to hear 
the case, and it is obviously difficult to assess the balance of fairness when (as is usual for 
why else has the dispute about jurisdiction arisen?) the interests of the parties are opposed. 
The application o f forum non conveniens to divorce cases represents the unity of principle 
in jurisdictional discretion in both matrimonial and non matrimonial cases. Clearly, the 
system of staying or sisting proceedings has not only the merits of discouraging 'forum- 
shopping' but also of avoiding conflicting decisions and rendering the proceedings less 
costly in terms both of time and finance.
Choice of Law
Although English and Scots law are silent on the question of choice of law in divorce, it 
is generally agreed that only the lex fori should be applied. In Iraq a statutory choice of 
law was introduced to apply in cases of divorce principally the national law of the husband. 
The system centered around the lex fori is of tempting simplicity and maintains the public 
policy of the forum. The Iraqi approach offers a more effective safeguard against evasion 
of laws and a little hope towards international concerns. Neither approach, however, is 
without substantial criticism. The lex fori approach may defeat the reasonable expectations 
of the parties and makes the result of any litigation depend upon where the action was 
brought. It carries with it the risk of 'forum-shopping' and 'limping marriages'. With the 
broadening of the jurisdictional rules on which English and Scottish courts now assume 
jurisdiction over spouses with little connection (one year's habitual residence of either 
party), the argument of public policy to justify the application of the lex fo r i  becomes 
dubious.
Certainly, the lex fori approach provides us with rules that are easy to apply, that do 
not lead to problems of obtaining expert evidence and that of determining what law to apply 
where the parties have different personal laws. Nevertheless in cases involving a foreign 
element the interests of simplicity should not be given great weight over justice and
339
international harmony of decision. The Iraqi approach gives no weight to the national law 
of the wife. It also provides no objective solution to cases of stateless persons or cases 
where the husband has two or more foreign nationalities- It has become subject to several 
exceptions in favour of applying Iraqi law, which fact may destroy the main choice of law 
process and bring anomalies and uncertainties.
Y et, it is desirable to have a choice of law rule which aims at solutions which eliminate 
'fomm-shopping' and facilitate recognition of divorces abroad as well as provide justice. It 
may be fair to say that choice of law rules should be subject to the common personal law of 
the parties. If, however, the parties do not have a common personal law, reference should 
be made to the petitioner's personal law on condition that divorce should not be granted 
unless there is a strong possibility of its recognition by the respondent's personal law or the 
interest of both parties requires the dissolution of marriage.
Recognition
In view of the criticisms that had been levelled against the previous law of recognition, 
part II of the Family Law Act 1986 was enacted to set up new divorce recognition rules 
aiming to remove the uncertainty and complexity which characterized the previous law, and 
enabling the courts to give wider recognition. The common law rules have been 
abandoned, and the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971 repealed. All 
depends on the provisions of this Act which contains three different sets of recognition 
rules depending either on the place, or the method, in which the divorce was obtained, 
namely, (1 ) divorce granted by civil court in the British Islands, (2 )  foreign divorces 
obtained by proceedings comprising all judicial divorces and some extra-judicial divorces 
and (3 ) foreign divorces not obtained by proceedings,.which category consists solely of 
extra-judicial divorces.
Undoubtedly, the Act made significant changes in the law of recognition, but not to the 
point of removing all the uncertainties created by previous law. There are still problems
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and limping marriages' will continue to be created with all their evil effects. Accepting that 
there is force in providing specific rules for recognition in the United Kingdom of other 
British divorces, in the author's submission it is regrettable that different types of foreign 
divorce are treated differently in the Act.
The approach of section 44 (2) in providing for automatic recognition in the United 
Kingdom of divorces granted within the British Islands is strongly effective. It has the 
merit of simplifying the law and promoting international certainty. The courts now need 
not consider whether there was sufficient jurisdictional link between the parties and the 
country granting divorce. An English court is bound to recognise a decree of divorce 
granted by a court of civil jurisdiction in Scotland and vice versa. What is notable here is 
that the 1986 Act did not provide for a mandatory recognition throughout the United 
Kingdom of other British divorces. This means that a British divorce may still be denied 
recognition on some limited grounds i.e no subsisting marriage and Res judicata. This 
attitude may be justified on the ground that the substantive law of marriage and divorce is 
not the same throughout the United Kingdom.
The recognition throughout the U.K. of other British divorces is limited to those 
granted by a court of civil jurisdiction. Section 44 (1) ended many years of problems 
caused by the earlier section 16 (1) of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 
by the use of the term 'proceedings', which led to doubts as to the scope of the denial of 
recognition to extra-judicial divorces obtained in the British Isles, and in particular as to 
whether it applied only to wholly informal divorces such as 'bare' talaq. There is now no 
longer any scope for recognition of non-judicial divorces obtained within the British 
Islands. Looking at the wording of the 1986 Act as a whole, and in particular to section 44 
(2), it seems that the existence of section 44 (1) in the context of the 1986 Act is 
unnecessary. For the purpose of recognition under this Act all divorces whether or not 
obtained by proceedings must be effective in the country where obtained. Since an extra­
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judicial divorce does not form part of the U.K. family law then this section appears 
redundant, but perhaps as a policy matter it is justifiable to place the matter beyond doubt.
The 1986Act dealt with recognition of foreign divorces obtained by "proceedings" in a 
more suitable manner than the previous law. The dichotomy between "overseas divorces" 
and "divorces obtained outside the British Isles" contained in the 1971 Act was obviously 
unsatisfactory and served only to create confusion. Its meaning was not immediately 
apparent. It gave rise to difficulties of knowing exactly which types of divorces would be 
recognised under section 6. Moreover, it created an anomalous rule in that it gave a wider 
recognition to divorces obtained in the country of nationality or habitual residence and less 
to those obtained in the country of the domicile in the United Kingdom's sense. Thus, a 
divorce could not be recognised if one party was domiciled in the foreign country unless it 
would be recognised in the country where the other party was domiciled, whereas a divorce 
could be recognised on the basis of habitual residence or nationality of either party even if 
the law of the other would not recognise it. Such a rule could not be justified for the 
domicile in the United Kingdom's sense is no less a strong connecting factor than is 
habitual residence or nationality.
The abolition of this distinction is certainly desirable since it simplifies the law and 
makes it easier to understand and apply. The rule now is simply that no foreign divorce 
obtained by proceedings will be recognised unless it is obtained and effective in a country 
with which at least one party has an adequate connection. Therefore, the common law rule 
that a divorce which was void in the country where it was obtained could in some 
circumstances be recognised is now no longer law.
Certainly, the requirement of effectiveness would have the merit of bringing about a 
harmony of decisions between different legal systems. What remains difficult is what law 
should decide upon the meaning of divorce and its effectiveness to dissolve the marriage. 
The difficulty has stemmed from the absence of the definition of this term in the 1986 Act.
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It would be undesirable to require the law of the recognition court to determine whether or 
not the foreign decree would constitute divorce. Such an approach may lead (as in 
Viswalingbam v.Viswalingbam  [1980] 1 F.L.R.15) to a refusal to accept some foreign 
decrees as being divorces despite the fact they validly dissolve the marriage according to the 
granting state. It is fair to say that the foreign decree should be within the meaning of the 
1986 Act so long as it is considered as a divorce according to the granting state even if it 
cannot be fitted into the concept of divorce in the recognition court.
The jurisdictional grounds of recognition of foreign divorces obtained by "proceedings" 
set out by the 1986 Act are more realistic than those in the 1970 Hague Convention. 
Nationality of, or habitual residence or domicile in, the country in which the divorce was 
obtained will ensure as many as possible recognitions of foreign divorces in the United 
Kingdom. What is notable about the present recognition rules is that they do not cover all 
foreign divorces. A divorce granted in Iraq on the ground of unqualified residence would 
not be within the scope of those recognition rules. If it is accepted that the purpose of the 
Act is to seek a reduction in 'limping marriages', it could be said, so far as the conscience 
of the court will allow, that it should be prepared to grant recognition to divorces where 
they have been validly pronounced by the foreign court even where the recognition court 
would not itself have granted a decree in the same circumstances. This would keep to a 
minimum uncertainties and inconsistencies of status as between different legal systems.
Extra-Judicial Divorces
The law governing recognition of foreign extra-judicial divorce in the 1986 Act appears 
to be more difficult than it was at common law whereby foreign extra-judicial divorces 
were recognised as valid as long as they were recognised as such in the country of the 
parties' domicile. The method and even the place in which the divorce had been obtained 
had no logical bearing on its recognition. The 1986 Act has abandoned the common law's 
approach in favour of varying the recognition rules depending on the method by which the
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divorce was obtained. The recognition now depends upon whether or not the divorce was 
obtained by 'proceedings'. The validity of an extra-judicial divorce obtained otherwise 
than by proceedings would be recognised if it is obtained in the country of the common 
domicile or obtained in the domicile of one of the parties and recognised in that of the other, 
provided that neither party had been habitually resident in the United Kingdom for the year 
preceding the date of divorce.
Since the law of extra-judicial divorces may be interpreted and applied by immigration 
staff, social security, marriage registrar and lawyers, it is important that the law should be 
clear. The current state of the 1986 Act does not fulfil those aims because of the lack of 
clarity that shadows the basis of classification between extra-judicial divorces obtained by 
proceedings and those not obtained by proceedings. Although 'proceedings' are defined in 
section 54 as 'judicial or other proceedings", it is submitted that the Act does not advance a 
clear criterion as to what constitutes 'other proceedings'. The reference to the case law in 
this point is not conclusive because the courts dealt only with limited divorces and they 
gave no clear answer whether or not some other extra-judicial divorces are within the 
meaning of 'proceedings'. Moreover, the decided cases showed that the courts' approach 
in considering what constitutes proceedings was confused. For instance, in the Fatima 
case the pronouncement o f talaq  was considered part of proceedings, whereas in 
Chaudhary it was not considered as proceedings at all.
It is submitted that there is no policy reason that might justify the variation of 
recognition rules according to the method by which the divorce was obtained. The 
distinction not only has created confusion and uncertainty amongst the immigrant 
communities but also attempted to impose British standards of justice on them. It is strange 
that the insertion of the distinction in the 1986 Act comes at a time when the major practical 
reason for the retention of the restrictive rules of recognition has been removed by the 
enactment ofthe Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. It is equally strange that 
the state of distinction comes at a time when so much criticism has been placed upon it.
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What the 1986 Act has achieved is to put into legislative form the arbitrary distinction 
which had been made by Quazi and Chaudhary between taiaq obtained in Pakistan and 
taiaq obtained in Kashmir or Iraq, a distinction which cannot be justified by the limited 
nature of the Pakistani reform. It is true that the recent statutory formalities in some 
Muslim countries will delay the taiaq coming into effect for some period and will prevent 
the wife from being divorced without her knowledge, but the fact remains that taiaq is still 
in the hand of the husband who can divorce his wife at any time. It is hard to agree with 
the view that a bare taiaq is arbitrary and offers no protection to the wife and children. It is 
also hard to say that the existence of proceedings is a guarantee of protection. Indeed, 
social and economic circumstances produced pressure on the Iraqi legislature to place the 
wives to a taiaq in a stronger position than wives to a judicial divorce in term of financial 
relief. It is regrettable that the present law emphasises some degree of formality rather than 
the avoidance of 'limping marriages' and the promotion of international uniformity.
Undoubtedly, the reason for the use of domicile in section 46 (2) as the sole connecting 
factor for the recognition of extra-judicial divorces not obtained by proceedings is that the 
parties' connection to the law of that country must be sufficiently strong to override the 
doubts as to whether these divorces should be recognised in the particular case. The real 
significance of this domiciliary rule has subsequently been diminished by habitual residence 
when section 46 (2) (c) provides that a divorce obtained in the country of domicile will not 
be recognised if either party was habitually resident in the United Kingdom for the year 
preceding the date of divorce. There is here a clash between domicile and habitual 
residence as a connecting factor to test the validity of divorce and the Act makes the latter 
the decisive test, a fact which cannot be accepted in principle, for habitual residence for one 
year hardly suggests a strong connection with a given country.
In any event the residence limitation postulated in section 46 (2) (c) can be seen as 
denying to foreign domiciliaries or nationals the right to divorce under their personal law
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and forcing them to go to the United Kingdom court to obtain divorce. There is no 
convenience reason in forcing an Iraqi national who wishes to rely on his personal law to 
come to the United Kingdom, with all hardship, inconvenience and costs that may be 
involved therein, to obtain divorce simply because his wife has a parallel connection to a 
legal system within the United Kingdom, while the Pakistani can rely on his personal law 
to obtain divorce, even if the parties have both been habitually resident and domiciled here, 
merely because his taiaq involves some empty formalism. Moreover, the real policy of the 
residence limitation is somewhat confused. Indeed, if the policy, as Lord Hailsham in the 
debates of the Family Law Bill suggested, is to give greater protection to wives resident in 
the United Kingdom, then why should a divorce be denied recognition in the case where 
the Iraqi divorcing husband is the United Kingdom resident, and the wife is both resident 
and domiciled in Iraq? Is it right to deny recognition to a divorce obtained validly in the 
country of domicile and undermine international harmony just to protect a wife who has 
never been in the United Kingdom? What is the interest of the United Kingdom law in 
protecting such a wife? This might be understood as rather imposing on the parties the 
British standards of justice.
A more restrictive approach against the recognition of divorces not obtained by 
proceedings is section 51(3) (b) which gives the courts a discretion to refuse recognition to 
such divorces on the ground of want of documentation. This new ground certainly forms a 
considerable stumbling block since it may often involve the parties in going to the court of 
the other country to obtain appropriate certification of validity of divorce. Such a certificate 
may not be easily obtained since under the 1986 Act the official document has to be issued 
by a person or body appointed under the country's law for the purpose of certifying the 
validity of divorce. The effect of this ground is to increase the burden of proof and would 
provide more discretion to the courts to refuse recognition, whatever the motive. Moreover, 
the provision was not present at common law, nor in the 1971 Act, nor in the Law 
Commission recommendations. The adoption of more restrictive recognition rules in
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relation to divorces not obtained by proceedings indicates clearly that the 1986 Act has 
failed to fulfil its aims of giving a wide recognition to foreign divorces. Therefore, sections 
46 (2) and 51 (3) (b) should be abolished. A reform is required to return at least to the 
underlying principle of the proposal of the Law Commissions in having one set of rules 
governing recognition of all foreign divorces
With the enactment of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, it is expected 
that the discretion to refuse recognition to a foreign divorce, ostensibly on public policy but 
tnily on financial grounds, will be used less frequently (Tahit' v.Tahir, 1993 S.L.T.194). 
Nevertheless, the courts still have a wide discretion to allow divorce to be attacked on the 
ground of public policy. This can be seen from the absence of the definition of this term in 
the 1986 Act. Since the factors of public policy are so various and wide, a foreign divorce 
may be denied recognition on unpredictable grounds. Clearly a widespread policy refusal 
to recognise divorce would be unfortunate and vitiate the aims of the 1986 Act. It is, 
therefore, emphasised that the discretion should be exercised sparingly and divorce should 
not be refused recognition unless the facts of the case showed that there is some strong 
reason to justify non recognition.
Transnational Divorces
The decision of the House of Lords in the Fatima case in relation to transnational 
divorces created as many problems in the field of extra-judicial divorces as it solved. It 
imposed a new condition on to the definition of overseas divorce in addition to the two 
given by section 2 of the 1971 Act in that for a divorce to qualify as an overseas divorce it 
must be obtained in the country in which the proceedings were instituted. The effect of this 
condition was not only to deny recognition to the divorce in the Fatima case but to all 
transnational divorces including those in which ail of the proceedings took place abroad, 
even if they were effective in each of the countries where some of the proceedings took 
place.
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The 1986 Act does not deal directly with transnational divorces and it seems that the 
draftsman had not intended to affect the law as stated in Fatima. Nevertheless, Fatima is 
not necessarily authority for non recognition of transnational divorces in the context of the 
1986 Act because the wording of the provisions of this Act was not drafted in identical 
terms with the wording of the corresponding sections of the 1971 Act. The 1986 Act 
emphasises the place where the divorce was actually obtained and not where the 
proceedings took place. It follows that it is not necessary that the whole of the proceedings 
must take place in the same country.
If the facts of Fatima recurred in a case considered under the 1986 Act, it is unlikely 
that recognition would still be refused, since the Act does not require the proceedings to be 
instituted in the country where the divorce was obtained. A possible ground to rely on to 
refuse recognition to such divorces is section 44 (1). Section 44 (1) however, is far from 
being a ground for refusal because its effect is to deny recognition only to divorces 
obtained in the British Islands by means other than from a court of civil jurisdiction. A 
divorce in a Fatima-iyi^e case is not one obtained in the British Islands where the 
pronouncement of tcüaq took place, but one obtained abroad where the proceedings were 
completed and effected. It could also be added that it would be curious if the courts were to 
apply this section since the House of Lords had refused to make section 1 6 (1 ) [now 44 
(1)] a basis for the refusal of the talaq in the Fatima case itself. Moreover, If a United 
Kingdom court is unwilling to recognise an unfamiliar alien concept of law in dissolving 
marriages because to do so would offend its notion of justice, then it is unnecessary to rely 
on section 44 (1) to refuse recognition to divorce in a Fatima-ty^Q case, since the 1986 Act 
itself provides in section 51 (3) (c) that courts may refuse recognition of the divorces if "its 
recognition would be manifestly contrary to public policy".
Section 44 (1) would create a precedent in denying recognition of all transnational 
divorces obtained in such circumstances, a policy which is hard to justify. The United
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Kingdom court has no interest in denying recognition to divorces where the pronouncement 
of tahq in the United Kingdom was merely incidental and the parties are nationals of a 
foreign country and have no strong connection with the United Kingdom. It is hard to say 
that the recognition of such a divorce would undermine fundamental policies of the United 
Kingdom or would infringe its sovereignty. Yet the use of the public policy discretion in 
section 51 (3) (c) would be a fair approach and an appropriate way in which to distinguish 
cases where the locus divortii is merely incidental from those where there is clear offence 
to the United Kingdom law.
This approach does not deny recognition in the way that Fatima does to all 
transnational divorces. It is clear that this approach would promote the natural expectations 
of the parties that a divorce obtained in accordance with their personal law will be effective 
and in that way would minimize the number of 'lim ping divorces'. It is possible, 
therefore, to say that subject to discretion to refuse recognition, a transnational divorce 
should be recognised if either party was domiciled, habitually resident in, or a national of, a 
country in which the divorce was obtained and the divorce was effective there irrespective 
of where the constitutive acts have taken place.
Iraqi Rules of Recognition of Foreign Divorces
It is difficult to find out when the Iraqi law will recognise a foreign divorce. All we 
have is speculative views based on the analogy of enforcement of civil and commercial 
judgments. It has been argued in the course o f this thesis that the validity of foreign 
divorce cannot be established by reference to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Code 
1928. The wording of this Code reveals clearly that its provisions are confined only to civil 
and commercial matters and have nothing to do with judgments affecting status.
If, however, one agrees with the view that the 1928 Code is wide enough to cover 
foreign divorces, one must say that numerous problems still remain to be resolved. The 
adoption of such a view will only bring uncertainty and will make the task of the judges
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difficult in the matter of recognition. The position with regard to recognition rules of 
divorces granted within the Arab league states may look a little better. Nevertheless, the 
Arab treaty is still inadequate because there is confusion over the scope of some of its 
provisions. Moreover, since it is a general treaty it remains doubtful whether its provisions 
are capable of solving the problems which might arise in this area of law. W hat is more 
surprising is that article 2 (d) requires Iraqi courts to refuse recognition to a divorce granted 
within the Arab states if the parties had begun divorce proceedings in Iraq before they 
raised proceedings in the granting court even if the result of the foreign divorce is 
compatible with the Iraqi decree. It is hard to understand the logical policy behind this rule. 
It seems quite clear that the result is more 'limping marriages' if the Iraqi courts dismiss the 
action on the merits. This article should be removed in favour of giving a power to the 
forum court to stay its proceedings if it thinks that the interest of the parties and the ends of 
justice require the case to be tried elsewhere.
It seems urgently necessary for the Iraqi government to pass legislation to clarify the 
law of recognition of foreign divorces. It is to be hoped that future legislation takes into 
account the modem tendency towards universal recognition of foreign divorces in order to 
avoid the problem of 'limping marriages' and to ensure certainty in the family relationship.
Capacity to Re marry After Divorce
The state of uncertainty as to whether an individual possesses capacity to m any when 
his foreign divorce is recognised in England or Scotland but not by his domiciliary law has 
now been removed. It has become clear that the 1986 Act regards as valid any subsequent 
marriage celebrated in these circumstances. The Act makes an essential qualification to the 
rule that legal capacity to marry depends on the law of the domicile. The divorce granted or 
recognised in England or Scotland prevails over the choice of law rule. This solution 
combines the merits of consistency and relative simplicity; it ensures the unity of decisions 
within the forum and makes the law much easier to understand, particularly to ordinary 
persons. For them the divorce carries with it the right to marry. It avoids the possibility of
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conflicting decisions in the same case which might arise from the application of a different 
choice of law to capacity to marry. It also promotes freedom to marry and works well to 
avoid the illogical result that a person who is single in the eyes of English or Scots law has 
no capacity to remany.
It remains doubtful whether the same solution should be applied to the converse 
situation, viz, where divorce is recognised by the relevant foreign law but not by English or 
Scottish law. This uncertainty has stemmed from lack of authority and legislative 
provision. The Canadian case of Schwebel v. Ungar, ( 1964) 48 D.L.R.(2d)644, should 
not be encouraged as a general rule for application by the United Kingdom law so as to 
validate a marriage celebrated in these circumstances because it runs contrary to the 
domestic rule that a marriage celebrated in England and Scotland is void if the party lacks 
capacity to marry by English or Scots law. It also produces an unacceptable result in that a 
person is validly and monogamously married to two persons at the same time, and the 
possibility of difficulties which might arise from this fact in relation to succession and 
matrimonial relief.
It is not illogical, therefore, to suggest that the problem caused by the incidental 
question in respect of divorces not recognised by English and Scots law and capacity to 
marry should be subject to the same rule enacted in section 50 to the effect that a person in 
such a situation should not have the capacity to remarry notwithstanding that the law of his 
domicile recognises the divorce. Clearly the ideal solution to the problem posed by the 
incidental question is the unification of the various system of private international law. 
Until this hope becomes a reality, the solution now depends on the underlying policies of 
the forum. Since the nature of marriage in Iraq is different from that in the United 
Kingdom law, it would be, therefore, difficult to suggest that the United Kingdom's 
approach should be adopted as a general rule in Iraq to solve all the clashes between the 
rules governing capacity to marry and those governing the recognition of a foreign divorce.
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Instead, the determination of the problem should depend on the nature of the individual 
case and the policy thereto. Having regard to the fact that the husband is allowed to have 
more than one wife at the same time, it is possible to say that he should have capacity to 
enter into a second marriage even if his prior marriage is still valid and subsisting in the 
eyes of Iraqi law. But a woman whose divorce is not recognised by Iraqi law should lack 
capacity to enter into a second marriage because to hold otherwise would imply the 
recognition of a kind of legal bigamy a fact which would be inconsistent with the domestic 
rule that a woman who is bound by a prior, valid and subsisting marriage, cannot contract 
another until the first marriage is ended by death or annulled or dissolved.
As regards the point where a foreign divorce imposes a prohibition or restriction on the 
right of one or both parties to marry, such a prohibition or restriction should be disregarded 
if it is considered as penal and contrary to public policy and therefore, a divorced person 
has capacity to marry even if he is under such a (penal) prohibition according to his law or 
according to the terms of the foreign divorce. The prohibition is regarded as penal when its 
object is to forbid the guilty party to the divorce from marrying for a determinate or 
indeterminate period. If, on the other hand, the object of the prohibition is to avoid doubt 
about the paternity of any child that might be bom after the divorce, it is submitted that this 
prohibition should be applied if it forms a part of the law governing the capacity of the 
parties to the new marriage or is part of a divorce decree worthy of recognition. When both 
parties aie subject to the prohibition it is submitted that such a prohibition must be applied 
so long as it is not an everlasting prohibition even if it does not form part o f the law 
governing the capacity of the divorced person to remarry.
Financial Relief After Foreign Divorce
The Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 now provides that courts have 
jurisdiction to make financial relief notwithstanding the existence of foreign divorce. The 
Act contains separate provisions for England and Scotland to deal with applications for
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financial relief after foreign divorce. The same end has been achieved by different means 
for the different legal systems. This difference reflects the conflicting views of the two 
Law Commissions in providing a solution to the situation existing before 1984. The scope 
of the discretion combined by wide jurisdictional rules which characterize English law are 
notably absent in Scots law, which adopts a more restrictive approach which may exclude 
cases which would be found in England to be meritorious and appropriate. While the Scots 
law concentrated on discouraging 'forum-shopping' and providing relief only in cases 
where there is a strong connection between the marriage and Scotland, the English law paid 
little attention to these matters being in favour of providing relief to those who had suffered 
financially abroad even if they have little connection with England.
Although the filter system is necessary in the context of English law to prevent tactical 
applications, it makes the law uncertain and unpredictable, while certainty and predictability 
are obvious in Scots law. The opportunity for enforcement of an order under Scots law is 
greater in practice than an order made under English law, since the Scots law requires that 
there must be a connection between the respondent and Scotland before the Scottish court 
can have jurisdiction and before the order will be made. There can be no doubt that the 
unjustifiably harsh results of the situation existing before 1984 have now been removed. 
The Act will achieve not only a greater measure of justice for a party to a foreign divorce 
but a considerable saving of time and money. The temptation to challenge the foreign 
divorce purely for financial reasons will have gone and the number of 'limping marriages' 
will be reduced.
Nevertheless, a party to a foreign divorce is still treated less well to that of an English 
or Scottish divorcee since he (she) requires to meet the filter system in English law and the 
strict conditions in Scots law before the court can make an order. The phrase 'judicial or 
other proceedings' in English section 12 is regrettable as it places the English law in a state 
of uncertainty. It is now not clear whether the English provisions apply to all foreign 
divorces or only to divorces entitled to recognition under section 46 (1), The object of the
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reform to the situation existing before 1984 Act would be defeated if the power of the 
English court to make financial relief is limited to divorces entitled to recognition under 
section 46 (1). A party to a foreign divorce not obtained by 'judicial or other proceedings' 
will continue to challenge the recognition of such divorces and this would absorb a quite 
excessive amount of time and money. The reform is all the more needed in cases where the 
divorce which has been obtained is other than judicial, since it is less likely that financial 
matters have been adequately treated. It is therefore possible to say that the phrase 'judicial 
or other proceedings' in English section 12 should be removed to the effect that the power 
of the English courts to make financial relief should be the same as the power of the 
Scottish court to cover all the recognised divorces whatever the method in which they were 
obtained.
It is also regrettable that the ability to make an application in Scots law is restricted to 
those who were not pursuers (or joint pursuer) in the foreign proceedings. In some legal 
systems as in Iraq the parties to the dissolution of marriage by khula must apply jointly to 
the court to confirm their agreement to dissolve the marriage. In this situation it is not clear 
which party is the pursuer and which is the defender. The Scottish condition would work 
to withdraw the court's power to make financial relief for such persons. Surely, the 
Scottish Law Commission did not intend to reach this result. It is, therefore, fair to say that 
such a condition should be removed, to the effect that the Scottish court should be given the 
same power as the English courts to make financial relief to either party to the foreign 
divorce. This would not encourage 'forum shopping', since, it is submitted, that the 
Scottish provisions contain within themselves sufficient protection against this problem.
The question of financial relief after the recognition of divorce has no place in Iraqi law. 
This is a natural result based on the fact that the Iraqi law contains no specific provisions 
concerning the recognition of foreign divorces themselves. Although a wife to a divorce 
granted within Arab states will not face hardship because the grounds for divorce and
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financial relief in those states are substantially similar to that in Iraq, it is submitted that a 
wife to a non-Arab foreign divorce recognised in Iraq will be destitute if no relief is 
available abroad. It is difficult to suggest that the Iraqi courts can rely on the 1928 Code to 
make financial relief because the provisions of this Code have nothing to do with 
judgments affecting status and, in any event, there is no authority supporting this view. If, 
however, one accepts the opposite view that the courts can rely on the 1928 Code to make 
financial relief, then the form of the relief which the courts can make is decided by the 
national law of the husband according to the general choice of law rule. Where this law is 
considered to be the law of Iraq, then the order which the courts can grant depends on 
whether the divorce occurs before or after the consummation of marriage. If it occurs after 
the consummation of marriage, the wife will be entitled to the whole specified dower, 
maintenance during the period of Idda, the occupation of the matrimonial home for three 
years, whereas if the divorce occurs before the consummation, she will only be entitled to 
half of the specified dower.
General Recommendation
In the light of our discussion of Iraqi law, it seems that there is no longer any 
justification for continuing to maintain the confusion and uncertainty in the present law. A 
legislative reform is clearly justified, and highly desirable. The aim of this thesis has been 
to set forth in an informed way, and in a comparative manner, conflict rules concerning the 
recognition of foreign divorces and important related matters. It is respectfully suggested 
that certain amendments should be made to the English and Scottish rules so as fully to take 
account of the different cultures with which today British courts may have to deal. There is 
a dearth of authority and guidance in this area in Iraqi law. Legislation is needed, and its 
authors should take into account, where appropriate, the experience of the United Kingdom 
law, and the aims and terms of the Hague Convention on the Recognition of Foreign 
Divorces and Legal Separations 1970. A complete reconsideration of Iraqi rules is 
advocated.
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